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THE DHVANI THEORY IN SANSKRIT POETICS

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FOREWORD

OF

Dr. SATKARI MOOKERJEE, M. A., Ph. D.

Quondam Asutosh Professor of Sanskrit, University of Calcutta

and Whilom Director, Nava Nalanda Mahavihara.

I feel flattered by the request of Dr. Mukunda Madhava Sharma for writing a foreword to his work "The Dhvani Theory in Sanskrit Poetics." This work removes the facile impression that the *Dhvani* Theory has been exhausted by modern writers. The contour and the main signposts have been surveyed. But the hidden resources lying in the unplumed depths are to be rediscovered and the implications and suggestions have to be worked out. This has been done in the present work to a large extent. After all, as Ānandavardhana has said in the *Dhvanyāloka,* "An old thing may present itself as surprisingly new in the words of a man of genius. Nature assumes a new form in the spring after shading its withered leaves." In fact, the new is the old regenerated. Dr. Sharma's treatment is not along the stereotyped lines. He has presented the familiar topics of the *Dhvani* Theory in a new garb with its irresistible charms of novelty. The perusal of this book even by Veteran Professors will be rewarding. I wish that not only students of Sanskrit Poetics but of literary criticism should make time to read this book and read between the lines.

The present situation in India charged with melancholy tensions which find frequent vent in violent explosions does not leave scope for suitable intellectual climate for serious study. But I think that this must be a passing phase and may prove to be a kind of labour pain for the production of a new lease o'ca;e. A nation cannot live in tension for ever. In that perie emert slm and peace concentrated study of old works a these words gence of a creative climate which will be ushered while intellectu will receive their mead of appreciation. Meanwhile intellectual activit s cannot acquiesce in a moratorium of their intellectual acquisit ies in spite of the devious moves of politicians for acquisi ion of power and pelf. This is the warrant and justification of such intellectual enterprises which contain a silent protest again st sordid games of Politics.

FOREWORD

OF

Dr. GAURINATH SASTRI, M. A., D. Litt.,
VICE-CHANCELLOR,
VĀRĀṆASEYA SAṂSKṚTA VIŚVAVIDYĀLAYA,
VARANASI.

In the evolution of Alaṃkāra Literature, *dhvani* or *vyañjanā* occupies a paramount place. *Abhidhā* as a *śabdavyāpāra*, is recognised by different Indian philosophers, but there is a difference of opinion amongst them, with regard to *lakṣaṇā*. Though the Mīmāṃsaka recognises it as *vākyavṛtti* and not as *padavṛtti*, yet he does not accord the same status to it as *abhidhā*. Whatever it may be, it took quite a long time to recognise *vyañjanā* as a separate *padavṛtti*. Indeed, there have been attempts to maintain that whatever sense, is conveyed by *vyañjanā* may be expressed by *abhidhā*. Similarly, it has been contended, that *vyaṅgyārtha* may be conveyed by *lakṣaṇā*, and there is no justification for admitting *vyañjanā* as a separate *vṛtti* to express what may be called *vyaṅgyārtha*.

It may be observed in this context that the medieval ālaṃkārikas felt that for the purpose of esoteric experience (*rasānubhūti*) the aid of *vyañjanā* or *dhvani* must be sought, for rasa experience is never possible on *vācya-bhūmi*, the plane of denotation. So long as we are concerned with *vācyārtha*, there is no occasion for rasa experience. It is why Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta have said that though *dhvani* is of three types, *vastu, alaṃkāra* and *rasa*, yet it is *rasadhvani* with which the ālaṃkārika is chiefly concerned, as it is the *rasadhvani* which is the soul of poetry.

It is, therefore, quite in the fitness of things that the present author has set himself to the task of unfolding the concept of *dhvani* as recorded in Alaṃkāra literature from the time of Ānandavardhana. It is very gratifying that he has been able to present the view of the Ālaṃkārikas with as much precision as possible.

I would only hope that the author would undertake a comparative study of Sanskrit poetics and western aesthetics sometime in future which will enable us to realize the value and importance of the contributions of the Indian mind to the subject.

Dedicated to the Sacred Memory

of

MY FATHER

DR. RUCHINARAYAN SHARMA,

who inspired me for Sanskrit studies

and


MY UNCLE

PRINCIPAL TULSINARAYAN SHARMA,

who initiated me into the realm of Sanskrit learning

Ūrdhvordhvamāruhya yadarthatattvaṁ
Dhīḥ paśyati śrāntimavedayantī |
Phalaṁ tadādyaiḥ parikalpitānāṁ
Vivekasopānaparamparāṇām ||

"The truth, which is perceived by our tireless intellect, climbing higher and higher, is the result of the ladder of thought designed by earlier thinkers." (Abhinavabhāratī, VI).



PREFACE

Speculations on poetics in India reached the zenith with the promulgation of the dhvani theory by Ānandavardhana. The essence of the theory, however, was already present in a tradition handed down by the *Nāṭyaśāstra* and, as is usually the case with other Indian śāstras, the germs of the theory can be traced even in the Vedic literature. But this theory found the first systematic expression only in Ānandavardhana's *magnum opus, Dhvanyāloka*. That, Ānandavardhana's theory caused a great commotion in the entire atmosphere of Indian intelligence, can be gathered from the reference to a host of opponents who faught an ineffectual fight even before the theory was put in the form of a treatise. Later on, thanks to the dhvani theory, India also saw the rise of a galaxy of intellectual giants like Abhinavagupta, Mahimabhaṭṭa and Mammaṭa. And in the present age we can realise the far-reaching implications of the dhvani theory if we make even a casual comparison with the modern western thoughts on literary criticism.

In the present work I have tried to explain and analyse the most salient features of this great dhvani theory with a special reference to the text of *Dhvanyāloka*. While doing so, I have deliberately avoided the longer discussions on chronology. But I have tried to show the development of the theory in a precisely chronological order up to its probable impact on the modern creative talents. In explaining the topics of the *Dhvanyāloka* I have devoted more space only to those which seemed to require some fresh critical comments. But yet I cherish a feeling of discontent in respect of the extent of the treatment of some of the topics of my own choice. Here is an instance. I gave the work to the publishers as early as in 1964 and in course of these four years I have come to realise that my treatment of the relation of the dhvani theory with the western thoughts on poetry in general and symbolism in particular, should have been

more comprehensive But I am happy, that it is not so premature now, to announce the completion of an all comprehensive study of symbolism, partaining to the different media of expression, wherein I have applied my best efforts to make up the short-comings of the present work

I am extremely grateful to the modern scholars, whose works I have studied and utlised for explaining the dhvani theory in a new way It is, however, a matter of regret for me that I could not utilise and accommodate in this work my belated acquaintance with two important works, viz., Dr V Raghavan's *Bhoja s Śrngāraprakāśa* and Krishna Chaitanya s, *Sanskrit Poetics*

Though I had occasions to differ from the views of some of the modern scholars, I have an unmixed respect and admiration for them and I hope, my attitude towards all of earlier authorities can be understood from the preamble verse of this work that I have quoted from the *Abhinavabharati*

I have really no words to express my gratitude to my guru Professor Narenda Chandra Bhattacharya, M A , Vedânta Sāmkhya Mimāmsâtirtha, Tattvaratna Shâstri, now Curator, the Asiatic Society, Calcutta, who guided me in my research work that culminated in my getting admitted to the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Calcutta in 1963 The present work is a retouched version of the thesis that I prepared under his kind supervision

I consider myself extremely fortunate to have come to a close association with as great a scholar as Professor Dr K C Pandey, M A , Ph D , D Litt , M. O L , Shâstri, U G C Professor of Sanskrit, Lucknow University, through this very humble work. Professor Pandey was one of the adjudicators of the present work in its thesis form and this has offered me the rare privilege to find him as one of my very kind gurus, since then

With all my heart melting with devotion, I also remain extremely grateful to my gurus Professor Dr Satkari Mookerjee, M A , Ph. D , quondam Asutosh Professor of Sanskrit,

Calcutta University and whilom Director, Nava Nalanda Mahavihara, and Dr. Gaurinath Sastri, M. A., D. Litt., Vice-Chancellor, Varanaseya Sanskrit Visvavidyalaya, for their kind and learned forewords.

It is also my pleasant duty to offer my thanks to Shri Aswini Kumar Barua, B. A., now a Journalist of the P. I. B., New Delhi, Shri Dharmeswar Chutia, M. A., an Assam Government Research Scholar working for his Ph. D. under my guidance, and my wife Sm. Elima Sharma for their untiring help in preparing the type-script, putting the diacritical marks and preparing the Index.

I am also highly thankful to the celebrated family of the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office for their courtesy and the interest they took in bringing the work to light. The work was lying with them since 1964. But the delay in getting it out of the press is only because of my unsparing preoccupations with the Department of Sanskrit, Gauhati University as its Head, till July 1967.

1–5–68. M. M. S.

32, GAUHATI UNIVERSITY
GAUHATI–14, ASSAM.

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Select Names of Works Referred to with Abbreviations Preceding them

1. A. Bh. — Abhinavabhāratī on NŚ, GOS. Vol. I, 1956, Vol. II, 1934.
2. A Critical History of English Poetry, by Grierson and Smith. Chatto & Windus. 1950.
3. Ādhunik Baṅglā Kāvya Paricaya (Bengali) by Dr. Dipti Tripathy.
4. Ādhunik Hindi Kavitāmen Prem Aur Saundarya (Hindi) by Dr. Rameswarlal Khandelwal, National Publishing House, Delhi 1958.
5. A E — The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta by Raniero Gnoli. Roma 1956.
6. Amarakośa.
7. Appreciations by Walter Pater.
8. A S — Alaṁkārasarvasva of Ruyyaka, NSP. 1939.
9. Aspect of Sanskrit Literature by Dr. S. K. De. Calcutta 1959.
10. A System of Logic by J. S. Mill.
11. A T S E — The Achievement of T. S. Eliot by F. O. Matthiessen. Oxford University Press. 1947.
12. Avaloka. — Com. on DR by Dhanika.
13. A V C — Aucityavicāracarccā by Kṣemendra. Haridasa Sanskrit Series. Chowkhamba. 1933.
14. A V M — Abhidhāvṛttimātṛkā of Mukula Bhaṭṭa. N.S.P. Bombay 1916.
15. Bhavabhūti and His Place in Sanskrit Literature by Anundoram Borooah. Calcutta 1878.
16. Bhāṣāpariccheda of Viśvanātha. Edited by Pañcānana Śāstrī. 1st. edn. Calcutta 1358 sāl.
17. Cārudatta of Bhāsa.
18. Collected Poems by William Empson. Chatto & Windus. 1955.
19. C. M. — Citramīmāṁsā of Appayadīkṣita, Kavyamala 38. N. S. P. Bombay 1926.
20. Contemporary French Poetry by Joseph Chiary.
21. C. S. — The Chequer'd Shade by John Press. Oxford University Press, London 1958.

22. De Poetica of Aristotle, Trans. by Ingram Bywater, Oxford 1946

23. Dhv. Dhvanyāloka with Locana and Bālapriyā and Divyāñjana commentaries. Edited by Pandit Pattabhirama Sastri *Also called Benaras* edition or Chowkhamba edition or KSS edition, 1940 References to Dhv. are references to this edition unless otherwise specified.

24 Dhv. Trans 'Theory of Suggestion in Poetry' being the English translation of Dhv by Dr. K Krishnamoorthy. Poona 1955

25. DR Daśarūpaka of Dhanañjaya with Avaloka of Dhanika with Hindi exposition by Dr Bholashankar Vyas Chowkhamba edition, Banaras 1955

26 East and West (of the Is M. E. O , Rome) year VI No 4 Jan' 56

27. English Literature of the Twentieth Century by A. S. Collins, 1956.

28. Foundations of Educational Psychology by Peter Sandiford Longmans, Green and Co , 1940

29. Palgrave's Golden Treasury Book IV. Macmillan, 1950

30 Hindusthan Standard, Puja Annual, 1959.

31. H S L A History of Sanskrit Literature by Dr. A. B. Keith, London 1920 (and 1941).

32 History of Sanskrit Literature by S. K. De, Calcutta University, 1947.

33. HSP. De Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics by Dr. S K. De Vol. I. London 1923, Vol. II, London 1925.

34. HSP. Kane History of Sanskrit Poetics by MM P V. Kane, Bombay 1951. (Roman numerals for page numbers refer to the 1923 edition).

35. I. Aest. Indian Aesthetics by Dr. K. C. Pandey, Chowkhamba, Benares 1950.

36 I P F The idea of Poetry in France by Margaret Gilman, Harvard University Press, 1958.

37. I T M — Indian Theories of Meaning by Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja. Adyar Library, 1963.

38. KD. — Kāvyādarśa of Daṇḍin. Edited by Pandit Rangacarya Reddi Shastri. Poona, 1938.

39. KL, Bhāmaha — Kāvyālaṁkāra of Bhāmaha, Chowkhamba, 1928.

40. KL, Rudraṭa — Kāvyālaṁkāra of Rudraṭa, NSP. 1909.

41. KP. CSS. — Kāvyaprakāśa, Calcutta Sanskrit Series No. VI, 1933.

42. KP. Jhal. — Kāvyaprakāśa with Bālabodhinī of Jhalakikara, Poona 1950.

43. KP. Saṁ. (or KP. Saṁketa) — Kāvyaprakāśa with Saṁketa of Māṇikyacandra. Edited by Dr. R. Shama Sastry. Mysore, 1922.

44. — Kāvyaprakāśa. Ullāsa X. Edited by S. S. Sukhtankar, Bombay, 1941.

45. KSS — Kāvyālaṁkārasārasaṁgraha of Udbhaṭa with Laghuvṛtti of Pratīhārendurāja edited by Narayana Daso Banahatti. Bombay 1925.

46. — Kṣemendra Studies by Dr. Suryyakanta, Poona 1954.

47. KSV — Kāvyālaṁkārasūtravṛtti of Vāmana (NSP.).

48. KTS — Kāvyatattvasamīkṣā by Dr. N. N. Choudhury, (1959).

49. — The Locana com. of Abhinavagupta as in the Benaras edition of Dhv.

50. Manu Saṁ. — Manusaṁhitā.

51. MB. Chowkhamba — Mahābhāṣya (Navāhnikaṁ). Chowkhamba 1954.

52. MB. NSP — Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali (vidhiśesarūpaṁ dvitīyaṁ khaṇḍam) NSP. Bombay 1935.

53. — New Bearings in English Poetry, by F. R. Leavis. Chatto & Windus (1932), 1959.

54. NM — Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa, Kashi Sanskrit Series, Benares 1936.

55. NR — The Number of Rasas by Dr. V. Raghavan, Adyar Library, 1940

56 NŚ — Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharata with A. Bh GOS. Vol I 1956, Vol. II, 1934

57. — Nyāyaratnamālā of Pārthasārathimiśra, GOS 1937

58 — Prof P K Gode Commemoration Volume, Oriental Book Agency, Poona 1960

59 — Poetry Direct and Oblique by E M W. Tillyard Chatto & Windus 1948

60 PLM — Paramalaghumañjūṣā by Nāgeśabhaṭṭa. Chowkhamba Benares, 1917

61. P S R — Psychological Studies in Rasa by Dr Rakesagupta, B H U Press 1950

62. RG — Rasagangādhara of Jagannātha (1st Ānana) edited in Bengali by Dr. Smti. Sandhya Bhaduri, Calcutta 1953

63. — Śastradīpikā of Parthasārathimiśra Translated by D Venkataramiah, GOS 1940

64 — Selected Essays of T. S Eliot

65 SD — Sāhityadarpana of Viśvanātha.

66 — Soviet Literature, 1961 (No. 9)

67. SP — 'Selected Prose of T S Eliot' in Penguin Books 1953

69 SSP — Śabdaśaktiprakāśika of Jagadīśa, Kashi Sanskrit Series, Benares (1934), with the Kṛṣnakānti commentary.

70 SVV — Śabdavyāpāravicāra of Mammaṭa in the same Vol with AVM, NSP 1918

71. — The Sacred Wood by T. S Eliot, Methuen & Co London, 1953

72 — Tattvapradīpikā of Citsukha

73 — The Renaissance by Walter Pater

74 — The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism by T. S Eliot, Faber & Faber.

75 TMP — The Trend of Modern Paetry by Geoffrey Bullough Oliver and Boyd, London, 1949

6. TRD — Some Aspects of literary criticism in Sanskrit or The Theories of Rasa and Dhvani by Dr. A. Sankaran.

77. TTD — Trends in 20th century Drama, by Frederick Lumley, Barrie and Rockliff, London 1960.

78. URC — Uttararāmacarita of Bhavabhūti.

79. VJ. De. — The Vakroktijīvita of Rājānaka Kuntaka. Edited by Dr. S. K. De. Calcutta, 1922.

80. VJ. Hindī — Hindi Vakroktijīvita. Edited by Dr. Nagendra. Delhi 1955.

81. VKPD. — Vākyapadīya (Brahmakāṇḍa) of Bhartṛhari with Bhāvapradīpa com. of Pandit Śrī Sūryanārāyaṇa Śukla. Chowkhamba, 1937.

82. V. Vārttika — Vṛttivārttika of Appayadīkṣita. Kavyamala 38, N. S. P. Bombay 1926.

83. VV. — Vyaktiviveka of Mahimabhaṭṭa, Kashi Sanskrit Series, Benares 1936.

84. VVV. — Vyaktivivekavimarśa on VV by Ruyyaka occurring in the said edn. of VV.

85. Vṛtti — Vṛtti portion of the Dhv. Benaras edn.

86. — Veṇīsaṁhāra of Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa.

87. Word — Word, Journal of the Linguistic Circle of New York, Vol. 17. No. 2. (August 1961).

Some other Important Abbreviations

1. A. G. — Abhinava gupta.
2. Com. — Commentary.
3. GOS. — Gaekwad's Oriental Series.
4. K. — Kārikā.
5. NSP. — Nirnayasagara press.

Select names of books consulted but not mentioned in the body of the text

1. The Philosophy of Word and Meaning by Gaurinath Sastri, Sanskrit College, Calcutta 1959.
2. Towards a Theory of the Imagination by S. C. Sen Gupta, Oxford University press, 1959.



THE DHVANI THEORY IN SANSKRIT POETICS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

What is Poetics : Poetry has been a very precious possession of the mankind from a very primitive period. Poetical productions, obviously, led to the development of a literary taste and the origin of the "science of poetics." It is, however, not to be understood as a mathematical science like physics and chemistry. In poetics we are concerned with the effects of poetry in the mind of the man of literary taste and, as such, we are to examine certain mental states. The merits of a poetical work is determined by this science on the basis of these mental states. It will be observed that the man of literary taste may vary in temperament and, as such, the assessment of the merits and the nature of appeal of a certain poetical work may not be the same in case of all the readers. Thus, poetics, in so far as it has the states of mind as the subject of study falls at par with introspective-psychology, the claim of which to be called a science is very insecure in contrast with modern psychology.[1] But the ideal of investigation in poetics is essentially the same as in physics or chemistry. In poetics also the general rules and principles hold good universally. Thus, poetics is useful in so far as it embodies certain broad generalisations on the nature of poetry and suggests some precisely proved means and techniques for the production of better poetry.

Indian poetics : India claims the distinction of having a long and glorious literary heritage. Sanskrit kāvyas were composed from as early a period as that of the Rāmāyaṇa (c. 400–200 B. C.) which marked the beginning of a more

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1. Vide, Foundations of Educational Psychology, pp. 4–11.

illustrious literary tradition[2] Even Rgveda, the earliest of all the extant literary compositions of the world, had a good amount of poetic element and even now claims a good degree of poetic appeal[3] This long literary heritage resulted in a standard literary taste and consequenty there was a very large number of works on poetics[4] These works had the already existing kavyas as the objects of criticism or they formulated certain rules for composing good type of kavyas and presented a theoretical discussion on the fundamentals of kāvya There is a purpose in using the word "kavya here The word kāvya has a much broader conotation than the English word "poetry" The question as to what kāvya is, will be discussed by and by, but it will be sufficient to remember here that, the word kāvya means not only poetical compositions in verse but also fictions, dramas and campus (romances composed in mixed prose and verse) etc[5] In English the term "literature' is often used to mean technical literatures also[6] and the term "poetry' is used in a much restricted sense to mean only the literary compositions in verse Hence, the term 'kāvya' is used here more conveniently to cover all the varieties of the type of fine art based on words and meaning The two monumental works viz, The History of Sanskrit Poetics by MM P V Kane and the Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics by Dr. S K. De have already given the history of the glorious tradition of Sanskrit poetics at such a length that an elaboration of the

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2 HSL. Keith, pp 42–45   3 HSP Kane, pp 314–317

4 Ibid Index of works   5 KD I 11

6 Bhāmaha also understands a broader meaning of the word kāvya like the broader meaning of the English word literature Compare

vṛttadevādi caritasamsi cotpādya bastu ca /
kalāśāstrāśrayam ceti caturdhā bhidyate punaḥ // (KL. I. 17)

Vide also Laghuvṛtti, pp 83–84 for Indurāja's comment on this view Compare Banabattu's notes on KSS, p. 155 in which he says that works dealing with arts and sciences are one of the four varieties of kāvya" etc

same here would be a repetition of repetitions. Yet for the convenience of understanding the dhvani theory there is the necessity of referring here to some theories which dominate the main schools and trends in Sanskrit poetics without entering deeper into the controversial questions of chronology, etc.

Schools of poetics : Of the traditional writers, Samudrabandha, commentator on Ruyyaka's AS, classified the schools after the latter in a interesting way. He observed "iha viśiṣṭau śabdārthau kāvyaṁ tayośca vaiśiṣṭyaṁ dharmamukhena, vyāpāramukhena, vyaṅgyamukhena veti trayaḥ pakṣāḥ ādye'pyalaṁkārato guṇato veti dvaividhyam dvitīy'epi bhaṇitī-vaicitryeṇa bhoga-kṛttvena veti dvaividhyam iti pañcaṣu pakṣesvādya udbhaṭādibhiraṅgīkṛtaḥ, dvitīyo vāmanena, tṛtīyo vakroktijīvitakāreṇa, caturtho bhaṭṭanāyakena, pañcama Ānandavardhanena." (An association of word and meaning having a speciality is kāvya. They owe their speciality to three factors, viz., an attribute, a function and a suggested sense. The first sourse of speciality has two varieties, viz., alaṁkāra (figure of speech) or a guṇa (quality). The second source has two varieties, viz., strikingness of speech and the function called bhogakṛti. Of these five alternatives the first one is followed by Udbhaṭa and others, the second one is followed by Vāmana, the third is followed by the author of Vakroktijīvita, the fourth by Bhaṭṭanāyaka and the fifth by Ānandavardhana.) Samudrabandha here recognises the (1) alaṁkāra school, (2) the guṇa school, (3) the vakrokti school, (4) the bhojakatva school and the (5) dhvani school. The guṇa school refers to the rīti school of the modern classification but the latter may be called guṇa school also as according to that school the essential nature of kāvya depends on the qualities (guṇas) that bestow speciality upon the styles (rītis) designated as the soul of poetry. In the modern classification there is no mention of a vakrokti school or a bhojakatva theory and the pioneer advocate of the theory, Bhaṭṭanāyaka, is better known as a strong opponent of the

dhvani school and his theory as the dhvanidhvamśa theory.[7] Samudrabandha was anterior to Viśvanātha and Ksemendra and as such the (6) rasa theory and the (7) aucitya theory do not occur in his enumeration Samudrabandha's classification is defective in so far as it does not accommodate Mahimabhatta's anumiti theory and also does not leave any scope for recognising Bharata's contribution to the field of poetics

Modern scholars enumerate the following schools and theories—(1) rasa school, (2) riti school, (3) alamkāra school, (4) dhvani scoool, (5) vakrokti school, (6) Anumiti theory and (7) aucitya theory [8] This classification leaves scope for the inclusion of all the known writers in one school or the other In the following lines we are examining the schools and theories in their outlines

The Rasa School This school is characterised by a partiality for rasa The followers of this school advocated that rasa is the most essential and indispensible element in a kavya Poetry owes its being to the depiction of rasa and in a characteristic Indian way they call rasa the atma (soul) of poetry Bharatamuni the author of the NŚ was the ancientmost propounder of this school Bharata observes—"na hi rasādrte kaścidarthah pravarttate" (No meaning proceeds from speech without any kind of sentiment) [9] The NŚ is primarily a work on dramatureey. But Bharata had the occasion to discuss the different aspects of kāvya also since the text of the drama, presented verbally (and thus involving the vā ika abhinaya) is at par with non-dramatic kavya Dr Keith has rightly observed, "the topics which were to engage writers on poetics, however, appear in elementary, though not undeveloped, form in the

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7 KTS p 7

8 S S Sukthankar, KP X Introduction. For only the schools vide HSP, Kane, p CXLVII

9 NS, VI–31.

Nāṭyaśāstrā."[10] But Bharata's partiality for rasa is very clearly betrayed by his declaration that the propriety of the use of the different types of the elements like vṛtti, lakṣaṇa, guṇa, alaṁkāra, etc., is determined by rasa.[11] Compare—"etacca rasāditātparyeṇa kāvyanibandhanaṁ bharatādāvapi suprasiddhameveti pratipādayitumāha" etc. (Dhv. p. 401). The poetics portion of the Agnipurāṇa also claims an affiliation of its unknown author to this school by the declaration "vāgvaidagdhya pradhāne'pi rasa evātra jīvitam."[12] Of the writers of regular works on poetics Viśvanātha may be singled out as the foremost advocate of this school since he gives the very definition of poetry in terms of rasa, recognised as the soul. Compare: "vākyaṁ rasātmakaṁ kāvyam." Modern writers would include Abhinava, Mahimabhaṭṭa and Bhaṭṭanāyaka also in this school. It is quite meet and proper, when S. S. Sukthankar includes Abhinava—for Abhinava not only believed that rasa is the soul but he had also given the most appropriate explanation of the term rasa. Dr. N. N. Choudhury associates the names of Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Mahimabhaṭṭa also with this school.[13] Since Mahimabhaṭṭa also recognises rasa as the ātmā (soul) of poetry by saying "Kāvyasya ātmani saṁjñini rasādīrūpe na kasyacid vimatiḥ."[14] we can include him safely. But as we do not have the full text of Bhaṭṭanāyaka's Hṛdayadarpaṇa we cannot be sure of his position. Regarding Bhaṭṭanāyaka we are to depend on whatever information is supplied by

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10. HSL. p. 373.,

11. NŚ (Trans.) pp. 308 (XVII–42), 320 (XVII–107, 108, etc.), 401 (XXII).

12. Agnipurāṇa, 337, 33.

13. KTS. p. 6.

14. VV. I. Also compare, "kavivyāpāro hi vibhāvādisaṁyojanātmā rasābhivyaktyavyabhicārī kāvyamucyate taccābhineyānabhineyārthatvena dvividham." VV. p. 95. and "rasātmakaṁ ca kāvyamiti kutastatrānaucityasaṁsparśaḥ sambhāvyate, yannirāsārthamitthaṁ kāvyalakṣaṇamācakṣīran vicakṣaṇammanyāḥ." VV. p. 126.

writers like Abhinava, Ruyyaka and Jayaratha Bhaṭṭanāyaka recognises superiority of rasa by observing :

vāgdhenurdugdha etam he rasam yadbalairsnayā /
tena nāsya samah sa syād duhyate yogibhir hi yah //

(Locana, p 92)

We will have an ossasion to study Bhaṭṭanāyaka's position in greater detail, but for the present it will be sufficient to note that Abhinava himself included Bhaṭṭanāyaka in the rasa school by pointing out that he himself recognised rasadhvāni as the soul of poetry—"rasadhvanistu tenaivātmatayāngīkṛtah" (Locana, p 52) Ānandavardhana also had no little partiality for rasa Hence, we shall have to examine more carefully why he is to be relegated to an independent dhvani school in the following pages

The Alamkāra School According to this school the most essential element in kavya is alamkāra (the figures of speech) None of the followers of this school ever called alamkara the soul of poetry But the fact that they recognised alamkāra as the most essential element is gathered from an examination of the emphasis they put on alamkāras. They, however, knew about rasa and guna, but relegated rasa to a subordinate position by including it as the essential element of some type of alamkara and they seldom maintained a distinction between guna and alamkāra. Compare, Dr. Keith's remarks on Bhāmaha that, 'he has, however, no clear marking line between qualities and figures'[15] and Ruyyaka's statement "udbhatādibhistu gunālamkārānām prāyaśah samyameva sucitam"[16] In the opinion of the followers of the dhvani school gunas may occur only in relation to the rasa But the followers of the alamkāra school put gunas at par with the figures by conceiving them without any invariable relation with rasas. Bhāmaha (7th c A D) was the pioneer of the alamkāra school His partiality for the alamkāras is evidenced by the

15 HSL p 382 16. AS p 9

statement—"Its (kāvya's) adornment like Rūpaka and others is propounded by others in several ways. Even the charming face of a damsel does not shine stripped of ornament."[17] His partiality for alaṁkāra is further betrayed by the fact that "he insists that there is a common element in all poetry, Vakrokti (i. e. figurative speech), while he denies, accordingly, to Svabhāvokti the right to be styled a figure at all."[18] But it requires to be very carefully noted here that, Bhāmaha recognises rasa and instructs that the Mahākāvya embodies the different rasas.[19] In the Ākhyāyikā also he seems to recognise the presence of rasa because of saying that it deals with 'separation of lovers' (vipralambhodayānvitaḥ).[20] But what is most interesting is that, in Abhinava's opinion Bhāmaha recognises the association of rasa as the jīvita (life) of kāvya. Vide Locana, p. 401, "vṛttayaḥ kāvyamātṛkāḥ iti bruvāṇena muninā rasocitetivṛttasamāśrayaṇopadeśena rasasyaiva jīvitatvamuktam. bhāmahādibhiśca—

svādukāvyarasonmiśra-vākyārthamupabhuñjate /[21]
prathamālīḍhamadhavaḥ pibanti kaṭubheṣajam //
ityādinā rasopayogajīvitaḥ śabdavṛttilakṣaṇo vyavahāra uktaḥ."

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17. "..........na kāntamapi nirbūṣaṁ vibhāti vanitāmukham" (KL. Bhāmaha, I. 13)

18. Keith, HSL. p. 383.

19. KL. Bhāmah, I. 21. "yuktaṁ.........rasaiśca sakalaiḥ pṛthak."

20. KL. Bhāmaha, I. 27

21. In the pariśiṣṭa I (Index, p. 2) the Chowkhamba edition referring to Abhinava's quotation reads the verse as given here. But the same edition reads in the body of the text (32) : svādukāvyarasonmiśraṁ śāstramapyupayuñjate. (Even a technical treatise, i. e., śāstra, may be presented when mixed with the sweet sentiment of kāvya). This reading seems to be more appropriate when the verse is read along with the earlier and latter verses. Abhinava possibly had the other reading and conveniently utilised that to strengthen his own doctrine.

MM. Kane begins his account of the alamkāra school with the statement—"The foremost representatives of this school are Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa; Daṇḍī, Rudraṭa and Pratīhārendurāja belong to this school." (HSP. Kane, p. CL). Of these writers Udbhata does not give any definition of kāvya He begins his KSS abruptly with the treatment of alaṁkāras He recognises rasas and bhāvas but relegates them to a subordinate position by including them all in the alamkāras—rasavat, preyasvat, ūrjasvī and samāhita. Udbhata holds that rasas like śrangāra are manifested also by their sthāyibhāvas expressly mentioned by name (rasavat... svaśabdasthāyisañcārivibhāvābhinayāspadam KSS IV 3, p. 52. Thus it appears that Udbhaṭa does not recognise rasa as a state of the mind of the man of taste developing to an unperturbed bliss through the cognition of and rumination on the emotions of the characters. Vivṛttikāra very rightly observes that, when the words, expressive of the sthāyibhāvas, are used, they are capable of indicating them generally, but are not powerful enough to develop them as emotional conditions in the mind of the men of taste. If such were the case, relish of all the rasas by the verse śṛngārahāsya, etc, will be an accomplished fact. Cf. "yatra svaśabdastadvācakastadvācakaḥ sāmānyena na tu tadabhivyaktau śaktaḥ. evam hi śṛngārahāsyetyādiślokānnāṭyādiva sakalarasapratipattiḥ syāt." (KSS. Notes, p 101). It will be helpful to remember that the author of Vivrtti, a commentary to KSS, was later than Abhinava and followed the latter in the matter of rasa realisation

We cannot very happily agree with the observation that, "Rudraṭa must be regarded as a representative of the alaṁkāra school. Although he knows the rasa theory propounded by Bharata and although he says that kāvya must be endowed with rasa (tasmāt tat kartavyam mahīyasā rasairyuktam / chap. 12. 2) still he looked upon alamkāras as very important" (HSP. Kane, p LVI) Because, a proper analysis of the contents of Rudrata's Kāvyālamkāra would show that he

should better be ascribed to the rasa school. Rudraṭa declares in the verse 1.4 that kāvya should have rasa to fetch an endless fame for the poet. Compare—

"jvaladujjvalavākprasaraḥ sarasaṁ kurvan mahākaviḥ kāvyam / sphuṭamākalpamanalpaṁ pratanoti yaśaḥ parasyāpi //
By recognising the arthadoṣa, viz., Virasa, he instructs that the rasas should be delineated in an appropriate manner. (KL. Rudraṭa, XI. 12, 13, 14). He introduces the question as to why kāvya should have rasa again in the chapter XII. He says that, "instructions on caturvarga may be imparted to those who have a taste for rasas in an easy and wholesome manner with the kāvya, whereas they are afraid of the śāstras lacking in rasa." Compare—

"nanu kāvyena kriyate sarasānāmavagamścaturvarge /
laghu mṛdu ca nirasebhyaste hi trasyanti śāstrebhyaḥ //
(XII. 1.)

"Hence, kāvya should be endowed with rasa with all care, otherwise it will be as teasing as the śāstras."

"tasmāt tat kartavyaṁ yatnena mahīyasā rasairyuktam /
udvejanameteṣām śāstravadevānyathā hi syāt //
(XII. 2.)

Then he proceeds to give an elaborate information regarding the nature and varieties of rasa in as many as four chapters viz. XII, XIII, XIV and XV. Then he introduces the final chapter viz., XVI with the verse :

jagati caturvarga iti khyātir dharmārthakāmamokṣāṇām /
samyaktānabhidadhyādrasasammiśrān prabandheṣu //
(XVI. 1.)

once again emphasising on the delineation of rasa in kāvya. Another point that we should remember is that unlike most of his compatriots and contemporaries Rudraṭa does not include rasas, etc., in one or the other type of the alaṁkāra. He not only advocates in favour of rasa as indispensible, but also gives it a distinct status by treating it in distinct chapters.

The celebrated commentators Namısādhu has rightly observed [under XII 2, "athalamkāramadhya eva rısa apı kım noktah / ucyate—kāvyasya hı śabdārthau śarīram / tasya ca vakroktıvāstavādayah kaṭakakundalādaya ıva krtrımā alamkarāh / rasāstu saundaryādaya ıva sahaja gunāh ıtı bhınnastatprakaranarambhah ' (KL Rudrata, p 150) Ruyyaka prior to his general statement that 'according to the earlier rheroricians alamkara are the most important element ın the kāvya (tadevamalam kāra eva kāvye pradhānamıtı pracyānām matam, AS p 9) observed that 'Rudrata also recognised two varieties of the bhāva alamkāra ' (rudratena tu bhavalamkāro dvıdhaivoktah, AS p 6) But this statement need not lead us to include Rudrata ın the alamkāra school since Ruyyaka's intention here, was to show how the suggested matter of fact (vastu) was ıncluded ın an alamkāra ırrespective of its importance or lack of importance by the earlier rhetorician Rudrata also This was meant to show that Rudraṭa did not recognise dhvanı but not that he did not recognise the importance of rasa

Pratīhārendurāja, author of Laghu vrttı, com to Udbhata's KSS, had a peculiar loyalty for the alamkāra school In fact ıt will be more precise to recognise him as a bundle of confusions In the capacity of a commentator of Udbhaṭa he had to uphold the cause of the alamkara school, whereas, ın the heart he was a devoted follower of the rasa school This conflict of outlook caused confusion not only of Pratīhārenduraja but also of the modern scholars We have already seen how MM Kane has associated Pratīharendurāja with the alamkāra school This is because of Pratīhārenduraja's observation that, Udbhaṭa did not discuss the question of dhvanı separately because of the fact that the dhvanıs may be included ın the alamkaras themselves Compare, "nanu yatra kavye sahrdayahrdayāhlādınah pradhānabhūtasya svaśabdavyapārāsprstatvena pratīyamanaıkarupasyārthasya sadbhavastatra tathāvıdharthabhıvyaktıhetuh kāvyajīvıtabhūtah kaiścıt sahrdayaır dvanırnām vyañjakatvabhedatma kavyadharmo'bhıhıtah sa kasmadıha nopadıṣtah/ ucyate/ eṣveva-

lamkāreṣvantarbhāvāt" ('KSS, p. 85). This would have been enough to ascribe him to the alamkāra school; but, there is a good amount of evidence to prove his devotion to the rasa school and a disguised loyalty for Ānandavardhana. Hence, observe the following points. (1) For Pratīhārendurāja, the consonants employed in the thee types of vṛttis should be helpful for suggesting rasas, compare : "evametāstisro vṛttayo vyākhyātāḥ/ tāsu ca rasādyabhivyaktyānuguṇyena pṛthak pṛthaganuprāso nibadhyate." (KSS, p. 6). This interpretation of kārikā 1/7 of KSS, (which does not have any reference to rasa) seems to be much after the heart of Ānandavardhana, since we can safely compare Pratīhārendurāja's quoted vṛtti with Ānanda's kārikā :

rasādyanuguṇatvena vyavahāro'rtha śabdayoḥ/
aucityavānyastā etā vṛttayo dvidhāḥ sthitāḥ // (Dhv 3/33)

(2) There is enough evidence to show that Pratīhārendurāja has been much charmed by Ānanda's theory. For we see Pratīhārendurāja actually declaring once that rasa is the soul of poetry although it was never warrented by the text commented on by him. cf. 'na khalu kāvyasya rasānām cālamkāryālamkārabhāvaḥ kintvātma-śarīrabhāvaḥ/ rasā hi kāvyasyātmatvenāvasthitaḥ śabdārthau ca śarīrarūpatayā/ (KSS, p. 83). Because of this conviction Pratīhārendurāja finds much difficulty in compromising with the conception of the alāmkāra rasavat. If rasa is the soul of kāvya, then why should rasa be counted as an alamkāra (embellishment) in case of rasavat ? He gives the reply to himself that in time of calling rasa alamkāra this aspect of rasa was not intended to be referred to. cf. 'yattu rasādīnām pūrvamalamkāratvamuktam tadevamvidhabhedāvivaksayā' (KSS, p. 83). But evidently it has never been the intention of Udbhaṭa to recognise rasa as the soul of poetry. Only Pratīhārendurāja, being under the overwhelming influence of Ānanda could not help cherishing rasa as the soul of poetry and consequently he had o face conflict of ideas as evidenced above. The learned

editor of KSS rightly observes on the line "yattu rasādīnām', etc, "But this, after all, is a meagre satisfaction and it shows the more clearly that Udbhaṭa did not know or atleast did not accept the theory that rasa was the soul of poetry" (KSS Notes p 159)

Discussing about the suggested sense in the verse 'cakrābhighāta' etc, an illustration of paryāyokta, Pratīhārendurāja says that the pratīyamāna, i e, suggested vastu does not render the piece a dhvani, since the suggested vastu is an embellishment to the express sense which is rendered charming by it Then he finally concludes that the suggested vastu is decidedly subordinate to the vīra rasa with relation to Vāsudeva But, as regards the position of the suggested rasa itself he is silent and he seems to admit that very rasa as the soul of kavya (cf ato'trāpi pratīyamānasya satyāpi pradhānatve svagunabhūta-vacyasaundarya sādhakatamatvadalankāravyapadeśo na virudhyate/ yadi vā bhagavadvāsudevavartitayā yo'sau vīrarasovagamyate tadapeksayā tasya mukhyayaiva vṛtyā gunabhūtatvādalamkāratā / KSS p 86) Thus Pratīhārendurāja sufficiently betrays his weakness towards the dhvani theory newly and very admirably propounded by Ānandavardhana, who was anterior to him

MM. Kane is not prepared to identify Pratīharendurāja, the author of Laghuvṛtti with Bhaṭṭendurāja, Abhinava's teacher. Narayana Daso Banhatti, on the other hand, advocates the identity of the two authors (vide, KSS Intr. pp XXV-XXVIII) Among other arguments, MM. Kane observes "We do not know the parentage of the latter (Pratīhārendurāja) But we know this that the latter did not approve of the theory of dhvani and included dhvanikāvya under alamkāras, while Bhattendurāja seems to have approved of it and explained the Dhvanyāloka to Abhinavagupta" (HSP, Kane, p LXX) But our observation as to Pratiharendurāja's weakness for the dhvani theory shows that there was hardly any improbability in Pratīhārendurāja's explaining the Dhvanyāloka in the

capacity of Abhinava's theacher, although, he had occasions to observe that Udbhaṭa included dhvani in alaṁkāras in the capacity of Udbhaṭa's commentator.

The Rīti School : The chief exponent of this school was Vāmana (c. 800 A. D.).[22] According to Vāmana the soul of poetry is style (rīti), 'which is a specified arrangement of words, the term specified referring to distinction according to the qualities possessed which are the cause of charm in poetry, while the figures are ranged as things which add to the charm.'[23] Vāmana's own words in the KSV are :

> rītirātmā kāvyasya (1. 2. 6),
> viśiṣṭapadaracanā rītiḥ (1. 2. 7.),
> viśeṣo guṇātmā (1. 2. 8),
> kāvyaśobhāyāḥ kartāro dharmā guṇāḥ (3. 1. 1.),
> tadatiśayahetavastvalaṁkārāḥ (3. 1. 2),

guṇanirvṛtyā kāvyaśobhā/tasyāśca atiśayahetavo'laṁkārāḥ / (beginning of 4. 1.). Daṇḍin (c. 750 A. D.)[24], who used the term mārga for rīti, also was to some extent an exponent of the rīti school.[25] Daṇḍin did not specifically mention rīti as the soul of poetry, but recognised the ten guṇas as the vitals of the vaidarbhī mārga (iti vaidarbhamārgasya prāṇā daśaguṇā smṛtāḥ. KD. 1.42). Thus Daṇḍin also deserves with Vāmana, the credit of probing deeper into the essential element (soul or ātman) of poetry. The guṇas were recognised also by Bharata. But the definitions of the individual guṇas varied from writer to writer.

Vāman establishes the essential nature of the guṇas by saying that "kāvya is appreciated because of embellishment" (kāvyam grāhyamalaṁkārāt 1. 1. 1) and "embellishment is another name for charm" (saundaryam alaṁkāraḥ 1. 1. 2). "The guṇas are the essential cause of charm in poetry" (kāvyaśobhāyāḥ kartāro dharmā guṇāḥ 3. 1. 1.). Vāmana

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22. HSL, Keith, p. 381.
23. Ibid.
24. HSP. Kane, XXVII.
25. Ibid, p. XXI.

recognises rasa also. Kānti, as one of the qualities of sense, is defined as the quality of having a prominent rasa. (dīptarasatvaṁ kāntiḥ 3 2 15. dīptā rasāḥ śṛṅgārādayo yasya sa dīptarasaḥ tasya bhāvo dīptarasatvaṁ kāntiḥ) Vāmana also recognised some amount of suggested vastu in the alaṁkāra called vakrokti (KSV 3. 48) In KD 1 93 and 1 94 we find the definition of the samādhi guṇa and an example which is almost similar to Vāmana's dafinition of vakrokti and contains a suggested matter of fact Thus both the prominent exponents of the rīti school recognised the presence of the two types of suggested sense (viz rasa and matter of fact, i e , vastu)[26] and had room for them in their scheme Hence, Ānandavardhana observes that the exponents of the rīti school had to promulgate the rīti theory as a result of their attempt to explain the essentials of the dhvani theory which they vaguely understood. (Dhv. III 46 and HSP Kane, p CLIII and compare vāmanena tu sādṛśyanibandhanāyā lakṣaṇāyā vakroktyalaṁkāratvaṁ bruvatā kaścidddhvani bhedo'laṁkāratayaivoktah, AS. pp 8–9) But, there is one technical defect with Vāmana's theory that he recognises rīti in general as the soul of poetry, whereas, of the three kinds of rīti, viz , Vaidarbhī, Gauḍī and Pāñcālī, the Vaidarbhī is strongly insisted on, the other two disparaged. Ānandavardhana, the chief exponent of the dhvani theory was possibly influenced by Bhāmaha, in recognising only three guṇas Of the later writers Mammaṭa, a devoted follower of the dhvani school, shows, how the twenty guṇas (i e ten guṇas of sense and ten guṇas of word) may be reduced to only three and a guṇa like samatā of Vāmana is in fact a fault of kāvya. Whatever be the fate of the rīti school in later times and whatever be Ānand's attitude towards Vāmana, there can be no gain saying of the fact that

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26. The third variety of the suggested sense viz , alaṁkāra is also in fact a vastu, i.e , matter of fact, but the only distinction is that the former is more imaginary.

Vāmana also contributed largely to the origin of the dhvani theory in the hand of Ānandavardhana.

The Dhvani School: The founder of this school was Ānandavardhana, the author of Dhvanyāloka. Ānandavardhana, belonged to the court of king Avantivarman of Kashmir (855-883 A. C.). "This date agrees well with what we know from other sources. He quotes Udbhaṭa and so is later than 800 A. C.; while he is quoted by Rājaśekhara (about 900 A. C.). Therefore the period of his literary activity would lie between 840-870 A. C."[27] In the Dhvanyāloka for the first time we hear the word dhvani used in a technical sense of "a particular type of poetry." Amarasiṁha, who is definitely earlier than 700 A. C.,[28] reads the word dhvani twice and gives the meaning as sound. (cf. śabde nināda ninada dhvani dhvāna, etc., p. 45 and, dhvanau ta madhurāsphuṭe kalo, p. 47 in Amarkoṣa). According to Anandavardhana's theory the words can convey also a suggested meaning in addition to their conventional primary meaning. In the domain of poety the suggested meaning occurs in three forms, viz., vastumātra (mere matter of fact), alaṁkāra (figures of speech) and rasādi (rasa and other such mental states). A composition where a suggested sense predominates is called dhvani. In other words the suggestive aspect of poetry is called dhvani. This suggestive aspect of poetry is its very soul in so far as all ideal compositions embody a predominant suggested sense. Of the three types of the suggested sense the rasādi type is considered to be the best and the very propriety of the guṇas and alaṁkāras and other such elements depend on their assistance to suggest the rasādi variety of the suggested sense. The theory also attributes new meanings to the guṇas and rītis and the alaṁkāras like rasavat of the earlier theorists.

For explaining the phenomenon of the words conveying the suggested sense Ānandavardhana introduces a new func-

27. HSP. Kane, p. LXVIII.

28. HSL, Keith, p. 413.

tion of the words called vyañjanā in-addition to the abhidhā and lakṣaṇā of the earlier theorists For defending his novel view Ānanda seeks an analogy of the vyañjanā function with the sphoṭa theory of the grammarians The conception of vyañjanā was already there, but it is discovered in the domain of language for the first time by the dhvani theory.

The dhvani theory has been propounded for the first time in the Dhvanyāloka, which 'is an epoch-making work in the history of alamkāra literature' because of a very intelligent analysis of the suggestive potentiality of the language and particularly because of helping development of a new outlook of the poets in respect of the content of their composition As it is very rightly observed by Dr K Krishnamoorthy in his preface to the English translation of the Dhvanyāloka, the dhvani theory had been promulgated at a day when the Sanskrit literature has already been subject to a tendency towards decadence and a morribund literary acrobatic to produce more and more crude figures of speech relegating the most appealing and essential element of poetry, viz, rasādi to an insignificant position Ānanda, by laying greatest emphasis on the suggested sense and particularly the rasadi variety tried to rejuvinate the decaying genius of the days of Valmiki and Kālidāsa and to give a new fillip to the creative impulse of the Indian poets

The Dhvanyāloka has been commented on by the great Kashmirian scholar philosopher Abhinavagupta whose "literary activity falls between 990 A C and 1020 A. C" (HSP. Kane, p. LXXI) This commentary is known as Locana and Abhinava himself informs us of another commentary named 'Candrika' the author of which belonged to the same family as that of Abhinava [29] By now the Dhvanyāloka has been issued in several Indian and foreign editions, some of them

29 For more informations about Candrikākāra vide HSP, Kane, p LXXI

also bearing new commentaries. Of the Indian editions the more important ones may be indicated as follows :

(1) The editio princeps of the text with the commentary of Abhinava, edited by Pt. Durgāprasāda, NSP, 1891.

(2) Chowkhamba Edition with a modern commentary by Badarīnātha. (1937).

(3) Kāshī Sanskrit Series Edition with Locana and Bālapriyā (1940) edited by Pt. Paṭṭābhirāma Shāstrī.

(4) The Calcutta Sanskrit Series Edition (No 25. B) with a modern commentary by Madhusūdana Mishra (1931), edited by Prof. Narendra Chandra Bhattacharya Vedāntatīrtha.

(5) The first chapter only with Locana and Kaumudī Commentaries and Upalocana on Locana by MM. Kuppuswami Shastri, issued by K. S. R. Institute, Madras (1940).

(6) First two chapters (in 2 vol. s) with English exposition by Prof. Bishnupada Bhattacharya, Calcutta (1956-57).

The Dhvanyāloka is divided into four chapters, called uddyotas. From another angle of view it may be divided into two portions, viz., the kārikās (main verses, which are serially numbered) and a running vṛtti (commentary) on it. The vṛtti consists of prose explanation of the kārikās, illustrative verses and some more verses which are not numbered like the kārikās nor explained by the prose vṛtti, nor meant for illustration but for summarisation of the deliberations of the vṛtti or for supplementing the view expressed in a kārikā. These are sometimes called parikaraślokas, sometimes saṁgrahślokas and sometimes saṁkṣepaślokas.

The authorship of the Dhvanyāloka : There is no division of opinion as regards the fact that Ānanda was the author of the prose vṛtti with illustrations. But Dr. De believes that the kārikās were composed by an earlier kārikākāra, whose kārikās were explained by Ānanda with the prose vṛtti. He further believes that the saṁgraha, parikara and saṁkṣepaślokas were also composed by a scholastic tradition earlier to Ānanda, and

the latter simply incorporated them into his own work For the sake of convenience let me quote a few lines from HSP De vol I p 114 "If, on the other hand, we place the Dhvanikara in the time of Kalhana's Manoratha, this would only leave a bare margin of two generations between the Kārikākāra and Vrttikāra, which does not seem to be enough to make room for a period of scholastic exposition of the former, of which undoubted traces are preserved to us in the few memorial verses—parikaraślokas (pp 34, 130, 137, 147, 163)[30] saṁgraha-ślokas (pp 87, 223) samks-paślokas (pp 44, 74, 243)—incorporated by Ānanda in his vrtti, which itself, therefore, is not likely to be the first of its kind These ślokas are a sort of recapitulation-stanzas which are adduced by the Vrttikāra from unknown sources sometimes to explain the meaning of kārikas but more often to amplify and supplement them"

Author of the parikara-ślokas etc Now, my contention is that the so called memorial verses were also composed by Ānanda, the unquestionable author of the vrtti himself My arguments are as follows

(1) Abhinava is very particular about the distinction, be it numerical or formal or functional between Kārikakāra and the Vrttikāra, as will be shown below But he is silent about the distinction in the authorship of the prose vrtti and the memorial verses

(2) When occasian arises, Ānanda does not fail to name the predecessor Thus, for example, he names Bhāmaha in p 119 Even when Ānanda simply refers to a predecessor as 'anya' as in p 26, ' tathā cānyena krta evatra ślokah yasmin nasti na vastu" etc , Abhinava is prompt enough to name the predecessor (cf granthakrtsamānakalabhāvinā manoratha nāmnā kavina)

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30 Here the references are to the Kāvyamālā editon 1891, 1911

(3) When in p. 107. Ānanda presents a parikaraśloka saying "parikaraślokaścātra-vyaṅgyavyañjakasambandha," etc., Abhinava remains silent about the author, but simply comments "parikarārthaṁ kārikārthasyādhikāvāpaṁ kartuṁ ślokaḥ parikaraślokaḥ."

Again in p. 192, Ānanda says "tadayamatra saṁkṣepaḥ" and introduces three saṁkṣepaślokas. Abhinava comments there "tatra sarvatra sādhāraṇamuttaraṁ dātumupakramate-tadayamatreti" which rather implies an identity in authorship.

(4) From the comments or absence of any comment by Abhinava it seems to be clear that parikaraśloka is given by the Vṛttikāra to tell something with the force of a kārikā, a saṁkṣepaśloka is meant as a brief summary of a longer argument in prose, and the saṁgrahaślokas[31] are systematic recapitulation of the views expressed in the prose vṛtti.

(5) The saṁgrahaślokas, or saṁkṣepaślokas or even the parikaraślokas need not cecessarily imply an author different from the Vṛttikāra, inasmuch as we have instances of the Vṛttikāra himself composing the saṁgrahaślokas elsewhere. The verses occurring in the text of the Vyaktiviveka, by Mahimabhaṭṭa, who belonged to the middle of the 11th century A. D.[32], are mostly named as saṁgrahaślokas or āntaraślokas or āntarāryās. Should we suppose the Vyaktiviveka also to have been composed by more than one author ? *If not, what* is the propriety in taking a different stand in case of the Dhvanyāloka ?

(6) The only apparent reason which led the learned Doctor to imagine authors other than the Vṛttikāra for saṁgrahaślokas, etc., is the hypothesis that the kārikās were composed by a fictitious Kārikākāra, who is supposed to have

31. It will be interesting to find the terms kārikā and saṁgraha defined in the Nāṭyaśāstra also. Vide, NŚ (VI/9, 11) and NŚ (Trans.) p. 101.

32. I. Aesthetics, p. 273

flourished two generations earlier than Ānanda A scholastic tradition, in the form of the composition of the saṃgraha-ślokas, etc, by several unknown writers, is supposed to have been there to fill up the gap of two generations But it will be presently shown that the said hypothesis is not secure and the consequent theory of unknown authorship for the saṃgrahaślokas, etc, also fails along with the theory of a different Kārikakara

(7) Moreover, a careful study of the parikaraślokas, etc, would show, that a good number of the vital aspects of the dhvani theory are revealed by them Under such circumstances how could Ānanda claim the entire credit of revealing the theory for the first time ? (cf vṛtti pp 35-38, "tasya hi dhvaneh svarūpaṁ . sahṛdayānāmānando manasi labhatām pratiṣṭhāmiti prakaśyate," also Locana p 41, 'Ānanda iti ca granthakṛto nāma,' etc, and also the last verse of Uddyota IV by Ānanda and Locana thereon) If there were earlier thinkers and also makers of the theory in part, why should then Abhinava, the learned commentator, give the unquestionable appellation of Śāstrakara to Ānanda alone ?

(8) Dr De, further argues that ' in course of time the Kārikākara receded to the background, completely overshadowed by the more important figure of his formidable expounder, and people considered as the Dhvanikāra not the author of the few memorial verses but the commentator Ānandavardhana himself who for the first time fixed the theory in its present form " This quotation has a connection with the question of the parikaraślokas, etc In the said quotation it is observed that in course of time people forgot about the Kārikakāra but why should Ānanda himself have forgotten his entity ! As the definition of a parikaraśloka, given by Abhinava (Locana p 107), would show, these verses, supposed to have been taken by Ānanda from unknown sources, were later in time than the kārikās It is simply unbelievable that the name of the Kārikākāra and the names of the supposed unknown authors

of the parikaraślokas, etc., were all forgotten by or unknown to Ānanda. We also cannot believe that, Abhinava, who had a family tradition of studying the Dhvanyāloka and a line of preceptors (guruparamparā), knew nothing of the authors of the kārikās and the parikaraślokas, etc., if there were really any such authors.

Kārikākāra and Vṛttikāra : The most fascinating of the problems related with the authorship of Dhvanyāloka is about the distinction between the Kārikākāra and the Vṛttikāra. This problem has given rise to a good deal of controversy among the leading Sanskritist Scholars during the last sixty years or more. Dr. Buhler (Kashmir Report p. 65) and the learned editors of the Kāvyamālā edition of the Dhvanyāloka conjecture that the kārikās have been written by some one different from Ānanda, the author of the vṛtti. A large group of scholars consisting of Prof. Jacobi,[33] Prof. Keith,[34] Dr. De,[35] MM. Kane,[36] Mr. Sovani,[37] etc., supported this contention and the last went to the extent of propounding that Sahṛdaya was the name of the author of the kārikās. But another group of scholars consisting of Dr. A. Sankaran,[38] Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy,[39] Dr. S. K. Mookerjee,[40] Raniero Gnoli,[41] etc., opposed the view of the former school and advocated in favour of a numerical identity of the Kārikākāra and Vṛttikāra.

33. Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesselschaft.

34. HSL. p. 386.

35. HSP. De. Vol. I. chap. IX.

36. HSP. Kane. pp. 152–190 etc.

37. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1910. pp. 165–67.

38. TRD. pp. 50–60.

39. Authorship of Dhvanyāloka. Indian Historical Quarterly, XXXIV/3 & 4 ; Dhv. Trans. Preface, p. XVII.

40. B. C. Law. Vol. Part–I. pp. 179–194.

41. East & West. (Journal of the Is. M. E. O., Rome) Year VI, No. 4, Jan. 1956. pp. 293–94.

§ Few arguments in favour of identity If I enter into a fresh discussion of the views for and against the theory of identity of the authors of the vṛtti portion and the kārikā portion, that would merely be a boring repetition Yet, I cannot resist the temptation to present a few arguments which may not be quite insufficient to show the identity of the Vṛttikāra and Kārikākāra This labour will not be fruitless, for, if we be sure of the authorship of the different parts of the Dhv, there will be less of confusion in interpreting and understanding the intriguing portions of it

(a) Tradition records the name of Ānanda alone as the author of the Dhvanyāloka MM Kane says on p LXIII, '*I feel inclined to hold (though with hesitation)* that the Locana is right and that Pratīhārendurāja, Mahimabhaṭṭa Kṣemendra and others had not the correct tradition before them' I also feel inclined to add here that it could have been likely on the part of Mahimabhaṭṭa and Ksemendra to have a wrong tradition before them as they were still later than Abhinava in time But Pratīhārendurāja—who was none other than the preceptor of Abhinava in my opinion and who was contemporary to the latter in the opinion of MM Kane—must have had the more correct tradition being anterior to Abhinava and nearer to the author (or authors) of the Dhvanyāloka

(b) It is simply unbelievable that people totally forgot about the distinct Dhvanikāra (HSP De Vol I p 109), when even as early a writer as Bhāsa lives in so many references

(c) The name Sahṛdaya for the so-called Dhvanikāra suggested by Mr Sovani, is simply fictitious inasmuch as Ānandavardhana himself is called —sahṛdayacakravartī by Abhinava (Locana, p 41)

(d) On p 259 of Dhv vṛtti says 'iyatpunarucyata eva, then follows the kārikā II/27, alamkārāntarasyāpi etc Abhinava supplies the corrective to the vṛtti as '—iyaditi / asmābhiriti

vākyaśeṣaḥ". 'asmābhiḥ' joined with the 'ucyate' occurring in the vṛtti, spoken by the Vṛttikāra means—by us (or by me, the bahubacana being in the sense of gaurava) it (the following kārikā) is said. This implies, on the strength of the corrective of the Locana itself, an identity of the Vṛttikāra with the Kārikākāra.

(e) In TRD. p. 51., Dr. A. Sankaran quotes a reference of Abhinava to Ānanda as "etadevopajīvyānandavardhanācāryenoktaṁ suptiṅvacanetyādi (Abh. bh. Vol. II. chap. XIV. p. 367)". This 'suptiṅvacana' begins a kārikā of the Dhv. III–16, (p. 347) and nowhere in the vṛtti of that work does this expression occur. Now the same Abhinava, who is relied upon to establish the difference between Kārikākāra and Vṛttikāra, unmistukably assigns the authorship of the kārikā to Ānanda.

(f) It seems that in the capacity of the commentator to Dhv. Abhinava had to draw the distinction beween the Kārikākāra and had to justify a case which seemed apparently to be an utsūtravyākhyāna (p. 165. Banaras edn.) ; but as a commentator of the N Ś., free from the capacity of the commentator of the Dhv., he did not hesitate to attribute the said kārikā to Ānanda, who was known to Abhinava as the real author of the kārikā portion also.

(g) In "mayā vṛttikāreṇa satā" of Locana the word 'satā' is redundant unless it implies the otherwise numerical identity to the Kārikākāra and Vṛttikāra (Dhv. p. 165).

(h) Abhinava, no doubt, distinguishes between the Kārikākāra, and that is a formal distinction, but, he nowhere distinguishes the Kārikākāra (.or Dhvanikāra or Sḥṛdaya) from Ānandavardhana.

(i) In the learned opinion of Abhinava, Ānanda is the śāstrakāra ; it is simply unbelievable that Abhinava means only the vṛtti portion by the terms śāstra.

(j) Under kārikā II. 5. Vṛttikāra saying '......māmakīnaḥ pakṣaḥ' seems to identify himself with the Kārikākāra. But

this is not a sure case of identification inasmuch as in the kārikā itself the expression 'me matih' occurs So, to take a surer case, I refer to the vrtti on kārika II/21 saying " . dhvaniritYasmakam vivakṣitam' Dr De conjectures Kuntaka alone to be the author of both the kārikās and the vrtti of Vakroktijivita on almost similar grounds (Vide, VJ D- intr p VI)

In this way arguments may be multiplied to as many numbers to show that Ānanda was the author of the entire Dhvanyaloka consisting of the kārikās, vrtti and the parikaraślokas, etc

Fourth–uddyota–kārikās are not apocryphal Strangely enough some scholars are suspicious in respect of the genuineness of some of the karikas Prof Siva prasad Bhattacharyya who believes the karikās not to have been composed by Ānanda himself says in the article 'Dhvanyaloka and the text of the Dhvanikarikas' (Proceedings of the sixth Oriental conference, p 621)—"It appears to us that the entire fourth uddyota is more likely than not an apocryphal work so far as the Original Dhvanikārikas are concerned' I have gathered this peculiar view of Prof S Bhattacharyya from a quotation in the 'Dhv of Ānanda' by Prof B P Bhattacharyya, Intro p XXVII As it appears to me from the extract Prof S P Bhattacharyya believes that Ānanda, who is in his opinion distinct from the genuine Karikakāra, is responsible for the interpolations And he remarks "Ānanda has tried to escape detection by explaining the words in the kārikās in the vrtti following, exactly as if they are other s compositions in the manner as we find illustrated e g in the Vakroktijivita " But I am sure that any body studying all the uddyota carefully and with a critical eye, would hardly find any difference in Ānanda's manner of explaining the words of the karikas in the vrtti Instead of maintaining a difference as the Vrttikara from Kārikākāra, he shows signs of identity Example 1 , Vide vṛtti on p 527, taditham rasabhāvādyaśrayena, etc , followed by the karika, drstapūrvā api hya-

rthā etc. (Dhv. IV. 4), followed by no word for word commentary, but only illustrations. This is a deviation from the usual way of the vṛtti and is tending more to show an identity of the Kārikākāra with the Vṛttikāra. Example 2. Vide vṛtti on p. 529 "tattu granthavistarabhayānnalikhyate svayameva sahṛdayairabhyuhyam atra ca punaḥpunaruktamapi sāratayedamucyate—vyaṅgyavyañjakabhāvesmin, etc. (kārikā No. IV. 5)." Taking into consideration "na likhyate" and 'idamucyate' directly connected with the following kārikā, we become more convinced of the identity of the Vṛttikāra and Kārikākāra. When there is no difference between Kārikākāra and Vṛttikāra, when Ānanda is the author of both the portions, when Ānanda is genuine, then the question of interpolation and Ānanda's conceit does not arise. Prof. S. P. Bhattacharyya points out another evidence that the fourth uddyota kārikās are in varied and novel chandas ; hence, these are not by the same Kārikākāra, but interpolated by Ānanda. My argument against this view is that Ānanda is the author of the whole Dhv. If the introductory kārika could be in Mandākrāntā chanda, then what is the harm in Ānanda's (who is a poet himself) taking to Mālinī, Rathoddhatā, and Śikhariṇī in the fourth uddyota ? Just as the introductory kārikā is introductory the fourth uddyota is also the concluding uddyota. Hence the distinct feature of it.

By now we are on firmer ground to take the whole of the Dhvanyāloka to have been composed by one single author, namely Ānandavardhana. Hence, we need not be accused of using the kārikās and the vṛtti together, like Wilson who has been accused by Hall of "using together the Daśarūpa and its exposition."[42] There is reason to believe that before propounding the theory of dhvani in the said book Ānandavardhana had discussions about the same with the contemporary scholars, some of whom did not approve of it. After the composition

42. Bhavabhūti and his place in Sanskrit Literature, p. 15.

was out, the theory was strongly opposed by the theorists like Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Mahimabhaṭṭa But the arguments of such rivals were either too weak and faulty or hushed up by stronger criticism of the followers of the dhvani school and the theory had a long line of robust supporters like Abhinava, Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha who accepted the theory with slight modifications and advocated for it with the greatest zeal In the following pages we will see how the theory of Ānanda influenced the later writers and why the modification had to be incorporated in

Antiquity of the theory : From Dhv. kārikā I 1, it is gathered that the doctrine 'dhvani is the soul of kāvya' was introduced by the learned persons in an unbroken tradition, although the same has not been written in a definite textbook before the Dhvanyāloka. In this respect we are enlightened by Abhinava who says "avicchinnen pravāhena tairetaduktam vināpi viśiṣṭapustakesu viniveśanādityabhiprāyah" (p 11) But, I doubt if the vrtti actually means to say this In my opinion Budhaih (kāvyatattvavidbhih) means the great poets who flourished in a paramparā, i e , avicchinnapravāhah, who knew (i e , recognised) the essential element in a kāvya, the very soul of a kāvya so to say, now termed as dhvani by Ānanda for the first time (kāvyasyatma dhvaniriti samjñitah), and duly exhibited it in their compositions (prakaṭitah) The vṛtti[43] on p 10, must be understood in this way Otherwise if we follow Abhinava's interpretation, we cannot compromise the same with the vṛtti[44] on pp 35-38 The word 'budhah' does not mean the theorist on the essence of kāvya, because the traditional theorists are called kavyalakṣanavidhāyins (vrtti on p 35) whose intel-

43 Paramparayā yah samamnātapūrvah samyak āsamantād mnātah prakaṭitah

44 'Tasya hi dhvaneh svarupam cirantanakāvyalakṣanavidhāyinām buddhibhiranunmīlitapūrvam" p 35 'atha ca rāmayanamahābhāratаprabhrtini lokṣye sarvatra prasiddhavyavahāram lakṣyayatam", etc p 38

lect could not reveal the very subtle element of dhvani. Then how can they be supposed to have told about dhvani as the soul of kāvya ? It has not been explained or revealed before Ānanda (anunmīlitapūrvam) but it was only exhibited (prakaṭita) ; and, Ānanda, finding dhvani to have been profusely present in Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata, etc., reveals it for the first time to please the men of taste.

Now, in the very body of the kārikā I. 1., he refers to the views of those who opposed the idea of dhvani. Of these some views were apprehended by himself in the manner of Patañjali, the author of the Mahābhāṣya, and it is quite plausible, that, Ānanda who considers the grammarians as foremost amongst the learned men, read the Mahābhāṣya and was impressed by its mode of arguments. Some views of the opponents are, of course, real. As for instance, Manoratha, *who is said to* have been *a contemporary of Ānanda* did not find anything novel in the theory of dhvani and composed a satirical verse addressing only one (not many to give the theory a hoary antiquity) advocate of dhvani as jaḍa, "yasminnasti na vastu......dhvaneḥ," Dhv. pp. 26-27. The verse of Manoratha certainly had Ānanda alone as the object of aspersion. The view "bhāktamāhustamanye", at least, is imagined on the basis of earlier theories (cf. vṛtti pp. 21-32. yadyapi......parikalpyaivamuktaṁ 'bhāktamāhustamanye' iti). But the expressions (a) kecidācakṣīran (p. 16), (b) bhāktāmāhuḥ (p. 28), (c) sahṛdayahṛdayasaṁvedyameva samākhyātavantaḥ (p. 33), (d) and the reference to Manoratha (p. 26) need not necessarily mean that the theory was current for a pretty long time among the budhas—and the opponents also formed their adverse opinion againt the views of the budhas, advocating for the dhvani theory, flourishing long before Ānanda. Because, Ānanda was a poet and critic of the later half of the ninth century in Kashmir. He wrote in addition to Dhvanyāloka, Devīśataka, Viṣamavāṇalīlā, Arjunacarita, and Tattvāloka. The scholar certainly had an associaiont

with a learned circle and when he expressed his ideas about dhvani before starting to write the Dhv, he was very likely to get a rebuff from the contemporaries like Manoratha.[45] And

45. Identification of Manoratha has presented a problem to scholars like Dr. De. Abhinava says that Manoratha was a poet contemporaneous with the granthakṛt. As informed by Kalhana in Rājataranginī (IV. 497 and IV. 671 HSP De Vol I, p 112) Manoratha was associated with kings Jayāpīda and Lalitāpīda of Kashmir between C. 780 and 831 A D Ānandavardhana is associated with king Avantivarman of Kashmir who ruled between C 865 and 884 A D, by the following reference

Muktākanah śivasvāmī kavirānandavardhanah /
Prathām ratnākaraścāgāt sāmrājye'vantivarmanah //

(Rājataranginī V 34, as in KSS, Int, p X)

On the strength of Kalhana's reference, Ānanda is placed between C 855 and 884, and Manoratha is placed between C 780 and 813 Thus it appears to Dr De, that, Kalhana's Manoratha cannot be the same as one referred to as contemporaneous with Ānanda by Abhinava. Again in the opinion of Dr De granthakṛt cannot mean the Kārikākāra, supposed to be different from and earlier than Ānanda by them, also So, Dr De. concludes that Manoratha referred to by Abhinava is later than and different from Kalhana's Manoratha.

In my opinion there is no difficulty in understanding Kalhana's as Manoratha contemporaneous with Ānanda. Kalhana's Manoratha was a poet Possibly he supported some pre-dhvani school of poetics We do not know when the literary carrier of this Manoratha came to an end We simply gather that he avoided the company of the voluptuary Lalitāpīda. (mānī manoratho mantrī paraṁ parijahāra tam, IV 671). Hence it is very likely that he continued to live for a still longer period of time. MM. Kane also thinks that since this Manoratha should have seen the kārikās for a strong criticism 'kārikās were composed between 800–825' (HSP. Kane, p 189). Hence it is clear that Manoratha flourished at least up to 825 Now, Ānanda is said to have 'attained fame' in the time of Avantivarman. (prathām agāt). Hence, in order to attain fame by 855 A. D, Ānanda must have begun his literary activity much earlier.

starting confidently to write his own work, with the mirth of triumph, he refers to the views of all his contemporary opponents.

But Ānanda's statement "tathaivānyaistanmatānusāribhiḥ sūribhiḥ kāvyatattvārthadarśibhirvācyavācakasammiśraḥ......... dhvanirityuktaḥ" (vṛtti, pp. 133–135) seems to go against my views expressed above because of the 'plural sūribhiḥ and the past darticiple uktaḥ' (Vide, TRD. p. 61). Yet I have a humble say. As gathered from the vṛtti. pp. 132–135, 'sūribhiḥ,' here refers to the grammarians and the kāvyatattvavits of the vṛtti on kārikā, 1. Now 'dhvaniriti sūribhiḥ kathitaḥ' means 'grammarians called dhvani and the poeticians also called dhvani. But, inasmuch as the grammarians called only the varṇas

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We may suppose that he wrote the Dhv. some 20 years earlier in about 835 and in the earlier 10 years or more, in the twenties of that century he had occassions to discuss about the dhvani theory with senior contemporaries like Manoratha.

It is Ānanda who referred to Manoratha as 'any.' (cf. vṛtti. p. 26). But, he did so only by way of illustrating the view of the abhāvavādins. (vide vṛtti pp. 12, 13, tadabhāvavādināṁ cāmī vikalpāḥ sambhavanti). And the Kārikākāra (whoever he might not be) himself had the abhāvavadins in mind. (Kārikā I. 1.). As I hold that Ānanda himself was the Kārikākāra, we need not think that, the kārikās themselves were composed in the time of Manoratha. Even if the Kārikākāra is taken as completely distinct from Ānanda, he does not himself make any reference to Manoratha in his kārikā to show a contemporaneity with Manoratha. And the conjecture of Dr. De is unwarranted since Kalhana's Manoratha himself can be supposed as a senior contemporary of Ānanda. Moreover, Ānanda's manner of referring to Manoratha as 'anya' also shows that possibly he had bitter occasions of arguments with the former on dhvani Udbhaṭa, the author of KSS, who is said to have been the sabhāpati of Jayāpīḍa (Rājtaraṅgiṇi, IV, 495) also, need not be taken as a contemporary of Ānanda, inasmuch as he is not associated by Kalhana with Lalitāpīḍa—since he seems to have been already too old and venerable to get a lac of dināra every day in time of Jayāpīḍa.

as dhvani and they did not recognise any dhvani in kāvya, the support received by Ānanda in propounding the dhvani theory is only to the extent of an analogy, or at best, he finds the anticipation of the vyañjanā vṛtti (resident in pada, padāṁśa, padārtha, etc) in the vyañjanā function of the varṇas recognised by the grammarians. Yet Ānanda declares that the very conception of dhvani is based on the views of the grammarians. (cf. also, pariniścita nirapabhraṁśa, etc Dhv. vṛtti. p 443) It is very natural that Ānanda who seeks the support of the grammarians for the sake of dignity of his theory, would also try to associate the theory with a great antiquity. That is why he uses 'sūribhih' to give the abrupt idea of a large group of scholars talking of dhvani or it can be very well explained as used in bahuvacana in the sense of gaurava. 'Kathitah' is also meant to make the theory look age-long and hence dignified "Tathaiva tanmatānusāribhih" is more an intellectual stunt It has been the practice of most of the ancient Indian masters to give their own views a tinge of a hoary antiquity by associating them with a long line of teachers or with a mythological origin For example, the Carakasamhitā recounts a long line of teachers and the kavyamīmamsa gives a mythological origin of the sāhityavidyā. This "sūribhih kathitah" must not be accepted in its face value as we have no scientific evidence of the term dhvani being used for kāvya even for once before the Dhv , and it must be supposed as simply justifying Kalluka's remark 'prāyena hi ācāryānam iyam śailī yat svābhiprāyamapi parābhiprāyamivāmananti' (Manu Sam I) Dr. Keith observes that "The Kārikās assert that the doctrine is old, but if so we must assume that it had not won much success, and it may be that the author referred really to some not distant predecessor, justifying himself by the view that the *doctrine was implict in the older writers*." (HSL. p 387) We will presently see, in course of discussing the sources of the theory, the justification of Dr. Keith's observation in the portion italicized by me above

Sources of the theory : It is seen above that although the term dhvani was newly introduced to the field of poetics and although Ānanda claims to have propounded the theory of dhvani for the first time, he inherited the fundamental idea from a long series of predecessors : and it will not be fruitless to make an attempt here to trace the theoretical background of Ānanda's ideas.

(1) The most important factor in the dhvani theory is the vyāñjanā function of the words and meanings of poetry. Bharata called the phenomenon of the suggestion of the sthāyibhāva developing into a rasa vyañjanā, since he used the expression vyañjitān (suggested) in the extract quoted below. 'Vyañjanā,' for Ānanda, precisely means 'revelation.' The analogy of the lamp and the jar is drawn between the suggester and the suggested sense in Dhv. III. (p. 421). Cf. "tasmād ghaṭapradīpanyāyastayoḥ, yathaiva hi pradīpadvāreṇa ghaṭapratītāvutpannāyāṁ na pradīpaprakāśo nivartate tadvadvyaṅgya-pratītau vācyāvabhāsaḥ." The analogy implies that, the suggester exhibits its own self while revealing the suggested element. Cf. also "svarūpaṁ prakāśayanneva parāvabhāsako vyañjaka ityucyate" (Vṛtti. p. 431). Ānanda also recognises and demands in strong terms an order in understanding the suggester and the suggested. (Dhv. pp. 405–431. Cf. tasmādabhidhānābhidheyapratītyoriva vācyavyaṅgya-pratītyornimittanimitti-bhāvānniyamabhāvī kramaḥ / sa tūktayuktyā kvacillakṣyate kvacinna lakṣyate //) Such a difinite meaning of vyañjaka or vyañjanā seems to have been derived from Bharata's own explanation of the sūtra, "vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicāri-saṁyogādrasaniṣpattiḥ," running as—"ko dṛṣṭāntaḥ / atrāha yathā nānā-vyañjanauṣadhidravyasaṁyogād rasaniṣpattiḥ tathā nānābhāvopagamād rasaniṣpattiḥ // yathā hi guḍādibhirdravyairvyañjanair-oṣadhibhiśca......nānā-bhāvābhinaya-vyañjitān vāgaṅgasattvopetān sthāyibhāvānāsvādayanti sumanasaḥ prekṣakāḥ harṣādiṁścādhigacchanti / tasmān-nāṭyarasā ityabhi-vyākhyātāḥ"

(NŚ pp 287 289) The sentiment is produced (rasa n spattih)[46] Now one enquires, ' What is the meaning of the word rasa ? ' How is rasa tasted ? ' (In reply) it is said that just as well disposed persons while eating food cooked with many kinds of spices enjoy (āsvadayanti) its tastes (rasa) and attain pleasure and satisfaction so the cultured people taste the Dominant States (sthāyibhāva) while they see them represented[47], by an expression of the various States with Words Gestures and the Temperament[48], and derive pleasure and satisfaction Thus is explained (the Memorial Verse ending with) tasmān nātyarasā iti (NŚ Trans p 105)

It is to be noted here that while Bharata used the term vyañjana only with reference to the suggestion of the sentiments (rasa) Ānanda had also matters of fact (vastu) and imaginary ideas (alamkāras) as suggested (vyañjita) by the words and primary meanings in poetry

(2) Ānanda uses also the terms 'avagamana', 'pratyayana and 'dyotana', etc , in the sense of vyañjana (suggestion) The grammarians also conceived of the upasargas and nipātas as suggestive (dyotaka) The upasargas and nipatas cannot express their own meaning themselves but they reveal the meanings (dyotakā bhavanti) of the expressive words, used side by side, in a special form Cf nāmakhyātayostu karmopasamyogadyotakā bhavanti ' (Nirukta, 1 1 4)

46 Although very literally translated as ' produced here the expression nispatti may have different implications according to different explanations of the sūtra

47 Literally suggested' (vyañjitān)

48 These three refer to the three types of abhinaya viz vācika āngika and sāttvika It may be noted that words gestures and temperaments are directly influenced by the Dominant States whereas the costumes have a remote relation with the Dominant states in the subjects and hence there is no reference to the āhārya type of abhinaya

and "sa eṣa nāmākhyātayorevārthaviśeṣa upasargasaṁyoge sati vyajyate / yathā pradīpa-saṁyoge dravyasya guṇaviśeṣo-bhivyajyamāne dravyāśraya eva bhavati, na pradīpāśrayaḥ" // (Durgācārya's com. on the same). Ānanda does not refer to these dyotaka (suggestive) particles. But, yet, it will not be unjust to believe that Ānanda had these conceptions of the grammarian in his mind in time of promulgating his theory of vyañjanā function of poetry. In this connection we may also compare the following words of Nāgeśa, who points out that the grammarians also have to recognise the vyañjanā function of the ālaṁkārika since it has already been recognised by them in case of the nipātas and the sphoṭa "ata eva nipātānāṁ dyotakatvamākara uktaṁ sphoṭasya ca vyaṅgyatā haryādibhiruktaiva, dyotaktvaṁ ca samabhivyāhṛtapada-śakti-vyañjakatvameva iti vaiyākaraṇānāmapyetatsvīkāra āvaśyakaḥ."[49].

(3) For designating the suggestive type of kāvya as dhvani Ānanda endeavours to find a sanction in the doctrine of the grammarians. The grammarians do not recognise any suggestive function of the expressive words but they hold that the syllables that we hear suggest an eternal and complete word within the heart of the hearer, which is called sphoṭa and which alone is associated with the meaning. The words that we hear consist of certain evanescent sounds represented by the letters constituting the said word. Such sounds, called srūyamāṇavarṇas, can never get together to convey the corresponding meaning. What the succeeding sounds (srūyamāṇa-varṇas) do is that they reveal (suggest) the eternal undivided word bit by bit so that by the time the last sound of the word is heard the entire word gets revealed to convey the idea.[49a]

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49. 'Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntalaghumañjūṣās, p. 156.

yaḥ' pended to V. Vārttik a, pQuoted fromtho vyañjanānirṇa-

49a. The process of the revelation of the sphoṭa is illustrated by the grammarians by means of various analogies. For these Vide ITM. p. 124.

Thus the sruyamanavarnas which suggest the sphoṭa and the kāvya have one thing in common and that is their suggestive capacity, i e, vyañjakatva These srūyamanavarnas are also called dhvani by the grammarians Compare, "athavā prati tapadārthako loke dhvanih śabda ityucyate (M B Chowkhamba, p 12) and "sphoṭah śabdah dhvanih śabdagunah' of Patañjali (quoted in Bhavapradīpa com, VKPD p 67) The relation between dhvani (suggestive sound) and sphota, as it is conceived by Patañjali, can be very clearly understood from the following lines of the Bhāvapradīpa commentary Hence, compare, "etadeva taparasutre bhasye uktam—

dhvanih sphoṭaśca śabdānām dhvanistu khalu lakṣyate
alpo mahamśca Kesāmcidubhayam tatsvabhavatah

atra Kaiyaṭah 'dhvanih sphoṭaśca vyangyo vyañjakaśca sta iti śesah śabdānām vyangyānām sambandhī vyañjako yo dhvanih sa eva mahānalpaśca lokṣyate vyangyastvabhinnakala eva' " (VKPD p 48) Dr K Kunjunni Raja observes that Patañjali's conception of sphoṭa is different from that developed by Bhartrhari in the Vakyapadīya [49b] But Ānanda is concerned not so much with the nature of sphota as he is with the relation between dhvani and sphota Yet while Ānanda's acquaintance with MB can never be ruled out, it is more reasonable to seek in Ānanda's outlook a more direct influence of the Vakyapadīya This conjecture may be warranted also by Bhartṛhari s temporal proximity to Ānanda and by the epoch making nature of the Vākyapadīya Bhartrhari calls the śruyamānavarna nāda (VKPD, I 84 p 73) That the nāda and the sphota also stand in the relation of the suggester and the suggested (*vyangyavyañjakabhava*) *in the theory of Bhartrhari* may be gathered from such statements as

grahanagrāhyayoh siddha niyatā yogyatā yatha /
vyangyavyañjakabhāvena tathaiva sphoṭanādayoh //
(VKPD I p 83)

49b ITM pp 102-105

We may also consider the following points to trace how Bhartṛhari might have contributed to Ānanda's conception of vyañjanā.

1. It is advocated also by Bhartṛhari that the suggested element, viz., sphoṭa (also called śabda) is nitya and that the phenomenon of suggestion is not restricted to the anitya objects alone. (VKPD. I. 95. p. 82)

2. According to Bhartṛhari there is an order (krama-niyama) of realisation of the suggester and the suggested. Compare :

yathānupūrviniyamo vikāre kṣīrabījayoḥ /
tathaiva pratipattṝṇāṁ niyato buddhiṣu kramaḥ //
(VKPD. I. 91. p. 79)

That Ānanda also demands this order of realisation in Dhv. pp. 405–413 is already pointed out.

3. A very important factor in the phenomenon of vyañjanā is that the suggester reveals itself along with the suggested. Compare, "vyañjakatvamārge tu yadārtho'rthāntaraṁ dyotayati tadā svarūpaṁ prakāśayannevāsāvanyasya prakāśakaḥ pratīyate pradīpavat. yathā līlākamalapatrāṇi ganayāmāsa pārvatī ityādau." (Dhv. p. 424). In the example, referred to, 'the counting of the play lotus by Pārvatī' is cognised by us as the express (vācya) sense while the same suggests also the idea that 'Pārvatī was feeling shy'. The behaviour of the lamp revealing itself while suggesting something else is relegated to the śabdaḥ also by Bhartṛhari. Compare :

grāhyatvaṁ grāhakatvaṁ ca dve śaktī tejaso yathā /
tathaiva sarvaśabdānāmete pṛthagiva sthite //
(VKPD. I. 55. P. 54).

Here the word 'tejas' stands for the lamp of the analogy, the word 'śabda' stands for the śrūyamāṇavarṇas in which form it reveals itself. What is supposed to be suggestsd by the śabda revealing itself in the form of the śrūyamāṇavarṇa is the sphoṭa, which is also called the nity śabda and which

alone is maintained to be meaningful This position can be more clearly understood by studying the kārikās 1 44 & 1 56

(4) That Ānanda had the idea of dhvani actually from Bhartrhari may be gathered from the following statement, betraying his unstinted allegiance to the grammarians, as "*pariniścitanirapabhramśaśabdabrahmanam vipaścitām mata*-māśrityaiva pravrtto'yam dhvanivyavahāra . kim virodha virodhau cintyete" (Dhv III pp 443-444) Here he refers to the grammarians as those who have duly established the conception of the Brahman identified with the pure (nirapa-bhramśa) word This is undoubtedly a reference to Bhartrhari for Brahman is conceived as the eternal (anadinidhanam) word by him in the very first karikā of the VKPD

anādinidhanam brahma śabdatattvam yadaksarm /
vivartate'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato *yatah* //[49c]

(4) Of the writers on poetics Bhāmaha largely contributed *to the shaping of Ānanda's* views regarding a *sense other than* the universally recognised and commonly understood express sense Ānanda observes that, all the alamkāras are often seen to have a touch of either another figure or another idea which happen to be suggested In case of the association with an additional alamkara he notices that all alamkāras have at least a touch of exaggeration (atiśayokti) This atiśayokti sometimes merges with other figures expressly and as a suggested content at other times When suggested the atiśayokti may *appear either* as the principal sense or as the *subordinate* sense When it is the principal sense we have a dhvani on that score and when it *is secondary we* have a gunībhūta-*vyangya type of kāvya* (*i* e , a poetry with an *unpredominant* suggested content) In propounding this position Ānanda expressly makes a reference to Bhāmaha's view on the invariable presence of atiśayokti with all alamkāras Compare tathāhi dipakasamāsoktyādivadanyepyalamkarāh prāyena

49c Also vide Appendix, A

vyaṅgyālaṁkārāntarasaṁsparśino dṛśyante......bhāmahenāpyatiśayoktilakṣaṇe yaduktam—

saiṣā sarvaiva vakroktiranayārtho vibhāvyate /
yatno'syāṁ kavinā kāryaḥ ko'laṁkāronayā vinā // etc.

(Dhv. III, pp. 464–470).

In respect of the presence of an additional meaning (anyārtha) in some of the kāvyas, which was recognised later on as the suggested sense by Ānanda, Bhāmaha's definition of samāsokti—"yatrokte gamyatenyorthastatsamānaviśeṣaṇaḥ" with the word 'gamyate' is also significant.

It is also to be noted that Ānanda accepted in name and number the same three guṇas of Bhāmaha, although he reoriented the conception of the same.

(5) Ānanda does not deal with the definition of the different alaṁkāras. When there is an occasion to refer to any alaṁkāra he simply refers to the views of the earlier ālaṁkārikas, particularly Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa, his compatriots. In Ānanda's śabdaśaktimūla variety of dhvani (Dhv. II. 21) homonyms suggest some figure. The phenomenon of the alaṁkāras being suggested by express figures seems to have occured to Ānanda from a study of Bhāmaha's atiśayokti and the idea of śabdaśaktimūla-alaṁkāradhvani appears to have come to him from a study of Udbhaṭa's definition of śleṣa. Śleṣa, according to Udbhaṭa, is a composition of (i) homonyms which are pronounced in the same manner and of (ii) words which appear to have the same pronounciation but which really differ in some attributes such as—svarita, etc.[50] The alaṁkāra also conveys the idea of an additional alaṁkāra (alaṁkārāntaragatāṁ pratibhāṁ janayatpadaiḥ). The alaṁkāra is divided into two varieties, viz., śabdaśleṣa and arthaśleṣa. (vide. KSS. IV, 9–10). In śabdaśaktimūla variety of dhvani

50. Theorists like Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha would recognise this latter variety of homonyms only in the Vedas and not in kāvya. (vide KP. II. 19).

also we have an invariable suggestion of some alamkāra (ākṣipta evalamkaraḥ śabdaśaktyā prakāśate Dhv II 21) It may be conjectured that Ānanda derives the idea of his śabdaśaktimūla-dhvani from Udbhata's śleṣa and that is why he feels it necessary to draw a line of demarcation between the two on the very out set in the words nanvalamkārāntarapratibhāyāmapi śleṣavyapadeśo bhavatīti darśitam bhaṭṭodbhaṭena, tatpunarapi śabdaśaktimulo dhvanir niravakāśa ityaśankyedamuktam 'ākṣiptah' iti' (Dhv p 235)

(6) It is already observed that Vamana's KL contained the germs of the dhvani theory to a great extent and Ānanda remarks that the rītivādins propounded their theory only as a result of their ineffectual effort to analyse dhvani (cf Dhv III 46) Presence of a meaning other than the express' meaning in words and sentence has been known to Vamana also Vāmana recognises a suggested sense in the akṣepa alamkāra and hence explaning the sūtra "upamanakṣepāśca kṣepah' in a second way says "upamānasyākṣepatah paratipattirityapi sūtrathah yatha, aindram dhanuh .. atra śaradveśyeva indum nāyakamiva, raveh pratinayakasyeva *ityupamanani gamyante* iti The words in the italicized portion seem to mean, "the standards of comparision are suggested The expressions 'akṣipta' and 'gamyate (gamyante) are very frequently used by Ānanda to refer to the suggested sense Ānanda might have had the idea of a meaning other than the express one from literary elements of this nature in Vamana's work It may, however, be questioned that similar ideas regarding a meaning other than the express one are met with in the KD of Dandin also, and it may be clear from a quotation like the following illustration of the ākṣepa alamkāra

na ciram mama tapaya tava yātra bhaviṣyati /
yadi yāsyasi yātavyam alamaśankayatra te //
ityanujñāmukhenaiva kantasyakṣipyate gatih /
maranam sūcayantyaiva so'nujñākṣepa ucyate //
(KD II. 135-136)

Here the idea of maraṇa (death) is a suggested meaning of the verse—na ciraṁ, etc. That according to Daṇḍin also the 'suggested meaning' is different from the express may be gathered from his own expression "sūcayantyaiva". But it would have been more after the heart of Ānanda to use the word 'ākṣepa' in the sense of 'suggestion' and not in the sense of 'obstruction' in the manner of the present context. At any rate the possibility of Ānanda being influenced by Daṇḍin is remote and in the matter of an 'additional meaning' he is more likely to have been influenced by Bhāmaha and Vāmana and Udbhaṭa since there are more positive references to these writers. In this context we may also contrast Daṇḍin's definitions of samāsokti, paryāyokta and ākṣepa, etc., with those of Bhāmaha, with profit.

(7) We have already seen how Rudraṭa cherished a great partiality for rasa and anticipated its being given the foremost importance by Ānanda. In the case of vastuvyañjanā (i. e., the suggestion of a matter of fact) also, he had enough to contribute to the moulding of the dhvani theory of Ānandavardhana. As very rightly observed by Ruyyaka, Rudraṭa includes vastuvyañjanā in the two types of his bhāva-alaṁkāra, recognised by Rudraṭa for the first time. Definitions and examples of both the types of bhāva alaṁkāra, as quoted below would clearly show the recognition of a meaning other than the express one by Rudraṭa. First variety is defined as :

yasya vikāraḥ prabhavannapratibandhena hetunā yena /
gamayati tamabhiprāyaṁ tatpratibandhaṁ ca bhāvo'sau //
(KL, VII. 38)[51].

Here the word 'gamayati' means, 'suggests'. The example 'grāmataruṇam......mukhacchāyā' is given by Mammaṭa himself to show the presence of a subordinate type of the suggested sense. (KP., I.). The second variety is defined as :

51. Locana reads, 'prabhavannapratibandhastu hetunā' and gives the verse 'ekākinī yadavalā' as the illustration, whereas it is intended as the example of the second variety.

abhidheyamabhidadhānam tadeva tadasadṛśasakala
guṇadoṣam /
arthāntaramavagamayati yadvākyam so'paro bhāvah //
(KL , Rudrata, VII 40)

Here it is explicitly stated that there may be a meaning standing as quite opposite to the express sense in respect of all the qualities and faults of the latter (tadasadṛśasakalaguṇa doṣam) and this meaning is had through suggestion and not expression ('gamayati and not 'abhidadhāti') Its example "ekakinī yadavala pāntha' (Locana, p 130) is recognised by Abhinava to have a suggested sense but he shows that it is not a case of dhvani only because the suggested sense is not predominant We may possibly be justified in recognising Rudrata s treatment of the bhāvalamkāra as the intellectual background for Ānanda's arguments for establishing the distinction of the express and the suggested senses

(8) By now it is sufficiently clear to us that in respect of the suggestion of rasa Ānanda had the idea from Bharata As regards the suggestion of figures he took the clue from Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa And as regards the suggestion of matters of fact he had the impetus from a number of alamkaras and their illustrations given by Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa, Rudraṭa and Vāmana The definitions of the alamkāras like samāsokti, paryayokta and aprastutapraśamsā demanded an invariabe presence of some suggested content in the illustrations, some of which could even be interpreted as cases of dhvani Hence Ānanda takes great pains to establish a distinct status for the dhvani type of kāvya by asserting boldly that in dhvani the suggested content must be unquestionably predominant Compare

(a) paryayoktepi yadi prādhānyena vyaṅgyatvam tadbhavatu nāma tasya dhvanāvantarbhāvah / na tu dhvanestatrantarbhavah / tasya mahāviṣayatvenaṅgitvena ca pratipadayiṣyamanatvat / na punah paryayokte bhamahodāhṛtasadṛśe vyangyasyaiva pradhanyam / vācyasya tatropasarjanībhavenāvivakṣitatvat / (Dhv pp 118-119)

(b) saṁkarālaṁkārepi yadā....../ atha vācyopasarjanībhāvena vyaṅgyasya tatrāvasthānaṁ tadā so'pi dhvaniviṣayo'stu, na tu sa eva dhvaniriti vaktuṁ śakyam / paryāyoktanirddiṣṭanyāyāt / (pp. 120–124)

(c) yadā tu sārūpyamātravaśenāprastutapraśaṁsāyāmaprakṛtaprakṛtayoḥ sambandhastadāpyaprastutasya sarūpasyābhidhīyamānasya prādhānyenāvivakṣāyāṁ dhvanāvevāntaḥpātaḥ / itarthā tvalaṁkārāntarameva. (pp. 126–129)

Thus Ānanda's efforts to distinguish his own position themselves would show his intellectual indebtedness to his predecessors.

(9) In Dhv. III, Ānanda observes: "Conceding to the fact that sentiments, etc., can be suggested only by specific senses, a classified treatment of suggestive elements would be useful, since specific senses are inseparably connected with suggestive words. Such a classification regarding the charm attained by particular kinds of words in particular contexts, which has been proposed also in other works, becomes justifiable only when we understand it to be based on the suggestiveness of words." Compare: "śabdaviśeṣāṇāṁ cānyatra ca cārutvaṁ yadvibhāgenopadarśitam tadapi teṣām vyañjakatvenaivāvasthitamityavagantavyam". (Dhv. p. 358). Abhinava informs us that anyatra refers to the Bhāmahavivaraṇa of Udbhaṭa. Abhinava illustrates a classification of senses by the statement: "srakcandanādayaḥ śabdāḥ śṛṅgāre cāravo vībhatse tvacārava iti rasakṛta eva vibhāgaḥ / rasam prati ca śabdasya vyañjakatvamevetyuktaṁ prāk." This information from Abhinava renders it clear that Ānanda derived some clue regarding the suggestivity of senses from Udbhaṭa's Bhāmahavivaraṇa also.

(10) It is interesting to note that while Ānanda remains silent about the contributions of Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa to the development of his own theory, he recognises Vāmana's efforts to approach to the conception of dhvani in at least two places. Compare:

(a) dhvanimārgo manākspṛṣṭopi na lakṣita, etc (Dhv p 32).

(b) asphuṭasphuritam, etc. (Dhv. III. 46).

The reason for this preferential reference may be conjectured as follows. Bhāmaha and Udbhata also talked of an 'anyārtha' but did not point out its ontological difference from the express sense But Vāmana talked at least of the lakṣaṇā function in his definition of the figure vakrokti, thereby, delving deeper towards the nature of dhvani [51a] In Ānanda's point of view, even this much reference to a function of the words is very significant since his entire theory rests on the recognition of a new function of words called vyañjanā With this intellectual background Ānanda wrote his Dhv, for propounding the dhvani theory. In the next chapter, we shall see the contents of the theory in greater detail and the references to the later writers henceforth, are expected to reveal the course of development of the theory in the hands of the later critics and supporters of the theory

The Vakrokti School: Kuntaka, author of the Vakroktijīvita, was the founder of this school. The salient features of Kuntāka's theory are as follows:

(i) Kāvya becomes lively in association with vakrokti Cf śarīraṁ jīviteneva spuriteneva jīvitam / vinā nirjivatāṁ yena vākyamyāti vipaścitām // (under Kārikā I 17, VJ Hindi, p 63)

(ii) Vakrokti is otherwise called 'kavivyāpāravakratva' or 'Vakrakavivyāpāra'. Vakrokti is defined as 'vaidagdhyabhangībhaniti' (I 10) It is also recognised as the alamkṛti, i.e., embellishment of śabda and artha, the physical constituents of a kāvya

(iii) The importance of vakrokti is also emphasised by way of stating its invariable association with kavya so much so that an unembellished kāvya can never be conceived of. (I 16).

51a For an elaborate discussion vide Dhv. Uddyota I (edited by Prof. B P. Bhattacharyya) pp 17–19

(iv) To constitute a kāvya words and meanings occur in a composition which is a source of an unworldly delight to the man of taste. (I. 7). The capacity of kāvya to delight, causes a natural elevation or consummation of rasa. "tasya ca.........kācideva svabhāvamahattā rasaparipoṣāṅgatvaṁ vā vyaktimāsādayati". (under K., I. 9. VJ. Hindī, p. 44)

(v) Whatever renders the poetry charming must be recognised as an alaṁkāra. Compare : I. 10 and "kintu vakratāvaicitryayogitayābhidhānamevānayoralaṁkāraḥ / tasyaiva śobhātiśayakāritvāt". (VJ. Hindī, pp. 51–52).. By the term vakrokti Kuntaka designates all the charming elements of kāvya like guṇa and dhvani and not only the already well known alaṁkāras like upamā and rūpaka. The alaṁkāra, that he discusses in his work, is unlike the well known alaṁkāras, by dint of its being capable of bringing an unworldly charm to the kāvya. (I. 2.)

(vi) In kārikā I. 7., Kuntaka defines kāvya as an indiscernible association of śabda and artha. In the vṛtti he adds "śabdārthau kāvyam, vācako vacyaśceti dvau sammīlitau kāvyam" (VJ. Hindī, p. 18). But by 'vācakaśabda' he means the 'vyañjaka śabda' also. The artha (vācya) must have 'svabhāvamahattā' or must be helpful to the delineation of rasa, so that the artha may be capable of delighting the sahṛdayas.

(vii) As an example of kāvya being instrumental to the delineation of rasa he cites the poem "tamabhyagacchat" which results in suggesting karuṇarasa and as such presents a case of rasa-dhvani, if not by itself, atleast in association with the neighbouring verses. As an example of svabhāvamahattā Kuntaka cites the verse "daṁṣṭrāpiṣṭeṣu" which does not have any alaṁkāra. It cannot be said to have svabhāvokti ; for, svabhāvokti is not an alaṁkāra for Kuntaka. What then is the source of appeal ? A careful examination would show that a devaviṣayakarati (sentiment of love for the god) or the information regarding the poet's devotion to the god, conveyed

to us by suggestion prominantly, is the sole source of appeal Thus we may see that according to Kuntaka also, the kāvya may be appealing either because of its being instrumental to the suggestion of rasa or because of suggesting a matter of fact

(viii) Although Kuntaka recognises only that kavya which has alaṁkāra, yet a kāvya having no alaṁkāra of the ordinarily known types like upama and rūpaka also may be an ideal kāvya if the matter under description possesses an inherent beauty or if the piece is instrumental to the delineation of rasa Even when it possesses alaṁkāra the same must be duly appropriate and must occur in proper quantity. We cannot say that the bare description is kāvya and the beautiful aspect of the object described presents a case of svabhāvokti inasmuch as the beautiful alone makes the 'bare kāvya', which may be embellished later on Compare kārikā III, 1. and vrtti noticing particularly—"tasmādatyantaramaniyasvābhāvikadharmayuktaṁ varnanīyaṁ vastu parigrahanīyam / tathāvidhasya tasya yathāyogamaucitvānusārena rūpakādyalaṁkāra yojanayā bhavitavyam / etāvāṁstu viśeso yat svābhāvikasaundaryaprādhānyena vivakṣitasya na bhūyasā rūpakādyalaṁkāra upakārāya kalpata / vastusvabhāvasaukumāryasya rasādiposanasya vā samācchādanaprasangāt" / In such cases the kāvya cannot bear the burden of embellishments in the manner of a damsel, fond of putting ornaments, discarding ornaments in time of bathing, separation, austerity and the gratification of the sex A man of taste relishes only the natural beauty of poetry Compare "tathā caitasmin visaye sarvākāramalamkāryaṁ vilāsavatīva punarapi snānasamaya virahavrataparigraha suratāvasānādau nātyantamalaṁkaranasahatām pratipadyate/ svābhāvikasaukumāryasyaiva rasikahrdayāhlādakāritvāt" / (VJ Hindi, p 297)

(ix) The position revealed just above is quite after the heart of Ānanda who desires that the alamkāras should be appropriate to the rasas and at times the delineation of the alamkāras should be abandoned Vide, Dhv. Kārikās II, 14-19,

and particularly "kāle ca grahaṇatyāgau nātinirvahaṇaiṣitā" (Dhv. p. 223). Mammaṭa also maintained almost the same position by holding that ordinarily poetry should always be embellished but in places (i. e., where there is a rasa, as it may be gathered from his examples) the kāvya may also occur without any alaṁkāra. (Vide, KP. I).

(x) Examples of matters of fact having inherent charm (vastu-vakratā) would show that either they present charming ālambaṇa or uddīpanabibhāvas and thereby become instrumental to the suggestion of rasa and present cases of dhvani-kāvya or they present cases of vastudhvani themselves. In the verse 'tāṁ prāṅmukhīṁ tatra niveśya tanvīm,' etc., an excess of beauty of Pārvatī is wanted to be conveyed. Compare : "atra tathāvidhasvābhāvikasaukumāryamanoharaḥ śobhātiśayaḥ kaveḥ pratipādayitumabhipretaḥ" (VJ, Hindī, p. 298), which reveals the fact that the idea of excess of beauty is conveyed by suggestion. Hence, here we may discover a vastudhvani and from the standpoint of Ānanda the appeal of the verse may be due to that vastudhvani. And as regards rasadhvani there is a recognition by Kuntaka himself.

(xi) Possibly the Vakroktijīvita would be the best example to show how far-reaching the influence of Dhvanyāloka was. Kuntaka does not adversely criticise the dhvani theory but it is clear that in the VJ. he wants to present a parallel theory and not a rival one. Dr. Keith observes : "a poem attains at best a transcendental charm (lokottaravaicitrya) which can be judged in the long run only by the man of taste, a result in which Kuntala agrees largely with the theory which he attacks" (HSL. p. 392). Kuntaka recognises the vyañjanā vyāpāra and refers his readers to the Dhvanikāra himself in respect of the same. Compare : "pratīyate iti kriyāpadavaicitryasyāyamabhiprāyo......yasmād dhvanikāreṇa vyaṅgyavyañjakabhāvo'tra sutarāṁ samarthitastat kiṁ paunaruktyena." (VJ. Hindī, p. 196). Kuntaka never had the occasion to refute the idea of dhvani. On the contrary, he equated some of the

varieties of vakrokti with some sort of dhvani Compare his remark under the context of paryāyavakratā "esa eva ca śabdaśaktimūlānu-ranana rūpavyangyasya padadhvanervisayah (p 211) Ānanda recognised the suggestive capacity of the words, syllables, sentences and the prabandhas, etc, and Kuntaka also recognised vakratā in the different aspects of the composition as enumerated above, and this fact led Ruyyaka to remark "upacaravakratādibhih samasto dhvaniprapañcah svīkrtah (AS p 10)

Kuntaka's attitude towards rasa was also almost the same as that of Ānanda Hence, we may compare with profit,

nirantararasodgāragarbhasandarbhanirbharah /
girah kavīnām jīvanti na kathāmātramāśritah //

(VJ. IV, 11)

with "kavinā kāvyamupanibadhnatā sarvātmanā rasaparatantrena bhavitavyam na hi kaveriti vrttamātranirvahanena kiñcitprayojanam itihāsādereva tatsiddheh". (Dhv III, p 336)

(xii) The major point of difference between the two theories is that the vakrokti theory recognises vakrokti as the jīvita (life) of poetry while dhvani theory recognises dhvani as the soul of poetry But in final analysis we observe that both the theories demand that in kāvya there must be a lokottaravaicitrya as so very rightly pointed out by Dr Keith

So far we have seen how Kuntaka has been a subject to the intellectual sway of Ānandavardhana. But his own work has been of very little consequence It may be supposed that Mammata adopted his principle in accepting citra as a genuine (though the worst) variety of kavya But Kuntaka also did not appreciate an alamkāra of sound for alamkara's sake The meaning must have adequate appeal We gather it from his observation on the verses "bhana taruni, etc, (VJ Hindi, pp 18-19) as "pratibhādāridryadainyād', etc This position of Kuntaka was adopted and appreciated by Mammata by saying "atra vacyasya vicintyamānam na kiñcidapi cātutvam pratīyate ityapustarthatatvānuprāsasya vaiphalyam" (KP X.)

and by Viśvanātha by quoting the verse "ananuraṇan" as an illustration of "anuprāse vaiphalyasyāpuṣṭārhatvam" (SD. VII.).

In this manner we find some of the views of Kuntaka being adopted by later ālaṁkārikas but his conception of vakrokti lost all its width and has been reduced to the position of a mere śabdālaṁkāra. Ruyyka recognised vakrokti as the designation of alaṁkāras in general but ultimately adopted the term to designate a variety of arthālaṁkāra in his own work. Cf. "vakorktiśabdaś-cālaṁkārasāmānyavacanopīhālaṁkāraviśeṣe samjñitaḥ" (AS. p., 222). Vidyānātha in Ekāvalī and Appayadīkṣita in CM also took it to designate a variety of arthālaṁkāra. But Mammaṭa's vakrokti is only a śabdālaṁkāra and Viśvanātha also considers vakrokti as a figure of words. Moreover, Viśvanātha criticised Kuntaka's theory on the strength of the argument that vakrokti being simply an alaṁkāra can never be the jīvita of kāvya. But it will be fair to Kuntaka to note here that Viśvanātha's argumnnts against the theory of Kuntaka is not justified in so far as the latter's conception of vakrokti was quite different from that of the former.

Of the later critics of the theory Mahimabhaṭṭa was possibly most correct in making the assesment that the vakrokti theory was nothing other than the dhvani theory in disguise. Mahima quotes the definition of vakrokti and questions that vakrokti should mean a statement distinct from the ordinary speech either because of (1) a propriety in the use of words and senses or because of (2) the statement being suggestive of a prātīyamāna (suggested) sense. Now, (1) if the former alternative is understood then we must hold that the vakrokti is suggestive of rasa in so far as there can be a question of propriety only with reference to a contextual rasa. If indeed vakrokti thus pre-supposes an invariable presense of rasa then there is no novelty in the theory of vakrokti. (2) If the second alternative is understood then the definition of vakrokti is nothing other than a definition of dhvani itself and Mahima suspects

that it is because of this fact the classification of vakrakti and the various examples are entirely modelled on the scheme of dhvani Compare

yat punah "śabdārthau sahitau tadvidāhladakāriṇi "ityādinā śastrādiprasiddhaśabdārthopanibandhavyatireki yad vaicitryam tanmatralaksanam vakratvam nāma kāvyasya jivita miti dvitiyapakṣaparigrahe punardhvanerevedam lakṣanam anayā bhangyabhihitam bhavati abhinnatvādvastunah / ata eva cāsya ta eva prabhedāstanyevodaharanāni taitupadarśitani / (VV pp 124-126)

The anumana theory The anumana theory has been propounded by Mahimabhaṭṭa in his illustrious work called Vyaktiviveka We have seen that although Kuntaka tried to develop a parallel theory he had very little dispute with Ānanda But writers like Bhaṭṭanāyaka, author of Hrdayadarpana and Mukulabhaṭṭa, author of Abhidhavṛttimātrka wrote with the express purpose of demolishing the dhvani theory Commenting on Mahimabhaṭṭa s reference to Hrdayadarpana in the verse, VV, I, 4, Ruyyaka says that the Hṛdayadarpana was meant for demolishing the dhvani theory (darpano hṛdaya darpanākhyo dhvanidhvamsagrantho'pi) The Hrdayadarpana is not yet discovered, but we know from Ruyyaka's references that he was fully acquainted with the work Mukulabhaṭṭa wanted to include the vyañjana function in lakṣanā But it will be seen that his was a meagre doctrine and Mammaṭa very ably met his challenge in the SVV and the KP Dhanañjaya, the author of DR and Dhanika the author of Avaloka on DR, were the other notable critics who tried to prove the redundancy of the vyañjanā function and argued that the tātparya is enough to convey the so called vyangya (suggested) sense

Of all the later critics of the dhvani theory the most notable was, however, Mahimabhatta Mahima wrote a full length book called Vyaktiviveka to examine afresh the true nature of the vyangya sense and found out that all the varieties of dhvani

may duly be included in the scope of anumāna (inference).

anumāne'ntarbhāvaṁ sarvasyaiva dhvaneḥ prakāśayitum /
vaaktivivekaṁ kurute praṇamya mahimā porāṁ vācam //
(VV, I, 1).

Mahima criticised not only the conception of dhvani but also every word and syllable of the Dhv., wherever he found a fault. But it may be observed that, Mahima had in the core of his heart a great amount of admiration for Ānanda and had agreement with Ānanda's views in most places as regards the causes, effects and the essense of kāvya. Mahima also expressly recognised Ānanda's greatness and like Bhāravi saying "varaṁ virodho'pi satāṁ mahātmabhiḥ" he said :

"iha sampratipattito'nyathā vā
dhvanikārasya vaco'vivecanaṁ naḥ /
nityataṁ yaśase prapatsyate
yanmahatāṁ saṁstava eva gauravāya //
(VV. I. 3).

We may now note the salient features of Mahima's theory as follows :

(i) Mahima does not disagree with the view that the soul of poetry is rasa. He says :
"kāvyasyātmani saṁjñini rasādirūpe na kasyacidvimatiḥ".

(2) Mahima recognises the phenomenon of vyañjanā in case of the lamp and the jar. But such a natural vyañjakatva is not recognised in the dhvani kāvya. There is only an artificial vyañjakatva as in the case of dhūma (smoke) and agni (fire).

svābhāvikaṁ dhvaneryuktaṁ vyañjakatvaṁ na dīpavat /
dhūmavat kintu kṛtakaṁ sambandhāderapekṣaṇāt //
(VV. p. 133).

(3) Mahimabhaṭṭa does not recognise any dyotakatva (i.e., vyañjakatva) even in case of the upasargas and the nipātas. For example, the sense of prakarṣa (excess) depends on the use of the upasarga 'pra' and as such the sense of prakarṣa

should be understood as a vācya sense of 'pra'. These so called dyotakas are as good as the viś-sampadas and have vācakatva all right as in the case of the word nīla in nīlotpala The upasargas and the nipātas are called dyotaka in a figurative manner because of a wrong observation of simultaneity in the cognition of the nipāta or the upasarga and the associate word. Cf. "prādiprayogānugama vyatirekānusārinī bhramo bhakternibandhanam // (VV p 134) This being the position regarding dyotaka upasargas and nipātas, an analogy with the suggestive dhvani cannot be established

(4) Mahima does not recognise a relation of the suggester and the suggested between the audible letters and the sphoṭa Hence, according to Mahima, the application of the term dhvani on the basis of a similarity of the suggestive kāvya with the audible sounds (śrūyamāna varnas), otherwise called dhvani, is not justified. Compare "ata eva śrūyamānānām śabdānām dhvani vyapadeśyānām . gamyagamaka-bhāvasyopagamāt "

(V V P. 57)

(5) Mahimabhaṭṭa recognises abhidhā alone as a function of the word According to him there is no Laksanāvrtti and the lakṣyārtha also can be had through a process of anumāna He argues that there cannot be more than one śakti (power) of the word. If at all there be more than ore śakti they should all operate at a time just as in the case of fire we find both the śaktis, dāhakatva and the prakāśakatva (i e , powers of burning and revealing), operating simultaneously Hence if we recognise both the abhidhā and the laksana śaktis in the word then there should not be an order of cognition of the senses conveyed by the two powers Hence, the laksanā function must belong to some different substratum and that is none other than the vācyārtha (express sense) If the vacyārtha is supposed to be the substratum of laksana then that function must be identical with inference. In 'gaurbahīka' the primary meaning of the word 'gauh' which appears to have identity with 'bāhīka' leads to the inference of a partial identity

(similarity) between 'gauḥ' and 'bāhīka' because of its failure to have any congruity in respect of its identity with Bāhīka. Compare : "yat punarasyānekaśakti....../ tathāhi gaurbāhīka ityādau tāvadgavādayo'rthā bādhitabāhīkādyarthāntaraikātmyāstādrūpyavidhānānyathānuyapattyā kenacidaṁśenatatra tattvamanumāpayanti na sarvātmanā." (VV. pp. 108-110). Just as a case of anyathānupapatti leads to inference here, we have the case of avinābhāva leading to an anumāna in "kṛśāṅgyāḥ santāpaṁ vadati visinipatraśayanam." For Mahima anumāna is defined as the arrival at the knowledge of some other thing from the knowledge of some thing on the strength of avinābhāva (i. e., invariable concommitance or the relation of non-separation). Wherever there is the act of speaking (vadana) there must be an expression of an idea (prakāśa) and as such 'prakāśa' is the invariable effect of 'vadana'. Compare :

"avinābhāvāvasāyapūrvikā hyanyato'nyasya pratītiranumānamityanumānalakṣaṇamuktam / tathā hi vadatītyādau vadanāderarthāntarasya prakāśādeḥ pratītiḥ.........na cāyaṁ svārthameva pratipādayati tasya bādhopapatteḥ" (VV. p. 111). That the word 'vadati' conveys not only its express sense which is to be discarded as incongruous, is the opinion also of the supporters of the vyañjanā and the lakṣaṇā functions.

(6) If it is argued that the idea of prakāśa is had by a process of 'arthāpatti' then also that is none other than a case of amumāna since arthāpatti is included in the scope of anumāna. Compere :

"tarhyanyathānupapattyā......... arthāpatteranumānāntarbhāvābhyupagamādityuktam". (VV. p. 112).

(7) Mahima explains and designates the phenomenon of suggestion (vyañjanā) as poetic inference (kāvyānumiti), which is defined as follows :

vācyastadanumito vā yatrārtho'rthāntaraṁ prakāśayati /
sambandhataḥ kutaścit sā kāvyānumitirityuktā //
(VV. I. 25. p. 125).

Mahima tries to explain all the varieties of dhvani as cases of kāvyānumiti In śabdaśaktimūla dhvani he must have some reason to arrive at the non-contextual meaning and as such the instances present kāvyānumiti Even in case of ślesa Mahima demands that there must be an adequate reason for conveying more thān one sense and as such whatever additional meaning is had must be derived as an inferred meaning If there be no adequate reason for arriving at a further meaning the very effort of the poet to present a ślesa will prove only a fruitless strain Compare

tasmadarthāntaravyaktihetau kasmimścanasati /
yah ślesabandhanirbandhah kleśāyaiva kaverasau //
(VV I 86, p 348)

(8) Just as Ānanda believes that the meaning had through suggestion has a greater appeal, Mahima thinks that the meaning that is arrived at through anumāna is more appealing Cf "vacyo hyartho na tathā camatkāramātanoti yatha sa eva vidhinişedhādih kākvabhidheyatāmanumeyatām vavatirna iti svabhava evayamarthānām / " (VV I p 54)

(9) But even then the poem must have the invariable association of rasa In absence of rasa even a series of anumeyā rthas will not render it a kāvya and the composition will be as condemnable as prahelikā For instance, in the verse, vivarla sura a smae, we have a good number of anumeyārthas, but the mental process of the numerous inferences itself obstructs any relish of rasa, Compare 'tadiyamupāyapāramparoparoha nissaha kavyamityativyaptih // (p 86), 'kavivyāpāro hi kāvyamucyate (p 95), and 'isyate cāsau tatrāpi prahelikadau ca nirase syāt anumīyate (p 100)

(10) According to Mahimabhatta the permanent mental states of love sorrow, etc, belonging to poetical characters are inferred through the cognition of the vibhava, anubhava and the vyabhicāribhavas described in the kavya A pleasurable rumination over the sthāyibhāva (permanent state), thus

inferred is called rasa. It is the inexplicable magic of the poetry that the inferred sthāyibhāvas lead to the exquisite pleasure of rumination whereas in ordinary life the sthāyibhāvas as belonging to others do not lead to any such pleasure. Compare : "āstāṁ vā ratyādirnityaparokṣaḥ / pratyakṣo'pi hyarthaḥ sākṣāt saṁvedyamānaḥ sacetasāṁ na tathā camatkāram-ātanoti yathā sa eva satkavinā vacanagocaratāṁ gamitaḥ / yaduktam—

kaviśaktyarpitā bhāvāstanmayībhāvayuktitaḥ /
tathā sphurantyami kāvyānna tathādhyakṣataḥ kila // iti /
so'pi ca teṣāṁ na tathā svadate, yathā tairevānume-
yatāṁ nīta iti svabhāva evāyaṁ na paryanuyogamarhati /
(VV. I. pp. 73-74).

(11) Mahima accepts almost all the cases of dhvani and explains them in terms of kāvyānumiti. But wherever he finds difficulty in applying the process of inference he discards the case altogether. According to Ānanda there is śabda-śaktimūla dhvani in the verse "unnataḥ prollasaddhāraḥ" (Dhv. II. p.241). But as Mahimabhaṭṭa finds it difficult to admit a process of anumāna, he contends that in the said verse no additional (suggested) meaning is cognised at all. Cf.

"unnataḥ prollasaddhāraḥ kālāgurumalīmasaḥ /
payodharabharastanvyāḥ kaṁ na cakre'bhilāṣiṇam //"
ityatra tvanantaroktaḥ prakāro na sambhavatīti kuto'rthā-
ntarapratītiḥ / (VV. III. p. 417).

(12) In the matter of aucitya and doṣa Mahima is fully after Ānanda, since aucitya and doṣa owe their origin to the relative position of the contextual rasa. (Vide, VV. II).

That vyañjanā may be confused with anumāna has been apprehended by Ānanda himself, and in the proper place we shall see how to reconcile the dhvani theory with the bold arguments of Mahimabhaṭṭa. But, despite Mahima's intellectual wealth he hardly succeeded in having any follower and the only commentary, supposed to have been composed by

Ruyyaka and recovered only partially, also defends the dhvani theory against his bold criticisms

The aucitya theory This theory has been propounded by the Kashmirian polymath Ksemendra (2nd & 3rd quarter of the 11th century) The plain meaning of aucitya is propriety The theory claima that aucitya is the very life of kāvya, which is in intimate relation with rasas like śrngāra, etc ("aucityam rasasiddhasya sthiram kāvyasya jīvitam', k 5) This aucitya, i e., appropriateness is desired to be present in as many as twentyeight places like the word, sentence, meaning of the composition, guna and alamkāra and, indeed, in every limb of the kāvya (kārikās, 8-10) Aucitya is so very important that it infuses life to rasa, the very soul of kāvya ("aucitya sya rasajīvitabhūtasya vicāram kurute'dhuna," k 3)

A sketch of the development of the conception of aucitya from the days of Dandin through Ānandavardhana, Kuntaka and Mahimabhaṭṭa is given in full length by Dr Sūryakānta It is observed by him that of all the writers Ksemendra alone gave aucitya the status of the very soul of poetry Dr Sūrya kānta also regrets that Ānanda does not give any definition of aucitya (Kṣemendra Studies, p 67). Kśemendra, on the other hand, defines aucitya as follows •

ucitam prahurācaryāh sadrśam kila yasya yat /
ucitasya ca yo bhāvastadaucityam pracaksate //

"The great masters have called that to be proper which is verily suited to a certain thing The abstract idea of being proper, goes by the name of propriety (aucitya) ' But in this definition also 'a certain thing' with reference to which alone the aucitya is determined remains uncertain An analysis of Ānanda's treatment of aucitya shows that an element of kavya may be proper or improper only with reference to the contextual rasa. Ānanda declares "Except impropriety, there is no other cause for the abatement in the relish of poetry. A composition containing the well known propriety is the very secret

of rasa" (Dhv. III. 3). An analysis of the Aucityavicāracarcā will show that Kṣemendra also determines propriety or impropriety with reference to the contextual rasa. Let us have some examples : In the verse "magnāni dviṣatāṁ" (AVC. p. 2.). the word 'mugdha' is admired as rendering the meaning more appropriate. But the meaning, in fact, is rendered more suggestive of the simplicity of the nāyikā and thus renders the piece more effectively suggestive of rasa. Again, compare vṛtti under the verse "lāvaṇya draviṇa" (AVC. p. 2), where a better word is suggested for being more appropriate to the love-lorn lady under description, which surely indicates the determination of propriety by the contextual vipralambhaśṛṅgāra rasa. Or, we may compare the vṛtti under the verse "devo dayāvān" (AVC. p. 3) running as "atra bhīmasya......padairunnidraraudrarasasvarūpānurupo vakyārthaḥ sajīva ivāvabhāsate" where there is a direct reference to a rasa as the factor regulating the aucitya of the words (padas). In this manner examples may be multiplied to a good number to show that the word 'yasya' in Kṣemendra's definition of aucitya means nothing other than rasa although it is not explicitly stated in the definition. To be brief, Kṣemendra in his whole thesis echoes what has been very briefly stated by Ānanda in—

"anaucityādṛte nānyadrasabhaṅgasya kāraṇam /
prasiddhaucityabandhastu rasasyopaniṣatparā //
(Dhv. III.)[52]

It may be noted that Kṣemendra does not have any occasion to critise Ānandā; rather he follows Ānanda as by quoting the kārikā,—

"avirodhī virodhī vā raso'ṅgini rasāntare /
paripoṣaṁ na netavyastathā syādavirodhitā //
(Dhv. III, 24)[53]

Thus we have a brief sketch of the principal trends in the

52. Also vide, HSP, Kane, p. XCVIII.

53. In AVC. p. 14. the kārikā is read as "virodhi vāvirodhī vā"

development of Sanskrit poetics. By now we can also see what a strategic position the dhvani theory occupies in that course of development and as the first propounder of the same theory Ānandavardhana occupies the most important position amongst all the ālamkārikas Ānanda's influence over the later writers is recognised by Jagannātha, the last of the most notable writers in the expression—"ānandavardhanena sarvālamkārik-asaranivyavasthāpakatvāt" Hence, we are led to discuss in the following pages, some of the more important contents of the dhvani theory in general and the Dhvanyāloka in particular. We will also try to assess its value by way of referring concurrently to some of its western and modern parallels.



CHAPTER II

DHVANYĀLOKA AND THE DHVANI THEORY

The basis of the theory : The dhvani theory is based on the postulate that the most important element in poetry is its import. In Dhv. I. 2, Ānanda states that, the meaning of poetry, which is recognised as the soul of poetry when it can appeal to the men of taste, has primarily two aspects, viz., the 'expressed' and the 'suggested'. Compare :

"yo'rthaḥ sahṛdayaślāghyaḥ kāvyātmeti vyavasthitaḥ /
vācyapratīyamānākhyau tasy bhedāvubhau smṛtau // (I. 2).

In Dhv. I. 1, and in several other places Ānanda propounds that dhvani is the soul of kāvya, or in other words, the suggested meaning alone is the most essential element. Hence, the meaning in general being called the soul of kāvya in I. 2, may cause a confusion and, indeed, it has been much objected to by Mhimabhaṭṭa. But in fact Ānanda's stand is not vitiated by the kārikā I. 2. Ānanda in this kārikā propounds for the first time that in kāvya the meaning (artha) alone is the most important factor; and the meaning being appealing to the men of taste may even be designated as the very soul of kāvya. In the second kārikā itself it is not convenient for Ānanda to state that the more predominant pratīyamānārtha is the soul of kāvya, because he is yet to introduce a variety of meaning called the pratīyamānārtha. The kārikā I. 2, is only an adequate fore-word to the introduction of a pratīyamānārtha as distinct from the express sense which is commonly known and already set forth in various ways by the earlier ālaṁkārikas. (I. 3.). In the vṛtti of kārikā 1, 4 Ānanda ably shows that in poetry there may be a meaning other than the commonly understood express sense. Such an implied meaning is altogether different from the express sense and in no case liable to be confused with the latter. For example, the verse "bhama

dhammia"[1] expressly conveys the idea of an injunction (vidhi), but the men of taste gather also the additional idea that the intelligent girl is prohibiting the pious man from going to the bank of Godāvari. Prohibition (nisedha) being just the opposite of injunction (vidhi) need not be confused with the express sense. More examples and arguments are presented by Ānanda himself to show as to how the suggested sense claims a sharp distinction from the express sense in the first and the third uddyotas.

Varieties of the pratīyamānārtha: The pratīyamānārtha (i e, suggested sense) may be of three types In one of these types we get it as a vastumātra, i e., a mere matter of fact. Such a matter of fact is had in the verse 'bhama dhammia' in the form of the information that the girl is prohibiting the pious man. The second type is alaṁkāra, i. e., a figure. The figures of speech, which are defined in so many words, have certain single ideas at their base. In case of upamā we have a basic idea of similarity, in case of vyatireka we have the basic idea of superiority of either the upameya or the upamāna over the other. When such ideas are presented in a charming manner we have an alamkāra If the charming idea is expressly conveyed then we have a vācya alaṁkāra and if the charming idea is suggested we have a suggested alamkāra. For example in the verse,

> vīrānaṁ ramai ghusinarunammi na tadā piāthanucchaṅge /
> diṭhṭhi riugaakumbhatthalammi jaha bahalasindūre //(sic.)[2]

The express meaning is that the temples succeed better than the breasts in drawing attention of the heroes. Hence, there is

1. Dhv p 52. "O pious man, now you roam with all confidence, for, the dog has been killed to-day by the fierce lion which resides on the bank of the river Godavari "

2. Dhv p 262. "The sight of heroes does not so delight in their beloveds' breasts red with saffron anointment as in the temples of enemies' elephants, painted deep in vermilion."

an express vyatirekālaṁkāra. The suggested idea is that, there is a point of similarity between the breasts and the temples. The breasts are as large as the temples and hence attractive. But this idea of similarity is not expressly conveyed and hence we have a suggested alaṁkāra. The suggested alaṁkāras are also matters of fact in a sense. But while vastumātra is a bare statement of fact the suggested alaṁkāra happens to be more charming and involves some of the basie ideas underlying the different vācya alaṁkāras.

An outline of the rasādi variety : The third variety of the pratīyamāna sense is called rasādi. 'Rasādi' means 'rasa and others like rasa'. The list of 'rasa and others like rasa' is not given completely by Ānanda. Ānanda names only rasa, bhāva rasābhāsa, bhāvābhāsa and bhāvapraśānti (Dhv. II. 3), Abhinava presents a very long discussion on the nature of rasa. Abhinava's conception of rasa will be discussed at length later on. It will suffice to remember here that it is an exquisite joy caused by the rumination of a sentiment[3] felt by the reader with sympathy for the hero of the kāvya. The feeling is suggested to be belonging to the poetical character but because of an identification of the sympathetic reader with the poetical character the reader experiences the feeling as belonging to himself also. But yet it is not precisely like a personal feeling of the ordinary life. Since the reader shares the feeling with the poetical character and the sentimental poet and also the other readers like himself the feeling is said to be experienced in a generalised state. The reader's capacity to ldentify himself with some literary character or the poet is called 'hṛdayasaṁvāda'[4] and that such a case of indentification is necessary for the realisation of rasa is explicit from the following extracts.

3. Here sentiment means a sthāyibhāva or a permanent mental state like that of love or sorrow.

4. According to Ānanda 'saṁvāda' means 'anyasādṛśya'. Significance of the term may be had from Dhv. iv, 11-13,

(a) tannidanabhūtāyā hrdayasamvadādyupakrtaya vibhāva disāmagrya lokottararūpatvāt (Locana p 187) (b) rāma dicaritam tu na sarvasya hrdaysamvadīti mahatsāhasam (Locana p 187) (c) hṛdayasamvādatanmayībhavana kramādāsvādyamanatām pratipannah (Locana pp 85 86) Hence, the realisation of rasa consists in an intense experience of a sentiment and the resultant exquisite joy For example, a verse is said to have the suggested meaning as karuna-rasa (i e, pathetic sentiment) when from the reading of its contents the sentiment of pathos develops also in the heart of the reader It is the unworldly way of the world of poetry that a continued experiencing of the same feeling of pathos itself leads to an exquisite joy

Abhinava defines bhāvadhvani as follows 'tatra yadā kaścidudriktavasthām pratipanno vyabhicārī camatkārātiśaya prayojako bhavati, tadā bhāvadhvanih' (Locana, p 175) Here 'udrikta' may mean' 'increased', excessive', 'distinct' or 'evident or 'abundant' It is not clear from Abhinava's words if the vyabhicāri is to be simply recognised or it is to be experienced by the sahrdaya (i e, man of taste) as belonging to himself But as bhāva is treated in the same footing as rasa and as both are said to be suggested instantaneously, being termed as asamlaksyakramavyangya (i e, suggested through an unnoticeable sequence) we may conclude that in bhāvadhvani also the relevant vyabhicāribhāva is experienced by the reader himself For example, if in a piece the vyabhicāribhāva lajjā (shame) is to be taken as suggested instanteously, thus presenting a case of bhāvadhvani, the same feeling of lajja must be experienced by the readers themselves

To define rasabhāsa Abhinava says, "yada tu vibhavābhāsā dratyābhasodayastada vibhāvanubhāsaccarvanābhāsa iti rasā bhāsasya visayah" (Locana, pp 177-178) This means that the rasabhāsa is the relish of a sentiment from a semblance of vibhava (and anubhava) for, in order to explain the significance of the term ābhasa Abhinava says—' anukrtiramukhy-

atā ābhāsa iti hyeko'rthaḥ" (p. 179). Vivhāva has two aspects namely, (1) ālambana or the object (or person) in respect of which the emotion of the dramatic character arises, and (2) uddīpana or the entire surrounding, which enhances the emotion towards the object which primarily stimulates emotion. In case of rasābhāsa semblance of vibhāva means semblance of ālambana vibhāva, and we have such a vibhāva when the relation of the poetic character with the object of emotion is not genuine or when such an emotion, although it is duly stimulated, is not proper towards the object in hand.

Abhinava does not define bhāvābhāsa, but, it can be inferred that a suggestion of vyabhicārī on the strength of a semblance of vibhāva's is meant by bhāvābhāsa. Once we understand what is 'bhāva' there need not be any difficulty in understanding bhāvodaya, bhāvapraśama and bhāvasandhi which are its different aspects only. (Cf. "rasabhāvaśabdena ca tadābhāsatatpraśamāvapi saṁgṛhītāveva, avāntaravaicitrye'pi tadekarūpatvāt" (Locana. p. 90).

Importance of rasādi : This rasādi variety is the most important variety of the suggested sense. With the enthusiasm to assert it Ānanda says : "That very rasādi variety is the soul of poetry. That is why in the days of yore, sorrow of Vālmīki at the separation of the curlew couple took the form of a śloka," (Dhv. I, 5). In this statement there are two parts, viz., (1) 'that very rasādi veriety is the soul of kāvya' (kāvyasyātmā sa evārthaḥ) and (2) 'the sorrow of the first poet, caused by the separation of the curlew couple took the form of a verse' (ādikaveḥ purā krauñcadvandvaviyogotthaḥ śokaḥ ślokatvamāgataḥ). From the first part we learn that although there are other varieties of the suggested sense, although the suggssted sense in general should be recognised as the soul of poetry because of the general statements 'kāvyasyātmā dhvaniḥ' (I. 1) and 'arthaḥ sahṛdayaślāghyaḥ kāvyātmeti vyavasthitaḥ' (I. 2) yet rasa and bhāva are specifically

mentioned because of their importance. (cf "pratīyamānasya cānyabhedadarśane'pi rasabhāvamukhenaivopalakṣaṇam pradhānyāt" Vṛtti, pp 89-90) It is also to be noted that the expression 'rasābhāsa' stands for all the varieties of 'rasādi' Elsewhere Ānanda recognises the importance of either the suggested or the express sense on the strength of its appeal (cf cārutvotkarsanibandhanā hi vācyavyaṅgyayoh prādhāny avivakṣā Vṛtti p 114) Even if we suppose the prādhānya of rasādi over the other varieties of the pratīyamāna (viz vastu and alamkāra) to be on account of greater appeal, we may recognise vastu and alamkāra also as the soul of kāvya in their own capacity Interpreting Ānanda's expression 'prādhanyāt', Abhiava says — "prādhānyadıti / rasaparyavasanādityarthah / tāvanmātraviśrāntāvapi cānyaśabdavailakṣanyakāritvena vast valamkāradhvanerapi jīvitatvamaucityāduktamiti bhāvah' / (Locana p 90) This observation asserts that vastu and alamkāra even occuring as the suggested sense only help delineating the rasa Abhinava also observes that bhāvadhvani, etc, also simply help the delineation of rasa So the most important and appealing factor in kāvya is rasa Even then there is propriety in considering vastudhvani and alamkāra dhvani also as the life of kāvya because of their superiority over ordinary expressions But yet there is the scope for the doubt that if rasa is the most important element and bhāvadhvani and others simply contribute to its suggestion then what is the propriety in recognising dhvani in general, having all the varieties of the suggested sense, as the soul of kāvya? In fact, Mahimabhatta posed this question and even Viśvanatha, himself a supporter of the conception of dhvani, objected to the indiscriminate statement "*kāvyasyātmā dhvanih*". In my opinion the reply to all this is implicit in the words of Ānanda and Abhinava themselves The whole of the Raghuvamśa is a kāvya and even a single verse also may be supposed to be a kavya Sometimes an entire kāvya and sometimes even a part of it may be considered a kāvya and their respective merits may be subjected to assesment separately. In most of the varieties of

kāvya we find rasa as the most essential element of the entire composition. In some verses or parts of the longer kāvya we may be charmed by the suggested vastu or the alaṁkāra also. At times we single out verses from the body of a longer composition. [5] In such cases the charm of the composition may be due to a bhāvadhvani or due to the presense of a predominant suggested sense of any variety other than the rasa. That even parts of an entire composition are taken into consideration is evident from the following observations.

(i) sa ca rasādidhvanirvyavasthita eva......tathāpi tasya rasasyaikaghanacamatkārātmano'pi kutaścidaṁśātprayojakībhūtādadhiko'sau camatkāro bhavati. (Locana. p. 175).

(ii) evaṁ rasadhvanerevāmī bhāvadhvniprabhṛtayo niṣyandā āsvāde pradhānaṁ prayojakamevamaṁśaṁ vibhajya pṛthagvyavasthāpyate. (Locana. p. 179).

(iii) yadi vā prabandhe'pi muktakasyāstu sadbhāvaḥ, pūrvaparanirapekṣeṇāpi hi yena rasacarvaṇā kriyate tadeva muktakam / yathā — 'tvāmālikhya praṇayakupitāṁ' ityādiślokaḥ. (Locana, p. 326). The verse 'tvāmālikhya' occurs in the Meghadūta; but Abhinava is prepared to consider it as a muktaka (i. e., a poem comprising of a single verse) free from the entire context. Thus the verse 'tvāmālikhya' may stand as a piece of dhvani on its own merit.

This very principle of relative charm and isolation is followed in time of considering the citra and the guṇībhūtavyaṅgya type of kāvya also. Citra is conceived as a variety of composition having no rasa or any suggested sense but only an appeal due to its figures. The guṇībhūtavyaṅgya type is conceived as a type of kāvya having a suggested sense *sans* predominance. In this connection we may consider the following points. (i)

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5. Rājaśekhara also favours the idea of assesing the merits of a verse in isolation from the context. cf. "The subject of description may be in an isoloted verse or in a prabandha, each of which is of five kinds." (HSP. Kane, p. LXXIII).

Dhv III, 39 states that we should not be very hasty to call that kavya a dhvani when it appears more reasonable to apply only the designation of a gunībhutavyangya kavya to it (ii) But with reference to the contextual rasas even isolated cases of gunībhūtavyaṅgya also should be considered as dhvani (Dhv III 40) (iii) In gunībhutavyangya the suggested sense is subservient to the vacya sense But that superiority of vācya is only relative It is also subordinate in relation to the rasa suggested by the larger extent of the composition where the gunībhutavyangya occurs Compare

'ata eveyati yadyapi vācyasya pradhānyam, tathāpi rasadhvanau tasyapi gunateti sarvasya gunībhūtavyangyasya prakare mantavyam / ata eva dhvanerevatmatvamityuktacaram bahuśah' (Locana p 461) (iv) But, yet there may be stray and singled out instances where we may find unalloyed cases of gunībhūtavyangya also For this we are to examine very carefully as to whether there is an intention of the poet to delineate rasa with the help of the singled out passage Compare "yatra tu vākye rasāditatparyam nāsti gunībhūtavyaṅgyaih padairudbhāsite pi tatra gunībhūtavyangyataiva samudāyadharmah' (Dhv p 485) [6]

Significance of the episode of Valmiki Coming to the second part of the kārikā Dhv I, 5, we question, how does the episode of Vālmiki help in establishing the fact that rasa is the most important element in kāvya ? The reply is that Ānanda here lays bare the fact that the Rāmayana is an ideal kavya because of rasa and that it is rich in rasa can be established by a reference to the way of its origin itself What Ānanda means to say is that a sorrow has been caused in the heart of Vālmiki

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6 For a correct assessment of the attitude of Ānandavardhana towards the kāvya having a subordinate suggested sense vide VVV p 103

laksye ca dv[illegible] dham k[illegible]vyam d[illegible] mukhyam gaunam ca / ta ra mukhyam ya ra vya gyasya pradhān[illegible] m[illegible] am gunībhūtavya gyād ga nam / ulhasam ca gr[illegible] [illegible]

by the pitiful wailings of the curlew whose beloved has been killed and Vālmīki burst into the verse "mā niṣāda", etc., It cannot be known if Ānanda meant that there is karuṇa rasa in the verse "mā niṣāda". Ānanda says "nihatasahacarīvirahakātarakrauñcākrandajanitaḥ śoka eva ślokatayā pariṇataḥ/śoko hi karuṇasthāyibhāvaḥ/" (Dhv. pp. 88-89). From this it is clear that there was an intimate relation between the phenomenon of the spontaneous composition of the poem "mā niṣāda" and a sense of sorrow (śoka) in the heart of the poet. Ānanda further asserts that śoka is also the sthāyibhāva of karuṇa rasa. The verse 'mā niṣāda' is the begining of the whole Rāmāyaṇa which has karuṇa as its principal rasa (Dhv. pp. 529–530). Ānanda believes that in order to delineate sentiment in poetry the poet himself must be sensitive. The feeling to be depicted must already run through every vein of the poet. It is very desirable for the poet himself to be suffused with emotions. To assess this position of Ānanda we may compare the following also.

(i) Figures come in a competitive manner to the composition of a poet suffused with emotion. ("...rasasamāhita cetasaḥ pratibhānavataḥ kaverahampūrvikayā parāpatanti." Dhv. pp. 221–222).

(ii) śṛṅgārī cetkaviḥ kāvye jātaṁ rasamayaṁ jagat /
sa eva vītarāgaścennīrasaṁ sarvameva tat //
(Dhv. p. 498).

It is also severally stated that the reader also must have a heart sufficiently sensitive to feel the sentiment depicted in a piece of composition. Note the significant term—"sacetasām" in Dhv. I. 12. Ānanda, indeed, explains 'sahṛdayatva' as the aliveness to the depicted sentiments. cf. "rasajñataiva sahṛdayatvamiti" (Dhv. p. 359).

All these extracts clearly show that according to Ānanda, poetry owes its very origin to an intense feeling of sentiment in the heart of the poet and any composition of such a poet im-

bubed in sentiment is destined to be rich in the suggestion of rasa.[7] Thus with the help of the episode of Vālmīki, Ānanda tries to bring home the idea that rasa is the most important element in kāvya. Rāmāyaṇa is great because of its rasa, and it is an instruction from Ānanda to the would be poets that in order to make the kāvya rich in sentiment the poet himself must have an intense feeling as Vālmīki had. Moreover, Ānanda believes that the poet and the reader and the poetical character must all experience the same sentiment, and this is nothing other than what has been more precisely stated by Bhaṭṭatauta, Abhinava's teacher, in the extract "nāyakasya kaveḥ śrotuḥ samānonubhavastataḥ" (quoted in Locana, p. 92

It requires to be noted here that in some of the places referred to above Ānanda does not use the term rasa in its technical sense of a sentimental experience or relish of the reader but in a loose sense to mean a sentiment in general. In fact we cannot help using the term rasa in a general non technical sense also. Rasa as an experience belongs to the reader but yet the kāvya which stimulates the experience of permanent state is also said to have rasa. Hence, Dhanañjaya observes that we should have a secondary implication of the expression 'rasavat

7. cf. "Given the same natural qualifications he who feels the emotions to be described will be the most convincing, distress and anger, for instance are portrayed most truthfully by one who is feeling them at the moment. Hence, it is that poetry demands a man with a special gift for it, or else one with a touch of madness in him, the former can easily assume the required mood, and the latter may be actually beside himself with emotion" De Poetica, Chapter XVII.

That a sentiment similar to that of the poet is evoked in the heart of the reader is observed by the most modern critic also. Hence, compare : ". a poetry which by means of myths and symbols seems to convey rather than to describe the extremely complex emotional and intellectual state whence an experience similar to that of the poet will arise." Contemporary French Poetry, p. 1.

kāvyam' as a 'kāvya capable of arousing a sentiment (in the heart of the reader)' and not as a 'kāvya possessing a rasa', just as we have a secondary significance in the expression 'āyurghṛtam' because of a cause and effect realation. [8]

Abhinava, commenting on kārikā, I. 5, seems to tell us some thing different from what has been intended by Ānanda. [9] In Abhinava's estimate the śoka which has been the source of the verse 'mā niṣāda' and its sentiment, already became a rasa in the heart of the ādikavi. In order to be delineated in the kāvya the śoka experienced by the poet no longer remains a personal feeling, but it gets duly universalised. [10] This universalised feeling of śoka causes druti (melting) in the heart of the poet and gets manifested in the form of a verse in the manner of the waters flowing over the brink of a jar. Quoting Bhaṭṭanāyaka's 'yāvatpūrṇo na caitena tāvannaiva vamatyamum' Abhinava wants to assert that in order to give vent to it in the form of a kāvya the poet must experience a sentiment with all his heart. The experience of the sentiment should be so intense and sincere that the poet's experience of the sentiment would be much different from the experience of an ordinary man. Cf. "krauñcadvandvaviyogena......karuṇarasarūpatāṁ laukikaśoka-vyatiriktāṁ.........pratipanno ...... ślokarūpatāṁ prāptaḥ", etc. (Locana, p. 86). Up to this Abhinava does not appear to have any difference from Ānanda. But Abhinava's observation "na tu muneḥ śoka iti mantavyam" appears to run counter to the plain words of Ānanda as, "ādikaveḥ śokaḥ slokatvamāgataḥ." But Abhinava's words may be interpreted to mean that the muni being a sympathetic heart, his śoka does not remain a

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8. DR. IV.

9. Dhv. Trans. pp. 156–158.

10. The emotions of the poetical character shared also by the reader is experienced in a universal form neither strictly belong to the character nor to the reader. The phenomenon of universalisation will be discussed in the next chapter.

śoka of the ordinary personal nature Abhinava himself desires that rasa in its technical sense may be had only when it is suggested by the vibhāvas etc., as delineated in the kāvya which is a piece of art and hence, the feeling of śoka by the muni caused by an worldly scene should not be considered as a rasa Yet we may suppose that the designation of rasa is applied to the said feeling of rasa only to show its distinction from the ordinary personal feelings of the men of non poetical nature It is said not to be 'a śoka of the muni' to mean that the feeling of sorrow is not strictly personal But with all these confusing observations Abhinava sincerely tries to tread the very path laid by his predecessors in Ānanda, Bhaṭṭatauta and Bhaṭṭanāyaka.[10a]

Types of kāvya and position of rasa · Ānandavardhana finds different varieties of kāvya before him. Some of those varieties have rasa and others are devoid of rasa Ānanda proposes to discuss as to what type of composition (samghaṭanā) should be employed in the different types of kāvya Types of composition are understood in terms of the length and frequency of the compounds (i e, samāsas) The criterion for choosing a type of composition for a particular variety of kāvya is the presence or absence of rasa in the said variety Such varieties of kāvya are named in the vṛtti as follows:

"yatah kāvyasya prabhedā muktakam samskṛtaprākṛtāpabhraṁśanibaddham/ sandānitakaviśeṣakakalāpikakulakāni/ paryāyabandhah parikathā khandakathāsakalakathe sargabandhobhineyārthamākhyāyikākathe ityevamādayah /" (Dhv. p 323)[11] Ānanda observes that muktakas (single self sufficient verse poems) may or may not have rasa cf "tatra muktakesu rasabandhābhiniveśinah kavestadāśrayamaucityam/ anyatra kāmacārah/" (p 324) Any type of composition is allowed in 'parikathā' because rasa is not very sincerely desired to be depicted there cf "parikathāyām kāmacārah... nātyantarasabandhābhiniveśāt" (p 325) Even in the epic there may be or may not

10a. See 'Rasa and the Poet' in Chap III, below

11 Vide Locana for definitions

be the intention to delineate rasa. It is however, more desirable to have rasa in the epics. cf. "sargabandhe tu rasatātparye... sādhīyaḥ" (p. 325–26) Abhinava also illustrates "Bhaṭṭajayantaka's [11a] Kādambarīkathāsāra as an epic having the intention of simply telling facts and the Raghuvaṁśa as an epic having the intention of delineating rasa. (Locana, p, 326). In case of kathā and ākhyāyikā also the poet or the poetical charac ter may or may not be suffused with sentiment. cf. "tathā hyatrāpi......pūrvoktamevānusartavyam". (Dhv. p. 326). In this manner Ānanda recognises a good number of kāvyas virtually devoid of rasa. But yet he instructs that it should be the sole intention of the poets to depict rasa in all the varieties of kāvya. He further declares that the very purpose of the work Dhvanyāloka was not only to explain what dhvani is but also to instruct that the poet should solely intend on depicting rasa. cf. "kavinā kāvyamupanibadhnatā ...... tatsiddheḥ" (p. 336) and "...rasādirūpavyaṅgyatātparyamevaiṣāṁ yuktamiti yatnosmābhirārabdho na dhvanipratipādanamātrābhiniveśena"

(pp. 363–364).

A most important factor determining the presence or absence of rasa is the intention of the poet. Ānanda discuses the citra type of composition only on the basis of lack of intention to depict any rasa. Even in a citra there may be a flimsy flash of rasa but that does not deserve to be counted. cf. "vācyasāmarthyavaśena...vyavasthāpyate" (pp. 497–497) Ānanda finally observes that after his instructions are imparted only the beginners may be found to indulge in citra but the matured hand would compose dhvani alone. (cf. "tadevamidānīṁtana...... sthitametat", pp. 499–500). But it is to be noted that as soon as we say 'dhvanireva kāvyam' we revert to the old position

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11a. By the expressian Bhaṭṭajayantaka Abhinava means to refer to Abhinanda, (son of Jayantabhaṭṭa, the celebrated logician of Kashmır) who was the author of the Kādambari Kathāsāra. (vide, S. K. De, History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 324.)

that even vastu and alamkāra may be honoured when presented in a form of dhvani This position is further clarified by the samgrahaślokas following the above extract running as

vasmin raso vā bhāvo va tātparyena prakāśate /
samvrtyābhihitam vastu yatrālamkāra eva vā //

kāvyādhvani dhvanirvyangyapradhānyai anibandhanah /
sarvatra tatra visayī jñeyah sahrdayairjanaih //

Possibly this very catholicity wedded to Ānanda s partiality for rasa allows us to recognise a dhvani school as distinct from the rasa school

Utility of the dhvani theory Proposing to examine the utility of the dhvani theory we are instantaneously reminded of Abhinava s observation under kārikā I 5 as 'anyaśabdavailaks anyakāritvena vastvalamkāradhvanerapi jīvitatvamaucityādukt amiti bhāvah (Locana p 90) which points out that even matters of fact when suggested endows the composition with a distinction (vailakṣanya) Ānanda also shows on several occasions that even a vastu (a matter of fact) when conveyed through suggestion becomes more appealing In this connection we may observe the following points

(i) In kārikā I 25, Ānanda says that in dhvani suggestion conveys such a charming meaning which cannot be conveyed by the ordinary speech If normally expressed the same matter of fact will not be as charming as when it is suggested

(ii) The ideas which are suggested by a few words will require many more words to be denoted Suggestion helps conveying such volumes of ideas that it is almost impossible to convey the same by express statements More charming ideas are conveyed in a compact manner through suggestion with a great economy of words. cf 'vyangya m dharmān' taram prayojir rūpam rājvanirvisanādyasam hrdyam / taccāsaranabhyat vādabhidhāvyāpā cnāsakya amarpanam (Locana, under Dhv II 1, p 169)

(iii) We may also compare Abhinava's comment on the verse "ravisaṁkrāntasaubhāgya" as "asādhāraṇavicchāyatvānupayogitvādidharmajātamasṁkhyaṁ prayojanaṁ vyanakti." Hence an amazing ecoonmy is also another source of appeal.

(iv) What is implicitly obserevd in I. 25 and expressly stated by Abhinava is believed by the modern western critics also. Through suggestion the poet may communicate the incommunicable and volumes of ideas at a time. cf. "By reducing semantic and grammatical redundancy to an unusual level, by relaxing linguistic and social restrictions, the poet attempts to communicate the incommunicable. This is the essence of poetic licence. The thought expressed is accompanied by several other thoughts which are merely suggested" (Word, p. 211). Modern poets of the west and also of India following the ideal of the poets like T. S. Eliot, use the suggestive language for conveying greater volume of ideas and feelings in a compressed from. Compare, "By means of such references and quotations Mr. Eliot attains a compression, otherwise unattainable, that is essential to his aim; a compression approaching simultaneity—the co-presence in the mind of number of different orientations fundamental attitudes, orders of experience" (New Bearings in English Poetry : p, 107). According to E. M. W. Tillyard, suggestion through the employment of allusion (i, e., quotation form earlier poets) results in even economy of space and enrichment of texture. Compare : '...The reference is a true obliquity; it implies without a word of statement : and the result is economy of space and enrichment of texture." (Poetry Direct and Oblique, p. 68).

(v) Utility of composing kāvyas in the form of dhvani lies in the fact that the more appealing idea can be presented only as the suggested content and never as the expressed sense, as it has been observed by Ānanda again and again. Compare: "prasiddhiśceyamastyeva.... yadabhimatataraṁ vastu vyaṅgyatvena prakāśyate na sākṣācchabdavācyatvena." (Dhv. p, 533). This principle is accepted also by Mahimabhaṭṭa who would,

however, designate the suggested (vyangya) as inferred (anumeya), for, he observes, "vācyo hyartho na tathā camatkāramā tanoti yathā sa eva vidhiniṣedhādih kākvabhidheyatāmanumeyatām vāvatīrna iti svabhāva evāyamarthānām " (VV p 54)

(vi) The theory of dhvani had its utility also in bringing a rejuvenation to the old and hackneyed poetical ideas In course of the development of certain literature certain ideas get stereotyped and labelled as poetical and begin to lose the inherent charm on account of being much commonplace Hence, the same ideas require to be given a new expression, and indeed novelty is the greatest secret of beauty as it has been so very rightly observed by Māgha in the statement "kṣaṇe kṣaṇe yannavatāmupaiti tadeva rūpam ramaṇīyatāyāh " The more familiar and the easily accessible have less appeal whereas the new and the cryptic attract us more [12] The pioneers of the modern poetry in the west also are alive to such a problem of old and worn out ideas We find signs of a reaction of the new poets to the hackneyed poetical expressions in the following extract from the New Bearings in English Poetry : ' On the next sentence—'we have become accustomed to the idea that certain things are not poetical'—our commentary runs : Worse, we have become accustomed to the idea that certain things are poetical, e g flowers, dawn, dew, birds, love, archaisms and country place names ; 'that a poet can mention a rose but not a

12 Abhinava also observes that the suggested meaning being not conveyed by the words as the direct express meaning becomes more attractive like the breasts of a young lady, half hidden from the eye, and there lies the necessity of conveying a matter of fact through suggestion Compare, "tallakṣaṇaprayojanam śurakrtavidyasvakānām prāśastyam aśabdavācyatvena gopyamānam sannavikāśakucakalaśam va mahārghatāmu, ayaddhvaryata ||" (Locana p 138) Also compare "nāndhrīpayodhara ivātitarām pragāḍhah no gūrjarīvāna ivātitarām nigūḍhah / artho giramapihitah pihitaśca kaścit saubhāgyameti marahaṭavadhūkucābhah // (Quoted by Pt. Pattābhirama Sastri in Dhv. p 138)

Rolls-Royce'—suspicious" (p. 23). Ānanda also introduced the theory of dhvani for a re-orientation in the poetical expressions. Compare Dhv. IV. 1. and 2. He further observes, "ato dhvaneruktaprabhedamadhyādanyatamenāpi prakāreṇa vibhūṣitā satī vāṇī purātanakavinibaddhārthasaṁsparśavatyapi navatvamāyāti." (The expression of a poet will appear quite novel though it might embody an idea already found in an earlier poet, if it is adorned by atleast a single variety of suggestion from among the many varieties that have been mentioned.) [13] This position is very convincingly illustrated by the distinction in the appeal of the verses 'evaṁ vādini' and 'kṛte varakathālāpe' (Dhv. p. 528).

The suggested meaning itself is supposed to be charming, and if at the same time it occurs as the predominant content it renders the composition all the more beautiful. That is why Ānanda advocates in so strong terms in favour of dhvani (i.e., a kāvya having a predominant suggested sense). The modern critic also desires that the suggested content, in order to be more appealing and effective must occur as the predominant meaning of the composition. Campare —"Lastly it must be borne in mind that the common place, to be of the highest effect, must be powerfully and consistently dominant." (Poetry Direct and Oblique , p. 49).

(vii) The most important purpose served by the dhvani theory was to lay the greatest emphasis ,on rasa. It is already observed that by the time of Ānanda the Sanskrit literature was degenerating to a very regretable extent and it became a slave to the fad and fashion of stereotyped figures. Poetical ideas required to be presented in a new manner and that is why every idea and every object of description was desired to be given a tinge of rasa. Even the old and hackneyed ideas assume new values and charms in association with rasa. This utility of rasa is brought to a bold relief in the kārikā.—

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13. Translation by Dr. Krishnamoorthy.

dṛṣṭapūrvā api hyarthā kāvye rasaparigrahāt /
sarve navā ivābhānti madhumāsa iva drumāḥ //

(Dhv. IV. 4)

But rasa can never be denoted. It must be suggested and that is how we cannot help having dhvanis. In this connection it will be interesting to refer to the following observation also. "Sensibility, then, we may expect to be a very frequent subject of oblique expression, and it is likely to be most truly present when least is said about it ... manifestations." (Poetry Direct and Oblique p. 39)

Other devices for novelty: Ānandavardhana was, however, a realist, and as such being less stubborn about the use of dhvani for novelty, enumerated also other devices for effecting novelty in the expressed content. Those devices are namely, the effecting of distinction in respect of the circumstances (avasthā), place and time, etc. (Dhv. IV. 7). Distinctions in circumstances may mean description of the same object in different situations. Distinction in circumstances may be effected by personification of nonsentient objects like the rivers and the hills. The nonsentient objects are all supposed to have a second sentient personality and novelty in poetry may be obtained by delineating their personality with propriety. Ānanda observes, "ayamaparaścāvasthābhedaprakāro yadacetanānāṃ sarveṣāṃ cetanaṃ dvitīyaṃ rūpamabhimānitvaprasiddham[14] himavadgaṅgādīnām / taccocitacetanaviṣayasvarūpayojanayopanibadhyamānamanyadeva sampadyate" (Dhv. p. 539) Distinction in respect of place is reckoned, for instance, in case of the description of the women belonging to different regions. Compare:

"tathā hi mānuṣāṇāmeva ... , viśeṣato yoṣitām" (p. 541)

In this connection we are very naturally reminded of the al-

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14 The art of personification is in fact as old as the Ṛgvedic literature and it is philosophically sanctioned by the sūtra "abhimānivyapadeśastu viśeṣānugatibhyām" (Brahmasūtra, 2. 1. 5) which seems to be echoed by Ānanda here.

ready quoted verse, 'nāndhrīpayodhara'. Distinction in respect of time may be noticed in case of the different seasons.

The definition of dhvani : The definition of dhvani is given in the kārikā I. 13, which runs as—'yatrāthaḥ śabdo vā tamarthamupasarjanīkṛtasvārthau / vyaṅktaḥ kāvyaviśeṣaḥ sa dhvaniriti sūribhiḥ kathitaḥ //' (That kind of poetry, wherein either the conventional meaning or the word renders itself or its conventional meaning secondary (respectively) and suggests the implied meaning is designated by the learned as DHVANI or suggestive poetry.)

This definition has been subjected to severe criticism by Mahimabhaṭṭa, who pointed out as many as ten defects, (VV. p. 104). The ten defects are duly discussed and a proper reply from the standpoint of Ānanda is also given in the KTS (pp. 38-47). [15] Commenting on the expression "kāvyaviśeṣa" Abhinava writes, "kāvyam ca tadviśeṣaścāsau kāvyasya vā viśeṣaḥ/ —syāditi" (Locana, pp. 104–105). According to this explanation "kāvyaviśeṣa" may mean "either a kind of kāvya" or a "speciality of kāvya". In "kāvyagrahaṇād," etc., Abhinava takes the second meaning, i, e., 'a speciality of kāvya which belongs to a kāvya, consisting of śabda and artha and embellished by guṇa and alaṁkāra, as its soul (ātmā).' This meaning very agreeably accommodates itself with Ānanda's observation "kāvyasyātmā dhvaniriti" in kārikā I.1. If 'kāvyasya viśeṣa' or a 'distinction of kāvya' is called *dhvani we should naturally* have the desire to know, what this distinguishing factor is ? Now, as pointed out by Ruyyaka 'viśeṣa' should mean either a veriety or 'a speciality'. ("atra viśeṣaśabdaḥ prabhedaparyāyotiśayaparyāyo vā syāt." VVV. p. 92). But "sa kāyyaviśeṣa" has a direct relation with 'yatra' (where), which means a substratum or a domain, lying wherein the word and the meaning suggest the pratīyamānārtha (tamartham). If kāvya-viśeṣa means a speciality, it cannot have the relation of identity with what is

15. Vide. I. Aest pp. 313–332.

referred to by 'yatra' Hence at least in this kārikā, 'kāvyaviśeṣa' means a kind of kāvya' (taking viśesa as prabheda-paryāya) Abhinava understands as many as five meanings of the term dhvani, viz., (i) the function of suggestion, (ii) suggestive expression (iii) suggestive meaning, (iv) the suggested content and (v) poetry with predominantly suggested sense In case of the present kārikā he desires us to take the last sense of the term dhvani (Locana pp 105 106) But if we understand a variety of kāvya from the expression kavyaviśeṣa then we are sure to have the doubt as to how 'a kind of kāvya may be called 'the soul of kāvya Understanding dhvani as a kind of kāvya Mahimabhaṭṭa argues that we cannot call a variety of kāvya a dhvani we must call kāvya in general a dhvani since it is desired that all the kāvyas should have rasa cf api ca kāvyaviseṣa ityatra rasatma katvopagamāt. (VV pp 92–93) Dhvani even being under stood as a type of kāvya may be called the soul of kāvya It may be seen that dhvani, gunībhūtavyañeya and citra are only grades of kāvya whereas the different varieties of kāvya are muktaka kulaka, khandakathā etc as seen above Such complete kāvyas are referred to as prabandha (whole composition) Kāvya in general is supposed to be a collection of words [16] Ānanda calls the 'whole composition a prabandha (cf idānī malaksyakramavyangyo dhvanih prabandhātmā rāmāyanamahābhāratādau prakāśamānah prasiddhah eva Dhv pp 328–329) Abhinava shows that the prabandha is constituted of words (cf ' varnasamudāyaśca padam prabandhah Locana, p 302) Ananda tells us that the kāvya is a collection of words in the expressions like, ' śabdātmā kāvyam ti vyapadeśyo (Dhv p 105) In such a kāvya a particular portion also may be sugge-

tive and the same suggestive portion being constituted of śabdas may technically be called a kāvya. This kāvya, occurring within a longer kāvya may be designated as dhvani because of the predominant suggested sense. In this way, we may have an easy justification for calling a kind of kāvya a dhvani and at the same time recognising dhvani as the soul of poetry in so far as even an entire prabandha should have at least a portion suggestive of any one variety of the pratīyamānārthas and the rest of the prabandha should, as a rule, be helpful to the suggestion of that sense.[17] This principle of considering even a portion of a whole composition as dhvani is at the root of considering even individual words as dhvani. Compare : "kiṁ ca kāvyānāṁ...cārutvapratītiranvayavyatirekābhyāṁ bhāgeṣu kalpyata iti padānāmapi vyañjakatvamukhena vyavasthito dhvanivyavahāro na virodhī." (Dhv. p. 391). Even for them who consider rasa as the soul of poetry, there must be some portions which do not have the instantaneous suggestion of rasa but may claim to have rasa as their soul by virtue of being helpful to the suggestion of rasa as the description of the appropriate situation, location, etc. (or in other words, of vibhāvas, etc.). Portions lacking in immediate suggestion of rasa will be consi-

17. Tillyard desires also some non-suggestive poetry for putting the suggestive poetry into bolder contrast and for preparing the ground for the suggestive portion. Compare, "It is doubtful if we can get the full force of the best verse without having the humble kinds as a standard of composition. A long poem like the Illiad supplies within itself its own background; Pinder gained by the discovery of Bacchylides; Chaucer gains if Gower is not forgotten. Direct poetry will thus correspond to sheer observation of manners and of mind that fills the bulk of some of the greatest novels and which prepares for their crucial episodes. Ever since Poe pronounced that a long poem was a series of short genuine poems united by long stretches of stuff that was not poetry at all, people have been apt to slight this humble but necessary function of direct poetry". (Poetry Direct and Oblique, P. 24).

dered as having rasa by virtue of the rasa of the entire composition That is why Viśvanātha had to observe 'nanu tarhi prabandhāntarvartinām keṣāmcinnīrasānām padyānām kāvyatvam na syāditi cet na rasavatpadyāntargatanīrasapadānāmiva padyarasena prabandharasenaiva teṣām rasavattāngīkārāt (SD 1) Hence it is quite plausible that the expression yatra in kārikā I 13 refers to the suggestive portion of a kāvya as a whole For a similar implication of 'yatra' we may compare Dr V Raghavan's observation on 'bhāvikatvamiti prāhuh prabandhaviṣayam guṇam/ pratyakṣā iva dṛśyante yatrārthā bhūta bhāvinah //' of Bhāmaha as 'the term 'prabandha' may be rendered here as 'that part of the poem on the force of the word 'yatra' and on the basis of the Jayamangalā which points out only one canto in illustration of this Bhāvikatva' (Some concepts of the Alamkāraśāstra, pp 117–118) We may now understand 'kāvyaviśeṣa' in the sense of 'a speciality' of kāvya, so i e, the suggestive portion (called dhvani) may prove a speciality of the entire prabandha

Other meanings of the word dhvani It is already pointed out that according to kārikā, I 13 dhvani is a type of kāvya and according to Abhinava the word dhvani may have five senses, viz, (i) vyañjaka artha (suggestive meaning), (ii) vyanjaka śabda (suggestive word) (iii) vyañjanā vyāpāra (the function of suggestion), (iv) vyangya (the suggested content) and (v) samudāya kāvya (i e kāvya as a whole) It is also already seen that Ānanda applies the term dhvani to kāvya on the strength of the analogy of the suggestive kāvya with the audible sounds, which are suggestive of the sphoṭa and are designated as dhvani in the VKPD Abhinava also quotes further verses form the VKPD to show the justification of having the five different senses of the term dhvani, enumerated above[18] Abhinava also tries to show that, the term dhvani *may be used* in the five different senses on the strength of certain indications

18 Vide, 1 Acs (p 231) for an exposition of the relevant portion of the Locana

had from the following words of the vṛtti : "tathaivānyaistanmatānusāribhiḥ...vācyavācakasammiśraḥ śabdātmā kāvyamiti vyapadeśyo vyañjakatvasāmyād dhvanirityuktaḥ." But in my humble opinion, it is difficult to derive all the five meanings of the term dhvani from this passage of the vṛtti. Abhinava wants to connect (i) vācyavācakasammiśraḥ and (ii) śabdātmā and (iii) kāvyamiti vyapadeśyaḥ, separately with the clause 'dhvani rityuktaḥ'. The aggregation (samuccaya) of the three objects, viz., vācyavācakasammiśraḥ, etc., is to be understood even without the use of the particle 'ca' as in the verse 'gāmaśvam' [19]. The expression 'vācyavācakasammiśra' itself means the three elements, viz., 'vācyārtha', 'vācakaśabda' and 'sammiśra'. Hence, (i) vācyārtha and (ii) vācakaśabda are called dhvani. According to Abhinava the expression 'sammiśra' refers to the vyaṅgyārtha and hence, (iii) vyaṅgyārtha is also dhvani. But the exposition of the term sammiśra is not very convincing. For, if we follow the words "sammiśryate vibhāvānubhāvasaṁvalanayeti vyaṅgyo'pi dhvaniḥ," then we should understand only one variety of the vyaṅgya viz., rasa. Explaining the expression 'śabdātmā' Abhinava observes, "śabdanaṁ śabdaḥ śabdavyāpāraḥ...api tvātmabhūtaḥ, so'pi dhvananaṁ dhvaniḥ". Thus, (iv) the vyañjanāvyāpāra is also dhvani. But here we question, why should the vyañjanāvyāpāra be supposed to be ātmabhūta ? Abhinava's reply would possibly be like this—vyañjanāvyāpāra is called ātmabhūta, because it is called dhvani and because dhvani is called the ātmā in 'kāvyasyātmā dhvaniḥ' (K. I. 1). But this would involve a logical see-saw. Because, if at all the vyāpāra is called dhvani, it would be known to us only from the present passage of the vṛtti duly understood. That (v) kāvya is to be called dhvani is intended to be instructed by Ānanda himself.

The plain meaning of the present portion of the vṛtti may be as follows : Grammarians call the śrūyamāṇavarṇas dhvani.

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19. This refers to the verse,—aharaharnayamāno gāmaśvaṁ puruṣaṁ paśum / vaivasvato na tṛpyati surayā iva durmadī // (MB. NSP. p. 463).

The śrūyamānavarnas suggest the invisible eternal sphoṭa [20]. The ālamkārikas also call kāvya, which consists of words (śabdātmā), dhvani when it possesses suggestiveness (vyañjakatva). The audible sounds (śrūyamānavarnas) suggest sphoṭa and the suggestive kāvya suggests the different types of the suggested sense. And this is the basis of the analogy (vyañjakatvasāmyāt). For making the analogy between kāvya and śrūyamavarnas more precise it is pointed out that kāvya consists of words. But in I 13, it is observed that artha also may suggest. (yatrārthah śabdo vā vyanktah) That is why Ānanda points it out clearly that in kāvya, made of words, the meaning and the words remain duly mingled up (vācyavācaka-sammiśrah). Hence, when we conceive of a kāvya we conceive it in terms of some meaningful words. So, of the five meanings of the term dhvani, we may accept three meanings, viz., śabda, artha and samudāyakāvya, also on the strength of this passage of the vṛtti. Yet, we question why did Abhinava have the fascination to call the vyangya artha and the vyañjanavyāpāra dhvani? The reason may be like this: In kārikā I 1, dhvani is called ātmā. Again Ānanda calls the appealing artha ātmā in I. 2 and the rasādi variety of the suggested sense ātmā in I 5. Possibly because of these expressions Abhinava thought it necessary to interpret the vyangya artha also as dhvani, even with some apparent difficulty. In the expressions (1) anye tam dhvanisamjñitam kāvyātmānam gunavṛttirityāhuh (p 28) and (2) yadyapyuktam bhaktirdhavaniriti (p 141). Ānanda seems to conceive dhvani as a śabdavyāpāra, which may be confused with another vyāpāra, viz., lakṣaṇā. Such *expressions, it may be conjectured, led Abhinava to interpret* the vyañjanā function also as dhvani. But, in my humble opinion, the opponent is intentionally presented by Ānanda to be confusing dhvani as a function. By way of refuting the view

20. For a full treatment of sphoṭa, vide, "Sphoṭa and the Spoken Word" by T. V. Kapali Shastry in 'Srī Aurobindo Mandir Annual.' 15 August 1955

of the opponent confusing dhvani as bhakti, Ānanda clearly says that bhakti and dhvani are quite different in form. The former is nothing other than guṇavṛtti (i. e., secondary function) and the latter is something where the vācya and the vācaka suggest a predominant vyaṅgya artha. Compare, "vācyavyatiriktasyārthasya vācyavācakābhyāṁ tātparyeṇa prakāśanaṁ yatra vyaṅgyaprādhānye sa dhvaniḥ/upacāramātraṁ tu bhaktiḥ" (Dhv. p. 141), and Abhinava's words "upacāro guṇavṛttirlakṣaṇā". (Locana, p. 141).

But whatever be the merits of our present contention regarding the five meanings of the term dhvani, proposed by Abhinava, we must not fail to notice that the later tradition has accepted the said meanings of the term almost invariably. As observed by MM. Kane, "the commentary of Abhinavagupta occupies in the Alaṁkāra literature a position analogous to that of Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya in grammar or Śaṅkarāchārya's bhāṣya on Vedāntasūtras."[21] Abhinava has to be recognised as the chief exponent of the dhvani theory, without however, minimising the importance of Ānandavardhana, 'but for whom probably there would have been no Abhinavagupta's theory of meaning'.[22] That is why Abhinava influenced the notion of the latter supporters of the theory to a great extent as it may be evidenced from the case of Māṇikyacandra. Māṇikyacandra, commenting on Mammaṭa's sūtra defining dhvani, observes,—"nanu dhvanyate iti vyaṅgyam, sa ca kāvyātmā, tat kathaṁ kāvyaṁ dhvanirityāha ? ātmātmavatorabhedenopacārāt/yadā tu dhvanatīti dhvaniḥ iti kartṛvyutpattiḥ tadā nopacāraḥ/....kārikāyāṁ śabdārthasamudāya eva kāvyarūpa mukhyatayā dhvanināmnā prakhyāpitaḥ yathoktaprakāradhvanimayatvāt." (Kp. Saṁ. p. 12). This passage very distinctly echoes the Locana. Compare, for instance, (1) "sa iti/......kārikayā tu prādhānyena samudāya eva kāvyarūpo mukhyatayā dhvaniriti pratipāditam/" (Locana, pp. 105–106); (2) "kāvyamiti vyapadeśyaśca yo'rthaḥ so'pi

21. HSP. Kane, p. LXIX.

22. I. Aest. pp. 215–216.

dhvanih, uktaprakāradhvanicatuṣṭayamayatvāt" (Locana, p 135) and (3) "dhvanireva kāvyamiti/ātmātminorabheda eva vastuto vyutpattaye tu vibhāgah krta ityarthah" (Locana, pp 500-501)

Views of the opponents Like Patañjali Ānanda apprehends his own opponents. In kārikā I 1, he enumerates all the possible views of the opponents and the same kārikā also serves the purpose of stating the reasons for composing the very work The opponents may be classified in three broad groups, viz, (1) Those who claimed a total absence of any thing called dhvani, (2) Those who wanted to identify dhvani with lakṣanā and (3) Those who believed that there is something worth called dhvani but beyond the scope of any description or analysis

The first group itself may be supposed to maintain various views as follows (i) The earlier theorists have completely taken into account all the sources of beauty in poetical compositions Hence, there cannot be anything more to be called dhvani (ii) If at all some element of poetry is discovered newly to be termed as dhvani, that must be discarded as no source of beauty (iii) If at all it is a source of beauty it is sure to be something within the scope of the gunas or alamkāras or other such elements already recognised by earlier theorists It is very likely that, only a variety of the already recognised elements is newly named Even if it be claimed as an entirely new element of poetry, never before recognised by earlier theorists, there need not be a great clamour for it Since, numerous sub-varieties of the different figures are being discovered every day and this dhvani is nothing more than a sub-variety of some figure

We may assume that there were some contemporary scholars who actually raised the objections, pointed out above We are told of such a contemporary poet, who is identified by Abhinava as Manoratha, by Ānanda himself But that the second group of opponents, who claimed that dhvani is identical with lakṣanā, is imaginary is also told by Ānanda cf "yadyapi ca -parikalpyaivam uktam-'bhāktamāhustamanye' iti."

(Dhv. pp. 31–32). And those "whose minds were not astute enough to frame a definition, simply gave out that the true nature of dhvani was beyond all words and that it was discernible only to the minds of the sahṛdayas" were also real contemporaries. According to MM. Kane, Bhaṭṭanāyaka also maintained such a view regarding dhvani. Cf. "the principal point on which he differs from the Dhvanyāloka is that he regards dhvani as transcending definition and as purely svasaṁvedya. So he was a follower of whom the Dhvanikārikā says, 'kecidvācāṁ sthitamaviṣaye tatvamūcustadīyam' or as the Dhvanyāloka says, 'kecitpunarlakṣaṇakaraṇaśālīnabuddhayo dhvanestattvaṁ girāmagocaraṁ sahṛdayahṛdayasaṁvedyameva samākhyātavantaḥ.' " (HSP. Kane, p. LXXVIII). We, however, know at least of one theorist, viz., Jayantabhaṭṭa, who tried to refute the conception of dhvani but had to declare that the essential nature of it is quite indiscernible. Compare :

athavā nedṛśī carccā kavibhiḥ saha śobhate /
vidvāṁso'pi vimuhyanti vākyārthagahane' dhvani // and,
paramagahanastarkajñānāmabhūmirayaṁ nayaḥ. (Nyāyamañjarī, p. 45).

Ānanda's reply to the opponents: (1) Ānanda gives a sharp reply to his opponents that, the view, viz., "there is no dhvani; because, a type of poetry additional to all well known varieties will necessarily cease to be poetry" is unsound. Because, when poetry is subjected to a proper analysis, as is done in the Dhvanyāloka, the conclusion that dhvani is the essential element of poetry can never be resisted. cf. "yadyapyuktaṁ...lakṣye tu parīkṣyamāne sa eva...kavyatattvam/" (Dhv. pp. 106–107).

(2) Ānanda further argues that dhvani cannot be included in one or the other variety of the figures of speech. Because, the figures generally depend on the relation of the expressed and the expression, whereas dhvani depends on the relation of the suggester and the suggested between poetry and its content. Cf. "vyaṅgyavyañjaka...kutaḥ" (p. 107).

(3) There are, however, some figures which owe their very origin to the presence of some suggested content, e g , samāsokti, paryāyokta and ākṣepa Ānanda shows that in all such alamkāras the suggested content is either equal in importance with or subordinate to the express sense But the very definition of dhvani demands that the suggested sense must be predominant over the express sense A case of equal predominance of the vācya and the vyangya senses is had in case of samdehasamkarālamkāra Abhinava gives the verse "śaśivadanā" as its illustration (Locana, p 121) And Ānanda with reference to the samkarālamkāra observes, "alamkāradvayasambhāvanāyām tu vācyavyangyayoh samam prādhānyam" (p 123) A case of the suggested sense being subordinate to the express sense is illustrated by the verse "upodharāgena", which is an example of samāsokti Here niśā and śaśin are expressly described and their description is rendered more beautiful by the suggested idea of the behaviour of a couple of lovers (pp 109–111) This and similar cases are included under the purview of gunibhūtavyangya by Ānandavardhana If there be stray examples of any of these alamkāras involving a more predominant suggested meaning they will be called dhvani, but dhvani itself would not be included in the scope of the alamkāra concerned The criterion for considering either of the vācya and the vyangya as more predominant is a greater amount of charm cf "cārutvotkarṣanibandhanā hi vācyavyangyayoh prādhānyavivakṣā" (p 114) To sum up the arguments Ānanda gives three samkṣepaślokas (on pp 130–131 as "vyangyasya samkarojjhitah") and Abhinava more precisely gives us the cases *where in spite of the presence of a suggested* sense we cannot have dhvani, in his observation "tena caturṣu prakāreṣu na dhvanivyavahārah sadbhāve'pi vyangyasya (i) aprādhānye (ii) aspaṣṭapratītau (iii) vācyena samaprādhānye (iv) asphuṭe prādhānye ca" (Locana, p 131)

It may be interesting to note here that, Mammaṭa, who for the first time presents a classification of gunibhūtavyangya

variety of kāvya, derived much of his ideas from this observation of Abhinava. Compare :

agūḍhamaparasyāṅgaṁ vācyasiddhyaṅgamasphuṭam /
saṁdigdhatulyaprādhānye kākvākṣiptamasundaram //
vyaṅgyamevaṁ guṇībhūtavyaṅgyasyāṣṭau bhidāsmṛtāḥ /
(KP. V. 1. 2).

Mammaṭa's conception of the agūḍhavyaṅgya variety is based on the Vṛtti "yatra hi vyaṅgyakṛtaṁ...kavayo dṛśyante" (pp. 142–143) and the Locana thereon as "vayaṁ tu brūmaḥ ...uktyantareṇāśakyaṁ yaditi" (pp. 143–144) which desire that the suggested content also must not be very easily cognizable. Prasiddhi referred to by Ānanda is due to frequent use of the symbol and is the cause of rendering the suggested content less clandestine. This is very ably observed also by E. M. W. Tillyard. "Any very wide use of the fixed symbol in poetry is not likely to succeed. It is peculiarly liable to abuse. Excessively easy to invent, the fixed symbol risks becoming aridly mechanical on the one hand and fraudulently suggestive on the other. But capable as it is of powerful effect when used with economy it will always be valuable as a minor means of poetical obliquity." (Poetry Direct and Oblique. p. 67).

Bhakti is not dhvani : Replying to the view that dhvani is identical with bhakti Ānanda says that dhvani (i. e., suggestive poetry) cannot be identified with bhakti (i. e., indication) because they are different in nature. Dhvani is (a type of poetry) where a sense other than the express is communicated by the express sense and the expressive words, being intent on communicating the same suggested sense which is exclusively important. But bhakti is simply a metaphorical expression. (Dhv. p. 141).

Bhakti also cannot define dhvani because of the fallacies of ativyāpti and avyāpti. There will be ativyāpti because there may be cases of figurative expression where the suggested sense had through the implication (guṇavṛtti) is very easily discernible

and as such does not have any beauty The suggested sense in such a case does not assume any predominance because of the absence of any special charm A composition may be called dhvani only when it suggests such a beautiful meaning which is incommunicable in a way other than suggestion Cf, "uktyantarena visayibhavet" (p 146)

Hence, the mere association of a suggested sense with the use of an upacāra (metaphor) will not present a case of dhvani This corresponds to the samkṣepaślokas "vyangyasya pratibhāmātre, etc (Dhv p 130) There may even be cases of lakṣanā which do not convey any suggested sense at all Such cases of nirūdhā lakṣanā [23] also occur without any dhvani and hence there is the fallacy of ativyāpti when bhakti is taken as the definition of dhvani Moreover, it cannot be claimed that the beautiful suggested sense which comes in the wake of the implied meaning is also had through implication (lakṣanā) Implication depends on the failure of the primary meaning to have a syntactical relation with the meanings of the other words in the sentence That is why lakṣanā (implication) is said to be the tail of abhidhā (denotation) But dhvani is solely dependent on the suggestivity of the words which occurs irrespective of the consistancy or inconsistancy of the primary meaning (Dhv I 17, 18) If we propose to define dhvani with lakṣanā the fallacy of avyāpti also will occur Because, there

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23 Vide Dhv I 1? In 'lāvanya' the etymological meaning is taken to be the primary meaning. Etymological 'saltness' (i e., lavanarya bhāva) being incompatible mukhyārthavādha is conceived and the common meaning of 'grace' is taken as the lakṣyārtha Mammaṭa also does so in case of the word 'kuśala' But Viśvanātha's arguments in this connection appear to be more convincing Like the word 'gauh', lāvanya' is also a vācaka word In the śabdakhanda of the Bhāṣāpariccheda such words are considered as vācakapadas of the rūḍha variety Hence, what we observe here is that conception of the different varieties of lakṣanā was still in the formative stage in the days of Ānandavardhana

is the presence of lakṣaṇā only in the avivakṣitavācya type of dhvani. The other varieties are free from the presence of lakṣaṇā. Lakṣaṇā may at best be recognised as a variable associate of dhvani but that is not enough for defining dhvani or identifying dhvani with lakṣaṇā (kārikā I. 18). In the Uddyota III Ānanda very clearly distinguishes between guṇavṛtti and vyañjakatva whereby the distinction of dhvani from bhakti is more clearly established.

Dhvani is not indefinable : The view that, "dhvani is that kind of poetry wherein some indefinable charm is brought about both in words and in meanings, the same charm being discernible only to select critics like the preciousness of rare gems" is untenable. Because, all the sources of such a rare charm including the suggestivity of the poetry are duly explained and may surely be fully explained. There cannot be any other unique charm which is indefinable. If it is supposed that 'indefinability' means 'inexpressibility by all words' then such a supposition also will not stand; because, what is taken to be indefinable (anākhyeya) may be referred to by the word 'indefinable' itself. If the expression 'indefinable' is supposed to mean an 'indeterminate experience of something which eludes determinate usage of words' [24] then it may be pointed out that, the experience of such a unique charm is duly expounded by the writers on poetics. The Buddhist logicians, however, claim that everything in the world is indefinable and on the strength of their postulate one may argue that dhvani is also indefinable. But such a view of the Buddhists also require to be duly examined. It is indeed subjeted to a proper examination by Ānandavardhana in his Dharmottarī, a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya. Ānanda, however, concludes that their definition of dhvani will be at least on par with the definitions of perception, etc., proposed by the Buddhists themselves.

24. cf. "sāmānyasaṁsparśivikalpaśabdāgocaratve sati, prakāśamānatvaṁ tu yadanākhyeyatvamucyate kvacit..." (Dhv. p. 519).

According to a definition proposed by the Buddhists, perception (pratyakṣa) is the unerring cognition of given sensum in complete isolation from all ideata. cf "pratyakṣam kalpanāpodhamabhrāntam' (Nyāyavindu, I) In perception the object of cognition is a unique individual (svalaksana) and the process of cognition is a mere sensing without any element of ideation (kalpanā) in it According to Dignāga perception is a cognition which is not at all subjectively determined and is not modified by ideas or concepts (kalpanā)"[25] The concepts of name, class quality, action and relation do not enter into the perception of an object The perceived object is a unique individual which does not admit of any description by concept and words It is just what it is immediately sensed to be (tatorthā dvijñānam pratyaksam) Words and concepts express such aspects of things as are general or common to many things "[26] But a thing is an individual in so far as it excludes all other things from within itself [27] Hence a perceived individual cannot be expressed by words or concepts From this it follows that, perception is a pure sensation which cannot be properly described or embodied in verbal judgements But yet we have a definition of pratyakṣa Similarly dhvani also may be a unique charm supposed to be beyond the description of ordinary expression but yet having a definition like the definition of pratyakṣa, proposed by the Buddhists "[28]

Varieties of dhvani : One of the arguments of Ānanda against the opponent who want to include dhvani in some variety of the figures is that dhvani itself can be divided and subdivided into so many varieties and as such dhvani having a much wider domain can never be included in the scope of any alamkāra Compare "na caivamvidhasya dhvanervakṣyamāna pra-

25 Pramāṇasamuccaya, 1

26. Such words are referred to by Ānanda as 'sāmānyasamsparśi-vikalpaśabda.' (Dhv p 519)

27 'apohavāda' referred to in KP II

28 Also vide Śāstradīpikā, p. 40

bhedatadbhedasaṁkalanayā mahāviṣayasya ..... saṁrambhaḥ" (Dhv. pp. 135–136). As proposed in this quoted statement Ānanda duly endeavours to classify dhvani into so many varieties and sub-varieties and finally declares that it is not possible for any one to enumerate all the varieties and sub-varieties of dhvani and hence he simply indicates the direction for classification. (Dhv. III. 44). The tendency of classifying dhvani into innumerable varieties is found to be inherited also by the later theorists like Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha. But instead of engaging ourselves with all the varieties of dhvani, it will be necessary for us to discuss only the major varieties for understanding the essentials of the theory.

Dhvani is firstly divided into (1) the avivakṣitavācya and (2) the vivakṣitānyaparavācya types. In the former, the primary meaning is not desired to be conveyed at all. The primary meaning being discarded, a secondary meaning (lakṣyārtha) occurs to our mind and a suggested meaning appears in the wake of the same. In the latter variety the primary meaning (vācyārtha) is not undesirable. Even remaining consistent the primary meaning suggests any one of the three types of the suggested sense, viz., vastu, alaṁkāra and rasādi by virtue of being different from the ordinary statements of fact. Let us now study these two varieties in greater detail.

Avivakṣitavācya type : The primary meaning (vācyārtha) in this type may either be atyantatiraskṛta (absolutely incongruous) or arthāntarasaṁkramita (i. e., requiring partial modification). In both the cases, however, the words are used to convey a secondary meaning only with the purpose of suggesting further ideas. When such suggested ideas become the source of a greater appeal we have a dhvani. The verse "ravisaṁkrānta"[29] is given as an example of the former type, where the primary meaning of the word andha (blind) is to be totally suppressed (atyantatiraskṛta) as it is not at all applicable to a

29. Dhv. p. 172.

mirror as an adjective The word 'andha' means the mirror itself through implication based on its incapacity to reveal (reflect) things in the manner of a blind eye The purpose of 'implying the mirror by the word 'andha' is to suggest a lot of ideas like that of failure of the mirror to reflect things Compare, 'andha śabdo tra ādarśam lakṣaṇayā pratipādayati / asaṃkhyam prayojanam vyanakti/ (Locana, p 172) Here the word andha means the mirror and hence its primary meaning (i e, blind) is said to be absolutely suppressed

The verse snigdhaśyāmala[30] may be cited as an example of the second variety where the word 'rāma with its primary meaning as Rāma the son of Daśaratha is redundant. In fact such an apparently redundant word is used only to convey a meaning much different from what it expressly means Here through implication the word 'rāma means a 'Rāma who is mature or seasoned (i e pariṇata) with a good number of virtues that are conveyed to us through suggestion (e g, the experience of being exiled) Hence, the primary meaning is not fully discarded but it is remoulded (Vide Dhv p 169 and Locana thereunder)

Vivakṣitānyaparavācya Now in contrast with the above examples we may take up an example of that type of dhvani where the primary meaning is not to be discarded Let us refer to the verse 'śikhariṇi kva nu nāma (Dhv p 138) Here a young lover says in the presence of his young beloved— O young lady, I wonder in what mountain for how long a time, of what name a penance this young parrot underwent in order to have the fortune of chewing the bimba phala as red as your lower lip Here all that the young nāyaka says is intended to be expressly stated and the express meaning suggests the idea that the speaker is flattering the nāyikā so that she may be attracted towards her admirer Here the suggested content is a matter of fact (i.e, vastu) Some body may think that the

30 Dhv p 167

very question of the nāyaka regarding the practising of penance by a parrot is incongruous, since a parrot is not supposed to be competent for the same. If the primary meaning is thus supposed to be illogical, we shall have to admit a lakṣaṇā function in this verse also. In fact, Abhinava talks of such a possibility. Compare, "atra ca traya eva vyāpārāḥ—adhidhā tātparyṁ dhvananaṁ ceti/...yadi vākasmikaviśiṣṭapraśnārthānupapattermukhyārthabādhāyāṁ sādṛśyāllakṣaṇā bhavatu madhye/", etc. (Locana. p. 140). But in my opinion, Ānanda does not find any incongruity here. He may recognise the express sense of the verse "śikhariṇi" as unfailing, because the ideas of the poets and of the peculiar poetical characters are supposed to be naturally of a mature and more imaginary nature. The meaning which suggests further ideas in this type of dhvani is shown to be of two types in kārikā II. 24, and accordingly, the suggestive meaning of the verse "*śikhariṇi*" *is supposed to be the more* mature statement of a poetical charater in a peculiar state of the mind, in whose world of imagination even a parrot may practise penance. If thus we understand the verse as admitting of no incongruity (and as such of no lakṣaṇā) we are more justified in calling it vivakṣitānyaparavācya. We must not discard the primary meaning involving an artificial wonder of the speaker and that alone would lead us to the suggested content that, the speaker is flattering the nāyikā.

But yet, what Abhinava seems to mean is that while in avivakṣitavācya type the lakṣaṇā function is the very basis of the suggested content, in the vivakṣitānyaparavācya type the suggested content does not depend on the lakṣaṇā function as such. There may, however, be noticed the casual presence of some words or expressions used with secondary significance.

The *vivakṣitānyaparavācya type is sub-divided into two* varieties, viz., asaṁlakṣya-krama-vyaṅgya and saṁlakṣyakrama-vyaṅgya.

Asaṁlakṣyakramavyaṅgya : In this type of dhvani we have the suggestion of rasa, bhāva, rasābhāsa, bhāvābhāsa and

bhāvaśānti, etc., which appear as the predominant meaning of the composition (Dhv. II. 3). As we have already noticed, rasa and bhāva, etc., refer to certain states of the mind of the reader. These mental states, forming the suggested meaning of the composition occur almost simultaneously with the understanding of the express meaning of the piece and hence in this type of dhvani the suggested sense (vyangya) is said to be realised after the express sense (vācya) without any noticeable sequence. For example, the reader is supposed to be instantaneously infused with the feeling of anger (krodha) and to have and exquisite joy from ruminating over the same, while reading the verse "cañcadbhuja";[31] through an identification of himself with the dramatic character i. e., Bhīmasena. All the process of identification, experience of a permanent mental state and the relish of the exquisite joy runs very rapidly and lasts only so long as the situation as depicted in the poem is an object of cognition. That is how we have the suggested content in this type of dhvani. In the verse referred to above we are said by Abhinava to have the relish of the raudra rasa which has krodha (anger) as its permanent mental state. In this manner we have the relish of all the nine rasas and the bhāvas in their different forms. The psychological process involved in the realisation of rasa will be further discussed in the next chapter.

In the opinion of Abhinava, a bhāvadhvani is the conspicuous suggestion of a vyabhicāribhāva, which being experienced serves as the source of exquisite joy. But this is only a means to the realisation of rasa which is also the experience of a sthāyī developing into an unperturbed joy. While heading towards the relish of rasa we relish in a certain phase the bhāvadhvani also. Hence, bhāvadhvani is only a subordinate aspect of the all paramount rasadhvani. Cf. "evam rasadhvanerevām bhāvadhvaniprabhṛtayo niṣyandā āsvāde pradhānaṁ prayojak

31. Dhv. p. 210.

kamevamaṁśaṁ vibhajya pṛthagvyavasthāpyate." (Locana, p. 179). While experiencing the bhāvadhvani we recognise its prominence; but when we take the contextual rasa into account it is once again relegated to a subordinate position. The temporary importance enjoyed by the bhāva is like the importance of the servant on the day of his marriage, when he is followed even by the king. But the supremacy of the king is hardly diminished by the casual importance of the servant. This idea is very clearly conveyed by Mammaṭa in the words : "mukhye rase'pi te'ṅgitvaṁ prāpnuvanti kadācana/ te bhāvaśāntyādayaḥ / aṅgitvaṁ rājānugatavivāhapravṛttabhṛtyavat." (KP. IV). It may be pointed out here that the analogy of the king and the servant is introduced for the first time by Ānanda in connection with the relative importance of rasādi and the express sense in rasavadalaṁkāra which will be discussed presently. Hence, cf., "rasādirūpavyaṅgyasya guṇībhāvo rasavadalaṁkāre darśitaḥ; tatra ca teṣāmādhikārikavākyāpekṣayā guṇībhāvo vivahanapravṛttabhṛtyānuyāyirājavat/" (Dhv. III. p. 462).

In the saṁlakṣyakramavyaṅgya type we are not instantaneously overwhelmed by any feeling or idea. In this type of dhvani we pass on from the expressly conveyed idea to the suggested idea through a noticeable sequence as we did in the case of the verse 'śikhariṇi'. This type of dhvani is said to be of three types, viz., śabdaśaktyudbhava, arthaśaktyudbhava and śabdārthaśaktyudbhava. Let us treat them one by one.

The śabdaśaktyudhava type : This variety of dhvani is defined in kārikā II, 21. It owes its origin to the use of certain homonyms (i. e., anekārthakaśabdas). The homonyms convey more than one primary meaning wherefrom we gather the suggested meaning. In order to have two primary meanings as the basis of the suggested meaning we must have only the homonymous words. If we change the order of the words or if we try to substitute other words of meanings suitable to the context we do not have more than one primary meaning and the very basis being absent we also fail to have the suggested

meaning Since the words do not allow any alteration the words are taken to be chiefly responsible for conveying the suggested sense That is why this type of dhvani is called śabdaśaktimūla, i. e, based on the power of words It may be noted that the criterion for classifying the figures as 'figures of words' and 'figures of sense' is the possibility or otherwise of altering the words (i e, śabdaparivṛttisahamānatva and śabda parivṛttyasahamānatva) This type of dhvani is said to be based on the capacity of the words because of the suggested sense being dependent on the use of words capable of conveying two primary meanings at a time, although the primary meanings also contribute to the rising of the suggested content That, śabdaśakti means the peculiar capacity of the words to convey more than one conventional meaning at a time is clear from the vṛtti—"ārthyapi ca pratipattistathāvidhe viṣaya ubhayārthasambandhayogyaśabdasāmarthyaprasāviteti śabdaśakti mūlā kalpyate." (Dhv p 412)

Śleṣa and śabdaśaktimūla But it may be noticed that in śleṣa also there is the use of homonymous words Then how can we distinguish śabdaśaktimūladhvani from śleṣa ? To give an adequate reply Ānanda says—

ākṣipta evālamkārah śabdaśaktyā prakāśate /
yasminnanuktah śabdena śabdaśaktyudbhavo hi sah // (II 21),

The points of difference between śleṣa-alamkāra and śabdaśakti mūla-dhvani are as follows (i) In śleṣa we have two matters of fact from the same set of words which do not brook any alteration In other words, in śleṣa we have two matters of fact due to power of word (śabdaśakti) but in the śabdaśakti mūla we have a suggested alamkāra (and not a matter of fact) based on the śabdaśakti cf "yasmādalamkāro na vastumātram śleṣah " (Dhv p. 235) These words have the further purpose of clarifying the point that in śabdaśaktimūla we have a suggested alamkāra but not a suggested matter of fact The expression 'na vastumātram' need not be translated as 'not only a matter

of fact' because the word 'mātram' does not have the usual sense of restriction here. Here and also elsewhere Ānanda uses the term 'vastumātram' in a technical way to mean the matter of fact variety of the suggested sense. Cf. "sa hyartho vācyasāmarthyākṣiptaṁ vastumātramalaṁkārarasādayaścetyanekaprabhedaprabhinno darśayiṣyate." (Dhv. p. 50). Pratīhārendurāja also seems to have understood the expression 'vastumātram' like this. Hence, compare his own classification of dhvani where vācakaśaktyāśrayavyañjakatva corresponds to śabdaśaktyudbhava of Ānanda. There he remarks—"tatra vācakaśaktyāśrayamalaṁkārāṇāmeva vyaṅgyatvāt ekaprakāram / tatra hyalaṁkārā eva vyajyante natu vastumātram nāpi rasādayaḥ /...vācyaśaktyāśrayam tu rasādivastumātrālaṁkārābhivyaktihetutvāt trividham." (KSS. p. 89). If we are to understand the word 'mātram' of the vṛtti as a restrictive particle we should also have an inclusive 'ca' or 'api' after 'yasmādalaṁkārā'.

But it is said by earlier theorists like Udbhaṭa that in case of śleṣa also a further alakṁāra may be discerned. Udbhaṭa's definition of śleṣa demands the use of homonymous words and points out that śleṣa invariably gives rise to the idea of an additional alaṁkāra. (KSS. IV. 9-10). Hence, Ānanda observes that in śleṣa we have the additional alaṁkāra also as vācya; but in śabdaśaktimūla the alaṁkāra is suggested but not expressly stated. For example in the verse—

"tasyā vināpi hāreṇa nisargādeva hāriṇau /
janayāmāsatuḥ kasya vismayam na payodharau //
(Dhv. p. 236)

the word 'hāriṇau' is homonymous. In one case it means 'attractive' and in another case it means 'having a neck-lace.' Connecting the second meaning, i. e., 'having a hāra' with 'vināpi hāreṇa' we have the figure 'virodhābhāsa' which is expressly conveyed because of the particle 'api'. Thus we have a 'vācya śleṣa' and a 'vācyavirodhābhāsa' on account of the same śleṣa.

Example of śabdaśaktimūla In contrast with śleṣa, we have a case of śabdaśaktimūladhvani in—"atrāntare kusumasamaya yugam upasamharan ajrmbhata grīṣmābhidhānah phullamallikā-dhavalāṭṭahāso mahākālah" (Dhv p 241) Here we have two portions, viz the viśeṣya portion (mahākāla) and the viśe-ṣana portion (kusumasamayayugamupasamharan, etc) Mahā-kāla means the great season, i e, summer [32]

It may also mean the Lord Śiva The viśeṣana portion also has two meanings which may be differently applicable to the two meanings of the word mahākāla An example of śleṣa is "yena dhvastamanobhavena" (Dhv p 235) Here the whole verse is homonymous (śliṣṭa) and it may be applicable as a benediction soliciting the favour either of Mādhava (i e, Viṣ-nu) or Umādhava (i e Śiva, the consort of Umā) Thus we have two completely different meaings from the same words as differently applicable to Viṣnu and Śiva So far we have no difference between śleṣa and śabdaśaktimūla in respect of having more than one primary meaning But the point of difference is that in śleṣa both the meanings are contextual (prākaranika) Since 'yena dhvastam' is a mangala verse, it may be equally applicable to Śiva and Viṣnu But in "atrānt are", etc, where we should have only the description of the summer season, we are confronted with a meaning applicable to Śiva Mahākāla The meaning applicable to Śiva is not contextual

Whereas in case of śleṣa we easily accept both the primary meanings of the homonymous words, in case of śabda-śaktimūla we search for a relation of the non-contextual meaning with the contextual The idea of any such relation is not expressly stated, but conveyed to us as the suggested content of the piece When the relation of similarity between the contextual and non-contextual content is suggested we have a suggested upamā. When the suggested relation is that of identity we have rūpaka When the relation is that of superority

32 mahāmaclnau [illegible] napayah Locana, P. 241

we have the figure vyatireka as suggested. That is how in śabdaśaktimūla we have a suggested alaṁkāra, whereas in śleṣa we need not as a rule have a suggested alaṁkāra. Compare : "eṣūdāharaṇeṣu......dhvanerviṣayaḥ" (Dhv. p. 244).

If, however, the alaṁkāra which is suggested like this be pointed out by some other expressive word in the same instance we cannot call it a case of śabdaśaktimūladhvani. There we will have some alaṁkāra like vakrokti. For example, in the verse, "dṛṣṭyā keśava", the expression 'saleśam' (i. e., with equivocal words) lays bare the whole trick and as such we cannot consider the present verse as a case of śabdaśaktimūladhvani.

Samāsokti and śabdaśaktimūla : There is also scope for confusing śabdaśaktimūla with samāsokti. In samāsokti also there is the use of homonymous words. For example, in the verse :

upoḍharāgeṇa vilolatārakaṁ
tathā gṛhītaṁ śaśinā niśāmukham /
yathā samastaṁ timirāṁśukaṁ tayā
puro'pi rāgādgalitaṁ na lakṣitam // (Dhv. p. 109).

Almost all the words of the verse are homonymous and the viśeṣaṇapadas are applicable not only to the niśā (night) and the śaśī (moon) but also to a nāyaka and a nāyikā as the case may be. Thus we have the suggested idea of the behaviour of a couple of lovers (i. e., nāyakanāyikā-vyavahāra). Then why should it not present us a case of śabda-śaktimūladhvani as in the case of 'atrāntare', etc. ? Udbhaṭa gives the definition of samāsokti as :

prakṛtārthena vākyena tatsamānairviśeṣeṇaiḥ/
aprastutārthakathanaṁ samāsoktirudahṛtā // .
(KSS. II. 10).

Just as the meaning applicable to 'the great season' is prastuta and the meaning applicable to 'Lord Śiva' is aprastuta, we have the meaning applicable to 'niśā and śaśī' as prastuta and that applicable to 'nāyaka and nāyikā' as aprastuta. More-

over, Mammaṭa expressly demands the use of homonymous words in samāsokti Cf. "paroktirbhedakaih śliṣṭaiḥ samāsoktih" (K. P. X) That is how the cases of samāsokti may be confused as śabdaśaktimūla. The distinction is, however, more clearly stated by Mammaṭa himself In śabdaśaktimūla the viśesya is also presented through a homonymous word; whereas in samāsokti only the viśeṣanas are had through homonyms From the word 'mahākāla' itself we can have both the meanings 'Lord Śiva' and the 'great season' without any reference to the adjectives whereas the idea of a couple of lovers in 'upoḍharāgena' is had only through a reference to the adjectives presented by the homonyms

By the by, it may be pointed out that in Mammaṭa's "nirupādānasambhāra", given as an example of śabdaśaktimūla, we should have a vācya samāsokti since the viśesya portion is free from pun (ślesa) and the same alamkāra suggests a vyatireka and as such it does not appear to be a sure case of śabdaśaktimūla

Only alaṁkāra is suggested in śabdaśaktimūla : As desired by Ānanda in śabdaśaktyudbhava we have only an alaṁkāra as the suggested content and never an ordinary matter of fact. Pratīhārendurāja also recognises only an alaṁkāra as the suggested content in this variety of dhvani as it can be gathered from the few lines quoted a little earlier (vide. p 97) But the theorists, Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha would have a suggested vastu also in the śabdaśaktyudbhava type. As the example of such a variety the verse,

panthia na ettha sattharamatthi manaṁ pattharatthale gāme /
unnaa paoharam pekkhiūna jai vasasi tā vasasu // is given both by Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha Here the suggested sense as pointed out by Mammaṭa is "yadyupabhogakṣamo'si tadāssva." In this verse the word 'payodhara' at least is homonymous and means either 'clouds' or 'breasts'. The suggested meaning is had because of the latter meaning Since the word 'payodhara' does not allow any alteration,

the suggested sense is said to be based on the power of word. It cannot be gainsaid that the matter of fact as pointed out by Mammaṭa is suggested here. Hence, in order to accommodate this and similar cases, it appears necessary to recognise a śabdaśaktimūladhvani with a suggestion of vastu also.

Scope of abhidhā in śabdaśaktimūladhvani : In 'atrāntre,' etc., we have three meanings, viz., the contextual (prākaraṇika) description of the 'great season', the non-contextual (aprākaraṇika) description of 'Lord Śiva' and the suggested alaṁkāra (i. e., the idea of similarity between the season and the Lord Śiva). Here the meaning relating to the great season is decidedly abhidheya (i. e., conveyed by abhidhā) and the alaṁkāra is decidedly vyaṅgya (i. e., suggested). But there is difference of opinion regarding the status of the non-contextual meaning relating to 'Lord Śiva'. According to the latter theorists like Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha the aprākaraṇika sense is also suggested. Cf. śabdaśaktimūle tu abhidhāyā niyantraṇenānabhidheyasya arthāntarasya tena sahopamāderalaṁkārasya ca nirvivādaṁ vyaṅgyatvam." (KP. V) and SD. II, 21. Their argument is that, once abhidhā is restricted to one of the many senses of the homonyms, it cannot function once again to convey another sense because of the rule "sabdabuddhikarmaṇāṁ viramya vyāpārābhāvaḥ". But according to Ānanda both the prākaraṇika or aprākaraṇika senses had from the homonyms both in śleṣa and śabdaśaktimūla are conveyed by abhidhā. Even the theorists like Mammaṭa have more than one meaning from the homonyms in śleṣa as abhidheya, all of them being prākaraṇika. As for Ānanda the non-contextual meaning is also abhidheya, there is the scope for confusion of śleṣa with śabdaśaktimūla and the necessity of clarifying the point of difference. That, for Ānanda the non-contextual is also abhidheya is clear from his expression "vākyasyāsaṁbaddhārthābhidhāyakatvaṁ mā prasāṅkṣīdityaprākaraṇika-prākaraṇikārthayorupamānopameyabhāvaḥ kalpayitavyaḥ" (Dhv. p. 244). Ānanda is not

confronted with the maxim "Śabdabuddhikarmaṇām" etc, because of a reason conjectured below It is sure that he did not have an occasion to refer to this maxim That, Viśvanātha and others followed this maxim may be because of an influence of Abhinava who observes " na kramena viramya vyāpārābhāvāt abhidhānat" (Locana, p 55)

In between Ānanda and Abhinava there were already many theorists to cherish different opinions regarding the function involved in conveying the non-contextual meaning These varying views are properly introduced by Abhinava with the expressions, 'atra kecinmanyante', 'anyetu', 'eke tu' and 'itare tu' (vide, Locana, pp 241–244) Abhinava's own view is that the meaning applicable to 'the great season' alone is abhidheya All the additional meanings are had by the suggestive function (dhvanana vyapāra) Cf "mahāmścāsau dinadairghya śabdaśaktimūlāt " (Locana, p 241) And it may be noted that this was enough to tinge the views of latter writers beginning from Mammaṭa

Ānanda's view is, however, duly expounded in the following lines of the Locana—"itare tu ata evālam kāradhvaniriyamiti yuktam / vakṣyate ca 'asambaddhārthā bhidhāyakatvam mā prasāṅkṣit' ityādi/ nirākṛteti tātpar yam" (pp 243–244) That Ānanda considers the aprā karaṇika artha also as abhidheya and that alaṃkāra alone is suggested may be gathered also from the expressions like the following ones (a) ' śabdaśaktimūlānuraṇanarūpavyangye tu dhvanau paurvāparyam" (Dhv pp 410–411) (b) "pūrvavadabhidheya tatsāmarthyākṣiptālaṃkāramātrapratī tyoḥ ', et (Dhv p 411)

Mahimabhaṭṭa on śabdaśaktimūla From his mode of argument it appears that Mahimabhaṭṭa possibly under stood that, Ānanda wanted to have both the prākaraṇika and aprākaraṇika senses with abhidhā function Compare "dattānardaḥ prajānām nirmūlamevetyavagantavyam" (VV III p 417–419) It may also be conjectured from the

fact that, Mahimabhaṭṭa puts the śabdaśaktimūla an a par with śleṣa. Cf. "tatra dharmyarthasya śleṣādabhinnatvaṁ yathā ......devatāviśeṣavācino.........vakśyate" (VV. II. pp. 344–345). *Here the expression "devatāviśeṣavācinaḥ" is quite significant* in respect of the abhidhā function for conveying the ,aprākaraṇika sense. But this is not Mahimabhṭṭa's final observation. In his firm opinion there cannot be a homonymous word in the true sense of the term and as such the question of having two abhidheya arthas from the same word does not arise. Under such circumstances the question of having the aprâkaraṇika sense as abhidheya is remoter still. Mahimabhaṭṭa's argument is that the same word (homonymous) cannot convey two meanings in the manner of a lamp which may reveal two objects at a time. The word will convey only one meaning as required by the context. The lamp may rveal a further object either by 'tantra' or by 'prasaṅga'.[33] But the word cannot convey a second meaning without a parāmarśa on the part of the cogniser (pratipattṛ). Hence, the so called śliṣṭa (homonymous) word may convey a second meaning only when there is adequate reason to serve as the liṅga. If this position is conceded then the second meaning must be recognised as inferred. Compare :

ekonekārthakṛdyatra svabhāvenaiva dīpavat /
samayasmṛtyanākāṅkṣastantrasya viṣayo hi saḥ //
śabde tvasiddhamekatvaṁ pratyarthaṁ tasya bhedataḥ /
... ...
tasmādarthāntaravyaktihetau kasmiṁścanāsati /
yaḥ śleṣabandhanirbandhaḥ kleśāyaiva kaverasau //
(VV. II. pp. 347–348).

Even where more than one meaning seem to be understood from a homonymous word the same word must not be taken as the cause of both the meanings. For, if both are to

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33. "tulyapradhānatvena sādhāraṇyaṁ tantram, atulyapradhānatve tu prasaṅgaḥ." (VVV. II. p. 347)

be recognised as meanings of the same word then which one of them will occur first? Moreover there is the rule of the grammarians that for every meaning there must be a separate word [34] Hence, for the two senses we must have two words as distinct 'hetus' For having two senses from a homonym we must either physically repeat the word or must differently connect it with different contexts Mahima holds that in either of the cases the second meaning is had not because of an inherent capacity of the word but because of an additional factor and as such the second meaning is anumeya Cf "tatra vācyārthavisayasyāsya vyarthah śabdaśaktiparikalpanaprayāsah//" (VV III pp 418-419) In 'atrāntare', etc, Mahimabhaṭṭa does not recognise the suggested upamālamkāra but recognises an idea relating to lord Śiva Once he observes that the word mahākāla is repeated for conveying the idea of the god This repetition is due to samāsokti present in the passage Cf "atra hi samāsoktinibandhanā devatāviśeṣavacino mahākālaśabdasyāvṛttirna tu tasyaivobhayārthatvanibandhaneti vakṣyate" (VV. II p 345) Again he observes that the idea of the god is inferred through its relation with 'attahāsa' and 'yugasamhāra' From these attributes we arrive at the second meaning relating to Lord Śiva, in the manner of samāsokti but not because of any inherent function (śakti) of the word 'mahākāla' effective in respect of both the meanings Cf "atrāntare na tūbhayārthāvṛttermahākālaśabdasya sā śaktirityetaduktam vakṣyate ca" (VV. III p 417) Mahima's conception of samāsokti may be had from his observation—"na hi viśeṣanasāmyamevaikamaprastutārthāvagatihetuh / yathāhuh—prakṛtārthena vākyena tatsamānairviśeṣanaih / aprastutārthakathanam samāsoktirudāhṛtā / iti, kim tarhi tatkāryasamāropo'pīti"

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34 The maxim is 'pratyartham śabdaniveśānnaikenānekārthābhidhānam" of Mahābhāṣya on the Pāṇini's rule "svarūpānām," etc. (MB NSP p 22)

(VV. II. p. 337). Thue we see that, according to Mahimabhaṭṭa the second meaning is had from a repetition of the word 'mahākāla' and the same repetition is encouraged by the adjectives (samānaviśeṣaṇa) equally applicable to the 'great season' and the 'Lord śiva'. But it may be noticed that although 'phullamallikādhavalāṭṭahāsa, etc., are not labelled as anekārthaka-śabdas yet for connecting with the great season and the god Śiva they must be differently understood. In case of the season it means "phullamallikā eva dhavalāṭṭahāsaḥ" and in case of the god it means "phullamallikā iva dhavalaḥ aṭṭahāsaḥ yasya." Thus these expressions are also as good as homonyms. But in so far as the reason for understanding these expressions differently is not independent of a knowledge of the two meanings of the word 'māhākāla' itself, Mahimabhaṭṭa's way of exposition involves the fallacy of a logical see-saw.

The grammarian's view on homonyms: Mahimabhaṭṭa literally *follows the grammarian's maxim "arthabhede śabdabheda."* But it may be observed that Ānanda also does not seem to disregard the same. Hence, let us trace the reason of their difference. The grammarians themselves recognise anekārthakaśabdas capable of conveying more than one meaning. Bhartṛhari tells us of the factors—saṁyoga, viprayoga, etc., for distinguishing one of the many vācya senses of a homonym. Nāgeśa refers to the sentence 'akṣā bhajyantāṁ bhakṣyantāṁ dīvyantām' having akṣa (meaning sense organ, vibhītaka tree and dice respectively) as an anekārthaka and all its senses as abhidheya. (vide, Uddyota, MB. NSP. p. 73). Nāgeśa observes in PLM also that the words vary with the meanings. The words having different meanings are identified as anekārthaka only beacuse of similarity in form. "arthapadayostādātmyāttattadarthatādātmyāpannaḥ śabdo bhinno iti hetorarthabhedāccabdabheda iti vyavahāraḥ/. samānākāramātreṇa tu eko'yaṁ śabdo bahvartha iti vyavahāraḥ" (PLM. p. 12). Patañjali says—"iṣyate ca ekenāpyanekasyābhidhānaṁ syāditi taccāntareṇa

yatnam na siddhyati" (MB NSP p 73) Thus in śleṣa we must repeat the homonymous word to have its various meanings Because of this repetition of the same word in two different constructions of the sentence, at least within the mind, the objection of the same abhidhā functioning for two senses(i e, viramya vyāpāra) does not arise Since by repetition there are two words, there are also two abhidhās which may be interpreted as 'yatna' of Patañjali In my opinion Ānanda can have also the non-contextual meaning of the śabdaśaktyudbhava as abhidheya because he is already prepared to have the same meaning from a repeated word having a new abhidhā We are informed by Pratīhārendurāja that Udbhata also maintained the doctrine of 'arthabhede śabdabheda Cf "iha khalu arthabhedena tāvacchabdā bhidyanta iti bhaṭṭodbhaṭasya siddhāntaḥ/", et (KSS p 58) We know that Ānanda had great esteem for Udbhaṭa and adopted his ideas in many cases and as such it may be conjectured that this doctrine was in Ānanda's mind also We have already seen that this view is held by Mahima also But the repetition of the word is determined by some factors and as such the second meaning is anumeya In reply to this contention of Mahima it may be pointed out that what is supposed to be the abhidheyārtha by Mahimabhaṭṭa also depends on the factors like samyoga, viprayoga, etc, as pointed out by Bhartṛhari But yet the abhidheyārtha is not taken to be anumeya At that rate the second meaning also should not be considered as anumeya Hence it seems quite likely and reasonable on the part of Ānanda to take both the contextual and non-contextual meanings as abhidheya

Appayadīkṣita also in his Vṛttivārttika takes the aprākaraṇika sense in śabdaśaktimūla as conveyed by abhidhā (pp 6-15) According to him the prākaraṇika is distinguished by prakaraṇa (context) and the aprākaraṇika is distinguished by its co-existence (samabhivyāhāra, i.e., 'śabdasyānyasya sannidhi' of Bhartṛhari) with the other senses of the words, logically connected with it. From a perusal of Appaya's

words we are led to conclude that, in śleṣa the prakaraṇa cannot distinguish the two senses, both being prākaraṇika, but they are to be distinguished with the help of śabdasyā-nyasya-sannidhi, etc. In śabdaśaktyudbhava, however, the prākaraṇika sense may occur to the mind earlier. That does not deprive the aprākaraṇika of an abhidhā śakti for it, because even in śleṣa we cannot have both the senses at the same instance. We have either of the two indiscriminately earlier. It may also be remembered that even in śleṣa a strict simultaneity of the two meanings or a literal repetition of the same word is never demanded.

Scope of anumāna in śabdaśaktimūla : A very vital point in connection with śabdaśaktimūla that requires our close examination is the expression "kalpayitavya" in Ānanda's words——"aprākaraṇikaprākaraṇikayorupamānopameyabhāvaḥ kalpayitavyaḥ". Kalpanā means inference also. In Mīmāṁsā 'kalpanā' also means 'arthāpatti' (vide, Apte's Dictionary) and as a matter of fact here the process of arriving at the so called suggested meaning should be recognised as a case of śrutārthāpatti. According to Naiyāyikas, arthāpatti is included in anumāna itself. Hence we are naturally confronted with the question as to whether anumāna is also involved in śabdaśaktimūla. Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha also repeat the very words—"upamānopameyabhāvaḥ kalpanīyaḥ" without any question. Hence, we will have an occasion to examine whether anumāna is also responsible for the suggestion of the alaṁkāra in the śabdaśaktimūla-dhvani in later sections.

Arthaśaktyudbhava type : We have seen that in śabda-śaktyudbhava we must have some select homonymous words which do not brook alteration. Hence, the suggested sense in that type of dhvani is said to be based on the capacity of words. But in arthaśaktyudbhava we need not have such unchangeable words. The peculiar primary meaning is itself competent to give rise to the suggested content. The suggested content of the piece does not have any conventionally

expressive word for it Hence, Ānanda says, that artha-śaktyudbhava type of dhvani is that where such an express meaning shines which suggests with all intention (svataḥ tātparyeṇa) another matter of fact (vastu) which does not have expressive words corresponding to it in the said piece (uktim vinā) Compare

> arthaśaktyudbhavastvanyo yatrārthaḥ sa prakāśate /
> yastātparyeṇa vastvanyad vyanaktyuktim vinā svataḥ //

On the expression "svatastātparyeṇa" Abhinava says—"svatastātparyeṇetyabhidhāvyāpāranirākaraṇaparamidam padam dhvananavyāpāramāha na tu tātparyaśaktim" In the fourth chapter we will see that Ānanda possibly did not conceive of any tātparyaśakti, but by the time of Abhinava it was quite commonly talked of On the strength of certain other expressions of Ānanda we understand that 'tātparyeṇa' means *being intent on it* *Since it is a variety of dhvani the suggested* sense must be invariably predominant and the suggested sense may gain predominance only when the express sense is intent on suggesting the same Hence, compare · (1) tatparāveva śabdārthau yatra vyaṅgyam prati sthitau / dhvaneḥ sa eva viṣayo mantavyaḥ saṃkarojjhitaḥ // (Dhv I p 131) and (2) alaṃkārāntarasyāpi pratītau yatra bhāsate / tatparatvaṃ na vācyasya nāsau mārgo dhvaner mataḥ // (Dhv II 27. p 259), etc.

Example of Arthaśaktyudbhava . evaṃ vādini devarṣau pārśva pituradhomukhī/ līlākamalapatrāṇi gaṇayāmāsa pārvatī'/ (Dhv p 248) (When the celestial sage said this, Pārvatī, who was near her father, began counting petals of the play-lotus)

This is a verse from the sixth canto of Kumārasambhava of Kālidāsa The verse gives us an express sense which is in no way incongruous. Hence the vācya is vivakṣita. But the same vācya leads us to a suggested sense through noticeable stages (i. e , saṃlakṣya-krama) After we cognise the express sense telling us of Pārvatī's counting the petals of the play-lotus

we remember Pārvatī's earlir austerities for winning Śiva's love and thus take Pārvatī's weakness for Śiva into account. Thus finally we arrive at the idea that Pārvatī, who is engaging herself in the act of counting the petals, is feeling shy to hear a proposal regarding her marriage with Śiva. This information (i. e., vastu) regarding Pārvatī's feeling of shyness is conveyed by the capacity of the peculiar description of the situation which is had as the express meaning and not because of an unalterable set of words and hence, it is a case of arthaśaktyudbhava.

In this connection a few words of Ānanda deserve our close examination. Commenting on the above quoted verse Ānanda writes : "atra hi līlākamalapatragaṇanam upasarjanīkṛtasvarūpaṁ śabdavyāpāraṁ vinaivārthāntaraṁ vyabhicāribhāvalakṣṇaṁ prakāśayati." (p. 248). Ānanda says that a vyabhicāribhāva is suggested here. It is not simply a case of rasa dhvani. Ordinarily we have the suggestion of rasa from the expressly described vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāva. But here we have the vyabhicāribhāva itself as the suggested content. When we take account of the vyabhicāribhāva thus suggested and the ālambana Pārvatī herself, we have the relish of rasa. Hence, in between the express sense of counting petals and the suggested information regarding lajjā, there is a krama (i. e., order of understanding) ; but in between the knowledge of the vyabhicārī and the further suggestion of rasa there is no krama. Thus the suggestion of rasa yet remains instantaneous. Abhinava observes, "rasastvatrāpi dūrata eva vybhicārisvarūpe paryālocyamāne bhātīti tadapekṣayālakṣyakramataiva, lajjāpekṣayā tu tatra lakṣyakramatvam." (Locana, p. 250).

We have seen earlier that when a vyabhicāribhāva is predominantly suggested it gives us a bhāvadhvani. A bhāvadhvani is called alakṣyakramavyaṅgya-dhvani. But here we have a vyabhicāri-bhāva as predominantly suggested and yet it is classed under saṁlakṣyakrama variety. Hence, we

are to understand the difference between the suggested vyabhicāri in its two aspects In my opinion the bhāva of the alakṣyakramavyangyadhvani is a feeling felt by the sahṛdaya along with the poetical character to whom it primarily belongs But here the vyabhicāribhāva is gathered to be belonging to the poetical character alone and it is not equally felt by the sahrdaya Hence it remains an 'information regarding the vyabhicāribhāva.' Ānanda's 'vyabhicāribhāvalaksanam' literally means 'vyabhicāribhāvaviṣayakam '

The confusion caused by Ānanda's expression "arthāntaram vyabhicāribhāvalakṣanam prakāśayati" has been worse confounded by Abhinava's observation—"etaduktam bhavati yadyapi rasabhāvādirartho dhvanyamāna eva bhavati na vācyah kadācidapi, tathāpi na sarvo'lakṣyakramasya viṣayah" (Locana, p 248) These few words of Abhinava have often been quoted by later writers like Appayadīkṣita and Jagannātha to give us the confusing idea that the bhāvas in these two types of dhvani are same except in the matter of having a krama Hence, compare · (1) "nanu rasādidhvanirasamlakṣyakrama iti prasiddham, kathamatra tasyānuranānena vyangyatocyate/ maivam/ .... taduktam abhinavaguptapādācāryaih—"yadyapi rasabhāvādirartho " etc (CM p 26) (2) "upapādayiṣyate ca sthāyyādīnāmapi samlaksyakramavyangyatvam " (RG p 29) (3) Raising an objection to Abhinava's observation "rasabhāvādirartho," etc , Jagannātha says that "it is not possible to have rasa, bhāva, etc , as samlakṣyakrama, for, in such a case we should have eighteen varieties of samlakṣyakrama variety of dhvani leaving scope for rasādi also to be suggested through a noticeable order Yet we have a consistency of the words of Abhinava if we understand that rati, etc , being suggested through a noticeable order become matters of fact (vastu) But the possiblity of such an interpretation is doubtful " Cf "na khalu dharmigrāhakamānasiddham ratyādidhvaneralakṣyakramavyangyatvam/ samlaksyakramatayā vyajyamānasya ratyādestu vastumātratatva, na rasāditvamiti teṣāmāśayasya

varṇanena na taduktīnāṁ virodhaḥ/ upapattistvarthe'sminvicāraṇīyā." (RG. p. 248).

Abhinava's position clarified : If we read Abhinava's words more carefully we can learn that there is nothing to cause any confusion. Abhinava's words seem to refer to Ānanda's state ments—"....abhidheyasāmarthyākṣiptatvameva rasādīnām/ na tvabhidheyatvaṁ kathañcit" (pp. 78–84) and kārikā II. 3 (p. 175), where rasa, bhāva, etc. are said to be a-krama. But these two statements of Ānanda seem to run counter to his vṛtti on "evaṁ vādini", saying "...vyabhicāribhāvalakṣaṇaṁ prakāśayati", where a vyabhicāribhāva is said to have krama. To bring a compromise between the apparently vying views of Ānanda, Abhinava says that although rasa, bhāva (i. e., vyabhicāribhāva), etc, are always suggested (as alakṣyakrama) yet some of them (say some vyabhicārbhāvā) may also be conveyed by saṁlakṣyakrama (and thus may be matters of fact). So the heart does not immediately rest in lajjā, i. e., the heart does not get the relish which is experienced in case of alakṣyakrama by experiencing and ruminating over lajjā. (na lajjāyāṁ viśramayati hṛdayam). The lajjā in question is not a feeling to be felt by the sahṛdaya, but it is the matter of fact which the sahṛdaya thinks about. (....vyabhicārisvarūpe paryālocyamāne bhātīti....). That Abhinava himself takes "evaṁ vādini" as an illustration of vastudhvani is again clear from his observation—"evaṁ arthaśaktyudbhavo dvibhedo vastumātrasya vyañjanīyatve vastudhvanirūpatayā nirūpitaḥ", etc. (Locana, p. 257).

In fact Ānanda does not tell us that a vyabhicāribhāva is suggested. What he says is that the express idea of counting petals "reveals another meaning relating to a vyabhicāribhāva" (arthāntaraṁ vyabhicāribhāvalakṣaṇaṁ prakāśayati). Moreover, "evaṁvādini" is not the only instanse of saṁlakṣyakramārthaśakutyudbhava. In other instances we have vastu and vastu alone. In kārikā II. 22. Ānanda clearly says that another matter of fact is suggested (vastvanyad vyanakti).

From II 24 also we learn that Ānanda recognises only a vastu as suggested (vastuno'nyasya dīpakah) We must not argue that in II 22 and II 24 the term vastu is used to mean all the three varieties of the suggested sense as is done in I 4 , because in contrast with the contents of II 22 and II 24 Ānanda tells us in II 25 that in arthaśaktyudbhava type alamkāra also may form the suggested content

But we are once again confronted with Abhinava's words— "yo rasādirarthah sa evākramo dhvaneràtmā na tvakrama eva sah/ kramatvamapi hi tasya kadācidbhavati / tadā cārthaśaktyudbhavānusvānarūpabhedateti vaksyate /' (locana, p 174) where bhāvas of the two types of dhvani are distinguished only on the basis of krama and without any reference to the state of the mind of the reader But our doubt may be solved by referring to a few latter words where vastudhvani is distinguished from rasa and bhāva, which are said to be states of mind Hence bhāva of samlaksyakrama which is recognised to be a vastu, as seen above, automatically becomes distinguished from bhāva recognised as a state of mind being put on a par with rasa Hence compare, "nanvevam vibhāvadhvaniranubhāvadhvaniśca vaktavyah/ maivam / taccarvanāpi cittavṛttiṣveva paryavasyitīti rasabhāvebhyo nādhikam carvanīyam/ yadā tu vibhāvānubhāvāvapi vyangyau bhavatastadā vastudhvanirapi kim na sahyate" (Locana, p 177)

Śabdārthaśaktyudbhava type In the vṛtti on kārikā II 23, Ānanda informs us that there may also be a variety of saṁlakṣyakrama where both śabda and artha together suggest the additional meaning. Since, unlike the earlier two varieties, this variety owes its origin to the capacity of both the meaning and the word, we may designate it as ubhayaśakytudbhava But Ānanda does not give us any example of this variety specifically He simply says : "śabdaśaktyārthaśaktyā śabdārthaśaktyā vākṣipto'pi vyangyo'rthah kavinā punar yatra prakāśīkriyate' etc , where from we take the clue to the present variety

Mammaṭa says that there is only one variety of ubhayaśaktyudbhava and gives us the verse—"atandracandrābharaṇā samuddīpitamanmathā/ tārakātaralā śyāmā sānandaṁ na karoti kam/" as illustration where we have an upamālaṁkāra as the suggested content. Here 'śyāmā' means either a 'woman' or 'the night'. The other words are also all homonymous. The expression 'sānandaṁ na karoti kam' is not homonymous, strictly speaking. But yet it is equally applicable to both the meanings of 'śyāmā.' If we consider the non-homonymous nature of 'sānandam,' etc., the verse presents us a case of ubhayaśaktyudbhava. But just as in 'atrāntare,' etc., we have the non-homonymous expression 'atrāntare' as equally applicable to both the meanings of 'mahākāla' we have 'sānandaṁ', etc., in the verse under consideration. Hence, Māṇikyacandra seems to be quite justified in observing—"tathātra yadyapyartho'pi vyañjakastathāpi śliṣṭaśabdaśaktireva vyaṅgyamunmīlayati nārthaśaktiriti śabdotthadhvanireva na dvyuttha iti tattvam" (KP. Sam. IV. p. 119). In fact here also we have an alaṁkāra, owing to the use of homonymous words exactly as we have in śabdaśaktyudbhava. Viśvanātha also hardly finds any illustration as different from that of śabdaśaktyudbhava. His illustration also gives us only an alaṁkāra as the suggested content and the same verse may easily be passed as an illustration of śabdaśaktyudbhava. Hence, in order to find a justification for rocognising this veriety Pandit Durgāprasāda remarks that when in a varse changeable words and unchangeable words occur in equal quantity we should call that a case of ubhayaśaktimūla. Cf. "yatra tu kāvye parivṛttiṁ sahamānānāmasahamānānāṁ ca śabdānāṁ naikajātīyaprācuryaṁ, api tu sāmyameva, tatra śabdārthobhayaśaktimūlakasya vyaṅgyasya sthitiriti dvyuttho dhvaniḥ/ na cāyamanyataraśaktimūlakatayaiva vyapadeṣṭuṁ śakyaḥ/ vinigamakābhāvāt." (SD. NSP. IV. p. 210). Ānanda's own idea of ubhayaśaktimūla is best illustrated by the verse "dṛṣṭyā

keśava"[35] which had every claim to be treated as an example of ubhayaśaktimūla variety of dhvani but does not happen to be designated as a dhvani because the very suggested sense is also referred to by an expressive word. Ānanda tells us in II 23, that if the suggested sense conveyed by the powers of śabda, artha or both is referred to in the same context by another expressive word then that would not present a case of dhvani but an embellishment In the present verse the expression 'saleśam' (i e with significance) reveals the whole trick of suggestion Happily, commenting on Ānanda's words—"ubhayaśaktyā yathā 'dṛṣṭyā keśava goparāgahṛtayā' ityādau"[36] Abhinava ably says that we have to recognise śabdaśakti in the expressions, 'goparāga,' etc, and an arthaśakti because of the context, which is helpful for giving rise to suggested ideas The additional idea may be suggested to us only when we gather as a meaning from the context that Kṛṣṇa is the object of secret love for all the young women Hence, compare, "śabdaśaktistāvadgopīrāgādiśabdaśleṣavaśāt / arthaśaktistu prakaraṇavaśāt / yāvadatra rādhāramaṇasyākhilataruṇījanacchannānurāgagarimāspadatvam na viditam tāvadarthāntarasyāpratīteh, saleśamiti cātra svoktih" (Locana, p 254) This is how we are told that the basis of recognising ubhayaśaktimūla is the instrumentality of both the context and the use of homonyms for suggestion and not the mathematical calculation of equal quantity of variable and non-variable words

Type of the suggestive meaning It is observed that in arthaśaktyudbhava type of dhvani, a meaning suggests a further meaning The meaning which is thus responsible for giving rise to the suggested content is said to be of two types, viz., (1) prauḍhoktimātraniṣpannaśarīra, i e., possible only in a mature (i e, poetical) expression, and (2) svataḥsambhavī, i.e, common to the ordinary speech (vide Dhv II 24)

35 Dhv II p 240

36 Dhv II, p 253

The mature poetical expression may belong either to the poet or to the character delineated by the poet. The poets and the poetical characters depicted to be endowed with peculiar states of the mind are supposed to have more imaginary ideas and more poetical expressions. Hence what is impossible in the ordinary world may simply be possible in their world of imagination. In the verse "sajjehi surahimāso"[37] the month of spring is said to be making the arrows of Cupid ready for use. That is how the non-sentient month or season is conceived as capable of an action similar to that of a sentient being. In the ordinary imagination it is incongruous; but in the poet's world of imagination there is not even an iota of inconsistency in conceiving the month or the season like that.

In the mature expression of the poetical character also, ordinarily impossible things are accepted as possible, without any question. Hence, so far it is mentioned by the hero, there is no inconsistency in the parrot's practising penance, as expressly stated in the verse "śikhariṇi kva nu nāma."[38]

The svataḥ saṁbhavī type of meaning is always consistent, be it in the poetical speech or in the ordinary expression. For example, in the verse "evaṁ vādini" we find such an express meaning, which does not require any poetic licence for being passed as consistent.

We may notice that this recognition of a mature way of expression (prauḍhokti) facilitates the recognition of certain such expressions as based on poetic convention (i.e., kavisamayakhyāta) which would have otherwise caused the poetic defect of khyātaviruddhatā. That is why, when there is a reference to the "drinking of the moonlight by the cakora bird"[39] we should neither take it as a case of khyātaviruddhatā,

37. Dhv. p. 255.

38. Dhv. p. 138.

39. "jyotsnā peyā cakorairjaladharasamaye mānasaṁ yānti haṁsāḥ" (vide, SD. VII. 23–25, for some of the kavisamayas.)

nor, in my opinion, as a case of lakṣaṇā. That there is no question of lakṣaṇā in case of the praudhoktis is indicated by Ānanda himself by treating them under the context of vivakṣitānyaparavācya

Suggestion of alaṁkāras. It is already seen in the first chapter,[40] that earlier ālamkārikas like Udbhaṭa recognise also the presence of a suggested alamkāra in dīpaka, sasamdeha, etc. Compare

ādimadhyāntaviṣayāh prādhānyetarayoginah /
antargatopamādharmā yatra taddīpakam viduh //(KSS I ,14),and
alamkārāntaracchāyām yatkṛtvā dhīṣu bandhanam /
asamdehe'pi samdeharūpam samdeha nāma tat // (KSS VI 3)

With reference to such a position of the earlier theorists Ānanda says that in arthaśaktyudbhava we can have an alamkāra also as the suggested content But only when the suggested alamkāra is more predominant, on account of greater appeal, we have a case of dhvani (Dhv II 26-30) Since there is a reference to an express alamkāra suggesting an additional alamkāra, we gather that in arthaśaktyudbhava the express sense suggestive of the vastu or alamkāra may itself be embellished Hence, we may have either the suggestion of a (1) vastu or an (2) alamkāra from a vastu and the suggestion of a (3) vastu or an (4) alamkāra from an alamkāra These four varieties may appear to be twelve fold on the basis of the three types of the suggestive sense referred to in II 24 That is how we have twelve varieties of arthaśaktyudbhava in KP

Factors governing suggestion in arthaśaktyudbhava : Another very vital question discussed by Mammaṭa is regarding the factors which govern the suggestivity of the express sense Some of the factors are found in the 'speciality' (i.e , vaiśiṣṭya) of the speaker, the addresse, the modulation of the voice, the sentence, the content of the speech, the proximity of

40 Vide, Sources of the Theory, p. 25.

another person, context (prastāva), locality, and time. For example in the verse "evaṁ vādini" we pass on to a suggested sense only because of the speciality of the context which relates to as special a thing as Pārvatī's proposed marriage with Śiva, for whom she already cherishes a weakness. The suggested sense, indeed, occurs to us because of a consideration of all these factors. Compare ;

vaktṛboddhavyakākūnāṁ vākyavācyānyasannidheḥ /
prastāvadeśakālādervaiśiṣṭyātpratibhājuṣām /
y'orthasyānyārthadhīheturvyāpāro vyaktireva sā // (KP. III.) ;

The speciality of intonation : Of all the factors named by Mammaṭa, kāku or intonation requires our closer examination. Bharata speaks of two varieties of kāku, viz., sākāṁkṣā and nirākāṁkṣā.[41] This intonation occurs in the form of certain modulations of the voice which are called alaṁkāras (i.e., notes). They are six in number and are named as, ucca (high note), dīpta (excited), mandra (grave), nīca(low), druta (fast) and vilambita (slow). The sākāṁkṣā kāku belongs to a sākāṁkṣa vākya and the nirākāṁkṣā kāku belongs to a nirākāṁkṣa vākya. That vākya (i.e., sentence) is called nirākāṁkṣa, where only the conventional meaning is conveyed by the words. In the sākāṁkṣa vākya, the words convey more than what appears as the conventional meaning of the words. The meaning additional to the conventional meaning arises due to the speciality of intonation. Such a kāku is indicated by Abhinava as arthakāku. (A. Bh. Chap. XVII. Vol. II. 392). The modulation of voice (kāku) attached to the nirākāṁkṣa vākya also suggests certatn conditions of the speaker like surprise, intolerence, joy and lamentation. But

41. "dvividhā kākuḥ sākāṅkṣā nirākāṅkṣā ceti, vākyasya sākāṅkṣatvanirākaṅkṣatvāt," (NŚ.) Rājaśekhara defines kāku as a quality in the mode of utterance which is employed with the purpose of conveying a special sense. "abhiprāyavān pāṭhadharmaḥ kākuḥ."

here we are concerned only with the arthakāku of the sākāmkṣa vākya which alone conveys the suggested meaning as the intended content of the statement for expressing which the expressive words are not adequate

Mammaṭa gives the verse "tathābhūtām dṛṣṭvā" of Veṇīsamhāra, where Bhīmasena says with a modulation of the voice, "guruh khedam khinne mayi bhajati nādyāpi kuruṣu" The express meaning of the words appears as follows, "The master gets angry with me but not yet with the Kauravas" Due to kāku, the statement suggests the meaning—"The master (Yudhiṣṭhira) should not be angry with me, he should rather be angry with the Kauravas" This suggested meaning arises only because the words are uttered with a dīpta (excited) intonation and not in an ordinary manner (atra mayi na yogyah khedah kurusu tu yogya iti kākvā prakāśyate) It appears that the 'dīpta (excited) aspect' of the statement itself is referred to as the speciality of kāku by Mammaṭa But we will presently see that Mammaṭa's intention is something different.

The kārikā Dhv III, 38, where Ānanda refers to the use of kāku is variously interpreted[42] According to Abhinava, kāku gives rise to a suggested sense which is bound to be subordinate Because, kāku is a conspicuous speciality of the word (śabda) itself and hence, the suggested sense is as good as one referred to by expressive words as in the verse "dṛṣṭyā keśava" where the word "saleśam" reveals the whole trick So the suggested sense conveyed by kāku invariably gives us a guṇībhūtavyangya kāvya The same express sense aided by the suggested sense conveyed by kāku may once again give rise to a more predominant suggested sense like rasa In the portion—"svasthā bhavanti mayi jīvati dhārtarāṣṭrāh" of a verse of Veṇīsamhāra, quoted by Ānanda for illustration, the suggested sense due to kāku is that "it is quite impossible for the sons of Dhṛtarāṣṭra to remain alive yet while I am

42 Compare—"anye tvāhuḥ," etc., in Locana, p 478

living." This suggested sense augments the force of the express sense, which serves as an anubhāva for the suggestion of the contextual raudrarasa.[43] Because of Abhinava's conviction that the suggested sense conveyed by kāku is bound to present a case of guṇībhūtavyaṅgya Mammaṭa names a variety of guṇībhūtavyaṅgya as kākvākṣipta. (Vide, KP. V.). The suggested meaning of 'assertion' in the verse "mathnāmi kauravaśataṁ" in said to be guṇībhūta as it is as good as the express sense being simultaneously intelligible with the expressly stated 'niṣedha' (i.e., negation). Because of this relation of kāku with guṇībhūtavyaṅgya Mammaṭa adds in connection with the verse "tathā bhūtāṁ" that what is immediately suggested by kāku is a question which may be as follows— "kuruṣu kiṁ na khedo guroryanmayi khedaḥ" (as suggested by Māṇikyacandra). This immediately suggested sense, serving as the speciality of kāku, gives rise to such a suggested sense (i.e., mayi na yogyaḥ, etc.) which need not once again be treated as guṇībhūta. Hence, finally, we have a dhvani in the verse "tathābhūtāṁ" also.

Abhinava points out that kāku is an attribute of the word itself (śabdasyaiva kaściddharmaḥ). Yet Mammaṭa is justified in counting it as a factor for suggestion in the arthaśaktyudbhava inasmuch as Ānanda points out that it is in fact the express sense which suggests the additional meaning with the help of kāku and as independent from the express sense the kāku cannot suggest the meaning itself.

Strangely, Mahima also recognises an additional meaning. conveyed by kāku. (Vide. VV. p. 54). For instance, he recognises the idea of "assertion" conveyed by kāku in the verse "mathnāmi kauravaśataṁ." It is not vācya (i.e., express) since he illustrates the verse only to show the greater charm of the meaning on account of being different from the express sense. But, yet he would recognise the meaning conveyed

43. Vide Locana, pp. 478-479.

by kāku not as suggested but as conveyed by abhidhā (i.e. kākvabhidheya) The dhvani theorist would possibly say that it is a difference only in name What is kākvabhidheya for Mahima is vyangya for the dhvani theorist.

Mammaṭa quotes yet another verse from Veṇīsaṁhāra itself for illustrating a case of guṇībhūtavyangya owing to the use of kāku[44] Illustrations of kāku are all quoted from a drama because of the fact that the kāku is discernible only in the acting of a drama Hence, Aristotle does not think it to be strictly belonging to the realm of poetry. In this connection he observes—"As regards the Diction, one subject for inquiry under this head is the turn given to the language when spoken; e g, the difference between command and prayer, simple statement and threat, question and answer, and so forth. The theory of such matters, however, belongs to Elocution and the professors of that art. Let us pass over this, then, as appertaining to another art, and not to that of poetry." (De Poetica, chapter, 19)

Position of alamkāra in the dhvani theory · We have already observed that in śabdaśaktyudbhava and arthaśaktyudbhava type of dhvani an alamkāra also may be predominantly suggested But in such a case it is not to be understood as an alamkāra in the true sense of the term An alamkāra always presupposes an object more important than itself which is embellished by it. But the alamkāra which occurs as the principal suggested content of a variety of dhvani can never be subordinate. It is the principal object which deserves to be embellished by *other so called alaṁkāras Yet it is called* an alamkāra according to "brāhmaṇa-śramaṇanyāya" A śramaṇa does not have any caste distinction and as such if a brahmin takes to the way of a śramaṇa (i e, a buddhist monk), he ceases to be a brahmin Yet with reference to his earlier identity the śramaṇa may be identified as brāhmaṇa śramaṇa.

44. "mathnāmi kauravaśatam" etc. in KP. V.

Similarly the ideas of 'sādṛśya,' 'ādhikya,' etc, which are principally suggested are designated as alaṁkāra only because they could have been called so had they been conveyed as the express sense. This distinction requires to be carefully noted because in the dhvani theory alaṁkāras do not generally occupy a very honourable position. The alaṁkāras are adored and appreciated only when they are depicted with the intention of suggesting rasa and bhāva etc. Cf.

rasabhāvāditātparyamāśritya viniveśanam /
alaṁkṛtīnāṁ sarvāsāmalaṁkāratvasādhanam //

(Dhv. II. p. 197).

The poet must not indulge in depicting an alaṁkāra for alaṁkāra's sake. There should not be any special effort for depicting an alaṁkāra. Alaṁkāras occur automatically in the composition of the poet infused with sentiment. (cf. Dhv. II. 16). Hence, if any alaṁkāra is found to be detrimental to the depiction of rasa then it should be condemned. Hence, yamaka is to be totally discarded in case of śṛṅgāra rasa (Dhv. II. 15). This being the position of alaṁkāras Ānanda feels it necessary to clarify the actual idea of rasavat and other such alaṁkāras which involve rasa and bhāva.

Rasavat and other such alaṁkāras : (1) Ānandavardhana, who has great esteem for his predecessors like Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa, does not altogether discard the conception of alaṁkāras where rasa and bhāva are treated as embellishments. But Ānanda offers some modifications to make those alaṁkāras suitable to his own scheme. Udbhaṭa and Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin indiscriminately relegated the rasa and bhāvas to the status of embellishments without taking note of their predominance or inferiority in a piece. Hence, Ānanda says,—"If in a kāvya the chief purport of the sentence should relate to something else, and if sentiment and so forth should come in only as auxiliaries to it, then that sentiment and so forth are figures in such a kāvya."

pradhāne'nyatra vākyārthe yatrāngam tu rasādayaḥ /
kāvye tasminnalamkāro rasādiriti me matiḥ //

(Dhv, II 5 p 29.)

(2) The alamkāras which consist of rasa and bhāva as named by earlier theorists are as follows—

Daṇḍin gives the alamkāras—preyaḥ, rasavat and ūrjasvī (KD II 275) Preyaḥ is defined as 'priyatarākhyāna' and in both the examples of preyas we find the suggestion of a prīti for some god (i e, devaviṣayaka rati) A composition having rasa in any status is said to be rasavat (rasavadrasa-peśalam) Ūrjasvī is that where there is a suggestion of ahamkāra This ahamkāra is nothing other than the vyabhicāribhāva called garva

Bhāmaha gives one more alamkāra of this type and that is samāhita Bhāmaha's conception of preyas is same as that of Daṇḍin Compare, KD II, 276 with KL III. 5 Bhāmaha's rasavat desires a distinct delineation of the rasas like śṛngāra (cf rasavaddarśitaspaṣṭaśṛngārādirasam yathā) Bhāmaha's example of ūrjasvī also suggests Karṇa's garva Cf,

ūrjasvi karṇena yathā pārthāya punarāgataḥ /
dvihsandadhāti kim karṇaḥ śalyetyahirapākṛtaḥ // (KL III 7) From the example of samāhita, given by Bhāmaha, only this much may be conjectured that, it consists of a bhāva-praśama (KL. III 10) In his example, which only refers to the situation where we may have a case of samāhita, we get the word praśakti, meaning pacification, and this may refer to the praśama of some bhāva [45]

Udbhaṭa, whose treatment of rasavat, etc., seems to have

45 It may be opined that Bhāmaha here actually desires a bhāva-praśama, on the strength of the assumption that Udbhaṭa says explicitly only what is implicit in Bhāmaha; for Bhāmaha's influence over Udbhaṭa in respect of this group of alamkāras is very clear from a comparison of the definitions of rasavat given by both of them.

been closest to the memory of Ānanda, defines preyasvat as follows—

"ratyādikānāṁ bhāvānāmanubhāvādisūcanaiḥ /

yatkāvyaṁ vadhyate sadbhistatpreyasvadudāhṛtam // (KSS. IV. 2). Its example contains the suggestion of a vātsalya-bhāva (i.e., love for children) which is in fact a rati for putra, etc. Pratīhārendurāja observes—"evamayaṁ ratyātmako bhāvo vātsalyasvabhāvaścaturbhiranubhāvādibhiratrāvagamitaḥ" (KSS. p. 52). Udbhaṭa defines rasavat almost in the same manner as Bhāmaha. (rasavaddarśitaspaṣṭaśṛṅgārādirasādayam, etc.). But in case of suggestion of rasas in rasavat we must have the suggestion of the bhāvas rati, etc., and in preyasvat also we have the suggestion of the bhāvas rati etc. Hence there must be a distinction of the two types of bhāvas. Pratīhārendurāja says that ratyādibhāvas of preyasvat include the sthāyī, vyabhicārī and sāttvikabhāvas. To distinguish between the ratyādibhāva of the two alaṁkāras Vivṛttikāra points out under preyasvat—

"ratiriha devagurunṛpādiviṣayā gṛhyate /

kāntāviṣayāyāḥ stuteḥ sūcane rasavadalaṁkāro vakṣyate /." This expression, however, clearly betrays the influence of Mammaṭa, who was anterior to Vivṛttikāra (KSS. Intr. p. XXXI). Udbhaṭa's ūrjasvī is said to be containing either a rasābhāsa or bhāvābhāsa of later ālaṁkārikas like Mammaṭa (KSS. IV. 5). Udbhaṭa's samāhita is defined as "rasabhāvatadābhāsavṛtteḥ praśamabandhanam / anyānubhāvaniḥśūnyarūpaṁ yattatsamāhitam" (KSS. IV. 7). On the strength of this definition, anticipated by Bhāmaha, we suppose Bhāmaha's samāhita as containing a bhāvapraśama. In Udbhaṭa's definition of samāhita we hear of a rather unfamiliar object namely a praśama of rasa (i.e., an abatement of the operation of a sentiment).

(3) Ānanda says that rasa and bhāva, etc., my be embellishments only when they are subordinate to some other meaning of the composition. Presenting an example, Ānanda

says, "tadyathā cāṭuṣu preyo'lamkārasya vākyārthatve'pi rasādayo'ngabhūtā dṛśyante" In the verse 'kim hāsyena' [46] we have karuna rasa as auxiliary to another meaning The other meaning which is embellished by karunarasa is a preyo'lamkāra in the technical conception of Udbhaṭa, etc, In other words, the other meaning (i e , vākyārtha) is a priyatarākhyāna or the vākyārtha is suggestive of a ratibhāva (love or devotion) for the person addressed, in order to present a preyasvat Abhinava points out that the principal meaning is the statement of 'narapatiprabhāva.' The statement is embellished by karunarasa since the plain meaning—'you have killed the soldiers'—is rendered more appealing by way of making it more delectable. Compare, "na hi tvayā ripavo hatā iti yādṛganalamkṛto'yam vākyārthastādṛgayam, api tu sundaratarībhūto'tra vākyārthah, saundaryam ca karunarasakṛtameva" and "nanu rasena kim kurvatā prakṛto'rtho'lankriyate rasenāpi tarhi sarasīkriyate so'rtha iti svasamvedyametat" (Locana, p 194) The whole statement in its embellished form is a cāṭu (i e., a flattering statement or eulogy), as pointed out by Ānanda in the line quoted above In the verse "kṣipto hastāvalagna" [47] the principal vākyārtha is "tripuraripuprabhāvātiśaya", as pointed out by Ānanda himself and there īrṣāvipralambhaśṛngāra serves only as an embellishment.

(4) By the observation "tadyathā ...dṛśyante" Ānanda seems to show simply how rasa and bhāva may occur also as auxiliary (i.e , subordinate, angabhūta) elements. His example "kim hāsyena" presents an auxiliary rasa and hence a rasavadalamkāra of the new conception But the same verse gives us a preyasvat alamkāra and hence according to Udbhaṭa we should have the suggestion of some other bhāva of ratyādi group This bhāva is to appear as more predominant since

46 Dhv, II p. 193.

47. Dhv. II, p 195

it is conveyed by the vākyārtha (i.e. the principal meaning embellished by karuṇa rasa). Now the question is, is the bhāva supposed to be suggested by the vākyārtha embellished by karuṇa rasa, a bhāva of asaṁlakṣya type? As interpreted by Abhinava, Bhāmaha's preyo'laṁkāra is a description of a prīti (love) for guru, deva, nṛpati and putra. (Locana, pp. 191–192). If it is simply a description then it may be taken as a matter of fact (i.e., vastu). This matter of fact being predominantly suggested we may finally have a vastudhvani. But ratyādi in the definition of preyas given by Udbhaṭa may seem to be ratibhāva of the asaṁlakṣya type. It is already indicated that rati of asaṁlakṣya type, that too for the nāyikā or nāyaka, will present a rasa; and as there is an alaṁkāra called rasavat, and as the example of preyas describes love for a child the rati of preyas means rati for guru, nṛpa, etc. We know that Abhinava recognises only a vyabhicāribhāva duly exited in the heart of the sahṛdaya as presenting a bhāvadhvani. Hence, it appears that any delineation of love for guru, etc., would be only a matter of fact description for him. We find devādiviṣayaka rati, recognised in alakṣyakrama-bhāvadhvani only in the writings of the later theorists beginning from Mammaṭa. But Ānanda and Abhinava do not tell us of any such bhāva to be present in the verses 'kiṁ hāsyena' and 'kṣipto hastāvalagna'. What Ānanda observes in the words—"yadā tu cāṭuṣu devatāstutiṣu vā rasādīnāmaṅgatayā vyavasthānaṁ...tadapi guṇībhūtavyaṅgyasya dhvaniniṣpanda-bhūtatvamevetyuktam prāk" [48] may be found to be justified by recognising a principally suggested matter of fact regarding an eulogy of the king and the god in the illustrated verses in the manner of recognising a vastudhvani in the verse "śikhariṇi" where also we find a cāṭu as pointed out by Abhinava. Ānanda once again observes: "rasādirūpavyaṅgyasya guṇībhāvo rasavadalaṁkāre darśitaḥ; tatra ca teṣāmā-

48. Dhv. III. p. 499.

dhikārikavākyāpekṣayā guṇībhāvo vivahanapravṛttabhṛtyānuyāyirājavat" (Dhv III p 462) Here ādhikārika [49]vākya means the sentence as construed to have the principal vācya (i.e., meaning) which is principal on account of leading to the more predominantly suggested meaning such as the matter of fact regarding the rājaviṣayakarati in 'kim hāsyena '

(5) If in this manner rasa and bhāva are treated as alamkāras, their very use may be justified only if they help the suggestion of some rasa or bhāva as desired in the samkṣepa-śloka—"rasabhāvāditātparyamāśritya" (Dhv II p 197) But we find only vastu as principally suggested in the two verses given for illustration of subordinate rasas Yet the delineation of the rasa as the alamkāra may be supposed to be justified in consideration of their assistance for the suggestion of a more predominant contextual rasa where the suggested matters of fact also may serve the purpose of vibhāva, etc Compare,—"ayam bhāvah tadavaśyamanyenālamkaryena bhavitavyam / tatra yadyapi vastumātramapi bhavati, tathāpi tasya punarapi vibhāvādirūpatātparya vasānādrasādi tātparyameveti sarvatra rasadhvanerevātmabhāvah" (sic) [50]

(6) Ānanda and Abhinava are slow in recognising devādiviṣayakarati as presenting cases of bhāvadhvani of the asaṁlakṣyakrama type, possibly because of the fact that the bhāva of asamlakṣyakrama must be equally experienced also by the sahrdaya through hrdayasamvāda But it is doubtful if any feeling of devotion for the king occurs at all in the mind of the sahṛdaya by reading the verse 'kim hāsyena ' Ānanda and Abhinava are not prepared to call it a case of asamlakṣya-krama because the reader is hardly expected to have the same

49 Ādhikārika means principal cf "adhikāraḥ phale svāmyam adhikārī ca tatprabhuḥ / tasyet vṛttam kavibhirādhikārikamucyate" (S D VI) for a similar sense Vide, also, NŚ (Trans) Inter p LI

50 Locana, p. 197.

ardent feeling of devotion for the king as that of the speaker. Hence, the reader simply derives the information (vastu) that the speaker is flattering the king as the principally suggested content. That in cases of the panegyrics addressed to god and kings, etc., Ānanda does not recognise any sentiment of asaṁlakṣya type as the principal content may be confirmed also by the following observation of Dr. Keith : "We are on much firmer ground regarding the Devīśataka of Ānandavardhana the writer on poetics (c. 850), whose hundred very elaborate stanzas hardly conform to his own theory that the poet who pays too much attention to ornaments falls into the error of neglecting the suggestion which should underlie poetry, but the deviation is excused by his own admission that in panegyrics of the gods the sentiment is of secondary importance." (HSL. p. 218).

(7) But we find that even in the verses where rasa is subordinate, Ānanda desires the suggestion of the contextual rasa. In other words, such verses, where there is the prabhāvātiśayavarṇana in respect of a certain god with the help of subordinate rasa, as in 'kṣipto hastāvalagna,' may be helpful for the suggestion of a contextual rasa. We may have an illustration from the passages in the Mahābhārata, which describe the excess of greatness of the gods, which help the suggestion of the contextual śāntarasa by way of exhibiting the greatness of parabrahman, the realisation of which leads to the realisation of śānta. Here it will suffice for us to compare a few words from a much longer discussion of Ānanda regarding śāntarasa of the Mahābhārata, as follows : "devatātīrthatapaḥprabhṛtīnāṁ ca prabhāvātiśayavarṇanaṁ tasyaiva parabrahmaṇaḥ prāptyupāyatvena tadvibhūtitvenaiva devatāviśeṣāṇāmanyeṣāṁ ca" (Dhv. IV. p. 532).

(8) Mammaṭa and later writers consider also devādiviṣayaka rati [51] as being suggested as asaṁlakṣyakramabhāva.

51. "ratirdevādiviṣayā vyabhicārī tathāñjitaḥ" where devādi refers also to muni, guru, nṛpa, putra, etc. (vide KP. IV).

It appears that Mammaṭa derived the idea of considering devādiviṣayaka rati as bhāva from the definition and illustration of preyasvat given by Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa. It might have been duly experienced by the time of Mammaṭa that just as the love between the hero and the heroine is excited in the heart of the reader, the love for the child as expressed by the poet may also be equally shared by the reader. In this manner there is scope for samānānubhava (i.e., hṛdayasamvāda) also in the case of devādiviṣayakarati. That is why the later writers include the feeling of love for the child or the god or the friend, etc., at least in the scope of bhāvadhvani. As early a writer as Rudraṭa went even to the extent of recognising preyān as a rasa[52] where the sthāyibhāva is sneha. This is a love (rati) for the child and friend, etc. The later vaiṣṇava writers took special note of the devaviṣayaka rati for recognising also a bhaktirasa. But there is possibly a practical reason for the lack of any reference to devādiviṣayaka rati giving cases of asamlakṣyakramabhāvadhvani in the writing of Ānanda. It is a matter of experience that while the love for the child is more generally shared the devotion for a god referred to in a particular panegyric may be restricted only to a section of the readers. That some of the sentiments may be more generally experienced is admitted by Ānanda himself by observing—"śṛngārarasो hi samsāriṇām niyamenānubhava viṣayatvātsarvarasebhyah kamanīyatayā pradhānabhūtah" (Dhv III p 397). A sincere sharing of the love (or honour) for a king by the reader is very doubtful. Some of the devotional lyrics in Sanskrit are mere enumeration of names[53] and in some cases the feeling of devotion may not be fully evoked in the heart of the reader because of an indifference of the reader to the particular god addressed in the piece. But

52 That rasa is given a status higher than that of bhāva is already shown.

53 Vide 'Sanskrit Devotional Poetry' in 'Aspects of Sanskrit Literature' by Dr S. K. De (p. 101).

the principle is already laid down by Ānanda and particularly by Abhinava for recognising even such bhāvas as genuine bhāvas of asaṁlakṣya type if there be hṛdayasaṁvāda. In our opinion, even the patriotic poems, evoking a love for the country, similar to that of the poet [54] or the poetical character, [55] in the heart of the reader, may be treated as cases of asaṁlakṣyakramabhāvadhvani, and as such Mammaṭa's expression 'devādi' should refer also to 'svadeśa.'

(9) Pandit Pattabhirama Sastri contends that the rasādi occupying a subordinate position should be considered only a guṇībhūtavyaṅgya and never an alaṁkāra simply because of being (indirectly) helpful to the delineation of rasa inasmuch as even guṇas will have to be considered alaṁkāra on that score. The learned editor further adds that, it is a secret that, Mammaṭa does not recognise rasavat, etc., as alaṁkāras only because of their feeble claim to be called so. Cf. "rasopakārakatvamātreṇālaṅkāratvavyavahāro guṇeṣvapi ativyāpnuvan kathaṅkāraṁ nirākāryā iti guṇībhūtavyaṅgyānāṁ guṇībhūtavyaṅgyatvameva nālaṁkāratvam iti kāvyaprakāśādiprāmāṇikanibandharahasyamapyatrānusandheyam" (Dhv. p. 195). But it may be pointed out that Mammaṭa himself called rasavat, etc., as alaṁkāras and the same are not defined and illustrated in the tenth chapter only to avoid repetition, and the rahasya is also pointed out only by the less dependable commentators. The subordinate rasa may be called rasopakāraka in so far as it embellishes the principal vākyārtha which suggests the more predominant contextual rasa by rendering the suggestive vākyārtha more delectable. But the guṇas are never conceived as rasopakāraka. As it will be presently seen, the guṇas are invariable associates of rasa and even Mammaṭa calls the guṇas invariable attributes of rasa (ye rasasyāṅgino dharmā.........syuracalasthitayo guṇāḥ. KP. VIII).

54. As in the case of Kipling's 'For All We Have and Are.'

55. As in the case of Tennyson's 'The Charge of the Light Brigade.'

(10) While discussing arthaśaktyudbhava variety of saṃlakṣyakramavyaṅgyadhvani we have seen that the bhāva of the asaṃlakṣyakrama bhāvadhvani should be experienced by the sahṛdaya also Like Mammaṭa Jagannātha also considers the vyabhicāribhāvas and the devādiviṣayarati as presenting cases of bhāvadhvani, which is defined by him as "vibhāvādivyajyamānaharṣādyanyatamatvam tattvam" Here, harṣādi refers to the thirtythree vyabhicāribhāvas and rati (love) for guru, deva, nṛpa and putra, etc They make the number of bhāvas thirtyfour ('harṣādayastu trayastriṃśadvyabhicāriṇaḥ / gurudevanṛpaputrādiviṣayā ratiśceti catustriṃśat." RG I.) Under the context of discussing these bhāvas Jagannātha also refers to a view according to which the bhāvas of bhāvadhvani *are to be experienced by the readers also in* the manner of experiencing the sthāyibhāva in case of the suggestion of rasa Jagannātha observes, "harṣādīnām ca sāmājikaeṣṭānāmeva sthāyibhāvanyāyenābhivyaktiḥ, sāpi rasanyāyena iti kecit / vyaṅgyāntaranyāyenetyapare manyante" (RG I)

Position of guṇas in the dhvani theory :

Bharata recognised ten guṇas and same guṇas are enumerated also by Daṇḍin in the kārikā,

"śleṣaḥ prasādaḥ samatā mādhuryaṃ sukumāratā /
arthavyaktirudāratvamojaḥ kāntisamādhayaḥ" // (KD I 41)

Vāmana recognised ten śabdaguṇas of these names and another ten arthaguṇas of the same names Bhāmaha for the first time reduced the number of guṇas to three Bharata desired the use of the guṇas in conformity with the rasas [56] but the guṇas themselves are not conceived in terms of rasa [57] It

56 Vide sources of the theory in the first chapter

57. Compare for instance his definition of mādhurya which is as follows : "When a sentence heard or uttered many times does not tire or disgust (any one), it is an instance of sweetness (mādhurya)" NS (Trans.), XVII. 101, p. 319.

was Ānanda who for the first time conceived of guṇas in terms of rasas. In his conception guṇas owe their very being to the corresponding presense of rasas. But instead of making guṇas subordinate to rasas in this manner Vāmana gave guṇas the higher status by including the rasas in the scope of one of his twenty guṇas, viz., kānti, *which* is defined in the words, "dīptarasatvaṁ kāntiḥ." Bhāmaha's guṇas are same in name to those of Ānanda but his guṇas do not have anything to do with rasas. His conception of guṇas may be had simply from the words—

"kecidojo'bhidhitsantaḥ samasyanti bahūnyapi /
yathā mandārakusumareṇupiñjaritālakā /
śravyaṁ nātisamastārthaṁ madhuramiṣyate /
āvidvadaṅganābālapratītārthaṁ prasādavat // (KL., II. 2, 3).

These guṇas are understood without any reference to rasa. But Ānanda's guṇas hinge upon the rasas. Just as the quality of heroism depends upon the soul, the guṇas also depend on the soul of kāvya in the form of rasādi. Cf. "ye tamarthaṁ rasādilakṣaṇamaṅginaṁ santamavalambante te guṇāḥ śauryādivat." (Dhv. II. p. 204).

To show the relation of guṇas with rasa, Ānanda says that the rasa śṛṅgāra itself is madhura, i.e., sweet, on account of being highly delightful. This delight is characterised by a melting of the heart. The mental state of melting is called druti. Thus the quality of mādhurya, i.e., sweetness invariably owes its origin to the corresponding presense of the erotic sentiment. In practice, however, the mādhurya guṇa is said to be present in a kāvya (consisting of words and senses) which suggests the śṛṅgāra rasa. Hence, we cannot recognise mādhurya without any reference to a rasa, only on account of the softness of the sounds, which may be experienced also in case of the ojaḥ guṇa. Cf. Dhv. II. 7 and "śṛṅgāra eva rasāntarāpekṣayā madhuraḥ prahlādahetutvāt / tatprakāśanaparaśabdārthatayā kāvyasya sa mādhuryalakṣaṇo guṇaḥ / śravyatvaṁ punarojaso'pi sādhāraṇam." (Dhv. p. 207).

We have seen that the quality of mādhurya is intimately related with the psychological state of melting of the heart Hence, the mādhurya is more and more conspicuous in vipralambha śrngāra and karuna respectively because of greater and greater degree of melting

In the same manner the realisation of the rasas, raudra, vīra and adbhuta, causes a great dīpti [58] (or ujjvalatā, i e, blooming, expansion and burning) in the heart of the reader The raudra, vīra, and adbhuta rasas are invariable causes of the dīpti. Because of this relation of causality, the said rasas are themselves called dīpti in a figurative manner (i e lakṣaṇayā) The words and meanings which are capable of suggesting (i e, prakāśana para) such rasas are said to have the quality of ojah The earlier theorists demanded that ojah belong only to a composition having long compounds But Ānanda gives the verse "yo yah śastram" for showing that ojah does not invariably depend on long compounds of a composition (anapekṣitadīrghasamāsaracanah) But, that ojah solely depends on the corresponding presence of the rasas like raudra, is clear from the expression 'āśritya' of the kārikā, II 9 (tadvyaktihetū śabdārthāvāśrityaujo vyavasthitam)

In defining prasāda, however, Ānanda does not differ much from his predecessors Almost like Bhāmaha he says "prasādastu svacchatā śabdārthayoh" (Prasāda is the transparency of the words and meanings) It is common to all the rasas and all the types of composition, having long compounds or without having any compound But yet prasāda is recognised only with reference to the suggested sense Prasāda is characterised by the capacity of all the rasas to overpower the heart of the sahṛdaya immediately But this immediate effect of rasas may take place only when the rasa is instantaneously realised on account of a clearity of the expression and the sense

58 "dīpti pratipatturhṛdaye vikāsavistāraprajvalanasvabhāvā" (Locana, p 208)

Abhinava tells us that in fact the sweetness (mādhurya) belongs to the śṛṅgāra and other such rasas themselves. But the same sweetness is superimposed on the words and meanings capable of suggesting such rasas. The technical definition of mādhurya is "the capacity of words and meanings to suggest a *madhura rasa.*" Cf. "*etaduktaṁ bhavati—vastuto mādhuryaṁ* nāma śṛṅgārāde rasasyaiva guṇaḥ / tan-madhurarasābhivyañjakayoḥ śabdārthayorupacaritaṁ madhura-śṛṅgārarasābhivyaktisamarthatā śabdārthayormādhuryamiti hi lakṣaṇam" (Locana, pp. 206–207).

From Ānanda's words we learn that, guṇas, as understood in their technical implication, belong to the words and the meanings suggestive of rasa. (Cf. kāvyamāśritya mādhuryaṁ pratitiṣṭhati; śabdārthāvāśrityaujo vyavasthitam and prasādastu svacchatā śabdārthayoḥ). Druti, dīpti and the mental state of being overwhelmed are the effects of the rasas. Guṇas always owe their occurrence to the corresponding presence of rasa.

Jagannātha's conception of guṇa :

Mammaṭa recognises the guṇas as the dharmas (i.e., attributes) of rasa. We calla composition madhura (i.e., having mādhurya) only in a figurative way (i.e., through the use of upacāra). With a reference to this view of his predecessors Jagannātha proceeds to question the very conception of guṇas. He contends that in case of the fire we perceive the burning as its effect and the hot temperature as its quality, distinct from the effect. But in case of rasa we cannot perceive any quality as distinct from its effects like druti and dīpti. Hence, what we can conceive are the effects of rasa like druti and not the guṇas like madhura. Thus if we are to conceive of the guṇas at all then we are to conceive them only in terms of the mental conditions like druti. In the expression "śṛṅgāro madhura" (as we have in Ānanda's kārika, II. 7.) we are to understand the meaning as follows :

Śṛṅgāra is madhura and hence, śṛṅgāra has 'mādhurya' This mādhurya is the capacity of śṛṅgāra to cause druti, which is a mental state, i e, cittavṛtti Hence, mādhurya has the relation of causality (prayojakatā) with druti Because of this relation druti may be said to be identical with mādhurya, i e, we may say that druti is mādhurya, in a figurative manner just as we do in the expression 'āyurghṛtam', where there is an identification of longivity with ghee on account of a causal relation (i e., prayojakatā) Now we come to this position—

Mādhurya (i e, the capacity) produces druti Hence, druti is mādhurya, on account of prayojakatāsambandha

Rasa produces druti (identified with mādhurya), i.e, Rasa produces mādhurya Hence, Rasa is mudhura

This expression is possible in analogy with the expression, 'vājigandhā uṣṇā.' In fact vājigandhā (i e., Physalis Flexuosa) produces warmth, when it is consumed Hence vājigandhā itself is called warm in the manner of identifying a garment as warm when it is capable of producing warmth Thus Jagannātha concludes that, the guna mādhurya is the capacity to produce the mental state of druti. Anything that is produced may have many causes, some of them being general causes, e g, Īśvara, Īśvarecchā, prāgabhāva and adṛṣṭa Now, when mādhurya is conceived as the causality for druti, it is to be understood not as belonging to the general causes like adṛṣṭa, but as belonging to the particular causes, viz., śabda, artha, rasa and racanā Jagannātha does not consider this capacity to produce druti to be restricted only to the rasa, but *in his opinion the capacity belongs equally* to the word and the suggestive meaning also Such being the case, he does not feel the necessity of recognising any lakṣaṇā in the expression 'madhurā racanā,' which relegates the mādhurya guna also to the words Cf 'evameteṣu guneṣu rasamātradharmeṣu vyavasthiteṣu madhurā racanā, ojasvī bandha ityādayo vyavahārā aupacārikā iti mammaṭabhaṭṭādayah"

and, "atha śṛṅgāro madhura ityādi vyavahāraḥ kathamiti cet, evaṁ tarhi drutyādicittavṛttiprayojakatvam, prayojakatāsambandhena drutyādikameva vā mādhuryādikamastu / vyavahārastu vājigandhoṣṇeti vyavahāravadakṣataḥ / prajojakatvaṁ cādṛṣṭādivilakṣaṇaṁ śabdārtharasaracanāgatameva grāhyam / ......tathā ca śabdārthayopi mādhuryāderīdṛśasya sattvādupacāro naiva kalpya iti tu mādṛśaḥ." in RG. I.

It requires to be noted here that according to Dr. Sandhya Bhaduri Jagannātha revives the position of Daṇḍin, Vāmana and Bhojarāja,[59] and Prof. N. N. Choudhuri observes that Jagannātha "concludes that the theory of the old school represented by Daṇḍin and Vāmana that guṇas are the qualities of word and sense is perfectly sound and the subtleties introduced by Ānandavardhana and his followers are uncalled for scholastic devices."[60] But in my opinion Jagannātha neither wanted to revive Daṇḍin's or Vāmana's conception of guṇa nor did he maintain any difference from Ānanda. For, while the earlier theorists like Daṇḍin and Vāmana conceive of the guṇas without any reference to states of mind caused by rasas, Jagannātha conceives them as the capacity of rasas to produce certain mental states like druti. In my opinion instead of differing from Ānanda he adopts Ānanda's conception of guṇas in principle. For, it is already pointed out that according to Ānanda also the guṇas belong to the words and the meanings. For Ānanda śṛṅgāra is madhura and the quality of mādhurya belongs to the words capable of suggesting śṛṅgāra. Hence by way of suggesting śṛṅgāra the words may serve as the cause of druti according to Ānanda also. "śṛṅgāra eva rasāntarāpekṣayā madhuraḥ...... tatprakāśanaparaśabdārthatayā kāvyasya sa mādhuryalakṣaṇo guṇaḥ." (Dhv. p. 207). In course of arguments also Jagannātha betrays much evidence of his being influenced by Ānanda.

59. Vide her translation of RG in Bengali, p. 137.

60. Kāvyatattvasamīkṣā, pp. 75–76.

Jagannātha's identification of druti with mādhurya reminds us of Ānanda's words "yathā raudrādin hi prakāśayataḥ kāvyasya dīptiroja iti prāk pratipāditam" (Dhv p 315 dīpti = ojah, so, druti = mādhurya)

Without any difference with the followers of the dhvani theory Jagannātha also recognises only three guṇas, viz., mādhurya, ojah and prasāda Jagannātha no doubt reproduces the definitions and illustrations of the guṇas recognised by earlier ālamkārikas like Vāmana But that is only to show how the same guṇas may be included in the scope of the three guṇas recognised in the dhvani theory Indeed Mammaṭa also refers to those older definitions only to show the propriety of reducing the twenty guṇas of Vāmana to three That Jagannātha also, on his own part, recognises only the three guṇas of the dhvani theory is further evidenced by the fact that, after reproducing Mammaṭa's way of reducing the number of guṇas to three, he dwells at length on the letters and compositions which are suitable or unsuitable only to the three guṇas, viz., prasāda, mādhurya and ojah.

Ānandavardhana does not point out the letters that suggest mādhurya or ojah. Mammaṭa indicates them in detail and Jagannātha dwells on them at still greater length For example, Mammaṭa observes "varṇassamāso racanā teṣām vyañjakatāmitāh / ke kasya ityāha—

mūrdhni vargāntyagāś sparśāh aṭavargā raṇau laghū /
avṛttirmadhyavṛttirvā mādhurye ghaṭanā tathā //"

Jagannātha also speaks almost in the same tune as—"tatra ṭavargavarjitānām vargānām prathamatṛtīyaih śarbhirantasthaiśca ghaṭitā avṛttirmṛduvṛttirvā racanānupūrvyātmikā mādhuryasya vyañjikā." (RG I) But all these theories of the later writers are based on Ānanda's treatment of saṁghaṭanā and the varṇas, suggestive of rasa introduced by the kārikā, III 2.

Saṁghaṭanā in dhvani theory :

Ānanda maintains that saṁghaṭanā (composition) is also a factor suggestive of rasa. Saṁghaṭanā as shown by earlier theorists is of there types, viz., (1) composition without any samāsa, (2) composition with medium-sized samāsa and (3) composition with long compounds. (Dhv. III. 5). Conceding to this classification Ānanda adds that saṁghaṭanās are grounded in qualities like mādhurya and suggest the rasas. The propriety of the speaker and the contents of the speech determines it. (Dhv. III. 6). But we know that, Ānanda also determines a sentence having long compounds as the 'śabda' that reveals the quality named ojaḥ, (while the 'artha' responsible for the delineation of ojaḥ need not depend on long compounds). Since there may be a reference to the question of compounds also in time of considering the guṇas we are required to know clearly as to what is the difference between saṁghaṭanā and guṇa. The difference is that, a composition may have guṇas only when it possesses rasa, irrespective of the presence or absence of compounds. A sentence having long compounds also will not be said to have ojaḥ if there is no rasa. But in that very sentence we must have any of the three types of saṁghaṭanā which occurs irrespective of the presence or absence of rasa. Yet saṁghaṭanās are said to be suggestive of rasa because the propriety of using a certain type of saṁghaṭanā is determined by the type of rasa. The type of the appropriate saṁghaṭanā is, however, determined also by the theme (viṣaya). The poet is at liberty to use any saṁghaṭanā in that kāvya where rasa is not largely suggested. Cf, "parikathāyāṁ kāmacāraḥ, tatretivṛttamātropanyāsena nātyantarasabandhābhiniveśāt." (Dhv. III. p. 326). It is to be noted here that, the realisation of rasa owes its origin to the cognition of vivhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāva, which may be presented by the meaning of the words. Then how can we suppose the nature of composition to be suggestive of rasa ? The reply may be had from

the words of Ānanda himself Ānanda maintains that in karuna and vipralambha śrngāra the composition should not have samāsa The realisation of these two rasas consists of a very delicate condition of the mind of the sahrdaya which may be disturbed by the slightest difficulty in grasping the meaning on account of the presence of compounds When other sentiments like raudra are to be delineated there is no need for eschewing middle sized compounds entirely, sometimes when the exploits of a 'bravely haughty" hero are to be described it is not essential that even the composition with long compounds should be completely forsaken For in such cases 'compounds are also not less helpful for the suggestion of the rasa Cf ' karunavipralambhaśrngārayostvasamāsaiva samghatanā / tayorhi sukumāratarat vāt svalpāyāmapyas vacchatāyām śabdarthayoh pratītirmantharībhavati / pari hāryā (Dhv III pp 320–321) This observation of Ānanda shows that, the samghatanās suggest rasa by way of preparing a proper psychological atmosphere for the relish of rasa This very criterion is followed also in case of considering mere letters as suggestive of rasa

Letters as suggestive of rasa

Ānanda maintains that, letters are also suggestive of rasa But there may be an objection that mere letters are meaningless and hence cannot be suggestive of rasa, for, rasa can be experienced only through the realisation of vibhāva, etc, presented as the 'meaning' of the kāvya Hence, Ānanda establishes the suggestivity of the letters on the ground of the relation of *agreement and contrariety, as follows—*

The letters ś and ṣ, letters conjunct with 'r', and 'dha'— all these become deterrents of the erotic sentiment. When these very letters are employed in relation to the sentiment of disgust and so forth, they will only intensify them Hence letters suggest sentiments (Dhv III 3 4) Compare,

' śaṣau sarephasamyogo dhakāraścāpi bhūyasā /
virodhinah syuh śrngāre tena varnā rasacyutah //

ta eva tu niveśyante vībhatsādau rase yadā /
tadā taṁ dīpayantyeva tena varṇā rasacyutaḥ // (p. 303).

It may be noted here that in enumerating the letters ś, ṣ, etc., Ānanda had Udbhaṭa's definition of the paruṣā vṛtti in his mind. Compare, "śaṣābhyāṁ rephasaṁyogaiṣṭavargeṇa ca yojitā / paruṣā nāma vṛttiḥ syāt hla-hva-hyādyaiśca saṁyutā" (KSS. I. 4). Presently we will see that, Ānanda wants the different vṛttis also to be employed in conformity with the contextual rasa.

The question, as to how the meaningless letters may be suggestive of rasa, is very ably discussed by Abhinavagupta. According to Abhinava's aesthetics the rasas are certain psychological states and the extraordinary bliss resulting out of the very experience (pratīti) of these states. It is a matter of experience that some letters are agreeable to the ears while others are repulsive. That is why they react differently and cause different psychological states. That, meaningless sounds also may evoke sentiments is evidenced by the meaningless sounds of pure music, such as the seven primary notes regulated by the sound of the kettle drum or the sounds produced to imitate the rhythm of dances.[61] Compare, "etaduktaṁ bhavati......anukaraṇaśabdavacca." (Locana. pp. 304–305). The later writers up to Jagannātha worked out in greater detail the list of the letters which evoke different sentiments, either directly or by indicating the corresponding guṇas and it is a

61. There are varient readings of the relevent portion of Locana which runs in the KSS edn. as follows : "śrotraikagrāhyo'pi ca svabhāvo rasaniṣyande vyāpriyata eva, apadagītadhvanivat puṣkaravādyaniyamita - viśiṣṭajātikaraṇaghrāhyanukaraṇaśabdavacca" where, the kāvyamālā edn. (1928) reads 'ghrāṇādyanukaraṇa' and suggests also the reading "karaṇaprabhāvādyanuhāraśabdavat." In my opinion the most suitable meaning as shown here may be conveyed by the reading "jātikaraṇādyanukaraṇaśabdavacca."

task for the science of psycho-accaustic to put the worked out details to a scientific test. It may be interesting to note here that, in this manner even particular metres may be recognised as suitable for particular sentiments, as it is done by a theorist like Kṣemendra. Hence compare in his Suvṛttatilaka,

kāvye rasānusārena varnanānugunena ca /
kurvīta sarvavṛttānām viniyogam vibhāgvita // (3/7)
śṛngārālambanodāranāyikārūpavarnanam /
vasantādi tadangam ca sacchāyamupajātibhiḥ // (3/17)
vasantatilakam bhāti samkare vīraraudrayoḥ /
kuryāt sargasya paryante mālinīm drutatālavat // (3/19), etc.

It may be easily noticed that in considering the suitability of the different elements like letters and metres for different sentiments the latter are broadly grouped into two classes. The two groups may be indicated as follows :

(1) 'Madhura group,' consisting of rasas admitting of mādhurya guna, viz., śṛngāra and karuna. This group also may include śānta and the lately recognised rasas like vatsala, which are capable of causing a melting of the heart.

(2) 'Ojah group,' consisting of the rasas admitting of the ojaḥ guna, viz., raudra, vīra, adbhuta and vībhatsa, which are capable of causing expansion (vistāra) and the burning of the heart. [62]

The other rasas, viz., hāsya and bhayānaka share the characteristics of both the groups according to the situation and the quality of prasāda is common to all the rasas.

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62. A broad division of the letters into two groups, viz., harsh and agreeable, seems to be in the mind of Abhinava also when in the context of the gunas of Bharata he observes as follows :
svabhāva eva hi kecana varnāḥ santāpayantīva nikṛntantīva rephakakārādaya iva paruṣavṛttiprāvakāḥ, anye tu nirvāpayantīvopanāgarikocitāḥ lokagocara evāyamarthaḥ svasaṃvedyo'pīti na vitāryate tāvat (Abhinavabhāratī, NŚ. Vol. II. p. 330).

In the west also, the poems are classified into two groups, viz., tender-toned poems (corresponding to the poems of the madhura group) and aggressive-toned poems (corresponding to the poems of the ojaḥ group). In the matter of indicating the more frequent letters of these groups also there is much similarity with Sanskrit poetics. The following lines from a paper entitled "Communication in Poetry" by Iva'n Fo'nagy, will be very interesting in this context.

"The majority of the sounds occur with about the same relative frequency in both groups. All the more striking is the fact that the frequency of certain sounds shows a significant difference in the two groups. The phonemes /l/, /m/, and /n/ are definitely more frequent in tender-toned poems, whereas /k/, /t/ and /r/ predominate in those with aggressive tone. For some reason precisely these sounds seem to be the most significantly correlated with aggression—either positively or negatively. The back vowels are also generally more frequent in the aggressive poems. But the tense and high /i/, which according to Grammont may express anger, also occurs frequently in the aggressive poems.

Of course, it may be supposed that the relatively greater frequency of /t/, /k/ and /r/ in words suited to the expression of aggressive emotions reflects a peculiarity of the Hungarian language. The question poses itself whether the 'sound spectrum' shows a similar modification in a count based on French or German poems." etc. (Word, Vol. 17. No. 2., p. 195).

Mahimabhaṭṭa's conception of rasa realisation is very peculiar. He maintains that the sthāyibhāvas belonging to the characters delineated in a kāvya are inferred on the strength of the vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāvas duly described in the kāvya. The very cognition of the sthāyibhāva produces the relish of rasa which is experienced only by the man of taste. (yatra vibhāvādimukhena bhāvānāmavagamastatraiva sahṛdayaikasaṁvedyo rasāsvādodaya iti vastusvabhāva evāyaṁ

na paryanuyogapadavīmavatarati prāmāṇikānām.' VV I) Mahima further holds that the letters also help the inference of the sthāyibhāva belonging to the literary character because it is a common nature of the persons subject to different psychological states to use different sets of letters Compare, 'tathā hi ye ratiśokākrāntāntaḥkaraṇāḥ ye ca krodhotsāhādi vivaśāste madhurataravarṇaviracitāmasamāsaprāyām rephaśakāraṭakārakarkaśām ca dīrghasamāsabhūyiṣṭhāṁ saṁghaṭanāṁ māśritya bhūmnā *bhāṣamāṇā dṛśyanta iti svabhāva evāyam* ' (VV III) The weakness of this position of Mahimabhaṭṭa lies in the fact that the nature of the letters is determined by the contextual rasa also in those places where the speaker may not himself be infused with any sentiment Rati and śoka, etc, are said to be belonging to the poetical characters, but the poetical characters may not always be the speaker Even an impartial description of the vibhāvas, etc, may suggest rasa Moreover, it is also a commonly experienced fact that the different sounds really have different psychological effects even without being aided by any mental process like inference Hence, Mahima's explanation *loses ground to Abhinava's stand that in poetry,* the sounds help the suggestion of rasa by the description of vibhāva, etc, by way of preparing the suitable mental atmosphere for it.

It is also observed by Iva'n Fonagy in a very interesting way that the sounds play a double role 'On the one hand they *are elements in conventional symbols, connected with* content indirectly, through the word and the sentence on the other hand they are immediately linked with experience through the natural relationship of sound and content." (Ibid) That experiences may be evoked by the sounds directly without any obligation to the denotative word corresponding in meaning to the said experience is very ably illustrated in the following' lines—"In poetic communication the message conveyed by sounds is in fact completed in the course of transmission In the *line from* Attila Jozsef's poem Esik 'It is raining

dunnyög motyog a cipö.........'the shoes mumble and mutter' .... the 'moist' palatals make the metaphor absolutely clear. The words have the meaning of mumble and mutter, as they are translated, but the Hungarian /n'/ and /t'/ sounds lost in the English translation give the original words a squelching and squashy quality, which really imitates the sucking sound of the wet shoes in the mud." (Ibid. p. 214.).

A very interesting example of sound being happily wedded to the sense and as such of being suggestive of the appropriate situation may be had in the lines;

"And like a downward smoke, the slender stream

Along the cliff to fall and pause and fall did seem." from Alfred Tennyson's 'The Lotos Eaters', where the sounds not only suggest the 'fall and pause' of the stream but also the drowsiness of the whole situation.

It may be noted here also that the Symbolists very ably recognised this independent wealth of sounds, i.e., the capacity to suggest rasa. Compare : "But whereas the Imagists, aiming at clear, precise images, appealed almost exclusively to the eye, the aim of the symbolists was to approximate poetry to music, in particular to the music of Wagner, using words as the musician uses notes, not to convey logical meaning, but by their associations and patterned sounds to induce or evoke in the reader a state of mind which M. 1 'Abbe' Bre'mond likens to the mystic trance." (A Critical History of English Poetry, p. 507). Here 'mystic trance' may be said to be the same as the absorption (i.e., tanmayībhavana) of the sahṛdaya in the relish of rasa. But yet, these sounds must be the sounds of letters which belong to the meaningful words, which are capable of suggesting sentiments by way of describing the vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāva. Otherwise it will be difficult to distinguish between the domain of music and the domain of poetry with which alone our poetics is concerned. From the view point of poetry the meaningless sonnds

are only auxiliary agents for suggesting rasa as it is very rightly observed by Abhinava in the words "ata eva ca sahakāritāme vābhidhātum nimittasaptamī kṛtā varṇapadādisviti / na tu varṇaireva rasābhivyaktih, vibhāvādisamyogāddhi rasaniṣpattirityuktam bahuśah" (Locana, p 305)

Suggestion by order of words

To distinguish Vyañjanā from Abhidhā Ānanda again and again says that while Abhidhā belongs only to the words, Vyañjanā my belong to the word, part of a word, letters, saṃghaṭanā, etc The list of the elements bearing suggestivity, given by Ānanda, is not complete We are thus left by the theorist with the freedom of showing that even the order of words in the sentence may have a lot of suggestive potentiality. Students of Sanskrit poetics may best refer to "Word order and its stylistic value in the ISOPANISAD" by Salvador Bucca in the Professor P K Gode Commemoration Volume (p 34) for an illustration of this suggestive potentiality of the word order Hence, compare :

"Occasional place of the *subject*

idam sarvam (1 a) after the verb, at the third place of the sentence

te lokā (3 a) after the verb, at the third place of the sentence

devā, (4 b) after the verb, at the third place of the sentence

mukham (15 b) at the end of the sentence and of the verse

śarīram, (17 b) at the end of the sentence and of the verse

In all these cases the place has been determined by the emphasis laid on the elements of the sentence placed at the beginning

In the first case the word emphasized is *īśā*, the logical subject of the sentence, which expresses a fundamental idea of the Upaniṣad In 3a the strong place is occupied by

asūryā 'devilish,' which is a very important and meaningful predicate of the subject, for it expresses the nature of the worlds, where the slayers of the Self go. In 4b *na* is placed at the beginning; it is the negation of all the sentence, and it emphasizes the incapacity of the *devāḥ* to reach the *Brahman*."

In all these, what requires to be specially observed is that we have the idea of an emphasis in addition to the express sense of the words simply due to the occasional positions of the words in a sentence. This idea of emphasis (or excess or *atiśaya*) must be recognised as a suggested idea (vyaṅgyārtha), which may be compared to the idea of excess we have in respect of Rāma in "rāmo'smi sarvaṁ sahe;" but the expression must be reckoned as a case of Vivakṣitānyaparavācyadhvani owing to the speciality of the sentence (vākya). [Vide, Factors governing suggestion in arthaśaktyudbhava, p. 116, above.]

The suggested idea of an emphasis that we have due to word-order need not be confused with a case of kāku, which invariably requires a dramatic uttering of the words, whereas here the visual experience of the physical presence of the word itself is sufficient for giving the suggested content.

Compare : Not only words, but sounds and sound-clusters, morphemes bound as well as free, the syntactical arrangment, the usual word-order as well as its violation, that is to say, sound in all its myriad combinations, and, silence as well—can contribute to the final purpose of a poem : the evocation of Rasa, "the aesthetic sentiment." [T. N. Sreekantaiya : Meaning in Poetry : P. K. Gode Com. Vol. p. 393].

The position of rītis : In the opinion of Ānanda, the rīti theorists also scarcely understood the most essential element in the kāvya to be something like dhvani. From their treatment of rītis, it appears, that they were also making attempts to explain this very essence of poetry, i.e., dhvani. But they failed to identify and analyse dhvani and introduced the rītis instead. Ānanda ovserves like this possibly because of the

fact that the rīti theorists also recognised some suggested sense in kāvya, they were also charmed by the suggested sense, but in their attempts to define and analyse kāvya they failed to distinguish the dhvani element of the kāvya and instead of calling it the most essential element relegated the suggested sense to an insignificant position Thus, for example, Vāmana named a guṇa as kānti Kānti is the quality of having distinct rasas like śṛṅgāra (dīpta rasatvam kāntiḥ KSV III 2 15) If he would have said that kānti alone makes a kāvya or if he would have called it the most essential quality, then we would have had reasons to say that he also recognised at least a particular aspect of dhvani But for Vāmana kānti is as good as nineteen other guṇas Thus he relegated kānti to an insignificant position Yet the rīti theorists for the first time enquired about a soul of the kāvya And Ānanda recognises their naive attempt to analyse the most essential element of kāvya, which is nothing other than dhvani Since Ānanda clearly explains what is the most essential element in kāvya by way of propounding the dhvani theory, he feels it unnecessary to explain the rīti theory anew or to adopt it to his scheme with any modification Compare Dhv III 46 and the vṛtti thereunder. (Dhv p 517)

The position of the vṛttis The vṛttis are of two kinds, i e, (1) the vṛttis of drama (nāṭya) and the (2) vṛttis of kāvya The vṛttis of nāṭya are given by Bharata and they are namely—Bhāratī, Kaiśikī, Ārabhaṭī and Sāttvatī. The vṛttis of kāvya are given by Udbhaṭa and they are namely—Paruṣā, Upanāgarikā and Grāmyā Ānanda adopts them to his own scheme and interprets them as the proper use of artha and śabda respectively for helping the suggestion of rasādi. ("rasādyanuguṇatvena vyavahāro'rthaśabdayoḥ,' Dhv III 33) According to Ānanda vṛtti means vyavahāra (i e., use) Hence, the vṛttis of nāṭya mean the use of the meaning and the vṛttis of kāvya mean the use of the words But the vṛtti must always be conceived as having a propriety by way of being helpful

to the suggestion of rasa. In fact Bharata also desired the vṛttis to be *understood as related to some rasa. Cf.* "*kaiśikī* ślakṣṇanepathyā śṛṅgārarasasambhavā" (quoted in Locana, p. 518). [63] But in time of presenting the vṛttis Upanāgarikā, etc., Udbhaṭa does not make any reference to any sense. He simply says that these are the three modes in which anuprāsas occur. (KSS. I. 7 and pp. 5–6). Ānanda yet feels that these three modes of the arrangement of similar consonants may be congenial for suggesting different rasas, and the vṛttis may be appreciated only as such. [64] Ānanda once again observes that after the introduction of the dhvani theory the two kinds of vṛtti assume the position of rītis. (samyagrītipadavīmavataranti). In my opinion, what Ānanda means to say is that the vṛttis also appear to have been certain naive attempts to explain rasa, the most essential element, like the rītis and as such even in the dhvani scheme they are to be conceived as factors helpful for the suggestion of rasa.

The guṇībhūtavyaṅgya kāvya : Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya is defined as the kāvya, which has got an association with some suggested sense but where the expressed sense itself is more beautiful. (Kārikā III. 34). Ānanda suggests that this guṇībhūtavyaṅgya type should be skillfully employed in association with all the kāvyas having an appealing suggestion of rasa. Compare kārikā III. 35. where 'prasanna-gambhīrapadaḥ kāvyabandhaḥ sukhāvahaḥ' means the kāvya having rasas, because the prasāda guṇa is common to all the rasas and the presence of the same guṇa is indicated by prasanna-gambhīra, etc. The following points are to be noted.

63. Compare, NŚ. XXII. 25, XXII. 40, XXII. 47, XXII. 55. etc.

64. Abhinava observes that the unworldly nature of rasa is more strongly confirmed by the fact that even meaningless ways of alliteration are helpful for the suggestion of the same. cf. "ataśca raso'yamalaukikaḥ / yena lalitaparuṣānuprāsasyārthābhidhānānupayogino'pi rasaṁ prati vyañjakatvam" (Locana, p. 158).

(1) A suggested rasādi becomes subordinate to vācyārtha as in rasavadalaṁkāra (p 462)

(2) A suggested vastu becomes subordinate to the vācya as in samāsokti alaṁkāra (p 471)

(3) A suggested alaṁkāra may also become subordinate to the vācya as in the case of the figure dīpaka where an upamā is invariably suggested but not predominantly (p 462)

The citra type The composition which has no intention to depict any rasa, which does not have the capacity to convey any suggested sense, which has simply the charmingness of the vācya sense and the vācaka word, is called a citra That is not a kāvya proper but a mere semblence of kāvya (vide vṛtti p 494) Citra is of two varieties, namely, (1) śabda-citra, example—duṣkarayamaka etc —as in KD III 71 (p 347)

samānayāsamānayā samānayā samānayā /
sa mā na yāsamānayā samānayā samānayā //, and (2) vācya citra—as for example, an utprekṣā without any association with suggested sense or intention for suggesting rasādi

But the doubt arises—can there be any composition which does not present some fact ? And can there be a fact which cannot cause a feeling or mood or sentiment ? (Even if certain fact brings a passiveness of the mind that too must be recognised as a state of mind (cittavṛtti) akin to the śāntarasa) Moreover, if a composition cannot evoke any feeling then the very purpose of the poetic composition fails Hence, there cannot be some 'citra' type of composition devoid of the capacity to arouse a feeling or mood, and the occasion of determining what citra is, does not arise Ānanda admits the validity of such an objection, and shows his own doubt as to the availability of such a composition, called a citra in the strictest sense of the term and says that the citra is simply imagined to be there Ānanda's strong conviction is that for a composition's being heavy with sentiment the poet must have the intention to compose it with that definite purpose The

reason behind such a conviction is possibly that, for Ānanda, a poet himself must have the anubhava (experience) of a certain sentiment in order to relegated it to the heart of the sahṛdaya. It is some sort of sentimental communication between the poet and the sahṛdaya. Even when the poet does not intend to convey a sentiment the vācya sense referring to some fact or other may yet cause some feeling in the heart of the sahṛdaya; but that is destined to be very remote and weak and the composition being so scarcely associated with sentiment may be deemed to be as good as without sentiment—and hence the calculation of a citra type. Let us take the case of the duṣkarayamaka quoted above. As the commentator informs, this is the request of some nāyaka to his friend for fetching his love. There is also a description of the nāyikā that she is beautiful and learned. Here, after we understand the meaning we may have some shred of śṛṅgāra—but that is too flimsy to be counted at all. The fact is that our composition of the mind is so much perturbed by the effort to understand the vācya sense and our eyes, ears, and of all, intelligence is so much captivated by the form of the words that we do not any further have the mind congenial for an unperturbed relish of the feeling (a vītavighnā pratīti). Still worse is the case with gomutrikā, ardhabhrama, etc. It is regretable that Ānanda finds some poets who do not have command over their speech and indulge in composing citras. Hence he imagines this type. But as determined and suggested by his new theory, a composition without suggested sentiments, etc., does not become of a poet. Dispensing thus with the citra type Ānanda proceeds to remind that when the contextual rasa is taken into consideration we cannot have an independent instance of guṇībhūtavyaṅgya also (vṛtti. p. 499). But as normally the case is, some citra also may occur in the body of a larger prabandha having a predominant and more appealing rasādi. As a matter of fact there must also be some citra aspect of the kāvya. A kāvya cannot have rasādi or any suggested sense for

every word of it. There must also be some descriptive portion for the depiction of the rasādi But what is discouraged is a citra for citra's sake Hence, Ānanda opines that only the novice may spare to compose citras, but, for the mature poets dhvani alone is kāvya (cf vrtti pp 499-500, prāptapariṇatīnām tu dhvanireva kāvyamiti sthitametat) Ānanda observes that all good poetry possesses a suggested content, either commensurating with the small extent of it or being present in a particular portion of the kāvya but predominating over the whole length of the composition and serving as its soul Hence in saying 'dhvanireva kāvyam' he does not even leave any scope for guṇībhūtavyangya But for a proper analysis and for a better understanding of what dhvani is, through a contrast with citra and also guṇībhūtavyangya, all these different types are to be examined Tillyard also believes that postulation of 'direct' poetry which is in fact very rare is also needed for a better presentation of the oblique poetry through contrast Compare— "the terms 'direct' and 'oblique' poetry are a false contrast. All poetry is more or less oblique there is no direct poetry But the terms 'less oblique and 'more oblique' would sound ridiculous and the only way to be emphatic or even generally intelligible is by exaggeration to force a hypothetical but convenient contrast" (E. M. W Tillyard Poetry Direct and Oblique, p 10)

A reply to Viśvanātha's objection prahelikā · Ānanda would recognise a kāvya even with a vastu predominantly suggested as a genuine case of dhvani In this connection it is necessary to examine Viśvanātha's criticism of Ānanda's stand Viśvanātha writes—' yattu dhvanikārenoktam 'kāvyasyātmā dhvaniḥ' iti tat kim vastvalamkārarasādilakṣanastrirūpo dhvaniḥ kāvyasyātmā uta rasādirūpamātro vā ? nādyah prahelikādāvativyāpteh / dvitīyaścet ? omiti brūmah (SD I)

It should be noted that for Viśvanātha the Dhv kārikā I 1 savours of a definition of kāvya, which it is not. Even if dhvani is taken as the soul of kāvya then what is the body for the residence of that soul ? Viśvanātha says 'vākyam

rasātmakaṁ kāvyam' (SD. I. 3). Here the vākya is specified as the desired body for the soul rasa. This may be taken as a definition of kavya. But it is not logical to say that kāvya is defined as 'a kāvya where the soul is dhvani.' Because the doubt yet remains—'what is kāvya, the substratum for the soul dhvani.' Hence 'kāvyasyātmā dhvaniḥ' is not a definition of kāvya and it must not be understood as determining the scope of kāvya once for all. Viśvanātha's greatest objection is to vastudhvani, for, in his opinion if vastudhvani (and also alaṁkāradhvani) is recognised as the 'soul of kāvya' then even the examples of prahelikā will have to be recognised as kāvya. But Viśvanātha calls any suggested vastu vastudhvani without any reference to the predominance of it. An example of prahelikā presents a suggested vastu. But since it is a suggested vastu and not rasa, it cannot be called a kāvya. Of the earlier theorists Daṇḍin names and illustrates as many as sixteen varieties of prahelikā and refers to fourteen other varieties. Viśvanātha would not recognise it even as an alaṁkāra, because it is detrimental to rasa. An alaṁkāra, according to him, must be an upakāraka for rasa (cf. SD. X. 1.) Prahelikā is only a charming way of speech. Compare :

'rasasyaparipanthitvānnālaṁkāraḥ prahelikā /
uktivaicitryamātraṁ sā cyutadattākṣarādikā // (SD. X. 13).

Example :

pāṇḍavānāṁ sabhāmadhye duryodhana upāgataḥ /
tasmai gāṁ ca suvarṇaṁ ca sarvāṇyābharaṇāni ca //

From the peculiar verbal construction of the verse the meaning appears as that, Duryodhana was warmly received by the Pāṇḍavas; but that is simply absurd and the actual meaning is had only when we write as follows—Sabhāmadhye' (a)dur (aduḥ) yo (yaḥ) dhana (adhana), etc. This form of the sentence can be had only by a re-arrangement of the same words. And the actual meaning appears as that 'the poor man who came to the sabhā was given (aduḥ) cow, etc.'

This is a prahelikā on account of keeping the kriyā understood (kriyāgupti) Viśvanātha does not give us to learn what is the suggested sense here Yet let us examine if this is a case of dhvani according to the theory of Ānanda

(1) There are two senses One sense related to the poor man, another related to Duryodhana Both the senses are primary senses of the words taken separately

(2) It is not a case of ślesa, because both the senses are not contextual

(3) The words are here anekārthaka In such cases Viśvanātha finds an abhidhāmūlaśābdīvyañjanā. (SD II 21) The non contextual meaning, in such a case, is recognised as suggested That is a suggested vastu and as such should present a case of vastudhvani

(4) But, even if the non-contextual meaning is taken as suggested, it cannot be considered as a case of dhvani, since the idea relating to Duryodhana is not more appealing than and predominant over the express sense relating to the poor man Hence, we cannot apply Ānanda's definition of dhvani to this case

(5) It is also not a case of guṇībhūtavyaṅgya Applying Dhv III 34, we do not find it to be so, because the idea of the poor man being received, i e, the vācya sense, also does not charm us much

(6) That it is not a citra is declared by Viśvanātha himself in the kārikā defining prahelikā, quoted above

(7) We do not have both the express sense and the suggested sense as the source of camatkṛti Hence, we cannot have it as a genuine case of kāvya Here we simply have a puzzle or riddle, or being charmed by neither of the express sense or the suggested sense but by the mere manner of speech we must call it a case of uktivaicitrya and must not confuse it with Ānanda's vastudhvani


(8) So far we are accepting Viśvanātha's own stand as regards the nature of the non-contextual sense relating to Duryodhana. We are supposing that Viśvanātha would recognise the non-contextual sense as suggested and presenting a suggested vastu. But as observed earlier Ānanda would recognise also the non-contextual sense as the primary sense of the words conveyed by Abhidhā. Hence, there being no suggested vastu, according to Ānanda, the confusion of the verse with vastudhvani must not occur at all.

(9) Let us suppose again that Viśvanātha finds here a case of suggested alaṁkāra of the śabdaśaktyudbhava type and thus an alaṁkāra-dhvani. But according to Ānanda there cannot be a suggested alaṁkāra here. And there is also little justification in imagining, as a critic, some sort of a relation like sādṛśya, virodha, etc., between the contextual and the suggested sense. Even if we suppose that there is an alaṁkāra, it is a pretty doubtful if any sahṛdaya is delighted by that. The suggested alaṁkāra being not appealing and predominant and distinctly suggested, we cannot call it a dhvani. Moreover, it is crystal clear that the composer of prahelikā does not ever have the intention to convey such a suggested sense. The intention to that effect being not there, the imagined suggested sense does not deserve any consideration. (cf. Dhv. p. 496, 'vivakṣopārūḍha eva hi kāvye śabdānāmarthaḥ'). Hence, this is not a case of dhvani.

(10) Such verses may yet occur in the body of a genuine kāvya, and may at times serve the purpose of suggesting rasādi. For example, for delineating a buffoon or a clown causing the sentiment of laughter, a number of such verses may be put to his lips. But taken apart from the context they cannot stand as kāvya on their own merit.

It requires to be noted here that a good number of so called udbhaṭaślokas also may be dispensed with in this manner. A dhvani is a kāvya. To be recognised as a dhvani a certain

composition or a certain group of words must first of all be recognised as a kāvya. But we do not call a delightful assemblage of words kāvya unless we get the delight really because of the sense conveyed by the words. If we do not demarcate the scope of kāvya like this, it would indeed be difficult to find a scope for the riddles and the puzzles and the like Mere alamkāras, particularly the śabdālamkāras, also cannot present genuine instances of kāvya, but a kāvyānukāra because a kāvya is expected to appeal to heart by presenting a charming fact or an imaginary idea or a sentiment. If the composition fails to do any thing more than appealing to the intellect alone, it would not be called a kāvya according to the dhvani theory, inasmuch as the man of taste, who can *appreciate a kāvya, is called a sahṛdaya and in the term* sahrdaya itself there is a reference to the heart (hrdaya). The discovery of this subjective aspect of kāvya is indeed a great achivement for the dhvani theory. Yet the kāvyas of different poets may vary in capacity to appeal to heart. Hence the gradation of kāvya is also shown. It will be observed that the amount and nature of appeal of the same kāvya may vary from reader to reader also. That it is a fact and that it was recognised by the theorists themselves will be shown with illustrations. Since, they admit a gradation of the kāvya, a kāvya having the capacity to arouse a sentiment is recognised as the best type of kāvya; and this leads us to the phenomenon of rasa-realisation.



CHAPTER III

THE REALISATION OF RASA

Bharata's Rasa sūtra : According to Bharata no meaning can proceed (from speech) without (any kind of) rasa (i.e., sentiment).[1] With this conviction he tells us the process of realisation of rasa in the sūtra—"vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicārisaṁyogādrasaniṣpattiḥ" of the sixth chapter of the NŚ. This sūtra plainly means "rasa results from the combination of vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas (with the sthāyibhāvas)." That the word saṃyoga means a connection with the sthāyibhāvas may be gathered from the prose exposition of the sūtra by Bharata himself or a still later verse called anuvaṁśya śloka running as—

bhāvābhinayasaṁbaddhān sthāyibhāvāṁstathā budhāḥ //
āsvādayanti manasā tasmānnāṭyarasāḥ smṛtāḥ //, where 'bhāva' means 'vibhāva and vyabhicāribhāvas' and 'abhinaya' means 'anubhāvas'.[2]

The sthāyibhāvas are the permanent or dominant moods, which are made manifest within the heart of the men of taste by the reading of kāvya or the witnessing of a dramatic performance. These sthāyibhāvas belong to all human beings in varying degrees of intensity. They are enumerated by Bharata as rati (love), hāsa (gaiety), śoka (sorrow), krodha (anger), utsāha (enthusiasm), bhaya (fear), jugupsā (repugnance), and vismaya (wonder). Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta recognise also a ninth sthāyibhāva, viz., nirveda (passiveness). These permanent moods are connected respectively with the sentiments (rasas), viz., śṛṅgāra, hāsya, karuṇa, raudra, vīra, bhayānaka, bībhatsa, adbhuta and śānta.

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1. "na hi rasādṛte kaścidarthaḥ pravartate" (NS. VI).

2. Vide Abhinavabhāratī, NŚ. p. 290.

Vibhāva means the situation which evokes the dormant permanent moods (sthāyibhāvas) into operation It has two aspects, viz., ālambana and uddīpana The persons or the objects in relation to which the permanent moods begin to operate in the mind are known as ālambana vibhāvas (i e, supporting objects) For example, love (rati) manifests itself in relation to a man or woman and hence the man or the woman is the ālambanavibhāva in case of śṛngārarasa The other objects belonging to the same situation which encourage the intensity of the permanent mood are called uddīpanavibhāvas (or exciting situation) In case of love the objects like the spring season and the oon rise are recognised as uddīpanavibhāvas

The anubhāvas are the external manifestations of the operation of the permanent mood within In case of love (rati) the movements of the eyes and the side glances etc, are recognised as anubhāvas Bharata does not give elaborate description or definition or any definite number of the vibhāvas and anubhāvas as they may be understood from an observation of the behaviour of the people around (cf 'tatra vibhāvānubhāvau lokaprasiddhau / lokasvabhāvānugatatvācca tayorlakṣanam nocyate tiprasanganivṛttyartham' NŚ VII p 348) The anubhāvas whi h are ordinarily called so can be produ ed by an effort also Hence they may be called voluntary effects of the permanent emotions There are also eight other effe ts of the rising of the permanent moods whi h get manifested in the person having an excited permanent mood automatically These are not designated as anubhāvas but separately classed as sāttvika bhāvas Yet, as they o cur as after-effects of the permanent moods they are also 'nothing more than anubhāvas'[3] They are named as Paralysis, Perspiration, Horripilation, Change of Voice Trembling Change of colour, Weeping and Fainting [4]

Vyabhicāribhāvas are transitory mental states. They occur to the mind in a fleeting manner in course of experiencing a permanent mood. Although they are mental states they may be acted out in a manner so as to make others know about their occurrence. In kāvya also they may be suggested through appropriate descriptions. The anubhāvas are thirty three in number and they are like passiveness (nirveda), weakness (glāni), apprehension (śaṅkā) and shame (vrīḍā or lajjā). [5]

Interpretations of Bharata's sūtra : Bharata's sūtra is variously interpreted by later writers like Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta to show the way of realisation of rasa. According to Lollaṭa, rasa primarily belongs to the hero. For example, it was Rāma who had love (rati) for Sītā and as such the rasa (śṛṅgāra) belonged to Rāma. The spectator ascribes this rasa to the actor on account of the actor's clever acting. Thus the spectator's knowledge about Rāma's love for Sītā gives him pleasure. The love is sthāyibhāva; and the very sthāyī being brought to its full form (upacita) by vibhāva, etc., becomes rasa. It is called sthāyī in its undeveloped form and belongs both to the hero and the actor, who is supposed to be the same with the former. Cf. "tena sthāyyeva vibhāvānubhāvādibhirupacito rasaḥ / sthāyī bhāvastvanupacitaḥ / sa cobhayorapi / ....anukāryye'nukartaryyapi cānusandhānabalāt iti" (A. Bh. p. 272). This view does not treat of rasa as a matter of the reader's or the spectator's feelings or emotions.

According to Śaṅkuka, the actor skilfully imitates the actions of the hero to whom a certain sthāyī actually belongs. The sthāyī is inferred to be belonging to the actor on account of the vibhāvas, etc., which are very skillfully presented. The sthāyī is specially called rasa, on account of its being an imitated one. Cf. "tasmāddhetubhirvibhāvākhyaiḥ...... anukartṛsthatvena liṅgavalataḥ pratīyamānaḥ sthāyī bhāvo mukhya-

5. Vide NŚ. VI (18–21) and VII p. 355 and NŚ. Trans. 125.

rāmādigatasthāyyanukaraṇa rūpah / anukaraṇarūpatvādeva ca nāmāntareṇa vyapadiṣṭo rasah' (A Bh p 272) It appears that Abhinava refers to the view of Śankuka himself when he maintains that, according to others, the sthāyī which is cognised through inference is called rasa because of producing a delight in the mind of the cogniser on account of its inherent charm [6] This very position is confirmed by Mammaṭa also when he says—" anumīyamāno'pi vastusaundaryabalādrasanīyatve nānyānumīyamānavilakṣaṇah sthāyitvena sambhāvyamāno ratyādirbhāvastatrāsannapi sāmājikānām vāsanayā carvyamāno rasa iti śrīśankukah' [7]

The most poignant defect of this theory is that, if the sthāyī is simply inferred to be occurring in the heart of the hero or the actor it would be as good as an inference of the practical world, and as such it would have other ordinary reactions in the heart of the spectator in stead of an unmixed pleasure designated as rasa, as it is observed by Bhaṭṭanāyaka cf "na ca śabdānumānādibhyah tatpratītau lokasya sarasatā prayuktā pratyakṣādiva / nāyakayugalakāvabhāse hi pratyuta lajjājugupsāsprhādisvocitacittavrttyantarodayah" etc [8] Moreover, it is a matter of common experience that the relish of rasa is never perturbed by any process of anumāna [9]

Bhaṭṭanāyaka's conception of rasa We have seen that according to Lollaṭa rasa is produced by a connection of the sthāyī with vibhāvas, etc, which bring the sthāyī into full form Hence his view is called utpattivāda According to Śankuka the spectator cognises the sthāyī as belonging to the hero imitated by the actor, through inference Hence, according to him there occurs a cognition of rasa (rasah pratīyate).

The third notable theory was the theory of suggestion propounded by Ānandavardhana. Ānanda says that in kāvya rasa can never be expressly stated. It is suggested by the expressly stated descriptions of vibhāva etc.[10] Hence, according to Ānanda rasa is conveyed through suggestion. (rasaḥ abhivyajyate).

In Bhaṭṭanāyaka's opinion rasa cannot be realised in the aforesaid ways. If rasa as understood in the sense of a developed sthāyī is inferred or cognised as belonging to the hero or the actor or if it is gathered to have been produced in relation to the hero or the actor the spectator is very likely to take a dispassionate note of it. The question of such a sthāyī belonging to the hero is not likely to cause any relish in the heart of the spectator or the reader. It is already pointed out by quoting a few words from the A. Bh., that, the sthāyī, in so far as it is cognised as belonging to any body other than the man of taste himself, would simply cause certain personal attitudes like shame, aversion and desire and never the relish of rasa. The sthāyī also cannot be cognised as belonging to the man of taste himself; for that will be as good as supporting the utpattivāda. But it is impossible, because, for instance, if the love between Rāma and Sītā is delineated in the kāvya the man of taste cannot have the same feeling of love, as Sītā can never serve as a vibhāva (i.e., object of love) for him. It cannot be said that, let Sītā be taken as a beloved (kāntā) in a general form, because in case of the description of gods such a generalisation would not be possible. It cannot be said that Sītā would remind the man of taste of his own beloved, because in the matter of crossing of seas, etc., similar experiences of own life are are not there to be recollected. It cannot be said that in such a case an enthusiastic Rāma is recollected, for such a Rāma is not an already known object. If rasa is taken to be produced in the heart of the

10. cf. "tṛtīyastu rasādilakṣaṇaḥ...... darśayiṣyate" (Dhv. I. pp. 78–84) etc.

man of taste then in case of karuna rasa only śoka (i.e., sorrow) would be experienced and there would be no pleasant relish

According to Bhaṭṭanāyaka rasa also cannot be said to be vyangya (i e, suggested) Because, suggestion of rasa is possible if it already remains ready made If the sthāyī is said to be there in the form of a śakti [11] (i e, an impression in the sub conscious mind), which may be suggested by vibhāvas, etc, in proper occasion, then, there should be greater and greater efforts to have more and more of vibhāvas etc, for better and better suggestion of rasa in the manner of desiring to have more and more light for more and more distinct manifestation of the jar But in actuality, the men of taste do not try to have more and more of vibhāvas etc, in time of realisation of rasa Moreover, in the opinion of Bhaṭṭanāyaka it is not stated by the theory of suggestion of rasa as to whose sthāyī is suggested The question yet remains as to whether the rasa (i e, sthāyī raised to the status of rasa) belongs to the man of taste himself or to some one else? Compare "nanūktam bhaṭṭanāyakena raso yadā paragatatayā pratīyate tena na pratīyate notpadyate nābhivyajyate kāvyena rasah" (Locana, pp 180–182) and "bhaṭṭanāyakastvāha—raso na pratīyate / svagatatvaparagatatvādi ca pūrvavadvikalpyam /" (A Bh p 276)

According to Bhaṭṭanāyaka's own theory rasa is neither produced nor cognised nor suggested It is in fact relished by the man of taste There are three functions of poetry (1) Abhidhā—this power presents the meaning of the poetry

11 Śakti is here supposed to mean an impression in the subconscious mind (i.e., a saṁskāra) because according to the Mīmāṁsaka the apūrva (i.e, virtue) that issues out of the yāga and resides in the self as a saṁskāra is a potency (i e, śakti) of the yāga, which is instrumental in securing svarga (Vide, Śāstradīpikā, p 106)

in the form of the description of the vibhāvas etc. (2) Bhāvakatva—This power generalises the vibhāvas, etc., by liberating them from all relations in which they stand in ordinary life. This brings forth the realisation of the sthāyī corresponding to generalised vibhāva, etc. (3) Bhojakatva—This function of poetry takes away the qualities of rajas and tamas from the self of the man of taste and renders the quality of sattva more prominant in which state the realised sthāyī is so relished so as to have the melting (druti) and expansion (vistāra) and blooming (vikāsa) of the heart and a pure bliss which is on a par with the bliss of realising the Supreme Self. Hence, 'rasaniṣpatti' of Bharata's sūtra according to Bhaṭṭanāyaka means bhukti (i.e., relish) of rasa and his theory is known as bhuktivāda. Compare, "tasmātkāvye .... parabrahmāsvādasavidhena bhogena paraṁ bhujyata iti" (A. Bh. p. 277) and "tena rasabhāvanākhyo dvitīyo vyāpāraḥ; yadvaśādabhidhāvilakṣaṇaiva / taccaitadbhāvakatvaṁ nāma rasān prati yat kāvyasya tadvibhāvādīnāṁ sādhāraṇatvāpādanaṁ nāma / bhāvite ca rase tasya bhogaḥ yo'nubhavasmaraṇa-pratipattibhyo vilakṣaṇa eva......parabrahmāsvādasavidhaḥ" (Locana, p. 183). This is the view of Bhaṭṭanāyaka, as represented by Abhinava. We may notice that Bhaṭṭanāyaka does not make any reference to the sthāyī. He maintains that in one stage 'rasa' is realised (cf. "bhāvite ca rase") and in the final stage 'rasa' is relished. (cf. "tasya bhogaḥ," etc.). But we may suppose that according to him in both the stages the term rasa means the relevant sthāyī in a generalised form on the strength of his observation as represented in the A. Bh., that, if rasa is realised as belonging to the man of taste he should be sorry in case of karuṇa rasa, instead of having any pleasure. (cf. "svagatatvena hi pratītau duḥkhitvaṁ syāt").

Although 'rasa' means the sthāyibhāva in the expression "bhāvite ca rase" which corresponds to the stage of realisation of rasa, it does not mean a personal permanent mood of the man of taste. The vibhāvas, etc., which correspond to the

sthāyī are said to be generalised That is how they are stripped of all the temporal and spatial specialities Sītā, when generalised, is cognised simply as a heroine Consequently the sthāyī which is realised also becomes generalised Thus the realisation of rasa means a simple awareness or conciousness of the sthāyī of an universal form This realisation leads to a state of bliss in which the self takes rest within itself ("nija samvidviśrānti")

Abhinava's theory of realisation of rasa

Proceeding to present his own theory of realisation of rasa Abhinava says that rasa is a meaning (artha) of kāvya, ('tat kāvyārtho rasah") This he observes on the strength of Bharata's explanation of the term 'bhāva' as "kāvyārthān bhāvayantīti bhāvah' (NŚ VII) Commenting on these words Abhinava observes that by the term 'bhāva' certain mental states (cittavrttis) are referred to, they are the *sthāyī*-bhāvas, anubhāvas of the ālambanavibhāva and vyabhicāribhāvas In NŚ VII 3, Bharata says that bhāvas bring the rasas to the scope of experience (" bhāvayanti rasānimān yasmāttasmādamī bhāvā ")

Hence, rasa is a kāvyārtha (i e., a meaning of kāvya) But it is not to be understood as an express meaning Because rasa never occurs as the lexicographical meaning of the words. But it is an artha in so far as it is desired by the meaning of words and sentences to be chiefly conveyed cf 'tatra ca padārtha vākyārthau raseṣveva paryavasyata iti kāvyasyārthāh rasāh / arthyante prādhānyenetyarthāh / na tvarthaśabdo'bhidheyavāci' (A Bh p 343) In my opinion this assertion that, rasa is an artha of kāvya, in the beginning of the presentation of his theory may also be due to the fact that there were some thinkers who would not recognise rasa as a sense of kāvya Such a section of thinkers is referred to by Ānanda in the words 'yairvā sākṣātkāvyārthatā rasādīnām nābhyupagamyate, taisteṣām tannimittatā tāvadavaśyamabhyu-

pagantavyā" (Dhv. p. 373). Contrary to the view of such thinkers the dhvani theorists recognise rasa also as a suggested 'sense' of kāvya.

Some opponent may question in this stage, 'can there be such a meaning which is different from and additional to the primary (abhidheya) meanings of the words and sentences ?' Abhinava replies that in the sentences "rātrimāsata" (They lay by the night) and "tāmagnauprādāt" (He offered it to fire) the literal meanings relate to the past tense. But the hearer gathers also an additional idea (pratīti) designated as (pratibhā), bhāvanā, vidhi or niyoga as the case may be, in which the verbs are freed from the given tense and appear in the forms "āste" and "pradadāmi". This additional idea which occurs to the mind of the hearer in the shape of an action of the present tense belonging to himself (i.e., pradadāmi) in case of 'agnau prādāt' is also recognised as a meaning of the sentence. Similarly in kāvya also we may have an additional knowledge or idea (i.e. pratīti). [12] In kāvya, for example, the literal meaning of the verse "grīvābhaṅgābhirāmam" gives us only the description of a frightened deer. Thence an additional knowledge (pratīti) arises in the mind of the man of taste which has a bhaya (fear) as its object, as free from its relation to the deer or the time of the occurrence of the deer in the manner of the 'action of offering' being free of its expressly stated past tense or the third person, in case of "tāmagnau prādāt." [13] The bhaya, which is thus cognised as free from its temporal and spatial specialities (bhayameva paraṁ deśakālādyanāliṅgitam), is cognised

12. cf. "yathā hi 'rātrimāsata'.........kāvyātmakādapi śabdādadhikāriṇo'dhikāsti pratipattiḥ" (A. Bh. p. 278). See, AE, pp. 63–64, for a more informative exposition of this passage.

13. Vide, "Philosophical explanation of elimination of time etc." (I. Aest, p. 159).

through an unperturbed cognition (nirvighna pratītigrāhyam) and overwhelmes the heart and becomes the 'bhayānaka rasa' In case of such a cognition of the sthāyī bhaya, one's own self is neither very prominantly involved nor completely suppressed [14]

The bhaya which originally occured with the deer is experienced also by the man of taste This is because of the sthāyī being generalised Such an universalisation of moods is possible because of the similarity of the hearts wherein the endless impressions of the moods lie as a varnish In other words the man of taste gets identified at a stage with the poetical character and experiences the same feelings as that of the latter on account of similarity of the heart (i e., hṛdayasamvāda) It cannot be contended that certain feelings are peculiar only to the characters like Rāma and hence, a hṛdayasamvāda with Rāma is not possible, because the heart of every being carries the impressions of a variety of moods as it is observed in the Yoga sūtras IV, 9-10 [15] The identification of the reader with the poetical character is rendered possible by the fact of the latter being freed from the temporal and spatial limitations Once the identification is accomplished the sthāyī is experienced In course of experience the man of taste forgets even himself and cognises the sthāyī and sthāyī alone. This cognition by an unperturbed mind (vītavighnā pratīti) gives such an unmixed joy to the cognizant that the joy can hardly be distinguished from the knowledge In other words the act of knowing itself is the experiencing of a joy Thus as far as the implication of the sūtra of Bharata goes "a bhāva

14 "adh kart cātra na v śeṣata ull khitaḥ" (A Bh. p 279)

15 Vide A Bh p 279, 'ata eva sarvasāmājikānāmekaghanatayā va prat patih sutarām rasaparipoṣāya sarveṣāmanādi vāsanā citrīkṛtacetasām vāsanāsamvādāt" and Locana, p 187 "rāmā d caritam tu na sarvasya hṛdayasamvādīti mahat sāhasam citravāsanāviśiṣṭatvāccetasaḥ "

cognised by a blissful and unperturbed cognition is rasa." cf. "sarvathā tāvadeṣāstipratītirāsvādātmā yasyāṁ ratireva bhāti... sarvathā rasanātmakavītavighnapratītigrāhyo bhāva eva rasaḥ" (A. Bh. p. 280).

We have so far been severally referring to identification of the man of taste with the poetical character. Sometimes the poet himself, with his emotional statement, may appear as the poetical character. In such a case the reader will have an identification with the poet himself.

Identification of the man of taste with the poetical or dramatic character is aided by the factors like the propriety of guṇa, alaṁkāra, etc., in kāvya and by the factors like music and the costume in drama.[16] Through identification the man of taste considers himself to be in the same situation as that of the poetical character and shares the feelings of the latter. But this identification is also an object of the world of poetry and not usual to the ordinary world; for, even getting identified the man of taste retains his personality in so far as the pleasure derived from the realisation of rasa may latter on be recalled by his own self.

The unperturbed cognition of the sthāyī gives the man of taste an unalloyed joy. This joy is also called camatkāra. This camatkāra is the continued absorption in an enjoyment but not fraught with any pain on account of a sense of lack of satiety. This is indeed an unworldly state of enjoyment for all the worldly enjoyments are mixed with an element of dissatisfaction on account of lack of satiety. On the other hand when satiety is attained the same enjoyment cannot be pursued any further.[17] It will be seen that this camatkāra, which cannot be distinguished from the realisation of rasa is the same as what is meant by bhoga by Bhaṭṭanāyaka.

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16. Vide also I. Aest. p. 158.

17. cf. "tathā hi—sa cātṛptivyatirekeṇāvicchinno bhogāveśa ityucyate" (A. Bh. p. 279).

The seven vighnas (obstacles)

The cognition of the sthāyī for the realisation of rasa is said to be an unperturbed cognition (i e , vītavighnā pratīti) The possible obstacles are also pointed out by Abhinava [18] The obstacles are as follows—(I) Incompatibility in cognition due to lack of belief in the incidents or persons described in the kāvya as true [19] If the situation cannot be believed to be as it is presented, the question of the man of taste's considering himself to be in that situation cannot arise In other words the man of taste must move only in the world as it is created by the kāvya around him He would hardly find himself a citizen of that world of poetry if he is conscious of its unreality from the very beginning. This obstacle may be removed in two ways In respect of the situations which are also ordinarily possible, (lokasāmānya) a hṛdayasamvāda is enough In other words, a similarity of the heart due to the possesion of similar impressions of permanent moods with the poetical characters is enough for bringing a tinge of reality (i.e , com patibility) to the poetical situation It must not be expected that there would be hṛdayasamvāda in case of all the readers. Because, it is also observed by Abhinava that although the basic mental states (i e , the cittavṛttis) belong to all human beings, yet they belong in varying degress. cf " ata evānuttamaprakṛtiṣu bāhulyena hāsādayo bhavanti [20] na hyetaccittavṛttivāsanāśūnyah prāṇī bhavati / kevalam kasyacitkācidadhikā cittavṛttih kācidūnā / kasyaciducitaviṣayaniyantritā kasyacidanyathā" etc., (A Bh pp 282–283)

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18 Vide, A. Bh. pp 280, 282 Some editions or quotations have the reading 'vighnāikāryām sapta' There is also some difference in indicating the seven vighnas in modern works

19 "pratipattāvayogyatā—sambhāvanāvirabo nāma" (A.Bh p 280)

20 Vide PSR p 31, for the truth of this statement, established by a practical experiment

Again, in respect of the activities which are not common to ordinary beings of the world (alokasāmānya), the first obstacle may be removed by the presentation only of the famous personages such as Rāma,[21] which may bring into operation a deep-rooted belief even in the extraordinary feats of such personages, based on popular tradition. The supernatural elements which we often have in the Sanskrit dramas, apparently seem to have great possibility of this obstacle of incompatibility. For example, in the third Act of the URC there is the introduction of the invisible Sītā and in the last Act of the Mālatīmādhava Saudāminī is said to have flown down from the Śrīparvata. But, these and similar supernatural elements do not generally present the said obstacle because of the poet's skill of presenting them in an appropriate situation. In a world of sylvan deities (vana devīs) where the rivers, Tamasā, Muralā and Bhāgirathī are personified, it was quite plausible for Sītā to have been invisible through the influence of Bhāgirathī. The spectators also can very easily put belief in the flying of Saudāminī, since in the very first Act they are given to learn that Saudāminī is practising Yoga in the Śrīparvata. Since the possibility of a lack of belief is skillfully eliminated, the obstacle does not arise even in case of the presentation of the supernatural (i.e., alokasāmānya, as called by Ānandavardhana) elements.

(2) Attributing of a temporal or spatial speciality to the situation as related to the man of taste himself or to some one else (say, the dramatic character or the actor).[22] If the sentiments of pleasure or pain depicted in the kāvya or the dramatic performance be supposed to be belonging to the man

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21. Ānanda also discusses this as a question of propriety and observes, "ata eva ca bhārate prakhyātavastuviṣayatvaṁ prakhyātodāttanāyakatvaṁ ca nāṭakasyāvaśyakartavyatayopanyastam." (Dhv. III. p. 331).

22. "svagatatvaparagatatvaniyamena deśakālaviśeṣāveśaḥ."

of taste, limited by his own time and place, himself then he should have other feelings like the anxiety to retain the pleasure or the anxiety to abandon the pain Similarly, if the feelings of pleasure or pain be supposed to be belonging to some one else with own temporal or spatial limitations then the man of taste would have quite different feelings like those of indifference or disgust But for the realisation of rasa the same feeling as that of the poetical character alone is desired to be experienced by the man of taste, for which the man of taste must find himself free from his own temporal or spatial distinctions and must find the poetical character as some one belonging to the situation immediately present to the man of taste. For avoiding this obstacle, or in other words, for creating the illusion of the poetical world, dance, music and costume, etc, are introduced in the drama. The elements of the theatre which help to create the illusory atmosphere, like the scenery, costumes, traditional conventions, etc, are technically called nāṭyadharmī. The realistic part of the representation is called lokadharmī. In case of kāvya proper, however, we do not have advantages of the nāṭyadharmī or the lokadharmī (i e, the artificial or realistic representation) There, the plain and the figurative expressions employed for a skillful *representation of the vibhāvas* etc., serve as the lokadharmī and the nāṭyadharmī of the drama and help suggestion of rasa.[23]

(3) The state of being subject to one's own feelings of plea sure or pain[24] The person whose heart is like a clear mirror on account of being free from personal feelings is called a sahṛdaya The sahṛdaya alone can accommodate the sentiment depicted in the kāvya or nāṭya (i.e, drama) in the manner of

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23 cf. "kāvye'pi ca lokanāṭyadharmisthānīyena svabhāvokti-vakrokti-prakāradvayena alaukikaprasanna-madhuraujasvi-śabdasamarpyamāṇa-vibhāvādi-yogād ayam eva rasavārtā" (Locana, p 186).

24 "nijasukhaduḥkhādivivaśībhāvaḥ."

a clear mirror capable of holding images. If the heart is preoccupied with personal pleasures or pains, the sentiment of the poetical or the dramatic situation will not find any place in the heart of the reader or the spectator. In case of the theatre devices like the singing and instrumental music are employed to overcome this obstacle by making the person forgetful of his own feelings. That is how the audible art plays its part in the theatre. This role of music may be likened to the part played by the letters in suggestion of rasa in kāvya discussed in the last chapter. The efficacy of the vocal or the instrumental music, etc., for removing this obstacle is, however, somewhat limited. If the personal feeling is deeper in degree the said devices may not be totally helpful. It is also to be noted that sahṛdayatva (i.e., the capacity to get absorbed in the poetical situation) also varies from man to man and from time to time in respect of its nature and degree.[25]

(4) Lack of means for cognising the poetical situation.[26] If the means of cognition are absent how can the cognition occur at all?

(5) Along with it we can consider the fifth obstacle named as 'lack of clearity' (sphuṭatvābhāva).[27] The mere verbal references to a certain incident or situation may not present the situation in a clear form. Even after the verbal description or symbolical suggestion of a certain situation the mind of the man of taste naturally desires to have a direct cognition. And indeed 'all the forms of knowledge are based on direct perception', as it is observed by Vātsāyana in Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya, I–3. A thing which is directly perceived cannot be

25. Vide. I. Aest. p. 153. (Psycho-physical Condition).

26. pratītyupāyavaikalya.

27. I consider the fourth and the fifth obstacles separately on the strength of the words—"tasmāttadubhayavighāte'bhinaya" etc., said in the A. Bh. (p. 281) with reference to these 'two' obstacles.

proved to be otherwise by any other means of knowledge A fire band being rapidly turned, no doubt, gives the perception of a circle of fire (alātacakra) We cannot say that this perception is rendered invalid by other means of knowledge. The cognition of the circle of fire is proved to be invalid by another stronger perception itself and not by any other means of knowledge Hence, dramatic representation itself, aided by realistic representation (lokadharmī), the vṛttis and pravṛttis (i e., local styles) [28] is the means to avoid the two obstacles namely 'lack of means of cognition' and 'lack of clarity '

(6) Subordination of the principal (apradhānatā). [29] The mind of the man of taste gets the restful satisfaction only by ruminating over the permanent mental state Vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāvas are, no doubt, directly presented on the stage But the sthāyī stands paramount over them and hence the sthāyī alone can give the relish of rasa. If the sthāyī is not principally delineated there will not be the realisation of rasa Hence, the whole situation consisting of the presentation of the vibhāvas, etc , should aim at predominantly depicting the sthāyī

(7) Association of doubt (saṁśayayoga) The vibhāvas and anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas do not have any fixed relation with the sthāyī. A tiger may serve as the ālambanavibhāva for both krodha (anger) and bhaya (fear) The anubhāva in the form of tears may be related to sorrow (śoka) and joy (ānanda) as well Hence, if any one or two of the vibhāvas, etc , are represented in isolation from the others,

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28 Vide, NŚ VI 24–26 Vṛttis are already referred to in the preceding chapter

29 cf. "apradhāne ca vastuni kasya saṁvid viśrāmyati... evam apradhānatvaṁ nirāsaḥ sthāyi-nirūpaṇīyam 'sthāyibhāvān rasatvam' (NŚ VI, 4–6) ityanayā sāmānyalakṣaṇasabdāyā vastulakṣaṇaṁ ca kṛtaḥ" (A. Bh pp 281–283)

that would lead to a confusion (saṁśaya) in respect of the sthāyī. Hence, all the elements, i.e., vibhāvas, etc., are to be represented together.[30]

Some important points in Abhinava's theory :

So far we have been understanding that the sthāyī, which is realised in a generalised form in an unperturbed blissful state, is rasa. But Abhinava gives us to learn that what is cognised in this blissful state is not a sthāyī in the ordinary sense of the term. The cognition of this mental state consists solely of a blissful rumination. According to Śaṅkuka, the sthāyī, which is brought to knowledge by vibhāvas, etc., is rasa because it can be relished.[31] But if we follow the words of Śaṅkuka literally the sthāyī that is cognised in the ordinary life also should be called rasa, and the sthāyī known through inference also should be called rasa. But, what is in fact realised in case of śṛṅgāra, for example, is neither a rati (i.e., a feeling of love) belonging to others nor one's personal feeling of love. What happens is only a rumination[32] over the vibhāvas, etc., which assume a generalised form on account of the personal impression (i.e., vāsanā) of a sthāyī, appropriate to those vibhāvas, etc. Hence, in course of the rumination over those vibhāvas, etc., a blissful conciousness arises, in which, however, the sthāyī and one's own self also appear.[33] That blissful conciousness lasts only so long as the rumination over the vibhāvas, etc., lasts. In this manner the realisation of rasa differs from the mere knowledge of a sthāyī.

The rasa, even if it is understood as the sthāyī appearing in a blissful conciousness, is not a product of the vibhāvas,

30. cf. "tatrānubhāvānāṁ......upāttaḥ" (A. Bh. p. 284).

31. "sthāyyeva vibhāvādi-prattyāyyo rasyamānātvādrasa ucyate."

32. This is called 'carvaṇā', i.e., chewing the cud.

33. "romāñcādayaśca...deśakālaniyamena tatra ratim gamayanti / yasyāṁ svātmāpi tadvāsanāvattvādanupraviṣṭaḥ" (A.Bh. p. 285).

etc., for, it vanishes as soon as the rumination over the vibhāvas, etc, disappears

The sthāyī which arises in such a blissful conciousness does not stand as an already accomplished object to be made known by vibhāvas, etc That is how the vibhāvas, etc, do not serve as a cause of cognition for the sthāyī [34]

Now a question arises, 'What does Bharata mean by rasa-niṣpatti?' Because, the expression 'niṣpatti' literally means production Abhinava's reply is that what is said to be produced here is not rasa (i e, the sthāyī, which is relished in a generalised form) but the rasanā (i e, relish) which issues out of the realisation If rasa (i e, the generalised sthāyī) is said to be produced (in a figurative way) on account of being solely animated by that relish [35] then Abhinava's own position is not vitiated But the relish is nothing other than a blissful conciousness This leads Abhinava to give the final verdict that in his own opinion the blissful conciousness itself is rasa and not the object of the blissful cognition (i e, the generalised sthāyī) Thus rasa being a blissful relish, even in case of the karuna rasa there is the same unalloyed pleasure The blissful conciousness is the realisation of the self by itself The rasas are variously named as śṛngāra, karuna, etc, only because the conciousness is effected by the sthāyī at a certain stage of the experience. But it is not the final stage In the final stage of the realisation of rasa, there is the relish and relish alone. [36] Only in the initial stage, the sthāyī, which lies in the sub-concious (vāsanā) is brought to the realm of conciousness by dramatic performance or poetry Compare asmanmate samvedanamevānandaghanamāsvādyate / tatra kā duhkhāśānkā / kevalam tasyaiva citratākarane rati-śokādivāsa-

34 Vide, A Bh pp 284-285

35 Sthāyī as far as it is an object of blissful conciousness alone is rasa and not the ordinary sthāyī

36 Vide, L Aest, pp 128-29

nāvyāpāraḥ / tadudbodhane cābhinayādivyāpāraḥ /" (A. Bh. p. 292).

Further points from Locana :

So far we have been referring only to the A. Bh., for Abinava's theory on rasa. In this connection, a few references to the Locana also may give us much enlightenment. Here he observes that,—

(1) Realisation of rasa is different from other forms of knowledge because of the difference of the means. Here the vibḥāvas, etc., which serve as the basis of the cognition of the sthāyī are not the things of the ordinary world. They are extraordinary (lokottara), in so far as, vibhāvas, etc., give rise to rasa only in the realm of drama or poetry. The realisation of rasa is called carvaṇā (i.e., chewing the cud), āsvādana (i.e., tasting), or bhoga (relish). cf.—"kiṁ tu yathā...... tadvadiyamapi pratītiścarvaṇāsvādanabhogāparanāmā bhavatu / tannidānabhūtāyā hṛdayasaṁvādādyupakṛtāyā vibhāvādisāmagryā lokottararūpattvāt" (Locana, p. 187).

(2) But the expression "rasāḥ pratīyante" (i.e., Rasas are realised) must not be understood literally. It is a figurative expression like "odanaṁ pacyate" (Boiled rice is being cooked).[37] Because, it is already observed that rasa does dot stand as an

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37. Odana means "boiled rice." There can be the odana only when the process of cooking is over. In time of the cooking affair it does not stand as an already prepared object. Likewise rasa is also not a readymade object to be tasted later on. There is no rasa before the act of realisation. But there is also some difference between the two figurative expressions. We have odana actually when the process of cooking is over but we cease to have rasa when the process of realisation is over. We do not actually have odana so long as the process of cooking continues. But we have rasa only so long as the process of realisation continues.

already accomplished object to be realised later on. Rasa is called rasa only so long as the process of realisation goes on. The existence of a rasa prior to or after the process of knowing cannot be conceived of. This very realisation is a peculiar type of relish. cf. "rasāh pratīyanta iti odanam pacatīti vadvyavahāraḥ / pratīyamāna eva hi rasah / pratītireva viśiṣṭā rasanā" (Ibid, p 187) cf also, "sā ca rasanā rūpā pratītirutpadyate" (Ibid, p 188)

(3) Rasadhvani is the excess of relish resulting from a rumination over the sthāyī, which appears to the cognizant prominantly on account of the connection of the vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāva. Cf "rasadhvanistu sa eva yo'tra mukhyatayā vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisamyojanodita sthāyipratipattikasya pratipattuh sthāyyamśacarvanā prayukta evāsvādaprakarṣah" (Locana, p 179)

rasa and vyañjana :

Abhinava had the greatest difference with Bhaṭṭanāyaka only in respect of the functions involved in the reali sation of rasa [38] Bhaṭṭanāyaka recognises the functions called bhāvakatva and bhojakatva which are not recognised by any other school of thought. Abhinava by way of showing that these two functions are unwarrented and uncalled for, includes them in the scope of the vyañjanā function of the words and the meanings Kāvya itself, with its appropriate alaṁkāras and gunas, brings rasa to the realm of realisation (i e , bhāvanā). The function with which the kāvya does so is nothing other than suggestion (i e , vyañjanā). The relish of rasa, which is said to be due to the bhojakatva function, also can be had by suggestion. Because, what is conceived as bhāvanā (realisation) is nothing other than bhoga (relish). Hence, if rasa is said to be suggested the bhoga (relish) also happens to be suggested along with rasa. So, Abhinava's conclusion is that

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38. Vide, Theory of Rasa and Dhvani, p. 104.

"rasa is suggested; and it is relished in the manner of realisation." cf. "tasmāt sthitametat—abhivyajyante rasāḥ pratītyaiva ca rasyanta iti." (Locana, p. 190).

Bhaṭṭanāyaka raised the question that if rasa is said to be suggested then it must be an already accomplished fact. As far as my knowledge goes Abhinava does not give any direct reply to such an objection. But such an objection cannot occur if vyañjanā is understood to be the function of revelation having an analogy with the jar and the lamp. In other words, something is said to be the suggestor of another thing when the former reveals the latter while keeping itself manifest. For example, the lamp suggests the jar, for the lamp also reveals itself while revealing the jar. [39] This conception of vyañjanā does not demand the vyaṅgya to be already existent. We have seen how it is severally observed by Abhinava that the realisation of rasa is there only so long as the perception of the situation depicted in the kāvya (i.e., the vibhāvas, etc.) is there. Hence, it is rightly said that kāvya suggests rasa.

If it is insisted that the object which is suggested (i.e., the vyaṅgya) should be an already existent object, then we may possibly have yet another interpretation. In the finest analysis of Abhinava rasa is an unalloyed relish. This unalloyed relish is identical with the self. For, in the śruti, the self is conceived as saccidānanda (i.e., real, conciousness and joy). It is already observed that in Abhinava's theory realisation of rasa means the realisation of the self by itself. Jagannātha also understands the realisation of rasa as the realisation of the self and quotes the statement—"raso vai saḥ, rasaṁ hyevāyaṁ labdhvānandībhavati" from the Taittirīyopaniṣad (II. 7) in support of his doctrine. [40] That is how rasa can be said

39. cf. "tasmādghaṭapradīpanyāyastayoḥ, yathaiva hi pradīpadvāreṇaghaṭapratītāvutpannāyāṁ na pradīpaprakāśo nivartate tadvadvyaṅgyapratītau vācyāvabhāsaḥ" (Dhv. p. 421).

40. But Jagannātha wrongly represents the view of Abhinava in this connection. Vide, I. Aest. p. 127.

to be suggested, even when the function of suggestion is conceived in the manner of Bhaṭṭanāyaka

Rasa and the experience of the Absolute: If in this way realisation of rasa means the realisation of the self then how does the aesthetic conciousness (i e, rasāsvāda) differ from the mystical conciousness (i e, brahmāsvāda)? Abhinava does not identify one with the other He simply says that rasāsvāda is on a par with the brahmāsvāda [41] Because, when there is the experience of the Absolute, there can be no further coming back to the realm of worldly experience But in case of the realisation of rasa, there is the coming back of the subject to the realm of worldly experience even after the experience of the unalloyed bliss which is an aspect of the Absolute itself This point is very clearly marked by Dr. Pandey in the words "Aesthetic experience, therefore, according to Abhinavagupta, in its final stage, belongs to the level of Vyatireka Turīyātīta, in which all objectivity merges in the subconscious and the Subject, the Self, shines in its Ānanda aspect" [42]

The Vyatireka Turīyātīta refers to a stage in the mystic experience, according to the Kashmir Śaiva Philosophy, of which Abhinava was the greatest exponent. Turīyātīta is that stage of the mystic experience, where the subjectivity not only predominates but also rises above the objectivity. This Turīyātīta is of two types The first is called 'Vyatireka Turīyātīta', in which the objectivity persists in the sub-conscious The second is called 'Avyatireka Turīyātīta' This is the highest stage, "from which there is no descent" [43] Brahmāsvāda may be called the Avyatireka Turīyātīta, when we call rasāsvāda as Vyatireka Turīyātīta and that is how we observe the

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41 "Parabrahmāsvādasabrahmacāritvaṃ cāstvasya rasāsvādasya" (Locana, p 190)

42. I Aest p 130

43 Ibid, p. 122

propriety of explaining rasāsvāda (or rasa itself) as "brahmāsvādasahodara."

Rasa and the drama :

Coming again to the question of practical delineation of rasa, Abhinava observes that in certain cases only one or two of the three factors namely, vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāva occur. In such cases, what is not clearly depicted in the piece, occurs to the realm of imagination of the man of taste and thus completes the whole situation, suitable for the depiction of the relevent rasa. [44] Viśvanātha also observes that in the case where only one or two of the vibhāvas, etc., occur, there may be the suggestion of rasa if an imagination of the less prominant factors is possible on the strength of the context, etc. [45] Viśvanātha gives the verse "dīrghākṣaṁ śaradindukānti," for illustration, where Agnimitra simply gives a description of the nāyikā Mālavikā. Thereby, we get the description only of the ālambana-vibhāva. Yet, indeed, we complete the picture of the whole situation by imagining the vyabhicāribhāva in the form of an autsukya [46] and anubhāvas in the shape of side glances, etc., of Agnimitra. This is how we have the relish of śṛṅgāra rasa from the said verse even in the absence of a clear delineation of the appropriate anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas. But, Abhinava observes that the best type of relish can be derived when all the three elements are adequately delineated. But the delineation of all the elements is generally not practicable in shorter parts of compositions or single verses called *muktaka*.

44. A. Bh. pp. 286–287.

45. sadbhāvaścedvibhāvāderdvayorekasya vā bhavet /
jhaṭityanyasamākṣepe tathā doṣo na vidyate // (SD. III. 17).

46. *Autsukya* means a restlessness on account of a delay in union with the desired object, causing burning of the heart, etc., (SD. III. 159).

The situation may be presented in its entirety only in a whole composition. Of all the types of compositions the drama is the best in this respect.[46a] Because, all the affairs (as anubhāvas) of the characters (who form the ālambana vibhāvas) and the whole back ground (which serves as the uddīpana vibhāva) can be vividly presented by the staging of the drama.[46b] In course of reading a whole composition the reader draws up a mental picture of the affairs of the characters in such a manner that he gets the experience of witnessing a

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46a. Possibly because of this advantage of the drama to be most appealing with the suggestion of the greatest amount of rasa, it is observed that nāṭaka is the most appealing of all the varieties of kāvya in the celebrated verse: *Kāvyeṣu nāṭakam ramyaṁ tatra ramyā Śakuntalā / Tatrāpi ca caturtho'ṅko yatra ślokacatuṣṭayam //*

46b. It may be observed here that the back ground scenery is a necessity in the staging of a drama. In case of a blank screen (without any picture) as in the case of many modern dramatic performances, the background requires to be duly imagined by the spectators.

In the matter of this relative advantage of the drama we may compare the following lines of John Press (though spoken in a slightly different context): "In T. S. Eliot's *The Cocktail Party*, a similar cry is torn from Edward, driven to a despairing fury by his unloved wife:

And then you came back, you
The angel of destruction—just as I felt sure.
In a moment, at your touch, there is nothing but ruin
O God, what have I done? The Python. The octopus.

On the stage these incoherent, broken cries can be given an added force and significance by the voice and gestures of a skilled actor, whereas nondramatic poetry must rely solely upon the words printed on the page or, at best, upon being read aloud in a room......" CS, p. 165.

dramatic performance [47] and consequently gets the relish of rasa in the manner of getting it from the drama. But in cases of muktakas, etc., the reader has to depend on his own imagination for getting a full picture of the situation. Those who are sahṛdayas (i.e., men of taste) on account of constant reading of kāvyas and virtues of privious births, can easily form the mental picture of the whole situation and can get all that is desired from the drama, from the kāvya itself.

Rasa and the poet :

In pp. 66–68, we found an apparent disagreement between the views of Ānanda and Abhinava, in connection with the episode of Vālmīki. But we may have a happy solution to the whole confusion from an observation of Abhinava in the A. Bh. In A. Bh., under VI. 38, there arises the occasion for Abhinava to question like this : If according to the theory of rasa-niṣpatti, bhāvas give rise to the rasas, then, what is the propriety in saying that "no meaning can proceed (from speech) without (any kind of) rasa." [48] Abhinava gives the reply thus : The acting (naṭa-vyāpāra) presupposes the kāvya which owes its origin to the realisation of the bhāvas in a generalised (i.e., impersonal) form by the poet himself. Such a realisation itself is in fact rasa. The process of the poet's experiencing the bhāvas with a sympathetic heart is already explained in connection with the episode of Vālmīki. Hence, the source of kāvya is the rasa belonging to the poet. The poet is indeed as good as a man of taste who relishes rasa by

47. The reader imagines as if the incidents are occurring just before his eyes. cf. "yadāha vāmanaḥ—"sandarbheṣu daśarūpakaṁ śreyaḥ / tadvicitraṁ citrapaṭavadviśeṣasākalyāt" (kāvyālaṁkāra-sūtra. 1. 3. 30–31) iti, *tadrūpasamarpaṇayā* tu prabandhe bhāṣā-veṣapravṛttyaucityādikalpanāt" (A. Bh. p. 287). In the italicized portion the reading is taken from the foot-note.

48. "na hi rasādṛte kaścidapyarthaḥ pravartate."

reading the kāvya or witnessing the dramatic representation This position that the poet already realises the rasa which he relegates to his kāvya is strengthened by Ānandavardhana's words

śṛṅgārī cetkaviḥ kāvye jātam rasamayam jagat /
sa eva vītarāgaścennīrasam sarvameva tat // (Dhv III p 498)

(If the poet is suffused with the śṛṅgara rasa the whole world will be suffused with that sentiment But if he be devoid of any rasa the world also will be depicted to be void of any sentiment)

Here the emotion of the poet is said to be already a rasa Hence, there is no impropriety when Abhinava conceives Vālmīki's śoka not as a personal śoka but as rasa Compare ' nanu yadi bhāvebhyo rasāstarhi kathamuktam na hi rasādṛte kaścidapyarthah pravartate / tena pūrvam ta evoddeśyāh' kavigatasādhāraṇībhūtasamvinmūlaśca kāvyapuraḥsaro naṭa vyāpārah / saiva ca samvit paramārthato rasah / tadevam mūlam vijasthānīyah kavigato rasah / kavirhi sāmājikatulya eva / tat evoktam 'śṛṅgārī cet kaviḥ' ityānandavardhanācāryena /' (A Bh p 294)

Ānandavardhana's conception of rasa

In the last quotation we have seen how Abhinava is referring to a view of Ānandavardhana with great esteem Ānanda does not dwell at length on the psychology of the realisation of rasa Yet from Abhinava's attitude towards him and from some of his stray remarks we can form an opinion that Ānanda's conception of rasa was almost like that of Abhinava But the same conception was in a crude form and took the proper shape in the hands of Abhinava, coming down through a tradition represented by Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Bhaṭṭatauta Let us now refer to some of Ānanda's statements to see how his ideas chime with those of Abhinava

(1) We see from an analysis of Ānanda's treatment of guṇas that, he understands guṇas in terms of certain mental conditions of the man of taste like druti and dīpti. From this we may conclude that Ānanda understands rasa not as the knowledge about sentiments of the characters but as a mental condition (cittavṛtti) of the sahṛdaya (i.e., man of taste) himself.

(2) Ānanda does not recommend a composition having compounds for depicting the delicate rasas like the karuṇa and vipralambha śṛṅgāra. His argument is that these rasas are very delicate and hence the realisation (pratīti) of them may be hampered even by the slightest haziness regarding the composition and the idea. "tayorhi sukumāratvāt svalpāyāmapyasvacchatāyāṁ śabdārthayoḥ pratītirmantharībhavati" (Dhv. III. p. 321). If the rasas be understood as mere informations regarding the sentiments of others then the question of certain rasas being delicate does not arise. Hence, the rasas are understood as certain cittavṛttis of the sahṛdaya himself.

(3) That the readers (or spectators) generally share the sentiments of the hero may be gathered from the following statement made in connection with the question of rasavirodha (i.e., clash of sentiments): "kiṁ ca nāyakasyābhinandanīyodayasya kasyacitprabhāvātiśayavarṇane tatpratipakṣāṇāṁ yaḥ karuṇo rasaḥ sa parīkṣakāṇāṁ na vaiklavyamādadhāti pratyuta prītyatiśaya-nimittatāṁ pratipadyata." etc. (Dhv. III. 375). The question of the reaction of the sorrow of the villain in the heart of the reader occurs only because of the conviction that the sentiments of the characters usually have similar repercussions in the heart of the men of taste also.

(4) For sharing the sentiments with the characters the men of taste should already have impressions of similar sentiments. This idea of Ānanda may be gathered from his statement that, the śānta rasa (conceived as a cittavṛtti in the form

of an excess of joy due to loss of desire) cannot be denied on the score that it is not a cittavṛtti experienced by all. (cf "yadi nāma sarvajanānubhavagocaratā tasya nāsti naitāvatāsāvalokasāmānya mahānubhāvacittavṛttiviśeṣah pratikṣeptum śakyah," Dhv. III. p 393)

Then again, the śṛṅgāra rasa is said to be the most appealing and most important, as it is invariably within the experience of all persons "śṛṅgāraraso hi saṁsāriṇām niyamenānubhavaviṣayatvāt sarvarasebhyah kamanīyatayā pradhānabhūtah" (Dhv III p 397). This also shows that for Ānanda also hṛdayasaṁvāda is a prerequisite for the realisation of rasa

(5) *An imaginary opponent raises an objection in connection with the citra as follows* [49]. "All the kāvyas must describe some thing or other of the world All the things described in the kāvya must serve at least as the vibhāvas for some rasa or bhāva. Because the rasas and bhāvas, etc, are certain mental states There cannot be any object of the world which does not cause some mental state Hence the kāvyas embodying the descriptions of different objects invariably have rasa. That is why, a citra variety of composition as free from rasa can never be conceived of." Here, the opponent conceives rasas as certain cittavṛttis (cittavṛtti viśeṣā hi rasādayah) From the occasion of argument it may be gathered that the cittavṛttis are conceived as belonging to the reader and not as belonging to the poetical characters—because, the kāvya, where the citra variety is apprehended, is said to have the delineation of only ordinary objects or at lest of vibhāvas. The question of the rasas being conceived as the cittavṛttis of the vibhāvas does not arise at all

The opponent is an imaginary opponent and his arguments betray the conception of Ānanda himself That is why Ānanda concedes to his arguments; but finds other arguments to

establish the citra variety. It is at least clear that Ānanda does not question the opponent's conception of rasa which is much after the heart of Abhinava.

The objective correlative :

It appears to me that the theory of the suggestion of rasa, which has been so very briefly stated by Bharata in his sūtra "vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisaṁyogādrasaniṣpattiḥ" is once again very briefly presented by one of the greatest theorists of the present century in T. S. Eliot in his theory of "objective correlative." It is interesting to note that this great poet-theorist, who desires that poetry should "evoke" an "emotion" in the heart of the reader discusses the process of this evocation so precisely nowhere other than in his paper on the *Hamlet*. In the passage, quoted below, embodying his theory, in my opinion, "set of objects" correspond to "ālambanavibhāvas," "situation" to "uddipana-vibhāvas" and the "chain of events" either stands for anubhāvas or suggestion of vyabhicāribhāvas. The concluding line of the quotation, as it appears to me, desires an appropriateness (aucitya) and adequacy of the vibhāvas, etc., in respect of the desired sentiment. Hence, compare : "The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an "objective correlative", in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events, which shall be the formula of that *particular* emotion, so that when the external facts, which must turn in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked...... The artistic "inevitability" lies in the *exact equivalence of the external to* the emotion." [The Sacred Wood, pp. 100–101].

F. O. Matthiessen in his ATSE (p. 56) explains and analyses Eliot's theory of 'objective correlative' in such a manner that his analysis may stand as a very strong support to my interpretation. This theory, propounded in the context of the method of expressing emotion in poetry, prefers the dramatic poetry. "Perhaps the most important thing that

is revealed by applying Eliot's conception of the 'objective correlative' to his own work is the essentially dramatic nature of all his poetry," observes Matthiessen (Ibid, p 67) It is observed in the section entitled 'Rasa and the drama" in this chapter above, as to how Vāmana and Abhinavagupta also have singled out the drama as the best type of kāvya on the ground of *presenting the entire object and the situation and* the chain of events in their entirety for a full communication of the sentiment The dramatic poem also presents the characters, their speeches and the description of the situations in a manner so as to evoke sentiment in the heart of the reader and thereby to make it a piece of art more beautiful than the poem which simply informs the reader about an idea or the personal sentiment of the poet The following observation of Matthiessen would show how the theory of 'objective correlative' is applicable also to the drama proper

"These reflections perhaps make clear why it is accurate to say that Donne is a dramatic poet but not Spenser, that the songs of Campion and Shakespeare are dramatic but not those of Swinburne, or why Keats at the time of his death was increasingly absorbed with the desire to write plays, or why, among poets of seemingly equal nature like Wyatt and Surrey the ability to cut through graceful Renaissance decoration of sentiment to a bare statement of immediate emotion is what gives a few poems of the former their heightened vitality" (ATSE pp 68-69)

Here, in my opinion, "ability to decoration of sentiment" may refer to rasadhvani and 'bare *statement* of immediate emotion" to vastudhvani of a type that we have in case of "evam vādini devarṣau' (Vide p. 118 above).

CHAPTER IV

THE VYANJANA FUNCTION

The attitude of earlier theorists :

We have seen that the theorists like Bhāmaha and Vāmana, who were earlier to Ānanda also recognised a sense other than the express sense. They have referred to this additional sense (anyo'rtha) in their definitions of the alaṁkāras like samāsokti and paryāyokta. But none of them clearly explained as to how the additional meaning differs from the primary or the secondary meaning of the words and expressions. That is how they left much scope for confusing the additional (i.e., suggested) sense with the express or the secondary sense. They also did not discuss about the power (i.e., vyāpāra) of the words involved in the communication of an idea other than the conventional image (i.e., the vācyārtha). The dhvani theorists call the additional meaning vyaṅgya and the power of the words involved in the communication of said meaning vyañjanā. Ānanda establishes the existence of a meaning other than the primary and the secondary meanings in the first ud-dyota itself with the help of so many illustrations. In the third uddyota of the Dhv., he establishes the vyañjanā function as distinct from the abhidhā (i.e., the denotative function).

Implications of the terms s'akti and vyapara :

The words are supposed to convey the different types of meaning with the help of different vyāpāras or śaktis. For example the word 'gaṅgā' of the expression 'gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ' is supposed to convey its primary meaning as 'the current of the waters' with the help of abhidhā vyāpāra; its secondary meaning as 'the bank of the river' with the help of lakṣaṇā-vyāpāra and the idea of 'the holy calm of the bank of the Ganges' with the help of vyañjanā-vyāpāra. The vyāpāras

are also called śaktis and the Naiyāyikas designate abhidhā simply as śakti What then do the terms 'śakti' and 'vyāpāra' mean ? —

The Mīmāṃsakas conceive śakti as a different category (i e, padārtha) It is an imperceptible potency to occasion an effect by the adequate cause [1] Hence, śakti of the word is a latent potency of the word to convey the primary meaning Pārthasārathi observes that a word denotes a meaning by its natural power just like the visual organ revealing a coloured shape It is the uncommon power of the visual organ with which the colour is revealed Likewise the word also possesses its uncommon potency to convey the meaning [2] Lakṣaṇā vyāpāra, in this manner, means a secondary potency which operates on the occasion of the failure of the primary potency to convey the proper meaning But while it is easy to conceive abhidhā as an inherent or natural potency it is not so in case of lakṣaṇā Hence, Viśvanātha calls lakṣaṇā an artificial potency (i e, lakṣaṇā śaktirarpitā)

The Naiyāyikas do not conceive śakti as a different category (i e, padārtha) What is conceived by the Mīmāṃsaka as śakti is explained as kāraṇatva (i e, the state of being a cause) Udayana observes, ' na hi no darśane śaktipadārtha eva nāsti / ko sau tarhi ? kāraṇatvam (Kusumāñjali I 13) They call the abhidhā and lakṣaṇā also as vṛtti For them vṛtti means the relation [3] between the word and the

meaning. While abhidhā (i.e., śakti) is an eternal relation tracing its origin to the will of the God, the secondary relation owes its origin to the intention of the speaker.

When we analyse the term vyāpāra [4] we have to understand that abhidhā and lakṣaṇā are functions of the word. They have the word as their samavāyikāraṇa (since in the form of an act they inhere in the words) and the meaning which is conveyed by them as their effect. (The function is a cause on account of being an unconditional invariable antecedent of the meaning conveyed.)

Ānanda uses the terms śakti, vṛtti and vyāpāra, etc., indiscriminately. For example,

(1) On p. 415, vācakatva is called a vyāpāra and vyañjakatva is called an additional vyāpāra. (2) Vyāpāra is also called as śakti. cf. "......na hi yaivābhidhānaśaktiḥ saivāvagamanaśaktiḥ." (p. 417). (3) Again, abhidhāna is conceived as a sambandha (i.e., relation) in "prasiddhābhidhānāntarasambandhayogyatvena...... yuktā." (pp. 418-419). (4) The term vṛtti is, however, used only with reference to lakṣaṇā which is called guṇavṛtti but apparently without any special implication. (5) Ānanda also uses the term 'dharma' in the sense of vyāpāra as in "api ca vyañjakatvalakṣaṇo yaḥ śabdārthayordharmaḥ......" etc. (p. 436). (6) He conceives the suggestive capacity also as a śabdavyāpāra on a par with the denotative and indicative capacities. cf. "śabda-vyāpāragocaratvaṁ...... vyaṅgyatvenaiva na vācyatvena." (p. 418).

All these references would be enough to show that Ānanda conceives vyāpāra as a capacity (i.e., śakti) but he does not understand śakti as a different padārtha. He recognises it in general as a kāraṇatva or a dharma and recognises the admission also of a relation (sambanda) in the conception of the same. If the conception of śakti be as rigid as that of

4. "tajjanyatve sati tajjanyajanakatvaṁ vyāpāratvam."

the Mīmāmsaka then śakti should mean a self-sufficient potentiality of the word to convey the meaning instantaneously without the intervention of any other mental process [5]

We can trace the working of this very conviction when Viśvanātha argues that we cannot arrive at the meaning Bāhīka from the expression "gaurbāhīka" because of the relation of 'non-separation (avinābhāva) since the desire to have another meaning for completing the verbal judgement must be fulfilled by the word 'itself' Viśvanātha does not allow the admission of any mental reasoning or mental process to intervene in between the cognition of the word and the cognition of the meaning [6]

But presently we will see that Ānanda's conception of śakti or vyāpāra was so liberal as to allow at times the intervention of some other mental process also

Ānanda's arguments in favour of vyañjana function :

Ānanda apprehends that some one may raise an objection like this · Let there be the cognition of a meaning other than the primary meaning (i e, vācyārtha) of a sentence But why should such an additional meaning be designated as suggested sense (i e, vyangya artha)? Let that vyangya artha also be designated and considered as the vācya artha, when that is mainly intended to be conveyed The original primary meaning which occurs to the mind before the cognition of the suggested sense may be relegated to the position

5 Compare : "na ca pratyāyaka va-kalpanam eva jyāyaḥ / śabdāntaram arthapratyayadarśanāt tasyaiva tatra kāraṇatvam kalpayituṁ yuktam / na tu śabdāt saṁskārodbodhas [illegible] artha-pratītir iti yuktam / [illegible] pramāṇābhāvāt" (Nyāyaratna-mālā, p 107).

6. cf. "avinābhāvalabhyasyārthasya śābdānvaye [illegible] / śābde hyākāṅkṣā śabdena va pūryate" (SD II).

of the meaning of the words, being instrumental for the said suggested meaning in the manner of the word-meanings which are instrumental for the usual primary meaning of a sentence. cf. "satyamevaitat;...... padārthapratītiriva vākyārthapratīteḥ" (Dhv. III. pp. 414-415). [7]

Ānanda, with this apprehension in his mind, proceeds to argue that the suggested sense should never be confused or designated as the vācya sense. Because, the vācya and the vyaṅgya senses are conveyed by two entirely different functions (vyāpāras) of the words. If the suggested sense is conveyed by a distinct function it will not cease to be different from the vācya even being put at the position of the usual vācya sense in case of being chiefly intended to be conveyed. Hence, he presents the following points to bring out the distinct features of the vyañjanā function :

(1) Vyañjanā is distinct from abhidhā, because they have different scopes (i.e., viṣayabheda). Abhidhā conveys the vācya sense directly related to the word and vyañjanā conveys the meaning which is related to the related vācya. Had the suggested sense been directly related, it would not have been designated as a different sense at all. ("arthāntara-vyavahāra eva na syāt," Dhv. III. p. 417. Compare 'anyo'rtha' of Bhāmaha).

(2) Vyañjanā is different from abhidhā because of difference in form (i.e., rūpabheda). Words alone convey the conventional meanings with the help of abhidhā śakti. But even the meaning-less musical sounds may convey senses in the form of rasa, etc., with the help of vyañjanā (p. 417).

(3) The vyaṅgya artha also cannot be relegated to the position of the vācya artha. Because, the relation between the vācya and the vyaṅgya is not like the relation between the meaning of the words (padārtha) and the meaning of the

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7. We will observe that Dhanika actually raised a similar question in his Avaloka on the DR.

sentence (vākyārtha) Because, the very analogy is not an apt one The grammarians take the sentenses as indivisible and do not conceive of words as parts of the sentence Even those who recognise the words as distinct parts of the sentence (say the followers of Kumārila) must take note of the fact that the meanings of the words yield completely to the total meaning of the sentence When the meaning of the sentence is cognised, the meanings of the words cease to be cognised distinctly But the vācya sense does not cease to be cognised even when the suggested sense is cognised The vācya sense suggests the vyangya and it is the very nature of the suggestive factor to appear along with the suggested content The relation between the vācya and the vyangya is like that between the lamp and the jar Compare, "na hi vyangye pratīyamāne vācyabuddhirdūrībhavati vacyāvabhāsah" (Dhv III pp 420–421)

(4) Abhinava says that the opponent, who wants to have the vyangya artha as the vācya sense when chiefly desired to be conveyed, wants, in fact, to identify vyañjanā with 'tātparya śakti if not abhidhāśakti [8] But it will be helpful to note here that, Ānanda does not conceive of a tatparyaśakti He conceives tātparya as the intention of the speaker in respect of the meaning of the sentence This tātparya is relegated even to the word and the meaning, which are intent upon conveying the suggested sense This tātparya is not conceived by Ānanda as a function of the words of the same status as that of abhidhā, lakṣaṇā or vyañjanā There is also reason to believe that although Kumārila was the first exponent of the abhihitānvayavāda which conceives tātparya as a separate function he also conceived tātparya not as a function but as an intention in respect of the meaning of the sentence. The status of a śakti was given to tātparya by the writers like Jayantabhaṭṭa, who were

8 "nanvevam mā bhūdvācakaśaktistathāpi tātparyaśaktirbhaviṣya tītyāśaṅkyāha" (Locana p 419)

all latter than Ānanda. Abhinava conceives tātparya as a function; for, as we will see again, he utilised the Nyāyamañjarī to a great extent in his treatment of the functions of the word.

(5) Another point of difference between vācakatva (abhidhā) and vyañjakatva (vyañjanā) is that abhidhā resides only in śabda, whereas vyañjanā resides both in śabda and artha. (p. 423).

(6) Now a doubt arises, that the guṇavṛtti (i.e., the secondary function) also in its two varieties, namely, upacāra and lakṣaṇā, depends both on śabda and artha. Hence, the distinction of the vyañjanā from guṇavṛtti also should be clearly shown. (p. 423). [9]

(7) Vyañjanā is different from lakṣaṇā because of rūpabheda (i.e., difference in form) and viṣayabheda (i.e., difference in scope). Vyañjanā conveys a sense, which is direct (i.e., mukhya) and lakṣaṇā conveys a sense, which is secondary (i.e., amukhya). Guṇavṛtti or lakṣaṇā behaves as the abhidhā in a secondary way (inasmuch as the secondary sense is only a substitute for the primary sense, when the latter is unsuitable to the context). But vyañjanā is different, because, the suggested sense is not a substitute for the primary sense. The primary sense completely yields to the secondary sense. But the primary sense reveals itself along with the suggested sense like a lamp. For example, in the verse "evaṁ vādini" the primary sense of the sentence reveals itself along with the suggested sense. If here the suggested sense be supposed to

9. It may be noted that the secondary function is said to be resident in śabda alone by some theorists like Viśvanātha. cf. "sā śabdasyārpita...śaktirlakṣaṇā nāma." (SD. II). But some other theorists relegate it, in some cases, to the primary meaning also. cf. "kevalaṁ śabdastamarthaṁ lakṣayitvā...artho vārthāntaraṁ lakṣayitvā...karoti." (Locana, I. p. 152). Thus it may be noticed that the secondary function also was variously conceived.

be conveyed by lakṣaṇā then at that rate lakṣaṇā itself will appear to be the principal function of the sentences, because, the sentences often convey certain meanings, other than the primary sense, as the contents actually desired to be conveyed by the sentence ("yasmāt prāyeṇa vākyānām vā yavyatiriktatātparyaviṣayārthāvabhāsitvam," p. 424) It is to be noted here that Ānanda calls the primary meaning consisting of description of counting of petals as 'vācya' and the meaning relating to Pārvatī's lajjā as the 'tātparyaviṣayārtha' But those who recognise tātparya as a śakti would call the primary total meaning of the sentence as the 'tātparyaviṣayārtha.' Ānanda does not refer to any tātparyaśakti but what he means is that the suggested sense is actually intended to be conveyed.[10]

(8) There is difference between the suggestive and the secondary function also in respect of their scope (i e, viṣayabheda) Lakṣaṇā conveys the meaning only in the form of a vastu, whereas vyañjanā may convey vastu, alaṃkāra and rasādi alike. But, indeed, nobody can claim to have the suggested figure or rasādi with lakṣaṇā (p. 425) [11]

(9) Vyañjanā sometimes depends on abhidhā and sometimes on lakṣaṇā. Hence, because of depending separately on both of them Vyañjanā is not identical with either of them. Moreover, vyañjanā also belongs to certain elements which are quite free from abhidhā or lakṣaṇā. For example, the meaning-less musical sounds suggest rasas with the vyañjanā function (p. 428)

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10. Contrast, "For in general, every sentence possesses the power of conveying a purport over and above the expressed senses of individual words" (Dhv. Trans p. 103) for, there is no reference to individual words in the relevant portion of the text and a power is not meant by 'tātparya'

11. We will see later on that Mukulabhaṭṭa proposed to have all the varieties of the suggested sense with lakṣaṇā itself.

(10) In the avivakṣita type of dhvani there is, however, some association of lakṣaṇā; but, yet vyañjanā is not identical with lakṣaṇā. Because, we may have certain secondary senses also without any suggested sense occurring at the wake of it. (pp. 431–433).

(11) The denotative capacity of the word is an invariable attribute of it. From the day of learning it (i.e., vyutpattikālādārabhya) the word conveys its primary meaning without fail and without the help of any other factor. *But the suggestive* capacity is a variable capacity as it is superimposed on the word. It operates only with the help of certain variable factors like the context and the speciality of the speaker (pp. 436–437).

(12) The Mīmāṁsakas believe in a natural and eternal relation between the word and the meaning. But, the suggested sense is not inherently and eternally related to the word. Hence, such a meaning cannot be recognised by them as it appears. But Ānanda says that even the Mīmāṁsakas have the necessity to recognise a suggested sense. Because, they distinguish between the sentences of the vedas and the sentences uttered by men. Such a distinction is due to the unreliability of the sentences uttered by men. The unreliability is on account of the fact they convey also certain variable meanings which are super-imposed on the words by the speaker himself. These superimposed meanings generally consist of the desires of the speaker. But such meanings must be recognised as vyaṅgya, since *they are not ivariably related with the words* (pp. 438–443).

(13) Now, one may raise the objection that, since all the sentences uttered by men suggest also the intention (i.e., abhiprāya) of the speaker all such statements should be considered as dhvani. Ānanda replies that the suggested content in the form of the desire of the speaker is so organically bound up with the express sense of the sentence (i.e., vācya) that they can hardly be distinguished from the vācya in respect of

their importance.[12] If, however, the said intention of the speaker be the principal (i.e., mainly intended or vivakṣita) content that would present a case of dhvani. But, yet, the suggested content in the form of intention of the speaker will not be the only determinant of dhvani. Such a content would present us only a suggested vastu (i e , matter of fact). But dhvani has yet other two varieties of suggested sense, viz , alaṁkāra and rasādi. That is how dhvani is free from any confusion with the statements, made in course of the practical conversations. Hence, the vyañjanā function should be up to the approval of the Mīmāṁsakas also

(14) Ānanda says that the question of any difference or agreement with the grammarians does not arise at all; for, the very propriety of using the term 'dhvani' depends on their views (pp. 443-444) [13]

(15) Ānanda does not apprehend any objection from the logicians as regards the existence of a suggested sense, because, he has the conviction that logicians hardly indulge in any dispute as regards the actually experienced things. No body can, indeed, gainsay the experience of a suggestivity of the expressive words, musical sounds and the movement of hands, etc (pp. 445-447).

A confusion of vyañjakatva with liṅgitva :

(16) But the only objection of the logician, which is possible, is that the suggested sense is not conveyed by a śabdavyāpāra (i e., a function of the word), but by a mental process of inference (i e , anumāna). Śabda serves as the probans (i e., liṅga) and the suggested sense as the liṅgi (i e., probandum) Ānanda himself admits that the intention of

12. "tattu vācakatvāena bhidyate vyaṅgyaṁ hi tatra nāntarīyakatayā vyavasthitam."

13. The relation of the dhvani theory with grammar is already discussed in the first chapter.

the speaker is suggested. But according to the logicians that can be nothing other than an inferred fact.[14] (pp. 447-448).

(17) The reply is that there may be cases of vyañjanā being confused with anumāna. Vyañjanā may wrongly be called anumāna also. Certain senses conveyed by vyañjanā may be arrived at by anumāna also, but yet the position remains unperturbed that vyañjanā is a śabdavyāpāra, a function of the word (or the senses), other than abhidhā and lakṣaṇā. The great truth is that vyañjanā is not identical with anumāna and the knowledge of the suggested sense is not always the knowledge of the liṅgī, i.e., inferred object (vide vṛtti p. 449, "na punarayaṁ paramārtho yadvyañjakatvaṁ liṅgatvameva sarvatra vyaṅgyapratītiśca liṅgapratītireva"). From the utterence of a certain pauruṣeyavākya an abhiprāya may be inferred but not all abhiprāyas.

The purpose (i.e., scope) of a word is two fold—inferable and denotative. The inferable is the speaker's intention (abhiprāya). The intention of the speaker, that can be inferred, is either his desire to utter a word or his desire to convey a meaning by the word. These two inferred desires never constitute the sense of the word. The sense, which cannot be inferred, is again two-fold, viz., expressed or suggested. These meanings of the word (pratipādyo viṣaya) are never inferred (vide vṛtti p. 451, sa tu dvividho'pi pratipādyo śabdānāṁ na liṅgitayā svarūpeṇa prakāśate, api tu kṛtrimeṇākṛtrimeṇa vā sambandhāntareṇa).

(18) It may once again be argued like this : When the suggested sense is apprehended, its validity is arrived at with the help of anumāna. Hence, the vyaṅgyārtha once again becomes anumeya. In reply to this it is said that the validity of even the vācya sense is arrived at with the help of anumāna; but, yet we suppose the vācya sense to be had by a verbal function. Similarly the suggested sense also should be held

14. Vide points 12 and 13 above.

to be within the purview of a verbal function (viz, vyangya) even when its validity is established with anumana Moreover, the suggested sense which we relish in the kāvya is, in fact, never put to any taste of validity cf "yatha ca vācya viṣaya sampadyate" (pp 454–455)

It may be noted here that the varbal testimony is regarded as identical with inference by the Vaiśeṣikas, because, they arrive at the validity of the knowledge derived from the statement with an anumāna [15] But their view is duly criticised by the Mīmāṃsakas [16] The weakness of the Vaiśeṣika's stand is pointed out by Abhinava in the observation that the meaning of the words is not inferred, but only the validity of the meaning is inferred cf "na caitāvatā vācyasya pratītiranumānikī kintu tadgatasya tato'dhikasya satyatvasya, tadvyangye'pi bhaviṣyati (Locana, p 454)

(19) Although the scope of vyañjanā is distinguished from that of anumāna as shown above, there are yet certain expressions of Ānanda which savour of a confusion of liṅgitva (i.e, the state of being a probans) with vyañjakatva (i e, the state of being suggestive) The expressions are as follows

(i) "tasmādvaktrabhiprāyarūpa eva vyangye liṅgatayā śabdānām vyāpārah" (pp 452–453) That, for which the śabda plays a probans is also at the same time called a vyangya Thus the intention of the speaker is inferable, but it is also called vyangya It is no doubt vyangya, for, the śabda behaves like a vyañjaka in respect of it ("svarūpam prakāśayanneva parāvabhāsako vyañjaka ityu yate") The intention, which is inferred from a statement is of two types, viz., the intention to utter the words and the intention to convey meanings But these intentions are not meanings of the statement, strictly

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15 'Idam vākyamavisamvādi āptavākyatvāt" is the form of inference

16 Vide Bālapriyā, p 484, for the relevant quotations from the Ślokavārttika and vide Śāstradīpikā, pp 97–98 for further informations.

speaking. The meaning which is intended to be conveyed may itself be either vācya or vyaṅgya. These two meanings are, in deed, conveyed not through any inference but through a natural or an artificial relation. ("sa tu dvividho'pi pratipādyo viṣayaḥ śabdānāṁ na liṅgitayā svarūpeṇa prakāśate, api tu kṛtrimenākṛtrimeṇa vā sambandhāntareṇa" p. 451). But yet, the hint is there that the intention, which is inferred, may be called also suggested. Hence, anumāna is also a case of vyañjanā. But vyañjanā cannot be included in the scope of anumāna as it has a wider scope. For instance, there is suggestion in case of the lamp and the jar also, but no anumāna.

(ii) "Tasmāt liṅgipratītireva sarvatra vyaṅgyapratītiriti na śakyate vaktum" (p. 455) confirms the position that in some cases the cognition of the suggested content may be a case of the probandum itself.

(iii) "Yattvanumeyarūpavyaṅgyaviṣayaṁ śabdānāṁ vyañjakatvaṁ taddhvanivyavahārasyāprayojakam" (pp. 455–456), shows that, what is inferred may also be called suggested.

(iv) But, while the probans (liṅgi) may be treated as a suggestive factor (vyañjaka), all the suggestive factors may not be treated as probans (i.e., liṅga). That is why the lamp is not a liṅga in respect of the jar, the musical sound is not a liṅga in respect of the sentiments.

(v) In some cases suggestion is aided by inference or in some cases by casuality. In this manner suggestion may be found to have a much wider scope than that of inference. cf. "taddhi vyañjakatvaṁ......ārabdhaḥ" (Vṛtti, p. 456). Abhinava distinguishes the scope of anumāna even more clearly. Cf. "yata eva hi........ tadevamiti" (Locana; p. 456).

(20) It may be observed from the foregoing points that Ānanda was very liberal regarding the scope of vyañjanā. Hence, it is very likely that Ānanda really means that the

relation of similarity between the contextual and the non-contextual meanings in ' atrāntare, etc ", is to be inferred (i e , kalpayitavya) In this manner, in case of "evam vādini ' also we may apprehend the admission of an anumāna Cf " api tu smaranena tatra pratipattim karotitikrama vyangyataiva" (Locana, pp 249–250) But except in case of holding the intention as anumeya, in other cases there is an effort to distinguish vyañjanā from anumāna in their very essential form Abhinava observes that in case of gathering the suggested sense an accurate mental process of suggestion does not take place Cf "na ca tatra śabdasya kāranatve yaiva lingasyetikartavyatā pakṣadharmatvagrahanādikā sāsti " (Locana, pp 450–451) and "atha yatra yatraivam śabdaprayogastatra vācyam" (Locana, p 60) and ' sahakāribhedācca śaktibhedah spaṣṭa eva anumāpakatvavyāpārah" (Locana, p. 63) Abhinava demands that in order to explain cases of suggestion as inference there must be the recollection of universal concomitance, etc Knowledge of universal concomitance is instrumental (sahakāri) for inference If such instrumental factors differ, the function also differs Thus the difference in the thought procedure involved in vyañjanā and anumāna respectively results in the distinction of the two

(21) But it may be observed that the difference in thought procedure (i.e , sahakaribheda), which is taken as the basis of distinction between anumāna and vyañjanā, is very subtle In fact in the whole field of epistemology a good amount of difference of opinion may be observed in respect of different cases of inference For example, in śrutārthāpatti a fact is postulated on the strength of a verbal statement. In Advaita-vedānta and Bhāṭṭamīmāmsā it is a different pramāna But according to nyāya[17] it is nothing other than anumāna

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17 Cf. "śrutārthāpattirapi varākī nānumānādbhidyate" (The poor śrutārthāpatti also does not differ from anumāna), (Nyāyamañjarī, Pramāṇaprakaraṇa, p 42)

Abhinava would take the postulated idea as suggested; but according to him the verbal statement in śrutārthāpatti will not present a case of dhvani only because the statement is not embellished with figures or endowed with qualities.[18] Hence, from the Naiyāyika's point of view, cases of anumāna in the guise of śrutārthāpatti may be identified as cases of vyañjanā at ease (Vide, Śāstradīpikā, pp. 100-108).[19]

Difference is found to be very little also between Naiyāyika's jñānalakṣaṇa perception and inference, because of which the Advaitavedāntin includes the former in the latter. There are many cases of 'complicated' perception which claim to be reckoned as inference. For example, J. S. Mill is strongly of the opinion that, 'the perception of distance by the eye is, in reality, an inference grounded on exprience; though in familiar cases it takes place so rapidly as to appear exactly on a par *with those perceptions of* sight which are really intuitive, our perceptions of colour" (A System of Logic, p. 4). But, however subtle the distinction of vyañjanā might be, Ānanda would not hesitate to uphold it or to bring it to a bolder relief, as it is evidenced by his statement that, "it is not possible to discard the usefulness of detailed definitions of particulars, simply because general definitions are already there." ("na hi sāmānyamātra-lakṣaṇenopayogi-viśeṣa-lakṣaṇānāṁ pratikṣepaḥ śakyaḥ kartum," p. 457).

(22) Both for Ānanda and Abhinava the realisation of rasa and bhāva is not a thing to be arrived at through a process of inference or any type of reasoning. It is maintained that the meaningless musical sounds also suggest sentiments. The realisation of the sentiments is a spontaneous and almost instantaneous effect and it does not come in the wake of any

18. Cf. "......tenaitanniravakāśaṁ śrutārthāpattāvapi dhvanivyavahāraḥ syāditi" (Locana, p. 105).

19. Vide also point, 4, under "Mammaṭa and Vyañjanā" ahead.

inference That there is the absolute absence of any process of reasoning in case of the suggestion of sentiments is the greatest argument for distinguishing vyañjanā from anumāna But as we have seen, some amount of reasoning is admitted in case of śabdaśaktimūla and arthaśaktimūla Possibly taking clue from this loophole, Mahima demanded that all the dhvanis may be brought under the scope of anumāna (V V. I 1) Because of this amount of allowance to reasoning in dhvani, the later supporters of the dhvani theory could draw a very thin line of demarcation between vyañjanā and anumāna For example, they endeavoured to show that the process of reasoning, involved in the verse "nihśeṣa cyuta," is grounded on fallacious probans That is why it does not present a case of anumāna But vyañjanā may hold ground despite of a fallacy in the process of reasoning Cf "evamvidhādarthādevamvidho'rtha upapattyanapekṣatve pi prakāśata iti vyaktivādinah punastadadūṣanam' (KP V)[20] This argument for distinguishing vyañjanā from anumāna, with the admission to some amount of reasoning, is on a par with Prābhākara s arguments for distinguishing arthāpatti from anumāna against the will of the Naiyāyika, who identifies the former with the latter (Vide, Śāstradīpikā, pp 100–101) But it is a matter of opinion The Naiyāyika identifies arthāpatti with anumāna at all cost. Likewise, Mahima also jumped to the conclusion that all varieties of dhvani may be included in anumāna

To sum up, Ānanda's views are as follows

(i) Although in some cases vyañjanā appears in the form of an anumāna, it is a verbal function (śabdavyāpāra) different from abhidhā and lakṣanā (ii) Vyañjanā has a scope, wider than that of anumāna Hence, the former is distinct from the latter (iii) At least in case of the suggestion of sentiments vyañjanā does not admit of any reasoning or anumāna

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20 Vide also ŚD V

Bhaṭṭanāyaka's attitude towards vyañjanā:

We have already seen that Bhaṭṭanāyaka gets the suggested sense in the form of rasa with the help of the function bhāvakattva and bhojakatva. We have also seen how these unfamiliar functions have to yield to the vyañjanā function in the exposition of Abhinava's theory of rasa-realisation. We may notice that Bhaṭṭanāyaka also recognises some meaning other than the vācya (i.e., anyo'rtha) in forms other than that of rasa. But the anya artha which would have been a suggested content for the dhvani theorists is included by him either (i) in the realisation of rasa (and hence supposed not to be conveyed by vyañjanā but to be realised with the functions of bhāvakatva and bhojakatva) or (ii) in the vācya sense itself and hence considered to be conveyed by the abhidhā itself. (iii) Sometimes he denies the presence of the suggested sense altogether and explains that the beauty of the piece is due to some expressed idea.

Evidence to (i) above is had from Locana pp. 68–69. "yattubhaṭṭanāyakenoktamiha dṛptasiṁhādipadaprayoge ca dhārmikapadaprayoge ca bhayānakarasāveśakṛtaiva niṣedhāvagatiḥ tadīyabhīruvīratva-prakṛtiniyamā-vagamamantareṇaikāntato niṣedhāvagatyabhāvāditi tanna kevalārtha-sāmarthya-niṣedhāvagaternimittamiti, etc." These words have a reference to the verse 'bhama dhammia' (Dhv. p. 52), where, from an expressed vidhi we get the suggestion of a niṣedha. Bhaṭṭanāyaka possibly means to say that the reader of the verse would have the experience of bhayānaka rasa (with the help of bhojakatva and bhāvakatva, etc.) and whoever would have the experience of bhayānaka rasa would also certainly feel (timid and) prohibited as regards going to the Godāvarī-tīra, etc.

Abhinava's reply to this contention of Bhaṭṭanāyaka is very interesting. Vide the continuation of the quoted Locana (pp. 68–69). Of Abhināva's arguments the strongest is, however, that there is no experience of bhayānaka rasa from the

verse at all If one be obstinate about the suggestion of a rasa in the said verse then that must be recognised as śṛṅgāra rasa. Evidence to (ii) above is furnished by Locana, p 72, "yattvāha bhaṭṭanāyakaḥ ahamityabhinayaviśeṣenātmadaśāvedanācchābdametadapīti / tatrāhamiti śabdasya tāvannāyam sākṣādarthaḥ, kākvādisahāyasya ca tāvati dhvananameva vyāpāra iti dhvaner bhūṣaṇametat /" These words have a reference to the verse, 'attā ettha nimajjai' (Dhv p 71), where an express niṣedha suggests a vidhi Bhaṭṭanāyaka says that the vidhi (i e , the invitation of the pathika to her cot) is expressed by the word 'aham', because, the word being uttered in a dramatic manner (i.e , abhinaya viśeṣena) tells about her love-lorn condition and hence also the invitation (vidhi)

The argument against his position is that the vidhi is not the primary sense of the word 'aham , the vidhi is not conventionally related to the word 'aham', so to say Moreover, it is said to have expressed the idea of the woman's condition and the invitation because of the dramatic way of uttering the word Hence, the abhinaya is sahakārī and this abhinaya is nothing other than a kāku (i e , a modulation of voice) due to the peculiarity of which we should get no primary sense but a suggested sense only Evidence to (iii) above is furnished by Locana, p 171 "yattu hṛdayadarpana uktam 'ha hā heti sam-rambhārtho'yam camatkāraḥ' iti / tatrāpi samrambha āvego vipralambhavyabhicārīti rasadhvanistāvadupāgataḥ / na ca rāmaśabdābhivyaktārthasahāyakena vinā samrambhollāso'pi / aham sahe tasyāh kim vartata ityevamātmā hi samrambhaḥ /" This passage has a reference to the verse "snigdhaśyāmalakānti" (Dhv p 167) Bhaṭṭanāyaka means to say that the interjections 'ha hā hā' mean a samrambha (i e., an agitation) and that samrambha is the source of charm He possibly demands that the meaning relating to samrambha is a primary (i.e , abhihita) meaning But even conceding to this position, Abhinava would raise the objection that samrambha is simply an 'āvega' and 'āvega' is a vyabhicāribhāva for

śṛṅgāra rasa. As such the charm is finally due to śṛṅgāra rasa, and according to Bhaṭṭanāyaka himself it would be a case of rasadhvani. But the idea of 'saṁrambha' itself does not occur from the mere interjections if the suggested sense of the word rāma does not precede. And the saṁrambha understood, here, is really an agitation of the mind, i.e., a concern over the pitiable condition of Sītā standing in contrast with Rāma's own ability to face the adverse situation as suggested by the word 'Rāma' in 'ramo'smi.'

Mahimabhaṭṭa's attitude towards vyañjanā :

Mahimabhaṭṭa says that abhivyakti (i.e., suggestion) is defined as follows :

"Suggestion is the revelation of an object, whether it be already existent or otherwise, by a revealer, which does not look for the help of any relation between the revealer and the revealed, along with the revelation of itself (i.e., the revealer).[21]

The revelation (abhivyakti) of the already existent (i.e., sato'bhivyakti) is of three types. They are as follows [22] :

(1) When the effect, that lies latent and hence as imperceptible in the cause, becomes perceptible we have one variety of the 'suggestion of the real'. For example, when the milk becomes the curd we have this type of abhivyakti.

(2) When a revealer, remaining subordinate, reveals a perceptible (i.e., already manifest) object, temporarily obscured by some other factor, while revealing itself, we get the second variety. For example the revelation of the jar by the lamp.

(3) We have the third variety, when the residual traces of already experienced objects are revived by an object which

21. "sato'sata eva vārthasya prakāśamānasya sambandhasmaraṇānavekṣiṇā prakāśakena sahaiva prakāśaviṣayatāpattirabhivyaktiriti tallakṣaṇamācakṣate" (VV. pp. 76–77).

22. cf. "tatra sato'bhivyaktistrividhā......śabdācca gavādeḥ" (VV. pp. 77–78).

is invariably concomitant with the experienced, or by some object or word which symbolises or stand for it. (a) For example, when we see the smoke our idea of the already experienced fire is revived by the relation of invariable concomitance between the smoke and the fire. (b) We have this type of suggestion also when our idea of cow is revived by its symbolical representations like picture, plastic art,[23] image and imitation. (c) We have this type of abhivyakti also when simply the word 'cow' revives the image of the cow in our mind.[24]

(4) The revelation of the unreal (asato'bhivyakti) is of only one type. We have such an abhivyakti, when the rainbow is revealed by the rays of the sun.[25]

Mahimabhaṭṭa contends that the first type of sato'bhivyakti cannot be had in case of poetical suggestion because the suggested meaning is not directly perceptible like the curd. The second type of sato'bhivyakti also cannot be had in case of the suggested sense because the suggested and the express sense cannot be cognised simultaneously, in the manner of a simultaneous perception of the lamp and the jar. ("vācyārthasahabhāvenedantāpratīterasambhavāt").

The definition of third variety of abhivyakti is applicable only to anumāna and not to vyakti (i.e., suggestion). The example, (a) will be recognised as anumāna by all. The example, (b), which corresponds to upamāna (i.e., comparison), is also nothing other than anumāna, since, according to Mahimabhaṭṭa, upamāna also falls within the purview of

23. Vide, I. Aest, p. 302.

24. The three examples indicated by the letters, a, b, and c, correspond to the third, fourth and the fifth varieties of Ruyyaka's analysis, which will be referred to below.

25. "asato'bhivyaktiprakāśaiva .. .. yathārkālokād endracāpādeḥ" (VV, p 78).

anumāna. The example, (c) is dubious.[26] Taking all the examples together Mahimabhaṭṭa contends that the third variety of abhivyakti is actuallay anumāna. Cf. "tṛtīyasyāstu yallakṣaṇaṁ tadanumānasyaiva saṅgacchate, na vyakteḥ...... upamānādīnāṁ ca tatraivāntarbhāvāt" (VV. p. 78). Here he does not explain, as to how inference takes place in case of understanding a cow from 'word' ('śabdācca gauḥ'). Then he proceeds to argue that the consciousness of the additional (i.e., suggested) meaning from the vācya sense is not possible without the consciousness of the relation of invariable concomitance between the two. That is why one and all cannot understand the suggested sense. Moreover, the consciousness of the other meaning is not simultaneous with the vācya sense. There is a sequence of consciousness like that in case of knowing the fire from the smoke. Hence, suggestion in poetry is nothing other than inference.

If it is argued that there is simultaneity of conciousness in case of the suggestion of rasa then the definition of abhivyakti will have the fault of being very widely applied. For, in case of the suggestion of vastu and alaṁkāra there can never be any simultaneity of conciousness.

Mahimabhaṭṭa further contends that in case of the suggestion of rasa also the vibhāvas, etc., do not get revealed simultaneously with rasa. Since, there is a relation of cause and effect between vibhāvas, etc., and the unreal and image-like sthāyī which being brought to the realm of the consciousness of the men of taste is called rasa. Cf. "na ca rasādiṣvapi vibhāvādi-prakāśanasahabhāvena prakāśanamupapadyate, etc." (VV. p. 79).

26. Mahimabhaṭṭa says "śabdācca gavādeḥ." Ruyyaka understands it as "vācaka śabda" (i.e., denotative word). But there cannot be any inference in respect of the denotation of the cow by the word cow. Hence, 'śabda' in the present expression of Mahimabhaṭṭa means the descriptive or suggestive composition. Dr. Pandey calls it the 'poetical art'.

Mahimabhaṭṭa points out that even in case of the suggestion of rasa there is an imperceptible sequence (i.e., an asaṁlakṣya-krama) according to the dhvani theorist himself.

Now, if for avoiding all these discrepancies the condition of simultaneous cognition of the suggester and the suggested be excluded from the definition of abhivyakti, then abhivyakti would include anumāna also, because, in case of the fire and the smoke also, the latter reveals the former remaining subordinate to the same. If for excluding cases of anumāna (like that of the fire from smoke) it is claimed that only the unreal is revealed in case of abhivyakti, then the definition will not include the case of the lamp and the jar, as the jar is existent.[27]

If for including the case of the jar and the lamp the revealed is not desired to be unreal then the case of the rainbow and the sunrays will not be included.

If both the alternatives regarding the nature of the revealed be excluded from the definition then the definition will cease to be a definiton of abhivyakti and will be nothing other than a definition of anumāna. Mahima holds that, in fact, the expression 'sato'sata eva vā' (i.e., 'of the real or the unreal') in the definition of abhivyakti is redundant, for, we cannot conceive of a third thing, still different from the real and the unreal.

In this manner Mahimabhaṭṭa endeavours to show that in kāvya there cannot be, in fact, any suggestion (i.e., abhivyakti), but if there be the consciousness of an additional idea from the consciousness of the vācya sense, then that is nothing other than a case of inference (i.e., anumāna).

The definition and classification of abhivyakti (i.e., suggestion) elaborated above, are attributed to the dhvani theorist

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27 Mahimabhaṭṭa does not tell us separately that the fourth type of abhivyakti is not possible in kāvya. But he would possibly argue that the fourth type of abhivyakti is not desired in kāvya for fear of the failure of the analogy of the jar and the lamp.

by Mahimabhaṭṭa himself. Mahima's contention is that although the dhvani theorist conceives abhivyakti to be of the four types as explained by Mahima, yet the poetical suggestion corresponds only to the third variety. But Mahimabhaṭṭa's own conception of abhivyakti is different. Abhivyakti must be an automatic revelation as in the case of the lamp and the jar. But poetical suggestion does not belong to the second variety, of which the case of the lamp and the jar is an example as there is the intervention of the recollection of some relation between the suggestive meaning and the suggested content. Because of this admission to the recollection of relation poetical suggestion is a case of anumāna like that of the fire from the smoke and can be called a suggestion (i.e., vyaṅgya) only in a figurative way. Compare :

svābhāvikaṁ dhvaneryuktaṁ vyañjakatvaṁ na dīpavat /
dhūmavat kintu kṛtakaṁ sambandhāderapekṣaṇāt //
(VV. I. 74).

Ruyyaka's criticism of Mahimabhaṭṭa's view :

Ruyyaka analyses Mahimabhaṭṭa's classification of abhivyakti to have six different varieties. Ruyyaka finds the six varieties by classifying the third variety of Mahimabhaṭṭa into three types according to the nature of the factor which revives the residual traces of the already experienced. These three varieties correspond to the examples a, b, and c, referred to above. Thus classifying abhivyakti into six varieties in his own way Ruyyaka contends that the dhvani theorist recognises only one variety of abhivyakti, i.e., the second variety. There is no impropriety in applying the definition of this type of abhivyakti to the poetical suggestion. The question of applying the definition of other five varieties for explaining poetical suggestion does not arise, since the other five varieties are not at all recognised by the dhvani theorist. Compare : "iha ca sadasadviṣayatvenābhivyaktirdvidhā pratipāditā / ......tatra vyaktivādinā ghaṭapradīpanyāyena sadviṣayā vyaktiraṅgīkṛtā /

yathā ca na doṣastathopapāditam / śiṣṭam tu pakṣapañcakam anabhyupagamaparāhatameva." (VVV. pp 76–77)

In this quotation we find a reference to an earlier argument of Ruyyaka in defence of the dhvani theorist's conception of vyañjana

Ruyyaka contends that the analogy of the jar and the lamp is applicable to the suggestion of rasa by the vācya sense Because, there is the simultaneity of cognition of the vibhāvas, etc, and rasa (i e, the generalised sthāyī, brought to the realm of realisation) [28]

Replying to Mahimabhaṭṭa's contention that there is a causal relation between the vibhāvas, etc, and rasa and hence a sequence of cognition and so there is no simultaneity of cognition (i e, sahabhāvena pratīti), Ruyyaka says that, a case of sequence of realisation does not vitiate the case of a simultaneity of cognition Let the vibhāvas, etc, be cognised earlier But what is desired by the dhvani theorist is that in time of realisation of rasa the consciousness of the vibhāvas, etc, (i e, the situation) also must be there. That is why the dhvani theorist says—"na hi vyangye pratīyamāne vācyabuddhirdūrī bhavati vācyāvinā bhāvena tasya prakāśanāt." instead of "na hi vacye pratīyamāne vyangyabuddhirdūrībhavati, etc," Compare "vyañjaka pratītikāle hi niyamena vyangyapratītiriti nāsmākamāśayah / vyangyapratītikāle tu niyamena vyañjakapratītirbhavatyevetyāśayenākramatvam vyaktiśca samarthita," etc (VVV I. p 58)

Ruyyaka further contends that the four varieties of abhivyakti are unduly attributed to the dhvani theorists For, dhvani theorists recognise only the 'jar and the lamp' type of abhivyakti It is quite improper to criticise the views of others with definitions cooked up by oneself

28 This simultaneity of cognition is very clearly pointed out by Mammaṭa in his exposition of Abhinava's theory of rasa relation in the expression "vibhāvādyairvyaktaḥ" (KP IV)

The contention that, in case of recognising the poetical suggestion as an abhivyakti of the 'milk and the curd' type, the suggested object should be directly perceptible, may be raised also in case of including the poetical suggestion in the 'jar and the lamp type.' As such, the realisation of rasa cannot be called a case of abhivyakti; since, rasa is not a directly perceptible object.

By way of solving this tangle Ruyyaka says that, this objection is invalid; because, the dhvani theorist understands by the term abhivyakti, only a revelation in general. The dhvani theorist never talked of any abhivyakti where the suggested must be a directly perceptible object. Hence, even being directly imperceptible, rasa can be said to be suggested (i.e., vyaṅgya).[29]

Ruyyaka concedes to the objection that in case of the suggested vastu and alaṁkāra there is an order of cognition of the vācya and the vyaṅgya. But, that is not a very strong argument for dismissing the vyañjanā function. The position of the dhvani theorist, according to Ruyyaka, is that, the two functions, viz., abhidhā and lakṣaṇā are recognised in respect of the primary and the secondary sense. But, these two functions cannot proceed up to the third stage (of the suggested sense). For example, the idea of the holy calm of the bank of the Ganges falls to this third stage of meaning. In case of rasa, which stands on a par with this third stage, the vyañjanā function is recognised. Hence, it is proper to recognise the same vyañjanā in case of vastu and alaṁkāra also. The vācya sense is cognised in time of the consciousness of the

29. cf. "yattu sadasadviṣayatvena caturvidhā vyaktiratronmīlitā tadapi na saṅgataṁ ghaṭa-pradīpanyāyasyātreṣṭatvāt / yopīndriyagocaratāpattiprasaṅga udbhāvitaḥ so'pyasamañjasaḥ / na hyātmīyena lakṣaṇena paramataṁ dūṣyate / ...sāmānyena dhīgocaratāpattilakṣaṇatvādvyakteḥ / tataśca rasādau vyaṅgyatvamanavadyameva" (VVV. I. p. 59).

suggested sense also in case of vastu and alaṁkāra. There is, however, no harm if in time of cognising the vācya the vyangya does not happen to be cognised [30]

Suggested vastu cannot be had through anumāna :

Here we may notice that, the intervention of the recollection of the relation of invariable concomitance in case of suggestion [31] is not duly refuted by Ruyyaka also. It is also true that some amount of reasoning preceds the cognition of the suggested content in the form of the considerstion of the speciality, etc. But, we have already noticed that, the latter theorists dismiss the admission of any anumāna in case of arriving at the suggested vastu on the ground of fallacious probans For example, Mahimabhaṭṭa would infer the absence of roaming (abhramanam) from the presence of the lion in the bank of the Godāvarī (godāvarī tīre simhopalabdheh), which is expressly stated. Viśvanātha contends that the presence of the lion is a fallacious probans (anaikāntika hetu) Because, even a timid person may roam even after learning about the presence of the lion, because of direction from the master or out of love for the beloved. Further, the probans is dubious (saṁdigdhāsiddha) on account of the bad character of the speaker cf. "tathā-hyatra 'bhama dhammia' ityādau gṛhe śvanivṛttyā vihitaṁ bhramanam godāvarītīre siṁhopalabdhera-bhramanamanumāpayati iti yadvaktavyaṁ tatrānaikāntiko

30. cf "yatpunarvastvalaṁkārayorniyamena vācyānantarakālabhāvitvena pratītervyaṅgyatvamasamañjasaṁ bhavatītyuktaṁ, tatra pratividhīyate / iha śabdasyābhidhālakṣaṇābhedena dvividho vyāpāraścirantanairabhyupagataḥ / na sa tṛtīyakakṣyākṣipte'rthe pragalbhata iti tatra vyāpārāntaramabhyupeyaṁ / rasādau ca tattulyakakṣye vyañjakatvamupapāditamitīhāpi tadeva saṁśrayituṁ yuktaṁ / ... na dūṣaṇamityuktameva" (VVV. I. p. 69).

31 Mahima contends, "na ca vācyādarthādarthāntarapratītiravinābhāvasaṁbandhasmaraṇamantareṇaiva sambhavati, sarvasyāpi, tatpratītiprasaṅgāt" (VV. I. p. 79.)

hetuḥ / bhīrorapi guroḥ prabhorvā nideśena priyānurāgeṇa vā gamanasya saṁbhavāt / puṁścalyā vacanaṁ prāmāṇikaṁ na veti saṁdigdhāsiddhiśca" (SD. V.).

The case of inference of alaṁkāras :

Mahimabhaṭṭa does not recognise the presence of any suggested alaṁkāra in the cases of the śabdaśaktimūla dhvani. For lack of adequate reason he cannot arrive at the non-contextual meaning and hence the question of recognising a suggested alaṁkāra for rendering the non-contextual meaning congruous, does not arise for him. [32] At this rate there should be no suggested alaṁkāra also in the verse "durgālaṁghita" ('SD. II.). Hence, Viśvanātha says that it would be a foolishness similar to that of an elephant to deny the presence of the suggested alaṁkāra in the verses like "durgālaṁghita" which is, indeed, a matter of experience. Cf. "durgālaṁghita ityādau ca dvitīyārtho nāstyeva—iti yaduktaṁ mahimabhaṭṭena tadanubhavasiddhamapalapato gajanimīlikaiva" (SD. V).

In case of the verses like "prāpta-śrīreṣa kasmāt" [33] Mahimabhaṭṭa arrives at the 'basic idea' of the suggested figure through a process of anumāna. The process of anumāna is as follows : The activities which are widely known to be the activities of Lord Vāsudeva are said to be not proper for the king on account of his having already achieved the desired objects. Hence the king is identical with the Lord : This inferred idea of identity is the suggested rūpaka of the dhvani theorist. [34]

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32. Cf. "evaṁ cāsya vācyātirekiṇo'rthāntarasya pratītireva na samastīti yatrāprastutābhidhānaprasaṅgabhayāt tayorupamānopameyabhāvaprakalpanam tadapi nirmūlamevetyavagantavyam" (VV. III, p. 419).

33. Dhv. II. p. 261.

34. Cf. "......bhagavato vāsudevasyāmī vyāpārāḥ prasiddhāssanto yadanyatra rājādāvāropya tasya samīhitaprāptyā niṣidhyante tena tatkāryatvāt kāraṇabhūtabhagavadrūpatāropameva tatrānumāpayantīti rūpakānumitiriti vyapadeśaḥ pravarttate" (VV. III. p. 430).

But the alaṃkāra is also an imaginary type of matter of fact. Hence, it may be supposed that the dhvani theorists would dismiss the admission of anumāna on the ground of fallacious probans, here also

The case of inference of rasa

We have seen in the first two chapters,[35] how Mahimabhaṭṭa realises rasa through inference In this connection Viśvanātha questions Does Mahimabhaṭṭa recognise the knowledge of the love of the poetical characters like Rāma, which may be derived through inference, as rasa ? Or does he recognise the exquisite joy of the man of taste, in which his self sees itself, derived through a rumination over the mental state of love as rasa ? The followers of the dhvani theory do not accept the knowledge of the love of poetical characters as rasa If the second alternative is accepted then it is evidently clear that, the proposed probans is fallacious on account of the lack of the knowledge of invariable concomitance and hence, there cannot be any inference Moreover, the mere knowledge derived through the reasoning "wherever there is the express statement or dramatic presentation of such and such vibhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas, there is the origin of the rasas like śṛṅgāra"[36] is also not considered as rasa by the followers of the dhvani theory A perfect process of anumāna cannot operate in respect of the realisation of what is understood as rasa by them Compare SD V 4, and vṛtti thereunder

It may be noted here that, in the matter of aesthetics Mahimabhaṭṭa is a follower of Śrīśankuka, but he effects an improvement on the latter's inferential theory by (1) recognising a distinct subjective condition of the aesthetic experience,

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35 Vide, p. 54 and p. 141

36 "yatra yatra saṃvidhānaṃ vibhāvānubhāvasañcāriṇām abhidhānam abhinayo vā tatra tatra śṛṅgārādi rasāvirbhāvaḥ"

and by (2) distinguishing between the practical inferential experience and the aesthetic inferential experience.[37]

It may also be noticed here that, Abhinava also apprehends an opponent like Mahimabhaṭṭa and contends that the mere inference of a mental state belonging to others is not a rasa. Viśvanātha, in the foregoing argument appears to have derived the spirit from the relevent portion of the Locana which runs as follows : "nanvevaṁ......kimatra paracittavṛttimātre pratipattireva rasapratipattirabhimatā bhavataḥ ? na caivaṁ bhramitavyam; evaṁ hi lokagatacittavṛttyanumānamātramiti kā rasatā ? yastvalaukikacamatkārātmā rasāsvādaḥ kāvyagatavibhāvādicarvaṇāprāṇo nāsau smaraṇānumānādisāmyena khilīkārapātrīkartavyaḥ" (Locana, p. 155).

Mammaṭa and vyañjanā :

Mammaṭa was the most robust writer after Ānanda and Abhinava to place the conception of the vyañjanā function in a very sound footing. We will have several occasions to refer to the strong arguments of Mammaṭa in the later sections. In the present section we are trying simply to trace his intellectual background.

He discusses the necessity of recognising vyañjanā as a distinct function in the second and the fifth ullāsas of the KP. (1) In the second ullāsa his arguments for distinguishing vyañjanā from lakṣaṇā are based on Locana on Dhv. I. 17. (2) The arguments for recognising vyañjanā in case of the non-contextual meaning of the homonyms are based on Locana on Dhv. II. 21, etc. (3) In the fifth ullāsa Mammaṭa applies the whole wealth of his knowledge of Mīmāṁsā and Nyāya for establishing vyañjanā as a distinct function. His arguments against 'naimittikānusāreṇa nimittāni kalpante,' 'so'yamiṣoriva dīrgha-dīrgha-vyāpāraḥ' and 'yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa sabdārthaḥ'

37. Vide, I. Aest. pp. 285–290.

are based on Locana on the illustrative verse 'bhama dhammia' under Dhv. I. 4 (4) It is noticed that Abhinava's conception of 'tātparya-śakti' is based on Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī. It may also be noticed that, the arguments which are presented to be directed against śrutārthāpatti by the Prābhākara in the Nyāyamañjarī are taken in the Locana to be as good as arguments directed against vyañjanā. The prābhākara wants to have the idea gathered through śrutārthāpatti as an ordinary (express) meaning of the word itself In order to convey the additional idea the word itself is said to have longer and longer functions. cf. "prābhākarāstu dṛṣṭaḥ śruto veti bhāṣyam -- .. tamartham śābdameva pratijānate........vākyārthapratītā-viṣoriva dīrghadīrgho vyāpāraḥ ..., etc." (NM. p. 43). The plausible argument against this further potential capacity (dīrghadīrgho vyāpāraḥ) is that if the additional idea had by śrutārthāpatti is put on a par with the primary sense then the primay sense may claim identity with the gauna and lakṣya sense also. The relative validity of the śruti, liṅga, sthāna, etc., also would cease to exist. cf. "nanvevaṁ sati......bhaviṣyati." (NM. p. 44). These very arguments are presented by Mammaṭa in defence of vyañjanā in the fifth ullāsa. While Jayanta gathers the idea conveyed by śrutārthāpatti with a process of anumāna, Abhinava and Mammaṭa derive it because of vyañjanā. Abhinava and Mammaṭa agree with the Prābhākara in the matter of recognising the idea derived through śrutārthāpatti as a meaning of the word itself but they differ in respect of the function involved in arriving at the said idea. (5) Arguments of Mammaṭa on the question of the tātparyārtha of "viṣaṁ bhakṣaya, *etc." are directed against Dhanika.* (6) That, Mammaṭa thoroughly remembers the Dhv. III, can be seen from most of his further arguments in the fifth ullāsa. (7) Refutation of the claim to include vyañjanā in anumāna is evidently meant for Mahimabhaṭṭa. (8) Mammaṭa wrote a full-length book named Śabdavyāpāravicāra to refute Mukulabhaṭṭa's arguments for including vyañjanā in lakṣaṇā.

Dhanañjaya, Dhanika and vyañjanā :

Dhanañjaya, the author of Daśrūpaka and Dhanika, the author of Avaloka, the commentary on the former, flourished earlier than Mammaṭa. They contend that the vyañjanā function is redundant. The so called vyaṅgya artha may be had as the tātparyārtha (with tātparyaśakti) as it is also a meaning of the sentence.

Dhanañjaya concedes to the fact that the suggested sense may not have a denotative word for it. But that should not be the reason for not calling it as vācya, he contends. The sthāyibhāva, which is said to be suggested by the express description of the vibhāvas, etc., is not conveyed by any expressive words. But, yet it should be considered as the vācya sense itself of the sentence. The sthāyibhāva is indeed the 'vākyārtha' the vākya being intent on conveying the same. Dhanañjaya says :

vācyā prakaraṇādibhyo buddhisthā vā yathā kriyā /
vākyārthaḥ kārakairyuktā sthāyibhāvastathetaraiḥ //
(DR. IV. 37).

Dhanika, by way of commenting on this point, explains their position more clearly.

'There is no expressive word (i.e., denotative word or vācaka śabda) for conveying the idea of the sthāyī bhāva which is *designated by the dhvani* theorist as vyaṅgya. But, yet we may call that sthāyī as the vākyārtha (i.e., tātparyārtha or the intended meaning of the sentence). Because, the meanings of all the sentences are to be conceived in terms of a kriyā (i.e., action) even if there be no word in the sentence for faithfully denoting the same. For example, in the sentence, 'gāmabhyāja', the action of carrying the cow is expressly stated by a word denotative of the action. But the sentence, 'dvāraṁ dvāraṁ' which also conveys the idea of an action to be performed, does not have the word 'pidhehi' (close) to

denote the desired action Even then, the closing of the door is the intended meaning of the sentence Similarly, the sthāyi bhāva also may be taken to be the total intended meaning (i e , tātparyārtha) of the sentence, but not a vyangya sense This is what is hinted by the kārikā IV 37 On the basis of this kārikā, Dhanika presents a series of arguments as follows

A vākyārtha is the meaning of a sentence conveyed by its tātparyaśakti It cannot be argued that we cannot have such a vākyārtha for which there are no denotative words Because, all sentences result in some effect (i e., all sentences are kārya para) The ultimate effect in case of the sentences of the kāvya is the relish of rasa This relish of rasa renders it necessary to recognise the sthāyibhāva as the vākyārtha In respect of such a vākyārtha the vibhāvas etc , stand on a par with the word meanings (padārtha) which are usually instrumental for conveying the total meaning of the sentence Cf 'tatra vibhāvādayah padārtha sthānīyāstatsamsṛṣṭo ratyādirvākyārthah / tadetat kāvyavākyam yadīyam tāvimau padārthavākyārthau' (DR IV p 298) This argument is the same with what is apprehended from the opponent by Ānandavardhana in the words 'tasmāt tātparyaviṣayo yo'rthah vākyārthapratīteh' (Dhv p 415) This argument is however, duly refuted by Ānanda in his own way (Vide, p 189, above)

It is apprehended by Dhanika that the opponent may argue as follows Rasa is, in fact, a relish The musical sounds also may produce a similar relish But the relation between the musical sound and the relish can never be called the relation of the denoter and the denoted (It is undoubtedly the relation of the suggester and the suggested) Likewise the relation between the kāvya and rasa is not the relation of the denoter and the denoted In reply to this argument Dhanika says that, the analogy is not an apt one For, the relish caused by the musical sound may be derived also by the illiterate person, whereas the relish of rasa can be had

only by the literate. Cf. "na caivaṁ.........svānandodbhūteḥ" (DR. IV. p. 240).

Dhanika reinforces his arguments with certain quotations from another work of his, viz., Kāvyanirṇaya, as follows :

(1) Dhanika argues—As the so called vyaṅgyārtha is conveyed by tātparya (i.e., within the scope of the intention of the speaker) there cannot be really a vyaṅgyārtha (as additional to the tātparyārtha) and hence, there cannot be any dhvani.

(2) The dhvani theorist argues—But how can you call the meaning as tātparyārtha when it is not conveyed by denotative words ?

(3) Dhanika replies—There may be a tātparyārtha even when there is no word as denotative for it. As for instance, in the sentence, "viṣaṁ bhakṣaya" (take poison), we have, as the tātparyārtha, something which is quite different from what is denoted by the words 'viṣaṁ' and 'bhakṣaya'. The tātparyārtha does not ask to take poison. But even such a tātparyārtha, as we have in 'viṣaṁ bhakṣaya', not conveyed by denotative words, is not called the vyaṅgyārtha by the dhvani theorist himself.

(4) The dhvani theorist may say that, even a meaning which is not conveyed by denotative words may be the tātparyārtha when the denoted meaning is inconsistent (or where the sentence does not rest after communicating simply the denoted sense). But where, there is a meaning, additional to the consistent denoted meaning, we can have dhvani (i.e., a vyaṅgyārtha). Where the purpose is not fulfilled by the ordinary denoted sense, the denoted sense is discarded and the apparently additional meaning is accepted as the tātparyārtha.

(5) Dhanika replies—This argument is not proper. For, it cannot be claimed that the purpose of the sentence is

fulfilled by conveying the denoted sense itself and the suggested sense remains outside the scope of tātparyaśakti How can it be claimed that, the tātparyaśakti will cover only to the extent of the denoted sense and the suggested (i e , dhvani) will remain out of its scope ? The purpose of the whole sentence (i e , kāvya) will be fulfilled only when the so called suggested sense is conveyed The communication of the suggested sense is the intended result of the sentence and such a result (i e , kārya) is always intended by the sentence and the tātparyaśakti necessarily functions upto that desired sense, be it immediately denoted or additionally conveyed The extent of the tātparyaśakti is never measured by any measuring rod [38]

(6) That, even the so called suggested sense is within the scope of tātparya can be illustrated by the verse 'bhama dhammia' where the prohibition is really intended by the speaker

(7) Lastly, Dhanika explains the process of the communication of rasa to be as follows Through our observation of the couples in love in the practical life we are familiar with the relation of invariable concomitance between vibhāvas, etc , and the sthāyibhāva When in kāvya, vibhāvas, etc , are presented we conclude that such and such a behaviour of the couple is not possible without a feeling of rati (i.e , the sthāyibhāva for love) Hence, from the kāvya which gives us a description of vibhāvas, etc , we gather the idea of the sthāyī with the help of lakṣaṇā aided by the relation of avinābhāva (i e., non-separation) Compare " loke tathāvidha-ceṣṭā-yukta-strīpuṁsādisu ratyādyavinābhāvadarśanādihāpi tathopanibandhe sati ratyādyavinābhūta ceṣṭādipratipādakaśabdaśra-

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38 "etāvatyeva viśrāntis tātparyasyeti kimkṛtam /
yāvatkāryaprasāritvāt tātparyaṁ na tulādhṛtam /"
(DR. IV, p 242).

vaṇādabhidheyāvinābhāvena lākṣaṇikī ratyādipratītiḥ........." (DR. IV. p. 244).

An analysis of Dhanika's position :

In the last mentioned point we may notice that Dhanika is dragging us to a hopeless confusion of tātparyaśakti, lakṣaṇāśakti and anumāna (i.e., avinābhāva). For Dhanika the idea of sthāyī is not conveyed by vyañjanā. It is conveyed by lakṣaṇā with the help of avinābhāva (i.e., a process of inference). But according to his earlier arguments, what is said to be vyaṅgya by the dhvani theorist is within the scope of tātparya itself. We cannot understand 'tātparya' of Dhanañjaya as merely an intention like the tātparya of Ānanda. *Because*, he calls it *tātparyaśakti, indeed.* Compare : "na cāpadārthasya vākyārthatvaṁ nāstīti vācyaṁ kāryaparyavasāyitvāttātparyaśakteḥ" (DR. IV. p. 238). That is how we are to admit two functions (i.e., śaktis) and a process of anumāna also. But, it is quite precipitate for Dhanañjaya's conception of rasa to drag in the avinābhāva, since that would make him a supporter of the inferential theory. But, in fact, Dhanañjaya is a follower of Bhaṭṭanāyaka in the matter of aesthetics. [39]

Here, we may, however, notice that, Dhanika's conception of the vākyārtha is based on the view of the Mīmāṁsakas. The position of the Mīmāṁsakas, who hold that the total meaning of the sentence is communicated by the meanings of the *individual words* through implication (i.e., lakṣaṇā) is very clearly represented by Pārthasārathi in the following verse :

tasmānna vākyaṁ na padāni sākṣād
vākyārthabuddhiṁ janayanti kintu /
padasvarūpābhihitaiḥ padārthaiḥ
saṁlakṣyate'sāviti siddhametat // (Nyāyaratnamālā, p. 125).

But when the meaning of the sentence is thus taken as a

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39. I. Aest. p. 127.

lakṣyārtha by Dhanika it would be wiser to recognise 'tātparya' not as a function but simply as the intention of the speaker. And in fact, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school, tātparya, understood as the intention of the speaker is an invariable factor for the operation of lakṣaṇā.[40] But from the admission of avinābhāva Dhanika's conception of lakṣaṇā seems to be like what is embodied in an un-identified quotation in the Tattvapradīpikā which is as follows :

mānāntaravirodhe tu mukhyārthasya parigrahe /
mukhyārthenāvinābhūte pratītirlakṣaṇocyate // (p 262).

(Lakṣaṇā is the cognition of a meaning, which is related to the primary sense through the relation of avinābhāva, on the *occasion of the recognition of an incongruity of the primary* meaning with the help of some other source of knowledge)

Dhvanivādin's reply to Dhanika's arguments :

Mammaṭa feels that Dhanika is not properly understanding the Mīmāṁsaka's conception of tātparya and hence he is making a wrong application of the same for criticising the conception of vyañjanā. Hence, for refuting the position of Dhanika, Mammaṭa clearly explains the very theory of tātparya.[41] The relevent rules and their implications are as follows :

(1) Yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa śabdārthaḥ—Whatever is intended by the word is its meaning.

(2) Yadeva vidheyam tatraiva tātparyam—Only what is desired to be done (i.e , enjoined) is the intended meaning (tātparya).

(3) Why this restriction ? Because, even only a few words in the sentence (or a part of the sentence) may tell about what is particularly desired to be done. If a certain thing is already enjoined elsewhere, then with reference to the import

40. Cf. "Lakṣaṇā śakyasambandhastātparyānupapattitaḥ" (Bhāṣā-*pariccheda*, Śabdakhaṇḍa).

41. Vide, KP. V.

of the sentence at hand that need not be taken as desired to be conveyed (i.e., tātparyārtha). The fire burns only what is not already burnt. Similarly the sentence also enjoins what is not already enjoined. "adagdhadahananyāyena yāvadaprāptaṁ tāvadvidhīyate."

(4) If there be any injunction that must enjoin only an action. At that rate all the sentences should imply some action. Mammaṭa says yes, 'bhūtabhavyasamuccāraṇe bhūtaṁ bhavyāyopadiśyate.' 'Bhūta' means 'kārakapadārthas' (i.e., ideas not ordinarily implying any action; i.e., they are not sādhya but siddha) and 'bhavya' means 'kriyāpadārthas' implying action (i.e., sādhyas). But when these are uttered together the kārakapadārthas also assume the form of sādhyas and imply some relevent action.

(5) Thus, in the sentence, 'lohitoṣṇīṣā ṛtvijaḥ pracaranti' the 'moving about of the priest' (i.e., ṛtvikpracaraṇa) is an injunction already known from elsewhere. Hence, only the red head-dress (i.e., lohitoṣṇīṣ), which is a kārakapadārtha assumes the form of a 'bhavya' and enjoins the act of wearing the red head-dress. So, the sentence is said to have tātparya only to that effect. This is what is the actual implication of the maxim "yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa śabdārthaḥ."

(6) From the fore-going exposition, it will be clear that only used (i.e., upātta) words may have tātparya in respect of what is enjoined. [42] If words, which are not uttered or used in the sentence but simply learnt from some other source, are also supposed to convey tātparyārtha then sometimes the expression "pūrvo dhāvati" (The former runs) should have tātparya indiscriminately in respect of a meaning as "aparo dhāvati" (The latter runs). But, infact, it does not happen to be so, only because, only the used words can convey the tātparyārtha.

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42. cf. "yadyapi......śrutayoreva parasparaniyamaḥ" (Nyāyaratnamālā, p. 103).

(7) Now, some one may argue that the sentence, 'viṣam bhakṣaya' (Literally, 'Take poison') means 'etadgṛhe na bhoktavyam' ('Do not take food in his home') The 'prohibition of taking food' alone being desired to be conveyed, that alone should be *recognised as the meaning of the sentence, having* tātparya Hence, here we do not have the used words (i e, upātta śabdas) conveying the tātparyārtha That is how the suggested sense also, which is not the literal meaning of the used words, should be recognised as tātparyārtha

(8) Mammaṭa gives the reply with utmost economy of words He means to say that, we must not take 'viṣaṁ bhakṣaya' as an isolated sentence It is a part of an entire sentence running as 'viṣam bhakṣaya mā cāsya gṛhe bhunkthāh', where the use of the particle 'ca' connecting the two clauses, makes it a single sentence [43] Taken as a whole, the statement

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43 " tatra cakāra ekavākyatāsūcanārthaḥ / na cākhyātavākyayordvayorangāngibhāva iti viṣabhakṣaṇavākyasya suhṛdvākyatvenāṅgatā kalpanīyeti " (KP V.) It appears to me that, this is after an observation of Pārthasārathi, which runs as follows : " nāvaśyamavinābhāvanimittaiva lakṣaṇā / ekavākyatāpi tatra nimittam /" (Nyāyaratnamālā, p 125) In the Nāyakaratna commentary, 'ekavākyatā' is explained as "padānām parasparasamabhivyāhārah" (i e, juxtaposition of words) Pārthasārathi further observes that, sometimes the 'ekavākyatā' may be apparent (i e, pratyakṣā) and some times it is inferred from the context (i.e, prakaraṇādyanumeyā) In the latter case an apparently complete sentence is connected with another principal statement through the relation of the principal and the subordinate (aṅgāṅgibhāva) Mammaṭa with the anxiety to deny the status of a sentence even as the subordinate clause to 'viṣam bhakṣaya' means to say that there the ekavākyatā is apparent and that is not because of any aṅgāṅgibhāva cf. "ekavākyatā ca kvacitpratyakṣā yathā somena yajeteti / kvacit prakaraṇādyanumeyā yathā darśapūrṇa-

being that of a well-wisher, the clause, 'viṣaṁ bhakṣaya' will not convey its literal meaning at all. This clause forming a part of the entire statement will simply contribute to a secondary meaning of the entire stament as—'viṣabhakṣaṇādapi dūṣṭametadgṛhe bhojanamiti sarvathā māsya gṛhe bhuṅkthāḥ' (The taking of food in his home is worse than taking poison and hence never take food at his home). When, thus a secondary meaning is recognised in place of the literal meaning, the secondary meaning itself is taken to be the *tātparyārtha* of the used words. The secondary meaning is not additional to the literal meaning. But it is only a substitute for the same.

(9) Thus tātparya covers only upto the minimum consistent meaning of the sentence. Hence, in the sentence 'bhama dhammia', *tātparya may mean only the bhramaṇavidhi. If* there be any additional meaning, that will not fall within the purview of tātparya, but that will be a vyaṅgyārtha conveyed by yet another function of the words and senses called vyañjanā. Hence, the idea of niṣedha in the said verse is not a tātparyārtha but a vyaṅgyārtha.

(10) Even if we understand 'vidhi' as the tātparyārtha, that will imply an action. The beauty of the verse lies in the fact that we have the idea of vidhi as the tātparyārtha and then the idea of niṣedha not as the tātparyārtha but as the vyaṅgya. We may assume that the dhārmika understands the vidhi as the tātparyārtha. But for us it is suggested that there is a niṣedha, and it is simply expected that the dhārmika also would derive the idea of the niṣedha additionally.

(11) Viśvanātha points out that 'tātparyaṁ na tulādhṛtam' is not a very happy argument, because of the maxim that, the verbal functions can operate only in respect of one meaning. ..

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māsābhyāṁ yajeta samidho yajatītyanayoḥ samidupetā darśapūrṇamāsabhāvanā kartavyetyevaṁrūpaikavākyatā . kalpyate" (Nyāyaratnamālā, p. 125).

The same function cannot be rejuvinated for conveying meanings of different stages.[44] And this is the reason for recognising a lakṣaṇā function as different from abhidhā.

(12) Another argument of Viśvanātha is that, the tātparya-śakti of the Mīmāṁsaka helps in having only the minimum consistent meaning of a sentence. Hence, for having any meaning beyond that we must recognise vyañjanā. If to avoid this difficulty Dhanika says that his tātparya is different from the tātparya of the Mīmāṁsaka, then in his opinion also there will be a fourth function, additional to the already accepted three of the Mīmāṁsaka (namely, abhidhā lakṣaṇā and tātparya) Let this fourth function be named not as tātparya but as vyañjanā. cf "yat punaruktam .tanmate'pi turīya-vṛttisiddheḥ" (SD V.)

Mukulabhaṭṭa and vyañjana :

Mukula was the son of Bhaṭṭakallaṭa and the teacher of Pratīhārendurāja. He flourished in the first half of the tenth century.[45] Mukula, in his Abhidhāvṛttimātṛkā, tries to show that (1) all the suggested senses can be had by lakṣaṇā. He refers to the 'atyanta-tiraskṛta vācya' and 'avivakṣita-vācya' types without giving a direct criticism of them but wrongly including a vivakṣitavācya type also in the same footing as that of the former (A. V. M. p. 28).

(2) He names the capacity of the word to convey the meaning as abhidhāvyāpāra, classifies it into mukhya and lākṣaṇika abhidhāvyāpāra, and tries to show that the suggested sense is had by six forms of lakṣaṇā.

44. cf. ".. .. tayorupari śabdabuddhikarmaṇām viramya vyāpārābhāvaḥ iti vādibhireva pūraṇīyo daṇḍaḥ" (SD V) Here, Viśvanātha understands tātparya as śabdaśakti in the strictest sense of the term

45. HSP. Kane, p. LXXXVI.

(3) He recognises the three conditions of lakṣaṇā as mukhyārthabādha, mukhyārthapratyāsatti (relation with primary sense), and prayojana; classifies prayojana into two types and adds that both the varieties of prayojana also become the object of cognition along with the respective lākṣaṇika senses. cf. "etacca prayojanadvitayaṁ mukhyārthāsambhave sati mukhyārthapratyāsannatayā pūrvapradarśitena sambandhapañcakenāvagamyamāne lākṣaṇike'rthe yathāviṣayamanusartavyaṁ ......na hi tatpuṇyatvamanoharatvādisvaśabdaiḥ spraṣṭuṁ śakyate avyāptyativyāptiprasaṅgāt." (AVM. p. 17.)

(4) Strangely enough, Mukula also refers to some 'vyaṅgya dharma' [46] in connection with 'rāmo'smi' of the verse "snigdhaśyāmala" (which the dhvani theorists take as the prayojana of lakṣaṇā and hence as suggested) [47] but he says elsewhere that the same dharmas are conveyed by lakṣaṇā. Compare: "atastenāpi rājyabhraṁśavanavāsasītāpanayanapitṛmaraṇādayaḥ svābhidheyabhūtārthaikagāmino'sādhāraṇaduḥkhahetavo dharmā viśiṣṭasāmagryanupraviṣṭeva lakṣitāḥ" (AVM. p. 11). From this he may be said to be advocating for 'viśiṣṭe lakṣaṇā', referred to by Mammaṭa.

(5) Mukula's endeavour to show that, all the three types of suggested sense namely, vastu, alaṁkāra and rasādi are conveyed by lakṣaṇā, is evidenced by his treatment of the three illustrative verses given in AVM. pp. 12–14. Illustrating a case of lakṣaṇā due to the speciality of the speaker (vaktṛnibandhanatvena) he gives the verse "dṛṣṭiṁ he prativeśini" (AVM. pp. 12–13). According to him lakṣaṇā conveys the idea of the fact that, "the speaker would have erotic dalliance with the parapuruṣa." He comments that the express sense,

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46. AVM. p. 20. The printing, however, wrongly reads 'vyaṅgyam dharma' for 'vyaṅgya dharma', which is evidently correct.

47. In the dhvani theory the 'dharmāntarapariṇatarāma' is the secondary sense whereas the dharmas themselves are suggested. (Dhv. p. 169).

telling that there would be scratches by the reeds (nala), etc, is false (asatya) and hence, bādhita Hence, the secondary sense, observed above occurs to make it consistent. Compare, " atrahi parapuruṣa tenātra vaktṛviśeṣaparyālocanayāsatyārthe niṣṭhāyā upādānātmikāyāh pratipattih / " etc

(6) Illustrating lakṣanā due to the speciality of the whole sentence he gives the verse, "prāpta śrīreṣa kasmāt" and adds that prāptaśrīḥ, etc, refer only to Lord Vāsudeva Hence, the doubts (samśaya vitarka) as regards the activities are inconsistent unless there be identification of the king with Vāsudeva Hence, it is also a case of upādānalakṣanā which conveys the idea of the identification of the king with Vāsudeva, which, helps in making the statement consistent Compare " te ca vitarkāh prāptaśrīrityādinā bhagavadvāsudevasya vyāpāraviśesaviṣayah / yāvacca tasya nrpaterbhagavadvāsudevata na samasti tāvatkatham tadīyeṣu vyāpāraviśeṣu samśayah samupajāyate prāptaśrīrityādiṣu ca triṣu vitarkeṣu bhagavadvāsudevaviṣayeṣu yathāyogam tattatkāryanirākarana-hetugarbhatayā pravartamāneṣu nrpaterbhagavadvāsudevatā kṣiptā tenātropādānātmikā lakṣanā" etc (AVM pp 13–14)

(7) Illustrating lakṣanā due to the consideration (paryālocana) of the express sense, Mukula gives the verse, "durvārā madaneṣavo diśi diśi " Here the express sense is that the five things namely, the arrows of Cupid, the spring season, etc, are of the nature of fire and are unbearable When the express sense is taken into consideration vipralambha śrngāra is conveyed by lakṣanā Without this vipralambha śrngāra the words in the sentence are inconsistent. It is also a case of upādāna lakṣanā due to the (nature of) express sense Compare, "ityatra hi smaraśara prabhrtīnām pañcānāmadhyārop tavahni bhāvānāmasahyatvam vākyārthībhūtam / atastasya vā yata / tatparyālocanasāmarthyā ca vipralambhaśrngārasyākṣepa ityupādānātmikā lakṣanā vā yanibandhanā nāpi ca vākye padānām vipralambhaśrngārākṣepamantarenānvayopapattih etc (AVM. p 14)

Mukula's position and prayojanamūlā lakṣaṇā :

Mammaṭa gives a counter criticism of Mukula's views sharply but in brief in the SVV and in a general way in the KP. Mukula's views may be refuted, from the stand point of the dhvani theorists, in the following manner.

(1) Mukula recognises a prayojana of lakṣaṇā but does not explicitly say how it can be arrived at, but implicitly says that it occurs along with the secondary sense, decidedly being conveyed by lakṣaṇā, as evidenced by his sporadic statements.

In case of lakṣaṇāmūlā vyañjanā, as in the sentence 'gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ'—the suggested idea of coolness (śītatva), etc., cannot be conveyed by abhidhā, inasmuch as the word gaṅgā does not have a conventional invariable relation with the ideas as coolness, etc. (nābhidhā samayābhāvāt. KP. II. 24). Moreover, we cannot have the sense of coolness, etc., with the help of lakṣaṇā; because, as regards this sense the three conditions of lakṣaṇā are not present (hetvabhāvānna lakṣaṇā, KP. II. 25). We have already arrived at the secondary sense 'taṭa' from the incosistency of the primary sense 'current' with the lakṣaṇā function residing in the word gaṅgā. Naturally, the same function will not work again to convey the idea of śītatva, etc., due to the maxim "śabdabuddhikarmaṇām," etc. Then again, since the primary sense of the current is already out of picture we must take the secondary sense of 'taṭa' (bank) as the primary sense, with regard to a fresh lakṣaṇā function. But the secondary sense is certainly not the primary sense. It is also not inconsistent or incongruous ('nāpi bādhaḥ') The secondary sense also does not have a definite and invariable relation with the sense of śītatva, etc., which is desired as a lakṣyārtha. Since, there is no conventional relation of the word gaṅgā with śītatva, it cannot be a case of rūḍhimūlā-lakṣaṇā. Hence, it can at best be a case of prayojanamūlā lakṣaṇā. But to be a prayojanamūlā lakṣaṇā with regard to the sense of śītatva, etc., which is desired as the secondary

sense, we must have another idea as the prayojana We do not have such a prayojana But it is also an experienced fact that, the word gangā does not fail to convey the idea of the prayojana also Compare, laksayam na mukhyam etc (KP II 26) Then since the word is supposed to convey the idea of prayojana with laksanā, let us forcibly imagine of some other prayojana But the prayojana of the original prayojana śitatva, etc, will also have to be explained as conveyed by another lakṣaṇā with the imaginary presence of still another prayojana In this manner there will be the fault of anavasthā (i e, reeresus ad infinitum) Cf "evamapyanavasthā syāt yā mūlaksayakāriṇī" (KP II 27) [48]

Then let us suppose that the lakṣaṇā function itself conveys the idea of the bank as having its holy calm (i e, the pāvanatvādidharmayuktataṭa) Such a lakṣaṇā is designated by Mammaṭa as "viśiṣṭe lakṣaṇā" (cf "viśiṣṭe lakṣaṇā naivam' KP II 30) Mukula may be supposed to cherish such a view But Mammaṭa replies that we cannot have (from lakṣaṇā) the secondary sense along with the prayojana, because of the dictum that, the visaya (object) and the phala (fruit) of jñana (kowledge) are different from each other, "jñānasya viṣayo hyanyah phalamanyadudāhṛtam' [49] The object of perception is nīlaghaṭa and the fruit thereof is some such idea as 'nīlaghaṭo jñāyate mayā' (the black jar is known by me) Now if the laksyārtha be taken as including the prayojana or phala of lakṣaṇājñāna then the viṣaya and phala of jñāna will not be different from each other For, the viṣaya or the object of knowledge which is taken to be 'pāvanatvādiviśiṣṭataṭa' in the sentence 'gangāyāṁ ghoṣah' is not different from pāvanatvādi, the recognised phala of lakṣaṇājñāna

48 (The foregoing arguments of Mammaṭa are based on Locana, pp 148-180)

49 KP II 29

Implication of 'jñānasya viṣayo hyanyaḥ', etc.

There is, however, some controversy as to the proper implication of the said words of Mammaṭa, i.e., "jñānasya viṣayo hyanyaḥ phalamanyadudāhṛtam / pratyakṣāderhi nīlādirviṣayaḥ phalaṁ tu prakaṭatā saṁvittrvā" (Vide, Pradīpa quoted on p. 71, KP. CSS.). The point of objection is that, just as saṁvitti or prakaṭatā is a jñāna, similarly the phala of lakṣaṇā-jñāna is śaityādipratīti and not śaityādi. Hence the maxim is not aptly applicable where the suggested sense or prayojana is only śaityādi. Pradīpa suggests an interpretation of Mammaṭa's stand as follows : [50]

The object of knowledge (jñānasya viṣayaḥ) being the cause (janaka) of jñāna is different from the jñāna and similarly the phala (say, a knowledge, saṁvitti or the knowledge of śaityādi in case of lakṣaṇā) is also different from jñāna, being the effect (kārya) of it. Now naturally there being a sequence of occurrence between the cause of knowledge (i.e., viṣaya) and the effect of knowledge (i.e., phala) the two are different from one another, and hence, cannot be put in the same footing. Mammaṭa's words, "prayojanānena sahitaṁ lakṣaṇīyaṁ na yujyate," preceding the dictum, "jñānasya viṣayo hyanyaḥ," etc., may be understood to say that, the viṣaya and the phala must not be put on a par by having both of them as related with the same lakṣaṇā function at the same instance. Pradīpa seems to opine that though "śaityādi jñāna" above is the phala yet the term phala is loosely applied to śaityādi itself and the dictum is rendered applicable. Hence, if the knowledge of the secondary sense includes also the knowledge of the śaityādi, etc., then no phala would be had as distinct from the object of knowledge (i.e., lakṣaṇā-jñāna-viṣaya, viz., taṭa) and then there would be no necessity of postulating a vyañjanā vyāpāra for the cognition of a phala (i.e., prayojana) distinct from the secondary sense. But the

50. Vide, KP. CSS. p. 71.

difficulty is that the viṣaya and phala are always different and the latter cannot be included in the former. Pradīpa also suggests a simpler solution for the problem of distinguishing the scope of lakṣaṇā from that of the phala (thus showing the necessity of recognising the vyañjanā function) as follows :

'Lakṣaṇā is based on anvayānupapatti (incompatibility of the conventional meaning of a word with the rest of the sentence) and hence, the lakṣyārtha will include the minimum requisite for removing this incompatibility (anupapatti) and hence the lakṣyārtha is gaṅgā-taṭa and not viśiṣṭa gaṅgātaṭa.'[51] Lakṣaṇā is not meant to have as its object also what is not vitally necessary for removing the incompatibility. Thus, it does not have śaitya, pāvanatva, etc , as its object Compare "jñānasya janakībhūto viṣayo yathā jñānādanyastathā phalamapi tasya svato bhinnam, kāraṇasyeva kāryasyāpi bhinnakālatvaniyamāt śaityādau tu kvacit phalapadmaupacārikam dṛśyate. tathā ca lakṣyajñānameva yadi śaityajñānam tadā prayojanaṁ na syādityarthaḥ / . anvayānupapattyā hi lakṣaṇā prasaranti yāvadanvayopapādakam tāvadeva viṣayīkaroti natvanupapādakamapīti katham taṭe pāvanatvamapi viṣayīkuryāt" etc. (KP. CSS. p. 71)

Thus lakṣaṇā cannot convey the prayojana. But the secondary sense is found to have certain speciality, the idea of which must be conveyed by some function of the word itself, which the dhvani theorists name as vyañjanā, dhvanana or dyotana etc.

(2) From Mukula's words—"etacca prayojanadvitayaṁ mukhyārthāsambhave sati mukhyārthapratyāsannatayā... . avagamyamāne lākṣaṇike'rthe yathāviṣayamanusartavyam" (AVM. p. 17), it also appears that, when the secondary sense is had with lakṣaṇā the prayojana is to be understood by some other process of reasoning (anusartavyam, i e , to be followed). The necessity of such a process of reasoning as regards the

51. Dr. Thakur's "short analysis," KP. CSS p. 31.

prayojana seems to be supplied by the following words also (in continuation of the above quotation), "tatra sambandhalakṣaṇā yathā gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣa iti. atra hi śabdābhidheyasya srotoviśeṣasya ghoṣādhikaraṇatvānupapattyā mukhyaśabdārthabādhe sati yo'sau samīpasamīpibhāvātmakaḥ sambandhastadāśrayeṇa taṭaṁ lakṣayati / atra ca lakṣaṇāyāḥ prayojanaṁ taṭasya gaṅgātvaikārthasamavetāsaṁvijñānapadapuṇyatvamanoharatvādipratipādanaṁ, na hi tatpuṇyatvamanoharatvādi svaśabdaiḥ sprasṭuṁ śakyate / avyāptyativyāptiprasaṅgāt (AVM. p. 17). From this quotation we learn that taṭa alone is said to be conveyed by lakṣaṇā and puṇyatva, etc., (i.e., the prayojanas) are said to be beyond the scope of expressive words. (Since, both the mukhya-vyāpāra and lakṣaṇā are abhidhā for Mukula, we should understand both the vācaka and the lākṣaṇika words from the expression svaśabda).

Possibly apprehending such a position of Mukula, Mammaṭa contends that in prayojanamūlā lakṣaṇā a function other than the lakṣaṇā itself must be recognised. We have lakṣaṇā in those cases only when the prayojana is there. That prayojana cannot be cognised by the instruments of knowledge i.e., pramāṇas (other than the śabda itself) such as the cause of the incongruity of the primary sense. We do not think that, the primary sense fails, it must have a cause, and the cause is the understanding of prayojana. Why? Because the prayojana is not so unimportant to be arrived at by the reasoning of the said manner, rather the word is used in the secondary sense to convey the same prayojana more smoothly. (Compare, Locana, p. 150; prayojanāvagamasya sukhasampattaye hi sa śabdaḥ prayujyate tasminnamukhyārthe). Pratyakṣa does not precede the meaning of word. No anumāna occurs before its cognition (with any pratyakṣa preceding it). We cannot establish an anumāna in this case with the help of another anumāna because that would lead to anavasthā. There is also no smṛti involved in the cognition of the meaning of a

word because the idea (had from a śabda) was not experienced before Even where smrti is present it cannot be said to be invariably associated (or it does not relate to any thing definite) Thus śabda alone is the pramana (i e , source of valid knowledge) there Śabda does not convey the sense without a vyāpāra (i.e , function) The function is not abhidhā due to so many reasons It is none other than vyañjanā for having the phala Compare "saprayojanāyām ca lakṣaṇāyām tadatirikto vyāpāro'vaśyam aṅgīkartavyaḥ / tathā ca sati pra yojane laksanā / tacca na mukhyārtha bādhanimittavat pramāṇāntarādboddhavyam / tadarthameva lakṣaṇā-śabda prayogāt na khalu śabde'rthe pratyaksam kramate / nāpi tatpūrvakamanumānam / nānumānāntaram anavasthāpatteḥ tadanubhavābhāvāt // (SVV pp 5 6)

Refutation of Mukula's position

(3) In the verses illustrating lakṣanā due to speciality of speaker, etc , we cannot have the suggested senses because of lakṣanā In the verse, "dṛṣṭim he prativeśini ' there is no inconsistency or incongruity of the primary sense (mukhyārtha bādha) Hence the question of lakṣanā does not arise at all. We do not indeed reject the primary sense as inconsistant or false here. We accept the primary sense and aided by the speciality of the speaker (vaktṛvaiśiṣṭya) have the suggestion of her actual intention to meet the lover

In the verse 'prāptaśrīresa' the sense of inconsistency of the doubt does not arise Hence, Mammaṭa observes that there is no mukhyārthabādha and also no scope for lakṣaṇā. Abhinava very lucidly points out the consistency of the doubt [52] He says that, the ocean thinks that, only those who have not acquired Lakṣhmī and those who have yet to conquer the whole world and those who desire to sleep should come to perform churning, etc But, this king (who is addressed

52 Vide Locana, II. p 262

in the eulogy) has already acquired Lakṣhmī (i.e., the royal fortune); hence, he need not churn the ocean; he has already conqurred the whole world and so he need not erect any setu; he is very enthusiastic and hence he need not feel sleepy also. Then, why should this king come to the ocean and purturb it ? Thus, the doubt is quite consistent in respect of the king also. Abhinava adds that, the expressions like punaḥ, pūrvaṁ and bhūyaḥ alone are not responsible for the suggestion. Because, these expressions need not necessarily mean an identity of the subject. But the express sense of the whole verse is so peculiar that it suggests an identity of the king with Vāsudeva and hence a rūpakālaṁkāra is derived as the suggested content of the verse. Similarly, in the verse "durvārā madaneṣavo" also, an expressed sense, without appearing inconsistent (bādhita) suggests the rasa. Mukula does not show why there should be anvayānupapatti of the express senses of the words. The dhvani theorists would explain that, there is no mukhyārtha-bādha. All that is had as express sense is really meant by the speaker. Here, there is no inconsistency in the nāyikā's calling the arrows of Cupid, etc., the five fires. Because it is a very natural way of stating things for such a nāyikā in the lovelorn condition. In these last two verses the iota of inconsistency that appears can be done away with by considering the fact that these are the words of the nāyaka and nāyikā, specially delineated by the poet with a special way of expressing ideas (Vide, p. 115, above). Compare also Mammaṭa in SVV. p. 5, "dṛṣṭiṁ he......duḥsahāḥ // ityatra ca nādeyapānīyānayanena parapuruṣasaṁbhogasya naḍagranthilekhanena saṁbhāvyamānanakhadaśanakṣatānāṁ ca nihnavātmakaṁ vastu, bhavān haririti rūpakālaṁkāraḥ vipralambhaśṛṅgāraśca raso lakṣyate iti nodāhāryam / mukhyārthasya bādhābhāvāt / ......ākśiptasyālaṁkārasya lakṣyatve ca bahnyānayane pātrānayanasya lakṣyatvaprasaṅgāt / abādhitasyaiva vācyasya rasapratītikṛttvāt /" The argument of Mammaṭa about the suggested alaṁkāra in "prāptaśrīreṣa" is

very interesting Mukula says that the doubts of the ocean are not consistent if we do not have the idea of the identification, because, that alone removes the sense of inconsistency in the express sense of doubts The counter argument is that we really have a lakṣyārtha when there is incongruity of the express sense But, do we again apply the secondary sense to bring consistency to the inconsistent express sense? Moreover, the inconsistency that Mukula finds in "prāptaśrīreṣa" is also not a very conspicuous one If there is any inconsistency here, then we should find an inconsistency also in the expression bahnyānayana, because, bahni cannot be brought with a bare hand So, to remove this inconsistency we must gather the secondary sense of bringing a pātra (i.e., a container of the fire) also according to the way of arguments of Mukula But we do not have any laksanā involved in the realisation of the sense of the expression "bahnyānayana." Similarly we must not drag in any lakṣyārtha to find consistency in the express sense of "prāptaśrīreṣa" The idea of rūpaka occurs to our mind only as the suggested sense.

Jayantabhaṭṭa and vyañjanā·

Jayanta is a very prolific Naiyāyika of the 9th century His words and arguments are repeated even by as great writers as Abhinava and Mammaṭa to their best advantage

Jayanta includes the śrutārthāpatti as in "pīno devadattaḥ divā na bhunkte" in anumāna. On the strength of the same arguments he discards the distinction of dhvani (i.e., suggestion) of the niṣedha in the verse "bhama dhammia" or of the vidhi in the verse "māsma pāntha gṛham viśa" from anumāna But significantly enough, scarcely introducing the argument for including dhvani in anumāna, he desists from any further argument with the poet. It may be conjectured here, that, while it is easy to include the suggestion of the matter of fact in anumāna, it is not easy to include rasa in anumāna even for Jayanta. Hence compare,

etena śabdasāmarthyamahimnā so'pi vāritaḥ /

× × × ×

athavā nedṛśī carcā kavibhiḥ saha śobhate /
vidvāṁso'pi vimuhyanti vākyārthagahane'dhvani //
tadalamanayā goṣṭhyā vidvajjanocitayā ciram
paramagahanastarkajñānāmabhūmirayaṁ nayaḥ /
(Nyāyamañjarī, Pramāṇa Prakaraṇa, p. 45).

Jagadīs'a and vyanjanā :

Jagadīśa Tarkālaṁkāra, the author of the Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā flourished in c. 1700, and by that time it was fully realised and established that rasa is a blissful state of the mind of the sahṛdaya himself. Possibly because of a recognition of this subjeetive aspect of rasa realisation, Jagadīśa had to introduce the conception of a 'mental cognition' (i.e., mānasabodha) at the cost of the vyañjanā function, which he endeavoured to dismiss in a manner represented below :

(1) In "mukhaṁ vikaśitam", etc., the idea of a fragrance of the mouth similar to that of the flower is suggested. The Ālaṁkārika cannot arrive at that meaning with lakṣaṇā because, there is no failure to have a syntactical relation between the primary meanings of the given words. (......upasthitārthānvayānupapattidhīrūpasya lakṣaṇābījasya tatrāsattvādityālaṁkārikā vadanti, SSP. p. 146). But Jagadīśa would like to have the suggested meaning also with the help of lakśaṇā; because, according to him the knowledge of the failure to have a syntactical relation between the primary meanings of the used words is not the only cause of lakṣaṇā. In "yaṣṭiḥ praveśaya" (Get in the lances), he says, there is apparently no inconsistency, but, yet we have lakṣaṇā.

(2) In case of the use of anekārthakaśabdas (i.e., homonyms), Ālaṁkārikas (like Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha) would have the additional meaning with vyañjanā. There is no scope of lakṣaṇā at all. Abhidhā also cannot operate to the

extent of the second meaning, since, it is arrested in respect of the first meaning itself by the prastāva (i e, context), etc

In reply to this contention Jagadīśa would say that, the restriction of tātparya or context, etc, should not be the reason for recognising an additional function called vyañjanā Because, according to Jagadīśa, the knowledge of the tātparya or the context, etc, is not the invariable requisites for the cognition of a verbal judgement As such the second meaning of the homonymous words also may be arrived at with abhidhā itself in the manner of having the first meaning Compare "tātparyadhiyo hetutvasya pūrvaṁ[53] parāstatvāt, ata eva prakaraṇādīnāmananugatānāṁ kvacidasattve'pi kṣatyabhāvāt" (SSP. p 151)


(3) Another argument of Jagadīśa is that, it is doubtful if we really have a second meaning from the homonymous words at all The knowledge of lack of tātparya in respect of the second meaning itself will hamper the cognition of the same Compare, "vastutaḥ .. tattadarthakaśabdasāmānyaṁ pratyeva tattadarthaniṣṭātparyakatvadhiyaḥ pratibandhakatvāt" (SSP. pp 152–153)

(4) Then, he continues that, if at all the idea of an additional meaning occurs to the mind, then, that must be recognised to have been derived through a mental process of an association of idea. For the relish (camatkāra) caused by kāvya, which can be explained as a variety of mental process itself may be as good a cause as the verbal cognition. Hence in respect of the suggested sense, either in the form of the second meaning of the homonyms or in the form of rasa (?), we need not take the word itself as the immediate antecedent. Instead, a mental reflection may be taken as its cause. That is how the additional vyañjanā function may be shown to be

53 "śabdaprāmāṇyavicāre nirastatvāt," Kṛṣṇakānti.

redundant. Compare, "tattadarthānāṁ yathā kathañcidupanayavaśena manasaiva viśiṣṭadhīsambhavāt mānorathikasukhaprabhedaparyyavasitaṁ camatkāraṁ pratyapi śābdasyeva mānasasyāpi bodhasya viśiṣya hetutāyāḥ suvacatvāt, atiriktasya vyañjanākhyapadārthāntarasya .. ..pramāṇavirahenāsattvācceti saṁkṣepaḥ" (SSP. pp. 153–154).

(5) According to Jagadīśa, only that is the meaning of the word which has the knowledge of the words as its invariable and immediate antecedent. (cf. "yatrānvayavyatirekābhyāmākāṅkṣādimattayā *śabdasyāvagamo hetuḥ*," etc., SSP. p. 7). But, it may be pointed out that, the mental reflection (mānasabodha) of Jagadīśa itself results from a cognition of words and as such the mānasabodha at least must be recognised as a meaning of the word, the knowledge of the word being invariably antecedent to it. It is, however, a matter of opinion as to whether the pleasure (camatkāra) and the reflections caused by the reading of kāvya can be recognised as meanings of words. If ideas (i.e., reflections) are closer to the words, then they may be explained as meanings of words. But if they are separated by a series of ideas, they may not be considered meanings of words. But the dhvani theorists themselves, who recognise a series of suggested senses in the verses like "viparīa suraa samae" or "ua ṇiccala," do not give us any definite limit to the communicative capacity of words. A similar question of the limit of ideas evoked by kāvya is discussed also in the next chapter under the heading *of "reflectional feelings."*



CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

See what the kavya actually suggests :

We have observed in the second chapter that, according to Ānanda, all the types of dhvani can appeal We may explain the appeal of all the good Kāvyas to be due to some predominant suggested sense Of the three main varieties of the suggested sense viz vastu, alamkāra and rasādi, vastu may be of innumerable types Of course, to make kāvya a dhvani, the suggested matter of fact must be predominant and most appealing Alamkāras, i e, the basic imaginations involved in the alamkāras may also be of many types The rasas are nine in number but they may also have innumerable sub-varieties according to the nature of the sthāyibhāva and the nature of the vibhāvas etc The same sthāyī rati, may be for the beloved or for the guru or the king or the child or the motherland, etc. Thus the same sthāyi bhāva may develop into different types of śrngāra rasa or different types of bhāva of the asamlakṣyakrama type. Along with these we must take into account the thirtythree vyabhicāribhāvas which being principally suggested in asamlaksyakrama may present different types of dhvani

Since there are innumerable things to be suggested in innumerable ways, we must be slow in naming the suggested sense of a particular kāvya. Particularly in time of determining the asamlakṣya krama vyangya of dhvani we must ask ourselves, if we are really having the corresponding feeling or emotion for it In other words, we should have the proper hṛdayasaṁvāda Let us take a concrete example. In the beginning of the Uttararāmacarita, Muralā says :

. vadhū-parityāgāt prabhṛti-

anirbhinno gabhīratvādantargūḍhaghanavyathaḥ /
puṭapākapratikāśo rāmasya karuṇo rasaḥ //
(III. 1; URC. p. 67).

As regards the expression 'Karuṇo rasaḥ' of the given verse commentator Vīrarāghava says, "Karuṇo rasaḥ iṣṭajana-viyoga-janya-duḥkhātiśayātmakarasaḥ." But although there is the mention of the term 'Karuṇo rasah' yet we must not suppose that this particular verse suggests Karuṇa rasa for the sahṛdayas. This verse which refers to a pathetic state of Rāma due to the separation from his beloved, in fact, suggests Muralā's sympathy for Rāma and generates a similar sympathetic feeling in the heart of the sahṛdaya also which may be best explained as a rati for Rāma. Since there is a suggestion of rati for one of the devādi class of Mammaṭa (KP. IV. 48), we must take the kāvya as a bhāva-dhvani. It should be noted that, here and in other similar cases, Bhavabhūti does not use the expression, 'Karuṇo rasaḥ' in the technical sense of Abinava.

Let me cite another example;

In URC. III. 47 (p. 99) Tamasā says :

"aho-saṁvidhānakam—

eko rasaḥ karuṇa eva nimittabhedād
bhinnaḥ pṛthakpṛthagivāśrayate vivartān /
āvarta-buḍ-buda-taraṅgamayān vikārān
ambho yathā salilameva hi tatsamastam //"

Here, commentators like Haridāsa Siddhānta-vāgīśa think that apparently there is doṣa due to naming the rasa by svaśabda. (Vide, URC. with his com. p. 222). Siddhānta-vāgīśa also tries to defend the doṣa in some precarious way. But to me it appears that there is no conspicuous doṣa in the verse even though the rasa is distinctly named. Because we must not jump to the abrupt conclusion that the verse suggests Karuṇa

rasa [54] In case of Karuna not being the principally suggested rasa, here, we cannot call its being named a doṣa. Ānanda also believes that we may determine the anitya dosas like śruti-duṣṭa, etc, only with reference to the principal rasa of the pieces (Dhv II 11 p 214) But the svaśabda-vācyatva, etc, are said to be direct defects of the rasa (Vide, SD I) Moreover, Viśvanātha observes that in certain cases the naming of the vyabhicāribhāvas may not be a doṣa, [55] but he does not say anything like that about the naming of rasa itself Hence, apparently it remains a doṣa But, in my opinion even in this case we must take into account the suggested sense desired to be principally conveyed by the poet We must, being in the position of a critic, see what the poet desires to be the principal sense of the piece Ānanda also says—"Vivakṣopārūdha eva hi kāvye śabdānāmarthaḥ" (Dhv III p 496)

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54 We find this eagerness to discover the presence of a suggested sense, which is not actually suggested, even in the earlier commentators Even as celebrated a commentator as Rāghavabhaṭṭa proceeds to discover the suggestion of Śṛṅgārarasa in Śakuntalā I, 1 because of the feminine gendre in all the eight forms, referred to as "yā" etc, and called "tanu," which may also mean lean and thin (kṛśā), giving the idea of the behaviour of a nāyaka (hero), who is in association with eight nāyikās (heroines), through Samāsokti of "atha ca yetyādi sarvatra strīliṅganirddeśāttanubhiḥ kṛśābhiriti samāsoktyāṣṭanāyikāyukata-nāyakavyavahārasamāropācchṛṅgārarasoʼpi vyajyate" (com. on Śakuntalā, I 1) Rāghava continues that suggestion of Śṛṅgāra in the very first verse is due to the presence of Śṛṅgāra as the principal rasa of the drama (tatpradhānatvādasya rūpakasya) But in my opinion, we can hardly have any *relish of* Śṛṅgāra rasa in this verse and, at best we may recognise here a matter of fact suggestion (vastudhvani) regarding the presence of Śṛṅgāra as the principal sentiment of the drama.

55. SD VII 29-30

And in the verse "eko rasaḥ" we find that the principally suggested sense is a rati (sympathy) for Rāma in the asaṁlakṣya-krama. Hence here is a bhāvadhvani. The apprehended karuna rasa being out of picture, the question of the doṣa does not occur. Moreover, the expression 'karuno raṣaḥ' does not diminish the relish of the suggested bhāva and hence the general definition of doṣa "rasāpakarṣakā doṣāḥ" (SD. VII. 1) does not apply here.

In this manner, we are to take sufficient caution in time of determining the suggested senses of dhvani. It is also to be remembered that a dhvani need not have a definite magnitude. Even muktakas (i.e., single verses with poetical beauty) may be considered as dhvanis due to the predominant and appealing rasādi suggested therein. Thus, the single verses of Amaruka (i.e., of the Amaruśataka) may be considered as very good specimens of dhvani (Dhv. p. 325). Then again even as large compositions as the Rāmāyaṇa or the Mahābhārata may be considered as dhvanis each, with reference to the principal rasa of the whole composition. Such long compositions may have different rasas suggested in different parts, but yet, one particular rasa should be principally suggested. (Dhv. Kārikā. III. 21, p. 378). With reference to such a principal rasādi the whole prabandha is a dhvani.

Applicability of the Theory :

That, the dhvani theory, if understood in its true spirit, may be applied for the literary criticism of all the genuine kāvyas may be shown by way of examining the views of a modern nonconformist writer. Thus, Dr. Rākeśagupta in his Introduction to PSR (p. 3) declares that a great convention of the Indian poetics has been broken by his new theory on poetic relish. In order to establish a new theory he shows a good deal of flaws in the conventional theory. But I will show here that his doubts can be solved and objections can be refuted by the contents of the conventional theories of Ānanda

and Abhinava themselves, and the same theories may be accepted as standards for literary criticism.

Dr Gupta writes in the Introduction—"Now it was but natural for the exponents of Rasa theory, who should have synthesized both the above sense of the terms, to make Rasa mean relish of the emotional literature only and to call a combination of the different factors operating in the portrayal of an emotion (Vibhāvas etc) the cause of its consummation ("vibhāvānubhāva vyabhicārisamyogād rasanispattih" NŚ, Chap VI) The earliest critics, however, could have reason to limit their theory of Kāvya Rasāsvāda (Relish of Poetry) to this extent, for, fixed as their attention was on the dramas alone, they sincerely believed that poetic relish consists solely in emotional appeal ("na hi rasādṛte Kaścidapyarthah pravartate," Ibid , Chap VI) But, the position of the later writers on poetics, who laid down unambiguously that poetry is not only the emotional kind, has been surely very unsafe in carrying on the old narrow tradition of Rasa theory" (pp. 2,3).

But, it must be noted here that, like the 'earlier critics, Ānanda also recognised that the relish of dramas consists solely in emotional appeal Compare Vṛtti p 326, "abhinayārthe tu sarvathā rasabandhe'bhiniveśah kāryah," etc What Dr Gupta means by "carrying on the old narrow tradition of Rasa theory" is vague. Abhinava presented his theory of rasa primarily while commenting on the NŚ, and as such in connection with the drama. He also referred to the theory of rasa, in the Locana, only in connection with rasādi as suggested Hence, his theory of rasa, cannot be expected to explain pleasure had *from all the varieties of kāvya As Dr.* Gupta himself observes—Ānanda also speaks of other varieties of kāvyas devoid of rasa, Ānanda does not carry on the narrow tradition of rasa-theory to explain all the varieties of Kāvya. There is also no justification in criticising and reshaping the theory of rasa as given by Abhinava and as anticipated by

Ānanda to explain the pleasure (or in the words of Dr. Gupta–interest) had from all the kāvyas.

A Word on sādhāraṇīkaraṇa :

Dr. Gupta says that generalization (sādhāraṇīkaraṇa) of characters and their mental conditions is psychologically impossible (Vide PSR. pp. 52, 53, 54, 62, 63, etc.). But it occurs and there is sufficient explanation for it in Abhinava's theory itself. It is also observed that, "unless he[56] clearly cognizes that it is love between Śakuntalā and Duṣyanta, he shall not at all follow the play all of which will only be Greek and Latin to him" (PSR. p. 55). But the view of the dhvani theorist is that, when the spectator gathers an information about the love between Duṣyanta and Śakuntalā that is merely a suggestion of matter of fact, i.e., a vastu-vyañjanā for him. The state of having the suggestion of such a matter of fact need not be confused with relish of rasa. But when at moments the realisation of rasa occurs, then there is cognizence of the rasa and rasa alone. In the given example ;there is rati for Śakuntalā generalized, if the spectator is male and rati for Duṣyanta if the spectator be a lady. This state refers to the 2nd. obstacle. This is an absorbed state of the mind i.e., a state of tanmayībhavana, according to Abhinava. It is very transitory, because, this state is 'vibhāvādijīvitāvadhiḥ' and is sure to be over soon along with the change or absence of vibhāvas, etc.; and in the play or in the poetry situations are gradually changing from one to another. In this connection we may refer with profit to an example of absorbed relish given by Abhinava himself (Vide, p. 163 above).

Dr. Gupta says—"We have seen......that it is not necessary that even an absorbed perceiver would not think of anything else during his perception of a literary phenomenon......etc." (PSR. p. 62). But, I contend that, just in the absorbed moment the perceiver would certainly not think of anything else.

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56. The spectator.

According to Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika the atomic mind cannot afford to do so—and according to modern psychology also—it is not possible on the part of the mind to get absorbed some where and to think of something else If at all the mind does so then it will not be called an absorption at all

On pp 63, 64, etc, of PSR, Dr Gupta presents further objections to the theory of generalization He questions, "The Anubhāvas etc suggest that the emotions are there, but how are they able to pass them on to the perceiver ?" In reply to this question it must first be clarified that when the perceiver gathers the information that, "the emotions are there," that would not be a case of suggestion of rasa but a case of suggestion of vastu, i e, a matter of fact Since it is a vastu-vyañjanā, a question as to the process of the emotions being passed to the perceiver does not arise Dr. Gupta further questions, "The Vibhāvas etc are directly related to the Āśraya or the character in whom the emotion resides, and not to the perceiver. How are they able to kindle the same emotion in the perceiver ?" The reply in brief is that it is due to hṛdaya-saṃvāda (i e, similarity of experience) and according to the theory, kāvya has the capacity (śakti) of suggestion (vyañjanā) which relegates or kindles the emotions in the heart of the reader who finds himself in the described situation. It is usual only with the kāvya and the occurrence of a similar emotion does not happen in the world (loka), that is why, this phenomenon of kāvya is called extraworldly (alaukika).

The problem of the villain :

Dr. Gupta further contends—"Also in actuality we do not find people experiencing the depicted emotions ... There is the villain, for instance, with whom a perceiver in his emotional moods feels displeased or antipathetic. Whenever this villain even attempts to make love with the heroine, he feels offended and annoyed; and wherever a misfortune befalls him, he feels a sort of satisfaction." etc. (p. 64). It happens so

because the emotions of the hero alone are relegated to the spectator or the reader. Just as in case of the male spectator there is the experience of Duṣyanta's rati for Śakuntalā—here is also the experience of the hero's (i.e., nāyaka's) antipathy for the villain (pratināyaka). Since the misfortune of the villain cannot make us sorry, his lamentations or the situation depicting his misfortune must not be supposed to suggest a karuṇa rasa for us. Instead, in that case we have the suggestion of a matter of fact, a vastu, a happy information that, the villain is experiencing sorrow.

Ānanda and also Bharata were cognizant of such situations. In Rāvaṇa's offering love to Sītā, Bharata would not like to have a suggestion of śṛṅgāra but 'hāsya'. Compare, Locana, p. 178. 'Śṛṅgārānukṛtiryātu sā hāsyaḥ iti muninā nirūpitam' etc. It is hāsya because the perceiver is almost sure that Rāvaṇa would be laughably repudiated. In other situations it may also cause disgust as apprehended by Dr. Gupta under the influence of the perceiver's sharing the emotions of the hero; for Rāvaṇa's offering love to Sītā would not certainly cause laughter to Rāma.

Ānanda refers to almost a similar situation in Vṛtti. pp. 374, 375. "kiṁ ca nāyakasyābhinandanīyodayasya kasyacit prabhāvātiśayavarṇane tatpratipakṣāṇāṁ yaḥ karuṇo rasaḥ sa parīkṣakāṇāṁ na vaiklavyamādadhāti pratyuta prītyatiśayanimittatāṁ *pratipadyata* ityatastasya kuṇṭha-śaktikatvāt tadvirodhavidhāyino na kaścid doṣaḥ," etc. The karuṇa rasa (strictly speaking the feeling of sorrow) of the pratināyaka gives satisfaction to the perceiver as observed also by Dr. Gupta. In the Vṛtti, 'kuṇṭhaśaktika' possibly implies that the feeling of sorrow as observed in the case of the pratināyaka is only a bit of information i.e., a vastu suggested, which augments the effect of vīrarasa and the consequent delight of the nāyaka and the sympathetic perceiver also. The feeling of sorrow, when not equally experienced by the perceiver also, does not rise to the level of rasa—according to the theory of Abhinava

and my assumption is that, Ānanda also takes it to be nothing more than a suggested vastu, seems to be supported by the Vṛtti, on p 377 "tadatra tripurayuvatīnām śāmbhavaḥ śarāgnirārdrāparādhaḥ kāmī yathā vyavaharati sma tathā vyavahṛtavān ityanenāpi prakāreṇāstyeva nirvirodhatvam," etc, where, the behaviour of the Kāmī, which, when relished could have been a rasa, is presented as a vastu, i e, a matter of fact

In the case of the villain and the hero, only one emotion i e, the emotion common to the hero alone is relished, but, Ānanda is puzzled with another case where two conflicting emotions belong to the same character Vide Vṛtti on pp 376-7 "athavā vākyārthībhūtasyāpi kasyacit karuṇarasaviṣayasya tādṛśena śṛngāra vastunā bhangiviśeṣāśrayeṇa saṃyojanam rasaparipoṣāyaiva jāyate / yataḥ prakṛtimadhurāḥ padārthāḥ śocanīyatām prāptāḥ prāgavasthābhāvibhiḥ saṃsmaryamāṇair vilāsair adhikataram śokāvesamupajanayanti / yathā ayam sa raśanotkarṣī, etc " Here both the feelings belong to the same āśraya—the nāyikā She feels in turn the emotions of śṛngāra and karuṇa Correspondingly the sympathetic perceiver also gets the relish of śṛngāra and karuṇa The sex of the nāyikā need not present an obstacle, because, the perceiver relishes rati and śoka in abstract form Ānanda aptly observes the efficacy of śṛngāra to augment the effect of karuṇa

A similar psychological phenomenon of an emotion being intensified through contrast is observed also by Keats in his 'Happy Insensibility' (Golden Treasury, IV p 29) Compare also Bhāsa's,

'sukham hi duḥkhānyanubhūya śobhate
ghanāndhakāreṣviva dīpadarśanam /
sukhāttu yo yāti naro daridratām
dhṛtaḥ śarīreṇa mṛtaḥ sa jīvati //' (Cārudatta, I)

'Component feelings of poetic relish'

Dr Gupta observes—' Poetic Relish is a mental phenomenon and is composed of the feelings which are evoked in the

mind of the perceiver as psychological reaction to his perception of poetry. Feelings thus evoked cannot always correspond with the emotion depicted in poetry" (PSR. p. 83). His complaint seems to be that the traditional theory of rasa realisation is not competent to explain the phenomenon of such component feelings. My reply is that, such feelings may occur, but all of such feelings need not be expected to be explained by the traditional theory of rasa realisation. The dhvani theory can be applied for explaining the occurrence of such feelings to a great extent. Some of such feelings are so casual and accidental that the theory in general is not responsible for them. Let me consider those feelings one by one.

Sympathetic feeling :

Dr. Gupta observes, "It should be carefully noted that to feel sympathy does not mean to feel the exact emotion of the person or the character, with whom sympathy is felt. When we see a person in misery, what we mostly feel is pity and not miserableness" (p. 84). Dr. Gupta's word 'mostly' itself indicates that sometimes we also feel miserableness. In that case that is the suggestion of karuṇarasa i.e., a relish of rasa. But when we feel sympathetic, that is the suggestion of bhāva. Because, as observed by Mammaṭa, love *or affection for gods* etc., is called a bhāva. Compare, "ratirdevādiviṣayā vyabhicāri tathāñjitaḥ bhāvaḥ proktaḥ" (KP. IV). Here the word 'ādi' includes muni, guru, nṛpa, putra etc., also. Bhāva falls under rasādi and must be fit to be explained by the theory of rasaniṣpatti which requires sādhāraṇīkaraṇa of the rati. Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa being a relative term requires some one other than the perceiver to share the emotion. In most cases it is the poet himself, with whom the emotion primarily occurs, (cf. Dhv. p. 318. "tanniyame heturaucityaṁ vaktṛvācyayoḥ / tatra vaktā kaviḥ kavinibaddho vā, etc."). The poet need not be physically present; even in his absence he may be deemed to be physically present and the emotion is generalised and shared

with him Example, "The Bridge of Sighs" by T Hood, where we feel the poet to be the sympathetic speaker (Golden Treasury, IV, p. 71)

Antipathetic feeling

To illustrate this feeling, Dr Gupta writes, "We feel only hatred and anger when we find the villain trying to win the love of the heroine by all fair and foul means, and laugh when he is slapped by the dauntless maiden chaste to her real lover" (PSR p 85) It may be noted here that, Dr Gupta comprehends different emotions under the term of antipathetic feeling As in the given example, the so called antipathetic feeling may be broken into the emotions of hatred or anger and laughter. When it is the feeling of hatred there is jugupsā leading to vibhatsa and in case of anger there is the relish of raudra rasa and in case of laughter there is hāsya rasa

Recollection or Reminiscential feelings : (Vide PSR pp. 85, 86)

The cases given by Dr. Gupta, would present the cases of the third obstacle of rasa realisation The Sanskrit original for the 3rd obstacle is 'nija sukhādivivaśībhāvah ' When in time of the perception there occurs nijasukhādivivaśībhāva, according to the theory, there cannot be a relish of rasa. When a perceiver is finding similarity of the situation with the past events of his life he is no longer a sahṛdaya in the strict sense of the term Moreover, these effects of kāvya discovered by Dr Gupta are not universal and invariable Such effects are only casual with certain perceivers. Hence these feelings, though not altogether deniable, cannot be taken as determining factors (lakṣana) of a kāvya. Moreover, the kāvya cannot be taken as the immediate, unconditional and invariable antecedent of such feelings. The perceivers certainly do not aim at having such feelings from the perception of kāvya. Above all, these feelings, although they occur in case

of certain perceivers, cannot disprove of some pleasure had from the perception of the same kāvya.

Feeling pertaining to curiosity : (Vide, PSR. pp, 86–87).

This curiosity can be explained as 'āvega' or better as 'autsukya' of the conventional theorists. These are vyabhicāribhāvas and as such can be principally suggested and relished. In the detective novels as illustrated by Dr. Gupta there may also be a good amount of 'vismaya'–giving rise to the adbhutarasa.

Reflectional feelings : (Vide PSR. pp. 87, 88).

These feelings 'set us to think about a problem connected with some aspect of life.' "Evocation of such feelings and the like has become very frequent in the modern times with the growth of such species in contemporary literature as problems and satire plays and novels, which either suggest to the perceiver a social, political or economical problem or ridicule a prevalent malpractice of the soceity." Here the observation of Dr. Gupta is quite perfect; but he does not give a clear description of what this feeling is. Since the 'feelings set us to think'—the thinking itself cannot be a feeling. The feeling precedes the thinking. So let us repeat his example, "when we see an unfortunate accomplished girl......committing suicide......we may grow critical towards this evil conventional practice of our soceity and may either feel a strong urge to root it out or brood over the problem to find an effective solution to it."

'Growing critical towards the evil of our soceiety' can be explained as 'jugupsā' for the society and may be said to be a case of vibhatsarasa ('doṣekṣaṇādibhirgarhā jugupsā'). 'Feeling of the strong urge to root out the evil' is utsāha giving the relish of vīrarasa. 'The brooding over the problem' is cintā, a vyabhicāribhāva giving the relish of bhāva ("dhyānaṁ cintā hitānāpteḥ śūnyatāśvāsatāpakṛt"). These are to be taken

as rasa and bhāva only if these are felt while the perception of the vibhāvas, etc , are there (Cf Vibhāvādijīvitāvadhih, etc) If we are set to these feelings after we finish the perception then as in the previous case we would not possibly take the kāvya as the immediate cause, and if any pleasure and pain occur because of these feelings, later on, the theory would not think them to have any relation with poetic relish

When a social problem is suggested as such, that is nothing other than vastudhvani

It must be noted here that even in time of the traditional theorists themselves there were kāvyas giving rise to such 'reflectional feelings' Even Ānanda cognized a didactic aspect of poetry Compare, Vrtti, pp 398-399 'sadācāropadeśarūpā hi nāṭakādigoṣṭhī vineyajana hitārthameva munibhiravatāritā' etc

Critical feelings (PSR pp 88, 89)

Dr Gupta discovers certain critical feelings Let me reproduce his examples,—"A particular arrangement of words, the use of a particular poetic figure or some such other things may be sometimes felt by us as excellent or worthless"

It must be admitted that this component feeling 'may' occur But if we feel certain aspect of the kāvya as worthless that may be due to our individual taste, and thus it may not be an invariable characteristic of kāvya When it is generally felt, it is certainly a blemish, a doṣa It should be avoided and the conventional theory also desires the avoidance of blemishes The psychological aspect of a doṣa is also noticed by the theory A doṣa is that which hampers in the realisation of rasa (rasāpakarṣakā doṣāh. SD VII 1) But for understanding what poetry is, or in other words, for explaining what poetic relish is, the presence of doṣa (i e , worthless aspect of poetry) need not necessarily be taken into account Viśvanātha very convincingly deals with the question in course of criticising Mammaṭa's definition of Kāvya Cf "sati sambhave

īṣaddoṣāviti cet / etadapi kāvyalakṣaṇe na vācyaṁ, ratnādi-lakṣaṇe kīṭānuvedhādiparihāravat / na hi kīṭānuvedhādayo ratnasya ratnatvaṁ vyāhantumīśāḥ kintu upādeyatāratamya-meva kartum / tadvadatrāpi śrutidūṣṭādyaḥ kāvyasya" etc. (SD. I.).

When we feel the arrangement of words, etc., as excellent that will contribute to the camatkāra or camatkṛti,[57] which we have from the kāvya. Only in so far as this feeling, i.e., recognition of excellence contibutes to the camatkṛti, it can be included in the purview of poetic relish. The traditional theorists were also cognizant of such excellences. Compare Viśvanātha's remarks on his definition of anuprāsa—'svara-mātra-sādṛśyantu vaicitryābhāvānna gaṇitam' (S. D. X). If we are to explain the appreciation of excellence as something independent of camatkṛti then, I am afraid, many more feelings remotely related or hardly related with the poetic relish also will have to be included within the scope of poetic relish.

Thus in my opinion Dr. Gupta's objections may be shown to be unfounded and most of his novel ideas may be explained in terms of the much despised traditional theory itself.

Purpose of kāvya :

In the dhvani school of poetics the aims of kāvya are examined from two angles of view, viz. the poet's and that of the reader. There can be no difference of opinion with the dhvani school which states that kāvya brings fame and wealth to the poet. The aims of kāvya, as observed from the stand point of the reader are viz. pleasure (i.e., prīti) and knowledge (i.e., vyutpatti). But the dhvani theory recognises prīti as the chief goal. Abhinava observes : "śrotṛṇāṁ ca vyutpatti-prītī yadyapi staḥ.........tathāpi tatra prītireva pradhānam"

57. Camatkāra is the unworldly pleasure derived from the reading of kāvya. It is also called as ramaṇīyatā or lokottarāhlāda by Jagannātha in RG. I. Vide chapter III above for Abhinava's conception of camatkāra.

(Locana, p. 40) Because of considering prīti as the main aim of kāvya, the dhvani theorists give the status of the best kāvya to the single stanzas of Amaru, which are decidedly devoid of any moral lesson.[58] And, really the miniature poems of Amaru are exquisite pieces of art. Amongst the followers of the dhvani theory, Mammaṭa for the first time classified kāvya into three grades, viz., uttama (best), madhyama (mediocre) and adhama (worst) From his definition of uttama we simply learn that it should have a predominant suggested sense. In other words dhvani is said to be the best type of kāvya. But this classification refers only to the form (i e, technique) of kāvya but not to the contents. Mammaṭa does not tell us that the standard of kāvya may vary according to the quality of the contents also

Ānandavardhana does not explicitly speak of the quality of contents. But from his treatment of aucitya in the third uddyota we gather that, according to him poetry must not propagate deplorable ideas.[59] What we can gather from a study of the theory is that, according to it dhvani is a good art. The theory is immediately concerned only with the artistic (or say aesthetic) aspect of kāvya. But, the same good art may be a great art if the contents be of a higher order. The greatness is undoubtedly due to the instructive aspect of the kāvya, which may be designated as the śāstric aspect as only the technical works and the Vedas, meant for imparting instructions are called śāstra.[60] In my opinion, Ānanda draws a

58. Vide, HSL Keith p. 183 and Dhv. III, p. 326.

59. cf. "tasmādabhineyārthe'nabhineyārthe vā kāvye yaduttamaprakṛte rājāderuttamaprakṛtibhirnāyikābhiḥ saha grāmyasambhogavarṇanaṁ tatpitroḥ sambhogavarṇanamiva sutarāmasabhyam," etc., Dhv. p 332.

60. cf. KP. Vṛtti on I. 2 "prabhusammitaśabdapradhānavedādiśāstrebhyaḥ" and Bhaṭṭanāyaka's, "śabdaprādhānyamāśritya tatra śāstraṁ pṛthagviduḥ," (Quoted in Locana, p. 87), etc.

line of demarcation between these two aspects (i.e., the śāstric and the artistic or aesthetic or poetic aspect) when he explains the presence of śāntarasa in the Mahābhārata. When the Mahābhāratata is considered only as a śāstra and the relish of rasa caused by it is not taken into account, we find that, the most important suggestion of it is that, 'mokṣa (i.e., salvation) is the highest goal of human life.' When we consider the Mahābhārata as a kāvya, we find that its most predominant suggested sense is the śānta rasa which is 'an excess of bliss on account of loss of desires.' Compare, "tadevamanukramaṇīnirdiṣṭena vākyena bhagavadvyatirekiṇaḥ sarvasyānyasyānityatāṁ prakāśayatā mokṣalakṣaṇa evaika paraḥ puruṣārthaḥ, śāstranaye, kāvyanaye ca tṛṣṇākṣayasukhaparipoṣalakṣaṇaḥ śānto raso mahābhāratasyāṅgitvena vivakṣita iti supratipāditam" (Dhv. IV. p. 433). [61]

A similar distinction between the good art and great art may be observed in the writings of Walter Pater who observes in the Rennaissance as follows : "Only be sure it is passion— that it does yield you this fruit of a quickened, multiplied conciousness. Of such wisdom, the poetic passion, the desire of beauty, the love of art for its own sake, has most. For art comes to you proposing frankly to give nothing but the highest quality to your moments as they pass, and simply for those moments' sake." [62] But this speaks only for his con-

61. That the distinction is based on the presence or absence of a relish caused by the reading of the same kāvya is pointed out by Abhinava as follows : "tatrāsvādayogābhāve puruṣeṇārthyata ityayameva vyapadeśaḥ sādaraḥ, camatkārayoge tu rasavyapadeśa iti bhāvaḥ" (Locana, p. 533). It may also be noted here that Ānanda introduces the whole discussion by stating that the Mahābhārata is a śāstra having the colour of a kāvya. Cf. "mahābhārate' pi śāstrarūpe kāvyacchāyānvayini......mokṣalakṣaṇaḥ puruṣārthaḥ śānto rasaśca mukhyatayā vivakṣāviṣayatvena sūcitāḥ" (Dhv. IV. p. 530).

62. The Renaissance, pp. 238-239.

ception of good art The greatness of poetry is said to be dependent on the quality of its contents Cf " the distinction between great art and good art depending immediately, as regards literature at all events, not on its form, but on the matter Thackeray's Esmond, surely, is greater art than Vanity Fair, by the greater dignity of its interests It is on the quality of the matter it informs or controls, its compass, its variety, its alliance to great ends, or the depth of the note of revolt, or the largeness of hope in it, that the greatness of literary art depends, as the Divine Comedy, Paradise Lost, Les Misérables, the English Bible, are great art "[63]

Even granting that kāvya may have an instructive utility it must not be out and out a propaganda It must primarily be an art, appealing not to the intellect but to the heart For rendering the composition a genuine art the poet must delineate the basic human feelings Even the instructive purpose can be best served only when the kāvya is more appealing and more artistic That is why Ānanda recognises the kāvya having the delineation of the śṛṅgāra rasa (i e, erotic sentiment) as the best medium for imparting instructions Cf "śṛṅgārarasāṅgairunmukhīkṛtāh santo hi vineyāh sukham vinayopadeśān gṛhṇanti" etc (Dhv III pp 398-399) The necessity of depicting the basic human feelings like that of love in poetry cannot be gainsaid even by the communist movement as it is evidenced from the following words of Alexander Kirillov, a Russian writer

"Yes, now as then the moon will shine down on the world and lovers will always sit hand in hand, cheek to cheek, gazing at the moon And what about the poet ? After all, they will sit and gaze just as they did three thousand years ago "[64]

It may be finally noted that, even when kāvya is taken to be imparting some lesson, the lesson must lead to dharma and

63 Appreciations Style

64 Soviet Literature, 1951, No. 9 p. 147.

mokṣa. Abhinava very rightly observes that the ultimate result of all the four goals of life, viz., dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa, is pleasure. Hence, pleasure is the ultimate aim even of the instructive kāvya. Cf. "caturvargavyutpatterapi cānanda eva pāryantikaṁ mukhyaṁ phalam" (Locana, p. 41).

Pleasure is the chief end of kāvya :

In the foregoing section we have observed that Ānanda has a preference for the śṛṅgāra rasa. Does it mean that some rasas are more pleasurable than the other ? This question is indeed raised by some traditional writers also. Dr. Raghavan informs us that Rudrabhaṭṭa, the author of Rasakalikā (which is yet in manuscript form) holds that, 'some rasas are pleasurable and some are painful.' "The Nāṭyadarpaṇa also says in s. 109 (p. 158) sukhaduḥkhātmako rasaḥ and proceeds to elaborately prove in the vṛtti that some rasas are certainly painful and that our seeing them and enjoying them is really due to the excellence of the art of either the dramatist or of the art of the actors." [65] But, that, not to speak of other rasas, even karuṇarasa gives as much pleasure as may be given by śṛṅgāra, may be inferred from the fact that the people do have almost the same desire to read kāvyas having both the types of rasa. From the very fact of their desire to go through a tragedy knowingly, we may infer that they find pleasure in reading the same. Because it is the normal nature of human beings to undertake to do only what is pleasurable. This is observed by Gotama also, as follows : "idaṁ sukhasādhanamiti jñātvā sukhāptaye pravartate, idaṁ duḥkhasādhanamiti cādhigamya duḥkhahānayeti / sukhaduḥkhayoravāptihānābhyāmayaṁ lokaḥ prayujyata iti" (Uddyotakara's Nyāyasūtravārttika, I. 1. 24). Dr. Rākeśagupta does not believe in this logic. He observes that it is a "wrong pre-supposition that we undertake to do only pleasing things" and with so many examples endeavours to show that people take interest also in

65. Number of Rasas, p. 159.

unpleasent affairs He gives the example of the people who collect *round the spot of a motor accident causing the death* of a young man who leaves behind a young widow married only a month ago Seeing the sad incident and knowing more and more about the extent of tragedy they feel pain But, "inspite of all the pain that they are having they are still ready to welcome and to hear with interest any other detail about him, even though it may add to their sympathetic sorrow," he observes [66]

In reply to Dr Gupta's contention, it may be pointed out that the people do not like the tragic accident itself and as such the accident and the tragedy are painful and cause duhkha But they have 'interest' in 'knowing' more and more about the deceased and his relatives This knowing part of the activity is pleasent and that is evidenced by the 'interest' discovered also by Dr Gupta Will the people say that they want to know more in order to get more pain ? Or, why should we assume that the further informations relating to the deceased will give them only pain and not relief The people in fact make the enquiries to get a relief from the pain by learning, if possible, that the extent of the tragedy is not very great. But above all, do men want more and more such accidents to occur because they want to get interested in more and *more of such tragedies ?*

They do not. Because on the long run it does not give pleasure. But the case of kāvya is just the reverse Will any sahṛdaya be *unhappy to learn that a new author of* Shakespeare's or Saratchandra's talent is writing new volumes of high class tragedy ?

A new approach to Karuna rasa

It will be interesting to note here that K. N Watwe offers a new theory to solve the problem of the karuna rasa. According to him Karuna "is only a derived emotion arising in the

66 Vide, PSR. pp. 76-77

course of the operation of a strong impulse of attachment under certain conditions. The fact that *Karuṇa Rasa* is partly or wholly enjoyable cannot be gainsaid. What the sorrowing person does, in his woe, is that he dwells on his subject of attachment, remembers the many occasions of affection, recollects his virtues and admires his excellences that evoked his attachment for him. It is neither the event of death nor a long seperation from a beloved person, nor the sorrow evoked by such an occasion, but it is rather the love for the person that is at the bottom of the pleasure."

The author furthor observes :

"When the same object of love is placed in different conditions, love gives rise to different derived emotions. It gives rise to despair, when it is beyond hope of recovery and to soarow, when it is completely lost. If there be any pleasure in thinking of the object under those conditions and in inducing the desired emotions named above, it is due to the fact that the person, every time, has an occasion to revolve in his mind the emotion of love for the object." [The Problem of the Karuṇa Rasa and its solution, P. K. Gode Com. Vol. Part. II, pp. 468-470 .

In consideration of this new solution, we may observe that, if the recollection of the earlier associations with the object of love should give pleasure of the relish of Karuṇa Rasa, then that should hold good even in the ordinary world. But to have any amount of pleasure in the case of a worldly sorrow (śoka) is *normally* impossible. But in the case of the *relish* of karuṇa rasa, in the realm of poetry alone, we can pass on to a state of *aesthetic* pleasure through the experience of a sorrow. The theorists who opine that all the rasas lead to an aesthetic pleasure also acknowledge that śoka consists of an unalloyed sorrow. But through rumination (carvaṇā) that very sorrow (śoka) *becomes* Karuṇa Rasa and gives pleasure in the manner of the painful bitings in the time of an erotic dalliance leading

to an inexplicable joy. Since in the ordinary life emotion of love for the lost object does not make the sorrowful situation pleasurable, in poetry also we must account for the pleasure in some other way The sorrowful is equally sorrowful both in the ordinary world and in the poetry But in the latter we pass on from the ordinary experience to a state of aesthetic experience, where there is the unalloyed bliss

In reply to the view of the Nāṭyadarpana, referred to earlier, it can easily be pointed out that the pleasure derived in case of Karuna Rasa is not due to any appreciation of the dramatist or the actor, for, in time of the aesthetic relish of even the Karuna Rasa, the absorbed spectator cannot afford to think of the dramatist or the actor or any thing out side the dramatic situation which has a mesmeric effect on his mind

Dhvani Theory and the New Poetry :

The dhvani theory has a utility for us even in the contemporary phase of literary development as it serves a very appropriate defence also for the New Poetry.[66] By new poetry, I mean the type of poetry produced by the twentieth century poets like Eliot and Empson of England and Mallarme,

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66 In the 20th century drama also a technique of suggesting ideas through the use of symbols is very largely employed by the dramatists like Tennessee Williams of America For example, in his first success, *The Glass Menagerie*, "Williams has shown how a cripple girl, Laura, nurses the illusion of her own fragile childhood through a collection of little glass animals, one of which is different from the others by having a horn When this horn is broken, she sees the symbol as her chance to live an ordinary life" (TTD p 195) This shows how suggestion has come to be honoured also in the stage But I do not propose to deal with this suggestive trend of the modern drama as it relates to physical symbols. The suggestive language of the drama, however, comes under the context of suggestive poetry itself

Rilke and many of the continent.[67] In India the new trend has come to the poetry of the regional languages like Assamese, Bengali and Hindi as a result of the overwhelming impact of the modern western poets particularly Eliot. Writers like Abu Sayeed Ayyub[68] clearly show how the *modern* Bengali poets like Jivanananda, Bishnu De, Sudhindranath and Amiya Chakravarty are influenced by the different aspects of the new poetry of the west. The young modern Assamese poet also writes more with contemporary western thought in his bones than with his own literary heritage. In the expression of the new poets we find the echo of the western contemporaries. Their 'moon-light' darkness and tears give out odours,' the 'sun teases with shrieks', their 'sky is soft' and their 'earth is rough like the rough skin of an old man,' etc., appear like echoes from the poetry of Dame Edith Sitwell or Rilke. "In the poetry of Hem Kanta and Navakanta one notices the adoption of images, symbols and music such as one meets with in the poetry of Baudelaire, Paul Valery, Stephenne

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67. These new poets are classified under the different group designations such as the Imagists, the Satirists, the Metaphysicals, the Left-Wingers, the Symbolists, the Surrealists and the New Apocalyptics according to their poetical ideals and contents. But in respect of the diction and employment of suggestion they may all be discussed under the general designation of new poets. For example, in Hindi, as far as the content is concerned, the Pragativādī poety is based on the Marxian ideology and the Prayog(a)vādī poetry hinges on the Freudian psycho-analysis. But as far as the metre, diction and figures are concerned, both the schools show almost similar trends. (Ādhunik Hindī Kavitā-men Prem Aur Saundarya, pp. 442–440). We may bring both these types of modern Hindī poetry under the head of "New poetry" since we are concerned with their way of communication irrespective of the ideal communicated.

68. Vide his 'Modern Bengali Poetry' (Longman's Miscellany, 1943), or Dr. Dipti Tripathy's "Ādhunik Bangla Kāvya Paricaya."

Mallarme and Rainer Maria Rilke" "Navakanta has been influenced more deeply by T S Eliot than by others Like Eliot he also believes that poetry requires a language rich in suggestions both to senses and the intellect' [69]

The most notable characteristic of the new poetry under the context of the dhvani theory is its technique of communication Because, the language of the new poetry is also suggestive This diction is also variously called symbolical, oblique and ambiguous But while the votaries of the new poetry demand that the suggestive language is the only language for the new poetry some critics like Richards, Ogden, Tillyard and Empson endeavour to discover a special role played by suggestivity in the poetry of all ages

We may remember that Ānandavardhana was also inspired to formulate his theory on dhvani because he observed the predominant presence of suggestion in the bulk of poetry already present before him since the days of Rāmāyana, the ādikāvya Cf " atha ca rāmāyana mahābhārataprabhṛtini lakṣye sarvatra prasiddhavyavahāram lakṣyayatām sahṛdayanāmānando manasi labhatām pratiṣṭhāmiti prakāśyate' (Dhv p 38) and " lakṣye tu parikṣyamāne sa eva sahṛdayahṛdayāhlādakāri kāvyatattvam" (Dhv pp 106-107) We may also remember the case of the Irish symbolist W B Yeats, who emulated in his own poetry the suggestive art of the earlier poets In the *Autumn of the Body* he described (in 1898) how he found 'in the art of every country those faint lights and faint colours and faint outlines and faint energies" to which he had himself turned It is also interesting to learn that 'Shelley's poetry became palatable to him only when he realised the symbolism inherent in the recurrent images of leaves, boats, stars, caves, the moon In his own verse the rose, white birds foam, the wind, became means

69 'Assamese Poetry To day' by Dr B K. Barua (Hindusthan Standard, Puja Annual, 1959)

of conjuring moods rather than sensations." (TMP. p. 30). It hardly requirs to be pointed out that the forms of literature which could evoke sentiment were unquestionable cases of suggestive kāvya (i.e., dhvani). Other forms of literature, such as allegory and satire, which were there from earlier times, also presented cases of suggestion. Satire as a rule, is so rich in suggestion that its very designation is "vyaṅgya" (i.e., suggestion) in Assamese, Bengali or the Hindi language. Leroux, a French critic, defined allegory, in 1834, as "a discourse, or in general a sign expressing something other than what it states directly......In this sense, *metaphor, symbol, myth*, are but different degrees of allegory" (IPF. p. 222). Regarding the suggestive element of the other types of poetical composition of even the early 17th century Margaret Gilman observes —"The abundant production of odes and elegies during the early seventeenth century is marked by frequent preciosity, a wealth of versified maxims, often allied indeed with a wit and charm, *a concise and suggestive quality*,. which have won for it in recent years a revival of popularity somewhat akin to that achieved by the English Metaphysical poets." (IPF. p. 4). But a tendency for the deliberate employment of only the suggestive language evolved as a theory in the west only in the middle of the *19th century as it is evidenced by the* following observation of the French critic Sainte-Beuve, who wrote in 1866 :

"Today we want something different. For us the greatest poet is the one who in his works has given the reader the most to .imagine and to dream about, who has most moved him to be himself a poet. The greatest poet is not the one whose work is the most accomplished : he is the one who suggests the most, with whom at first one does not grasp entirely all that he has meant to say and express, and who leaves one much to ask, to explain, to study, much for one to finish. There is nothing like these incomplete and inexhaustible poets to arouse and foster our admiration; for hence forth

we want poetry to be in the reader almost as much as in the author Since criticism was born and has grown up, since it has invaded everything, has outdone everything, it cares little for poetic works bathed in a clear and perfect light, it will have nothing to do with them The vague, the obscure, the difficult, if they are combined with some greatness, are what it prefers It must have material which it may itself construct and work on For its own part it is far from displeased at having its skein to untangle, and at being given from time to time, if I may say so, a tricky job to do It is not displeased at feeling that it has its share in a creative work" (IPF pp 200–201)

The following observation on these lines of Sainte Beuve also deserves quotation

"Here are the words which were to recur so often in symbolist theory "imagine," "dream," "vague," "obscure," "difficult," and above all "suggest" For it seems to me that the great poetic change which took place about the middle of the century can be summed up as a passage from a poetry of statement to a poetry of suggestion The change is not so clear-cut, to be sure, as Sainte-Beuve's passage implies Surely all great poetry, even all good poetry, is to some extent suggestive, in the sense that it implies more than the literal and prosaic meaning of the words" (IPF, p 201)

In her notes (IPF, p 304) Margaret Gilman refers also to the observation of Tillyard that "All poetry is more or less oblique, there is no direct poetry" (Vide suprā, p 150) Margaret Gilman's observation that suggestion is a mark of all great poetry, it is hoped, would lead the reader to recall Ānandavardhana's observation in the context of the Citra presented in p 148 above

The new poets employ different devices to make their poetry suggestive, to communicate what cannot be communicated in the ordinary language The new poetry in India also

betrays the same trends in technique and texture. But it is very interesting to note that the most of the devices employed for an oblique communication and even the evils of the new technique may have parallels in the very many concepts of the dhvani theory. [70]

The reason for employing an indirect suggestive language in the new poetry was very lucidly given by T. S. Eliot in the following lines in 1921.

"We can only say that it appears likely that poets in our civilisation, as it exists at present, must be difficult. Our civilisation comprehends great variety and complexity and their variety and complexity, playing upon refined sensibility, must produce various and complex results. The poet must become more and more comprehensive, more allusive, more indirect in order to force, to desolate if necessary, language in to his meaning. [71]

It is also observed that the ambiguous language of the new poetry is effective not only in respect of conveying complex ideas but also in respect of suggesting and evoking complex emotions. Compare : "......a poetry which by means of myths and symbols seems to convey rather than to describe the ex-

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70. The Imagists (1908–1917) in England, for example, rigorously demanded precision of expression and introduced the doctrine of the image. Ezra Pound, one of the chief Imagists, defined Image as "that which presents an intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of time" (TMP. p. 81). Herbert Read, another chief Imagist wrote that" the Image discovers one thing with the help of another, and by their resemblance makes the unknown known. But it is not a logical resemblance" (CS. p. 172). An examination of the use of the Images is expected to show that it presents cases of vastudhvani in the manner of Aprastutapraśaṁsā.

71. Selected Essays. p. 289.

tremely complex, emotional and intellectual state whence an experience similar to that of the poet will arise." [72]

The conventional language is not adequate for achieving this end of conveying complex ideas and emotions. Hence new words are coined. Words are employed to convey an entirely new import The statement may even appear to be, logically speaking, obviously incorrect. [73] Poets like Edith Sitwell attribute unusual sensations and experiences to the different sense organs [74] All the devices like these may be explained in terms of the two varieties of the avivakṣitavācya type of dhvani and Edith Sitwell's queer sensibilities may find parallel in expressions like "niḥśvāsāndha ivādarśaḥ candramā na prakāśate" [75] (Dhv. p 172). Symbols, allusions and quotations employed for conveying greater volumes of ideas also may be explained, in most cases, as cases of vastudhvani

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72 Contemporary French Poetry, p 1.

73. Word p 208

74. "But the most distinctive feature of her style in these years was in her use of sense impressions. She often gave to one sense the attributes of another as had been done by Milton in the famous phrase "blind mouths" in Lycidas In particular what we see she often described in terms of hearing, as in "crackling green," "braying light," "jangling rain," or, in reverse, "the brass band's snorting stabs the sky" A S. Collins, (English Literature of the Twentieth Century, p 86).

75 We can admit a lakṣaṇā and then an avivakṣitavācya type of dhvani in Edith Sitwell's 'Crackling green,' for example, in the matter of the perception of the green only if we do not admit the possibility of an auditory perception of the green in the manner of jñānalakṣaṇa perception (referred to above, p. 199) In "surabhi candanaṁ paśyāmi" the surabhi (fragrance) may belong to the candana But here we must yet admit a lakṣaṇā as crackling does not normally belong to the green.

But in employing allusions, quotations and symbols, etc., the new poets utilise such a wide range of their learning and so strange and outlandish intellectual references that the contents become quite out of the grasp of the ordinary reader. The desire of the new poets to convey greater amount of information and more complex emotions results in an undesirable obfuscation of the message. Some critics link Mallarme's obscurity simply to his ambition to be concise.[76] And what is all the more deplorable is that some new poets create difficulty simply for the sake of difficulty as a religion.

Happily, along with the development of the technique of the new poetry an opinion against its obscurity also has gained ground both in respect of the western poetry [77] and its Indian counterpart. But the pioneers of the new poetry are themselves conscious of this possible complaint. And indeed, along with an apology for their obscurity they also present a commentary of their own to their own compositions as did Eliot do in case of his Waste Land and Empson does in case of his Collected Poems. Eliot not only recognised but also duly analysed the question of difficulty of the new poetry as may be evidenced from the following observation in the "Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism." [78]

"......The difficulty of poetry (and modern poetry is supposed to be difficult) may be due to one of several reasons.

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76. Word. p. 212.

77. Compare the following remark on Hopkins, who is found to have considerably influenced the modernists in England—"We may forgive his use of dialect words and invented words, but not his maltreatment of order and syntax—not such tmeses as "wind lily locks—laced," such contortions as, "Commonwel, Little I reck ho ! lacklevel in, if all had bread" (A Critical History of English Poetry. p. 508).

78. The numbers are inserted by me.

(1) First there may be personal causes which make it impossible for a poet to express himself in any but an obscure way. (2) Or difficulty may be due just to novelty we know the ridicule accorded in turn to Wordsworth, Shelley and Keats, Tennyson and Browning—but must remark that Browning was the first to be called difficult, (3) Or difficulty may be caused by the reader's having been told, or having suggested to himself that the poem is going to be difficult (4) difficulty, caused by the author's having left out something which the reader is used to finding, so that the reader, bewildered, gropes about for what is absent, and puzzles his head for a kind of 'meaning' which is not there and is not meant to be there" (pp 150–151)

What is observed by Eliot under point 1, may be explained as "aśaktikṛtadoṣa (i e, a defect due to poet's want of genius) of Ānanda referred to in the parikaraśloka,—

"avyutpattikṛto doṣaḥ śaktyā saṁvriyate kaveḥ /
yastvaśaktikṛtastasya sa jhaṭityavabhāsate //" (Dhv III p 316)
[A poet's defect resulting from ignorance will be hidden from view by his genius, but a defect due to his want of genius will attract one's attention instantaneously. Dhv Trans p 64]

The difficulty of the poem due to the obscurity of the suggested matter of fact is recognised as a doṣa by the followers of the dhvani theory as in case of the obscurity of the suggested matter of fact in the aprastutapraśaṁsā is called a doṣa, viz., kaṣṭārthatva (Vide, SD VII 12)

The second point of Eliot is an optimistic defence of the difficulty in so far as it advocates that the difficulty of the new poetry may be lessened by a greater familiarity. It is said by the votaries of the new poetry that although the new poetry is not readily intelligible to the mass because of remote intellectual references, etc., it is hoped that the masses themselves would develop a greater range of information and better familiarity with the new diction through more and more

reading of the new poems. It appears to be very much an echo of Bhavabhūti's,

ye nāma kecidiha naḥ prathayantyavajñāṁ
jānanti te kimapi tān prati naiṣa yatnaḥ /
utpatsyate'sti mama ko'pi samānadharmā
kālo hyayaṁ niravadhir viśālā hi pṛthvī // (MM. I. 8).

But it appears to be going to much ahead of time and the general run of the men of taste may hardly appreciate an attitude like that of Bhaṭṭi who boasts that his poem is intelligible only with the help of a commentary. It may be observed here that, although the later pervert Indian tradition calls Bhaṭṭi a mahākavi [79] there is reason to believe that the dhvani theory itself was promulgated as an antidote to a pervert taste as evidenced in the Bhaṭṭikāvya. It is also significant to note that in the whole of the Dhvanyāloka there is no reference to Bhaṭṭi in any way.

John Press observes in his "Chequer'd shade" that difficulty may be due to more than one reason. It may be due also to the employment of a difficult vocabulary and syntax (CS. p. 7) and the difficulty of the Bhaṭṭikāvya, I think, may be put under this head. But happily the difficult poets themselves become in course of time critical of the obscure expression. We find that Eliot in the later part of his poetical career repented for his earlier love for an obscure expression. William Empson also has realised the undesirability of obscurity. The first word of "Mr. Eliot's Sunday Morning service." "Polyphiloprogenitive," suggests a wilful pedantry. "Among the many gifts handed on by Mr. Eliot from the Metaphysicals was a poetry involved with farfetched erudition. The fashion was a salutary reaction against contemporary mindlessness; it was pursued with something of the naive enthusiasm of the Renaissance, a love of new words, strange instances, subtle

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79. Keith. HSL. p. 117.

allusions In practice the frequent use of unattributed allusions demanding a close knowledge of even the accepted "classics" strains the reader's attention Poetry comes to depend on scholarship In *The Waste Land,* Mr Eliot did not conquer this tendency of *Poems* 1920, yet it comes near to being a great poem

I that was near your heart was removed therefrom
To lose beauty in terror, terror in inquisition,

said *Gerontion* aptly describing the poet s attitude during what may be called his second period' (TMP pp 158–159)

But in Part V of the *East Coker* (The Four Quartets) "the poet turns to his art and confesses his failure to achieve perfect expression after twenty years

'Trying to learn to use words, and every attempt
Is a wholly new start, and a different kind of failure
Because one has only learnt to get the better of words
For the thing one no longer has to say, or the way in which
One is no longer disposed to say it." (TMP p 176)

Here we may also refer to the following observation of John Press

"No poet has revelled more unashamedly in the pleasures of intellectual virtuosity than William Empson who, in a characteristically tart commentary upon his own poetry, explains why he has included so many pages of notes in *The Gathering Storm*

Partly they are meant to be like answers to a crossword puzzle, a sort of puzzle interest is part of the pleasure that you are meant to get from the verse The fashion for obscure poetry came in at about the same time as the fashion for crossword puzzles, and it seems to me that the revival of puzzle interest in poetry, an old fashioned thing, has got a bad name merely by failing to know itself and

refusing to publish the answers. (*The Gathering Storm*, 'Note on Notes', p. 55)." [80]

Empson wrote like this in *the Gathering Storm* in 1940. But by 1955 he grew more considerate to admit that the better poetry requires fewer notes, for, he says—"There is a feeling, often justified, that it is annoying when an author writes his own notes, so I shall give a note about these notes...... Of course there are qureer forces at work, to write notes at all is to risk making a fool of yourself, and the better poems tend to require fewer notes." (*Collected Poems*, p. 93).

That the dhvani theory cannot allow this craze for puzzle-making in the name of suggestion is already discussed in the second chapter in the section, "A reply to Viśvanātha." The puzzle will appear as the flaw (doṣa) named kaṣṭārthatva, referred to above.

"Some good poets believe that they owe allegience only to their Muse, and that in our present form of society any attempt as communicating with a mass audience would involve a betrayal of that allegiance. Robert Graves states this belief unequivocally in the Foreword to his *Poems*, 1938-45 :

I write poems for poets, and satires and grotesques for wits...... To write poems for other than poets is wasteful." (CS. pp. 159-160). Thus the belief that poetry is only for a cotery of initiated fellows breeds the danger of unintelligibility and unpopularity.

Ānanda also apprehended the possibility of dhvani being the property of a few intellectuals; that is why he prefers the dhvani that may appeal to a greater circle. He recognises śṛṅgāra as the best rasa on the same score. Significantly enough he not only demands that the quality of Prasāda should be present

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80. CS. p. 41. Also Vide TMP. pp. 185-186, for a similar comment on Empson's quoted words.

in all types of composition[81] but also leaves the following words of caution

"yatra pratīyamāno'rthaḥ pramliṣṭatvena bhāsate /
vācyasyāṅgatayā vāpi nāsyāsau gocaro dhvaneḥ //
(Dhv. II, 31 p 281)

(If in an instance the implied sense is such that it can be caught only with great difficulty or if it is only subordinate to the Expressed sense, in either case it will not be an instance of Suggestion) [82]

"sarveṣv eva prabhedeṣu sphuṭatvenāvabhāsanam /
yadvyaṅgyasyāṅgībhūtasya tatpūrṇam dhvanilakṣaṇam //
(Dhv II 33 p 286)

(The full definition of Suggestion in all its varieties includes clarity of manifestation and principal importance of the suggested element) [83]

But the clearity of the meaning is not something mathematically measured Moreover, the sahṛdayatva or the capacity to appreciate poetry may vary from time to time. It also remains an undeniable fact that a single critic like Ānanda cannot be expected to determine all the dhvanis [84] The final court of appeal in this regard is the circle of sahṛdayas; in other words, it is the society which would best criticise kāvya Thus the universal appeal of the Rāmāyana and the Mahābhārata makes them the greatest kāvyas Yet, what we best

81 "prasādas tu svacchatā śabdārthayoḥ," Dhv p 213, "sarveṣu ca saṃghaṭanāsu prasādākhyo guṇo vyāpī," etc Dhv p 321

82 Dhv Trans p 52

83 Dhv Trans p 54.

84 Cf. " but every effort to formulate the common element is limited by the limitations of particular men in particular places and at particular times and these limitations become manifest in the perspective of history" (The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism, pp 141–142).

derive from Ānandavardhana is the dhvani theory in principle and that indeed embodies a pretty good criterion for literary criticism and instructs how by delineating the basic human emotions like love and sorrow the poetry of sustained appeal may be created. We may observe here that while in the matter of the diction the new poetry claims the designation as dhvani, it lacks mostly—and surely with good many exceptions—in a sincere and passionate appraisal of the human sentiments. In other words, it appeals more to the intellect than to the heart. In the beginning of this work I proposed to use the word kāvya indiscriminately for all the varieties of composition such as poetry, drama, prose fiction and prose short stories. There can be no gainsaying of the fact that of the varieties of literature that I have named above poetry is the *least popular* type to day. In comparison to fiction and short stories poetry is less sold. The reason is not far to seek. The fiction or the short story deals with human characters and their actions and delineate their sentiments under described circumstances. "We are human beings, and in what are we more interested than in human action and human attitudes?"—says Eliot (ATSE, p. 67). With the description of human characters and their attitudes the fiction or the short story also comes out with all the aesthetic appeal of a drama. The poetry which can evoke a sentiment in a similar manner is the dramatic poetry and such a poetry is bound to be popular. But if with all the wealth of symbolism and imagery the poetry does not do more than conveying a matter of fact (vastu dhvani) in the form of an ideal or a metaphysical theory, it is bound to lack in aesthetic appeal. We have also to draw a line of demarcation between the poem which informs us about the state of mind of the poet and one which actually evokes a sentiment in our mind (Vide ATSE, p. 80 for a commendable attempt at distinguishing between dramatic and reflective poetry). Communication of lofty ideas may win the appreciation as an intelligent or a valuable work but in order to win

the heart the poem must evoke some sentiment in the heart of the reader. Thus when it is not shorn of the poet's sympathy for the human sentiments even the difficult but suggestive new poetry triumphs

APPENDIX

An extract from a Paper entitled "Some Observations on the Theory of Sphoṭa," Read in the XXVI *International Congress of Orientalists in New Delhi in January 1964 by the same Author*

So far we have seen how the theory of Sphoṭa or One undivided Real Word is recognised and respected by the works on grammar, religion and philosophy alike. It is curious to note that it invaded the field of poetics also where it enjoys a very honourable recognition. Ānandavardhana designates the suggestive type of kāvya as Dhvani only on the analogy of the audible sounds which are called Dhvani by the grammarians and which also suggest the Real Word, Sphoṭa. The audible syllables or letters (śrūyamāṇavarṇas) are called śabda in an ordinary sense. But with reference to the Real Śabda they are called Dhvani. Compare :

pratyayairanupākhyeyairgrahaṇānuguṇaistathā
dhvaniprakāśite śabde svarūpamavadhāryate. (VKPD. I. 83
That the relation between the audible syllables (nādas) and Sphoṭa is that of the suggestor and the suggested is explicit from the VKPD. I. 97. :

'grahaṇagrāhyayoḥ siddhā niyatā yogyatā yathā
vyaṅgyavyañjakabhāvena tathaiva sphoṭanādayoḥ.

Ānandavardhana observes that the suggestive poetry also possesses suggestivity (vyañjakatva) and hence the designation Dhvani is applied by the rhetorician also to the suggestive poetry. Compare : prathame hi vidvāṁso vaiyākaraṇāḥ te ca śrūyamāṇeṣu varṇeṣu dhvaniriti vyavaharanti tathaivānyaiḥ... kāvyamiti vyapadeśyo vyañjakatvasāmyād dhvanirityuktaḥ (Dhv. pp. 132–135).

Of the three types of suggested content viz. vastu (matter of fact), alaṁkāra (figure of speech) and rasādi (sentiments),

the first two may also be expressly stated. But the third variety, namely, sentiment, can never be expressly stated. It must always be suggested. Ruyyaka, commenting on the Vyaktiviveka, very rightly observes that we must recognise the vyañjanā function, as a rule, for arriving at the rasādi variety of the meaning of poetry. *And once we recognise vyañjanā*, for having rasādi, under compulsion, there is no harm in enlarging its scope also to vastu and alaṁkāra, which also casually happen to be different from the express sense and the secondary sense. Compare :

"iha śabdasyābhidhālakṣaṇābhedena dvividho vyāpāraś-cirantanairabhyupagataḥ. na ca tṛtīyakakṣānikṣipte'rthe pra-galbhate iti tatra vyāpārāntaramabhyupagatam. rasādau ca tattulyakakṣe vyañjanamupapāditamitīhāpi tadeva samāśrayitum yuktam" (VVV. I. p. 59).

Now we may observe that the position of the suggestive poetry is analogous to the position of śrūyamānavarnas also because of the fact that the position of rasa is analogous to that of Sphoṭa Sphoṭa is the Śabdabrahman or the Supreme Self itself. Then again the realisation of rasa also means the realisation of the *Supreme Self; for, rasa is the Supreme Self* as propounded by Jagannātha on the strength of the expression "raso vai saḥ" of the Taittirīyopaniṣad (II. 7). Because of the Real Word being of the nature of Brahman, a knowledge of the carrect words leads to emancipation. Cf. "iyaṁ sā mokṣamānānāmajihmā rājapaddhatiḥ" (VKPD. I. 16). This spiritual service of grammar is very admirably put forth by Mādhava in his Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha. But it must be noted that both in case of *the realisation of Sphoṭa and the realisa-*tion of rasa, which are nothing other than the Parabrahman, we cannot have final emancipation instantaneously. That is how aesthetic consciousness (rasāsvāda) and the realisation of Sphoṭa differ from the mystical consciousness (brahmāsvāda) on the one hand and from the mystical experience of the Parāvāk on the other. Possibly this is why Abhinava does not

identify rasāsvāda with brahmāsvāda but simply says that rasāsvāda is analogous to brahmāsvāda (i.e., brahmāsvāda-sahodara). This point is clearly observed by Dr. K. C. Pandey in the words : "Aesthetic experience therefore according to Abhinavagupta, in its final stage, belongs to the lavel of vyatireka turīyātīta in which all objectivity merges in the subconscious and the subject the self shines in its Ānanda aspect (I. Aest. p. 130) [Vide, *Supra*, p. 176].

GENERAL INDEX

B

T


क्रमांक–
पुस्तकालय

CORRIGENDA

Page	Line	Incorrect	Correct
1	15	at par	on a par
5	8	a	an
6	27	at par	on a par
7	1	Nāṭyaśāstrā	Nāṭyaśāstra
10	10	śṛangāra	śṛngāra
13	19	*warrented*	*warranted*
„	35	o	to
15	27	Vāman	Vāmana
16	30	Ānand's	Ānanda's
19	26	samgrah–	samgraha–
50	1	vakrakti	vakrokti
61	8	basie	basic
63	1	Vivhāva	Vibhāva
64	13	Abhiava	Abhinava
82	8	Śrūyamavarnas	Śrūyamānavarnas
103	1	an a par	on a par
105	1	Thue	Thus
112	30	ubhavaśaktyud bhava	ubhayaśaktyud- bhava
113	27	varse	verse
119	8	*in*	*is*
132	31	my	may
149	3	relegated	relegate
157	6	anubhāvas thirty three	vyabhicāribhāvas thirtythree
158	16	in stead	instead
160	f n 4	samkāra	samskāra
194	23	lingitva	lingatva
215	2	Daśrūpaka	Daśarūpaka
224	11	abhidā lakṣanā	abhidhā, lakṣanā
265	f n 3	wc	we